Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
SO we agree that deployments should be by unit... but for how long and what size units (by brigade or by battalion)?
Combat wise, I'd say Bns -- but the personnel and training systems and organizations would have to be re-tooled to support that. Right now we're really structured and organized to do it by Division but have actually gone to a by-Brigade model, creating in effect a hybrid -- and not totally satisfactory -- situation.
Then do we agree that the formation/unit's stateside base provides the replacements?
I don't think it must the unit's home station; a central replacement system works well enough.
Some interesting stuff there.
It is that and brings to mind a thought. As a result of that WW II experience and the concomitant major combat induced personnel turnover and the psychiatric casualty effect we also had a one year individual tour effort in Korea. However, there were four significant differences. In my order of importance they were:

1. In Korea, most of the Officers above Lieutenant (and even many of them) and almost all NCOs above Sergeant had WW II experience and most also engaged in constant mentoring and training of subordinates. That included newly arriving units and most individual replacements through the end of the war. Not only was the experience factor lacking in Viet Nam, there was all too often a strange drop in mentoring and in unit training...

2 There was no six-month rotation of Officers to 'broadening assignments.'

3. There was no Infusion program. This program, so far as I know, was a Viet Nam era aberration that was designed to place 'experienced ' soldiers, NCOs and Officers in newly arriving units during the 1966-67 buildup of forces. It entailed taking some all rank persons in varying percentages from units in country and assigning them to newly arrived units to provide a leavening of experience and to insure the entire unit did not rotate at tour end as a body. At the same time, taking some newly arriving units and assigning them to units already in-country (assuring that the new guys would be labeled as FNG at best...). Unfortunately, there was IMO little coherence to who came and / or went where; no 'sister' or affiliated unit -- it was done on an individual basis and the swaps were NOT always rank / job for same rank / job. It was not a well designed plan and it was also poorly implemented in an unduly bureaucratic mode. As you can envision, it created major havoc in units. I believe that program did far more damage than the six month rotation of Officers. It also I think was the most significant reason for the lack of mentoring / in unit training. What it obviously did was destroy unit cohesion at a critical time and the knock on effects continued after the build up period. ...

4. The Korean 'experience' of rotation, replacement and combat performance essentially lasted from July 1950 through July 1953, thus there were effectively only three 'rotations' (though there were actually more due to far higher early casualties as compared to other, later wars). Further, by July 1951 an effective stalemate existed and the war of movement ceased to be replaced by the tedium but still dangerous though relatively stabilized trench warfare effort -- two very different wars in one, In any event, the short span insured the deleterious effects of time did not evince themselves as they did in Viet Nam. Whether the system would have continued to work reasonably well cannot be known. My guess is it would have been at least slightly superior to that of Viet Nam due to the first three reasons above.

So we did learn a little and have since wisely opted for unit rotations.

To return to your earlier query on tour length, I'd personally opt for indefinite and aim for 18-36 months, type and intensity of combat defined. However, I doubt most democratic legislatures would support that and I think a year is a marginally acceptable compromise -- with the caveat that it be done a whole lot smarter than we did it in Afghanistan and Iraq. Return to the same area of operations should have been the norm but it was deliberately avoided to prove the 'modular' concept would work -- and for other obscure reasons (like too much work for Planners who also rotated at year or so intervals and thus had no memory of what came before...)

I also believe that type of combat makes a major difference in how units are rotated and employed. In a COIN / FID effort, unit stability and continuity are important, casualties will be generally lower and leaving the unit in place and rotating people (in line with some of your suggestions) can be done -- if the legislatures do not interfere too badly. In higher intensity conflict OTOH, a major war of movement against a peer, that continuity is not necessary and the frequent rotation of units in and out of combat can lessen the psychiatric casualty problem; replacements can be received, training undertaken and rest obtained.
As to the last quote I do realise that casualty rates as mentioned are no longer the norm so that argument probably falls away.
Yes but casualty rates are very much a function of each individual war and the current "norm" can be quickly replaced by one that approaches Viet Nam -- or Korea, even WW II.

No easy answers...