Combat Power, Conflict Resolution, and US Economy

[Dayuhan]

So, I ask, what is the future of US military readiness and security given that the JCC believes we live in an unprecedented dangerous world? My questions are:

Agree with Ken, this is way overstated. Exactly what are these "unprecedented" dangers?

Te extent to which military spending is proportional to our ability to avert or preempt danger would depend on the nature of the probable threats. A large inventory of ships or aircraft is not going to do much to control the threat of a terrorist group with WMD.

- Of the terminated conflicts, is there a relationship between US combat power and definitive and favorable terminations?

I'd think "favorable terminations" have more to do with wise selection of goals than with the amount of military power available. More military power would not have turned Afghanistan into a democracy; that was never a reasonable goal to begin with. Sometimes what you choose to do with what you've got has more to do with success than what you've got.

[AmericanPride]

I wouldn't put too much stock in that "unprecedented dangerous world." It's been far worse several times. !942 was not a good year. Even 1962 was fearful to many. There have been others in the last 70 years or so. The system requires danger or an approximation thereof to keep the budget up to the maximum possible extent. DoD and the JCS are not above hyping the 'threat' to do that. Way the game is played in Washington...

I agree in principle, but I also must finding a starting point in measuring security threats, and the testimony of the highest ranking military officer and the highest ranking intelligence official seems like a good place to start. Later on, I will look more specifically into the claim of threat proliferation to test whether or not America's combat power is in decline from that perspective. Right now, I am focusing on combat power and military expenditures.

There's a direct relationship between tax revenue and military expenditures. Precisely what that relationship happens to be varies from time to time depending on Administration and perceived threat levels. There's an indirect relationship between wealth concentration and the other economic factors but it also can vary considerably over time due to many things. The relationship between any of those -- including military expenditures -- and combat power is tenuous and infinitely variable.

I am withholding my opinion on this subject until I lay out the data. It would seem, at least superficially, that there is a direct relationship between tax revenue and military expenditures, but the last ten years of a simultaneous increase in military expenditures and decrease in tax revenues calls into question the nature of that relationship.

That said, Of the Troops has a point. Ship, Aircraft, all Equipment -- and soldier -- capability (not performance allowed...) today is far greater than was the case in 1973 so straight line comparisons can be very misleading. To use one factor I've mentioned elsewhere, the average infantryman in Viet Nam walked around with about $2,500 (inflation adjusted) worth of gear on his body; his counterpart today has about ten times that and near concomitant capability.

This is a problem of space, which the DoD/NATO definition of combat power does not acknowledge. Whatever the firepower capability of a soldier, aircraft, or warship, it can only be applied in one geographic space at any one time; so, the number of soldiers, etc must be compared to the number of geographically disparate threats. So how we measure relative combat power between, say, the 1973 aircraft and the 2012 aircraft is to find their ratio of cost-per-unit to how many units are active. The F-35 costs between 197 and 237 million dollars. One of the aircraft it will replace is the F-16, which cost 14 - 18 million dollars per unit. If we assume that the amount of combat power that a dollar can buy is fixed, then in order for the F-35 to be "worth it", it must provide at least 1,316% more combat power than the F-16. By anyone's definition of combat power, does it? The US has 2,230 F-16s, 335 A-10s, and 409 F/A-18s (the other two aircraft the F-35 will replace), for a total of 2,974 aircraft. The official plan is to buy around 2,400 aircraft. If we assume that to be the case (even though procurement has been both delayed and reduced because of cost of growth), and use the DoD/NATO definition of combat power, then even though the US intends to buy 20% less aircraft than current inventory, for now it is purchasing an equal or greater amount of combat power. For the US to replace F-16 combat power 1:1 (assuming the F-35 can provide 1,316% more combat power), the US must purchase at least 1,600 new F-35s. These are numbers that I will look at in the near future.

Well, the defense numbers in your chart include the costs of actually fighting wars. Fighting a war does tend to use up combat power and, at the same time, cost a lot of money. You'll notice there is an uptick in 1991 which was the First Gulf War and another in 1999 for Kosovo, then it exploded after 9/11. Therefore I don't think it shows a death-spiral but the financial reality of fighting two large land wars in Asia. Peacetime and wartime defense costs are apples and oranges IMO.

