Before we look at the relationship between combat power, conflict resolution, and the US economy, I want to look at each service separately; first land power, then air power, and then sea power.



This graph compares the Army's budget with the number of its uniformed and civilian personnel. I have not been able to find numbers for the Army's vehicle inventory as I have for both the Air Force and Navy, so I admit this picture as of now is incomplete. However, I would like to point out that the 2001 sharp increase in funding did not produce a notable increase in personnel. This is because the majority of new spending was operational expenses. This should be compared to the number of soldiers that actually served in combat zones by year between 2001 and 2009 instead of overall end-strength. Since only a small percentage of personnel were actually ever in theater at any one time, it calls into question the sustainability of the force in prolonged conflict. The Army's budget more than doubled to maintain a tiny fraction of its forces in the field.

What does this imply in regards to US ability to engage and defeat the proliferating, disparate global threats identified by both Dempsey and Clapper?