Operational expenses and the base budget are calculated separately, so we can see clearly in the documentation that the increase in spending is related to the cost of maintaining the forces in the field after they have already been trained and equipped. Yes, war is expensive, and for the US Army at least (I have not looked at USAF and USN numbers yet), it is become more expensive to actually use combat power. The data so far strongly suggests that the cost to maintain forces in the field has far outpaced military appropriations and US economic capacity to finance it. This means, if trends continue, the amount of combat power that the US can deploy or the amount of time such forces can be sustained will diminish. This is a major economic and security problem if true.

Yes, it's call GDP. The more you have, the more military you can afford.

This is true if we assume that the growth in cost-per-unit is lower than than the growth in US GDP. If that assumption is false, then with every budget cycle, the US will actually be purchasing less combat power per dollar.

Exactly what are these "unprecedented" dangers?

Read the document.

Te extent to which military spending is proportional to our ability to avert or preempt danger would depend on the nature of the probable threats. A large inventory of ships or aircraft is not going to do much to control the threat of a terrorist group with WMD.

This is not necessarily true. How many soldiers, aircraft, and ships has the US used in combating Al-Qaeda and the Taliban? There are X amount of soldiers on the ground, Y amount of aircraft providing tactical, logistical, intelligence, etc support, and Z amount of ships moving to and fro (at times with escort) moving supplies, combat aircraft, etc. Then there are overhead assets that enable communication, etc, with their operators also. Whether or not all of this is necessary for defeating a terrorist group (with or without WMD) is besides the point; it can and is being used for that purpose. Your objection is one of military effectiveness, which will be looked at when I investigate conflict resolution.

[Ken White]

I agree in principle, but I also must finding a starting point in measuring security threats, and the testimony of the highest ranking military officer and the highest ranking intelligence official seems like a good place to start.

Mmm. Be careful. My observation over many years is that is a flawed assumption. My two pet, if minor, examples of the error of that approach are the testimonies before Congress of then General Louis Wagner as CG AMC that the Sergeant York DivAD was the finest air defense weapon in the world (shortly before it shot up a Latrine on the Range at Fort Bliss at its Press introduction (and shortly before it was cancelled)... ) and then General Robert RisCassi, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army that the Dragon (LINK)was the greatest anti tank missile in the world just before we canned it and started buying Javs.

Omitted from the Wiki article is the disconcerting tendency of some Dragons to go a few feet out of the launcher and plop on the ground -- and the fact that the gunner had to be unusually well trained and experience in firing the missile to obtain an even marginal hit.

Generals, like all humans, have agendas so be careful...

Right now, I am focusing on combat power and military expenditures.

You're probably aware that there are numerous hookers in the defense budget and several blind alleys. There's also a lot of Congressional vote buying concealed therein...

It would seem, at least superficially, that there is a direct relationship between tax revenue and military expenditures, but the last ten years of a simultaneous increase in military expenditures and decrease in tax revenues calls into question the nature of that relationship.

True and you'll also find other incongruous periods -- the overall trend for a multi decade period, five or more, will I believe give you more accurate data.

The F-35 costs between 197 and 237 million dollars. One of the aircraft it will replace is the F-16, which cost 14 - 18 million dollars per unit.

Check the new costs for the F-16 when it appeared in the 1970s and adjust for inflation. Using only current publicly available prices can badly skew your data.

If we assume that the amount of combat power that a dollar can buy is fixed, then in order for the F-35 to be "worth it", it must provide at least 1,316% more combat power than the F-16. By anyone's definition of combat power, does it?

I think that is a bad assumption; that the costs must be very accurately assessed and compared; and that the mechanically derived variance factor all must be approached with great caution. Combat power is a function of both capability and of application not only of the equipment but of its operators and support systems. How much, if any, better trained are today's pilots and how much more capable are all the mission systems? A Sidewinder is a Sidewinder but the AIM-9X is a vastly different creature than an AIM-9B. Mission planning capability? Sortie generation? Maintenance man hours versus flight hours? Sensors? How much is the 'Stealth' feature of the F-35 worth...

Operational expenses and the base budget are calculated separately, so we can see clearly in the documentation that the increase in spending is related to the cost of maintaining the forces in the field after they have already been trained and equipped.

As I'm sure you're aware, many items in the O&M budgets of all the services are spent on things other than supporting elements deployed or in the field -- much of it goes to maintain the massive (and unduly expensive...) garrison and base operation in CONUS. Much also is spent on Exercises and add-on training, on TDY and travel to esoteric meeting in CONUS and around the world. Lot of fluff in there...

The data so far strongly suggests that the cost to maintain forces in the field has far outpaced military appropriations and US economic capacity to finance it. This means, if trends continue, the amount of combat power that the US can deploy or the amount of time such forces can be sustained will diminish. This is a major economic and security problem if true.

I suspect you will discover that (a) it is quite true and (b) little is being done about it.

[AmericanPride]

OK, so now let's look at air power.

USAF Budget, Inventory, and End-Strength


This trend should come as no surprise to anyone. However, as I mentioned in my post with Ken, at least in regards to the F-35 replacement of the F-16, the US is actually purchasing per dollar less combat power with each new procurement cycle. If this is true, we will continue to see the number of tactical fighters decline at an increasingly higher rate compared to appropriations in the budget.

[AmericanPride]

Generals, like all humans, have agendas so be careful...

I agree. As I stated, I will be looking at conflict resolution after looking at combat power.

I think that is a bad assumption; that the costs must be very accurately assessed and compared; and that the mechanically derived variance factor all must be approached with great caution. Combat power is a function of both capability and of application not only of the equipment but of its operators and support systems. How much, if any, better trained are today's pilots and how much more capable are all the mission systems? A Sidewinder is a Sidewinder but the AIM-9X is a vastly different creature than an AIM-9B. Mission planning capability? Sortie generation? Maintenance man hours versus flight hours? Sensors? How much is the 'Stealth' feature of the F-35 worth...

It doesn't matter how we calculate or determine "combat power", or what other factors we include under its umbrella, as long as we apply both to the F-16 and the F-35 (or any other compared platforms). If all these factors are the same, but one aircraft costs X amount more than another aircraft, then in order to be cost effective that aircraft must also see a proportional increase in its combat power. I very much doubt that the F-35 has two or three times more combat power than the F-16, much less 11 times. As a side note, if we continue to see a decline in aircraft numbers combined with greater maintenance requirements and higher operational costs, then I suspect at some point we will also see a decline in flight hours. This could be off-set temporarily by increased simulator time and larger outlays for operations, but neither are sustainable to maintain combat power.

As I'm sure you're aware, many items in the O&M budgets of all the services are spent on things other than supporting elements deployed or in the field -- much of it goes to maintain the massive (and unduly expensive...) garrison and base operation in CONUS. Much also is spent on Exercises and add-on training, on TDY and travel to esoteric meeting in CONUS and around the world. Lot of fluff in there...

This budget document (slide 5) illustrates that the majority of new funding came from the operational budget, starting in 2002. Whether or not they used it for expenses elsewhere doesn't matter, since that money paid for overseas combat expenses in totality.

[Entropy]

AmericanPride,

You really need to define "Combat Power." You seem to be using the term in multiple way and in multiple contexts.

[Entropy]

It doesn't matter how we calculate or determine "combat power", or what other factors we include under its umbrella, as long as we apply both to the F-16 and the F-35 (or any other compared platforms). If all these factors are the same, but one aircraft costs X amount more than another aircraft, then in order to be cost effective that aircraft must also see a proportional increase in its combat power.

The problem is, all those factors are not the same. Comparing numbers of platforms is going to lead to bad analysis. Comparing platforms in a vacuum also leads to bad analysis. Just look at the various debates over the years as to what is better - The F-16 or the Mig-29? The answer is, it depends.

Platforms function as parts of a system where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts (which is the essence of combined arms). Just to give a quick example, the fact that we have AEW aircraft makes our air-to-air fighters much more effective than they otherwise would be.

As far as the F-35 goes, I think it's way too expensive. As I noted a couple years ago, it's too big to fail at this point.

[AmericanPride]

You really need to define "Combat Power." You seem to be using the term in multiple way and in multiple contexts.

There are three modes of analysis occurring simultaneously. First, there is the absolute measurement of combat power (as defined by DoD/NATO) of a platform's capabilities; this is more accurately described as "combat capability" for our purposes. The second mode of analysis is based on the first and is really just relative combat capability between different platforms of the same class. Lastly, there is relative combat power, which I described in my response to OTT, as a comparison between the US and its adversaries and threats. This is probably best described as "combat capacity"; the potential combat capability that can be leveraged by the US. Hopefully that clears it up some.

The problem is, all those factors are not the same. Comparing numbers of platforms is going to lead to bad analysis. Comparing platforms in a vacuum also leads to bad analysis. Just look at the various debates over the years as to what is better - The F-16 or the Mig-29? The answer is, it depends.

I agree, which is why I selected the cost-per-unit as the base measurement. I am certain that the F-35A, for example, has greater absolute combat capability than the F-16. But when we're discussing whether or not the US is actually purchasing more combat capacity when replacing the F-16 with the F-35A, we also must factor in how many platforms are being purchased. So, if the ratio of cost-per-unit:total inventory is different between the platforms, not only do we know that the aircraft have different combat capabilities, but that the US is also purchasing a different level of combat capacity. In the final tally, the US is purchasing an aircraft with greater combat capability but is simultaneously reducing its own combat capacity because it cannot procure as the necessary aircraft to replace the F-16's combat capability one-for-one. For this reason, I agree with you that the F-35 is too expensive. And I suspect that you are also right about it being too big to fail.

Before continuing on to seapower, I am going to look out USAF outlays; so hopefully that information will help guide our conversation some more.

[AmericanPride]

USAF Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, and Procurement Outlays


Here are some key events in USAF procurement:

1976: F-1t enters operational service
1976: A-10 enters operational service
1980: F-16 enters operational service
1983: F-117 enters operational service
1986: B-1 enters operational service
1993: C-17 enters operational service
1997: B-2 enters operational service
2008: F-117 retired from service

[Ken White]

If all these factors are the same, but one aircraft costs X amount more than another aircraft, then in order to be cost effective that aircraft must also see a proportional increase in its combat power.

I doubt many blue suiters would agree. I'm a retired and retarded no suit wearer and I sure don''t. Your problem in that statement is the "if"...

Whether or not they used it for expenses elsewhere doesn't matter, since that money paid for overseas combat expenses in totality.

That implies that you do not believe money spent elsewhere has any or much application to combat power...

I advised caution on your assumptions. This response adds to my belief that your study will likely not do what you wish it to do. Howsomeever, the best of Irish luck to ye...

[Dayuhan]

Read the document.

I did. I see nothing providing real support to the assertion of unprecedented danger.

I'm not sure anyone's speeches, and in particular speeches made by those representing institutions whose budget allocations depend on the perceptions of danger, are a good place to start assessing levels of threat.

This is not necessarily true. How many soldiers, aircraft, and ships has the US used in combating Al-Qaeda and the Taliban? There are X amount of soldiers on the ground, Y amount of aircraft providing tactical, logistical, intelligence, etc support, and Z amount of ships moving to and fro (at times with escort) moving supplies, combat aircraft, etc. Then there are overhead assets that enable communication, etc, with their operators also. Whether or not all of this is necessary for defeating a terrorist group (with or without WMD) is besides the point; it can and is being used for that purpose. Your objection is one of military effectiveness, which will be looked at when I investigate conflict resolution.

To what extent are these assets being used top combat AQ - the terrorist group in the picture - and to what extent are they being used to try to establish a government in Afghanistan that will be acceptable to the US? These are two entirely different goals.

If we assume that in order to avert these "unprecedented dangers" we need to run around deposing governments and installing new ones, then we might be pardoned for assuming that large expensive conventional forces are needed for the task. Those assumptions seems to me highly questionable. Again, the key to achieving goals is not only the amount of force you can apply, but the goals you select and the means you choose to try to achieve them. If we can't succeed in transforming Afghanistan into a Western-style liberal democracy it won't be because we couldn't apply enough force, it will be because we selected a goal we can't achieve and tried to pursue it by inappropriate means. If your hammer won't drive a screw, you don't need a bigger hammer.

The question remains: what exactly are the threats that produce these "unprecedented dangers", and what exactly is needed to combat these threats? If we're talking about the threat of non-state actors, transnational criminals, terror groups, etc, I see no rational point in assessing our capacity by the number of ships and aircraft we can deploy. The number of F-35s or F-22s or carriers we buy may be proportional to our economic means, but I'm not convinced that it has any great impact on our capacity to counter these threats.

Military spending in general is not only related to GDP and government revenue, but also to perceived levels of threat and the nature of perceived threats. If we're at war or faced with imminent threat, we're willing to spend a higher percentage of GDP on the military. If the perceived threat appears to be from conventional force, we'll be willing to spend more on conventional force. The threat of WMD-armed terrorists makes a poor justification for spending more on F-22s, for obvious reasons.

[AmericanPride]

I did. I see nothing providing real support to the assertion of unprecedented danger.

Dempsey did not claim any new emergent threat existed. He claims that the "unprecedented danger" is the simultaneous diffusion of threats horizontally and the proliferation of threat capabilities vertically. The testimony of DNI Clapper agrees with Dempsey's assertion.

I'm not sure anyone's speeches, and in particular speeches made by those representing institutions whose budget allocations depend on the perceptions of danger, are a good place to start assessing levels of threat.

This criticism would be more relevant and substantial if it also recommended a better metric.

The number of F-35s or F-22s or carriers we buy may be proportional to our economic means, but I'm not convinced that it has any great impact on our capacity to counter these threats.

As I've stated before, I will look at conflict resolution after looking at economic capacity and military expenditures. The information I have gathered so far indicates that US military power is shrinking as is US capacity to support said military power. Though GDP growth outpaces defense appropriations growth, US purchasing power relative combat power is reducing. In order to maintain the same level of combat power over time, the US must spend an increasing amount of dollars. Without reform, we will either reduce our military capacity or catch up and surpass GDP growth with military expenditures (so far, my assessment is that we are reducing military power in order to (1) profit private defense interests and (2) protect other government programs from defense appropriations). Regardless of what threats we face and the most effective means in defeating them, this is the real problem.

EDIT: Further, this problem exists before the costs incurred by the GWoT, which highlights the inefficiencies of the defense establishment. IMO, the GWoT should be a shot over the bow to the defense establishment and American public about the true costs of maintaining the status quo. In the US case, the armed forces have the double cost of maintaining, and then the operational costs of actually using it, which happen to exceed the costs of maintaining, even though we employed only a tiny fraction of combat power at any one time. This is the primary reason why we have abandoned the "two simultaneous major theater wars" idea; we can't afford the costs of maintaining our current force at levels necessary to fight them, and the current force levels cannot sustain two major regional wars. Activating the reserves is not a solution (even though that's historically the US strategy) because that only adds to the final cost. That's a major security dilemma which we avoided by simply abandoning the policy. I'm not confident that the Air-Sea Battle concept will provide any outlet for this problem if the failure of the "revolution of military affairs" (FCS, for example) is any indication.

[Dayuhan]

Dempsey did not claim any new emergent threat existed. He claims that the "unprecedented danger" is the simultaneous diffusion of threats horizontally and the proliferation of threat capabilities vertically. The testimony of DNI Clapper agrees with Dempsey's assertion.

"The simultaneous diffusion of threats horizontally and the proliferation of threat capabilities vertically" seems almost intentionally vague.

This criticism would be more relevant and substantial if it also recommended a better metric.

What about simply describing and assessing the specific perceived threats... who exactly are we afraid of, and what exactly are we afraid they will do? Would any such process support a claim that we live in a period of "unprecedented danger"?

The information I have gathered so far indicates that US military power is shrinking as is US capacity to support said military power. Though GDP growth outpaces defense appropriations growth, US purchasing power relative combat power is reducing.

Do we need to look at the military power we have relative to what we had at any time in the past, or at what we have relative to what we need to deal with today's perceived threats and the threats that are expected to emerge? Maybe we no longer have the power to stop Soviet tanks from rolling through the Fulda Gap, but is that a power we still need?

The challenge is not necessarily to maintain the same level and type of military power, but to maintain a level and type of military power suited to realistic assessments of the threat environment that we face. I expect that trying to quantify that and illustrate it with charts would be a frustrating process, but luckily I don't need to do it!

[Fuchs]

IIRC inflation is being measured by assuming that predecessor and successor are the same thing. Technological progress is a different thing, measured differently. Comparing both properly is usually beyond the capabilities of the methods known to mankind so far.

The only real military #1 status challenge is the PRC (and so far only regionally). This challenge is founded on industrial capabilities; the production during the last years prior to war can easily be much more important than legacy equipment. Think of China as an equivalent of the '1933' Soviet Union. Ships, aircraft, tanks and even guns produced during the 1920's were largely irrelevant by '41.

Thus I'd compare

* economical sustainability of the economy (excluding ecological and resource sustainability)
* industrial capacity that's suitable for a war industry
* dependence on unsecured resource imports
* secured finished product or resource export capacity, currency and gold reserves, secured military goods import capacity (ability to import arms)
* qualified personnel base beyond that (mechanical and electrical engineers mostly)
* size and quality of the officer corps
* size and quality of the senior noncommissioned officer corps
* quantity of able-bodied personnel with basic (para)military training age group about 18-30 yrs old
* political stability (ability to sustain war; remember Austria-Hungary and Russia in WW1)
* quantity of able-bodied personnel without basic (para)military training about 18-30 yrs old
* allied power of the same sorts

[AmericanPride]

The only real military #1 status challenge is the PRC (and so far only regionally). This challenge is founded on industrial capabilities; the production during the last years prior to war can easily be much more important than legacy equipment. Think of China as an equivalent of the '1933' Soviet Union. Ships, aircraft, tanks and even guns produced during the 1920's were largely irrelevant by '41.

I appreciate your analysis and I would argue that long-term security trends are currently in favor of PRC, not the US. While I am interested in your proposed metrics, I don't think there is much in the way of disagreement about current conditions. My primary interest is investigating if structural problems in the US economy is having a detrimental impact on US military power. I think the data so far illustrates that military power is declining; first, in a reduction of military capacity, and second, in a reduction of purchasing power of military capacity. My question is if this trend is at all related to the downward structural trends in the US economy?

"The simultaneous diffusion of threats horizontally and the proliferation of threat capabilities vertically" seems almost intentionally vague.

What about simply describing and assessing the specific perceived threats... who exactly are we afraid of, and what exactly are we afraid they will do? Would any such process support a claim that we live in a period of "unprecedented danger"?

Do we need to look at the military power we have relative to what we had at any time in the past, or at what we have relative to what we need to deal with today's perceived threats and the threats that are expected to emerge? Maybe we no longer have the power to stop Soviet tanks from rolling through the Fulda Gap, but is that a power we still need?

As I stated before, I am first looking at the economy and military capacity. Conflict resolution will be later. In the meantime, I recommend reading the Congressional testimony of DNI Clapper that I cited earlier if you are interested in a review of current and emerging threats. So far, the data suggests that independent of which threats exist, US military capacity now is less than in 1973, and the purchasing power for military capacity is also reduced. Again, this is the real security problem.

A far more apt comparison would of the the F-16IN recently offered to India (but beat out thus far by the Dassault Rafale). That variant of the F-16 is perhaps the most capable and it still won't quite match the F-35 in many respects. Flyaway costs run about $111M for the F-16IN versus $197M for the F35A. That's a factor of only 1:1.7 -- call it two times more cost and then ask the question on combat capability...

The US does not operate the F-16IN so it is not useful in measuring US combat power. But I would like to note that this is an excellent example of inflating prices far along in the platform's history. William Hartung's book provides an excellent overview of Lockheed Martin's practices in this regard; and I think it's a fair representation of the acquisition process as a whole.