Combat Power, Conflict Resolution, and US Economy

[AmericanPride]

USAF Maintenance and Procurement Outlays, and Combat Inventory


Now, just a quick note, the outlay figures are different from the last graph because in this one I am using the total obligation authority (TOA), which contains all budget authority (the numbers used in the previous graph), and authorized credits and transfers from other accounts. I think this provides a more accurate picture of USAF sustainability (the ratio between number of aircraft and costs). The inventory is shrinking while its sustainability cost is increasing. I suspect that this will become more profound when the F-35 enters service. In this aircraft's particular case, the USAF intends to purchase between 1,000 and 1,300 aircraft, well below the 1,600 platforms necessary to not diminish America's air power. And, already, the procurement process is facing cost overruns, delays in acquisition, and diminishing orders, which will only push the outlays and inventory size further apart.

At what point does this trend become a national security risk? What is the future of air power threats (not only peer competitors, but also the development and proliferation of air defense systems)? How long can the USAF (and the US economy) sustain a prolonged conflict with intense air power competitiveness?

[Fuchs]

I'll never get why Americans are so much focused on national military power while being allied or befriended with the majority of foreign military power.


Well, if you really want to look at the economical underpinnings of U.S. military power, look first at the U.S. shipbuilding industry. It's going to be a tough search for a needle in a haystack.

The U.S. produces
* few overpriced warships, none of them are competitive export produces
* Great Lakes ships that will never see an ocean
* leisure yachts
* a couple oil rig servicing boats and ships
* not much else

Its shipbuilding industry is rated lower than the one of such great historical naval power as Poland or Croatia. In fact, almost all (about 80%) of global shipbuilding is concentrated in East Asia.
Don't bring up the supposed special skills of military shipyards versus civilian ones; getting cables wrong, do poor welding, deliver late and over priced are not desirable special skills. Besides; 20 semi-mil spec hulls beat one mil spec hull.


edit: I may have been too subtle.

Yes, it's call GDP. The more you have, the more military you can afford.

A look at the GDP is useless in this topic. What counts are
* economic sustainability (at the very least balanced trade and an appropriate net capital investment; the U.S. has neither)
as the background of military spending
* the size and composition of the share of the economy that can convert to a wartime economy
(electronics, machine building, chemicals, metal industries, resource production, automotive industries, shipbuilding, aerospace industries)

The GDP includes -especially in partially de-industrialised countries such as the U.S., France or the UK- a far too great share of irrelevant economic output. You're not going to win a war with the economic output of investment bankers, car washers, lawyers, fast food servants, mobile phone services, website designers or coiffeurs.

[AmericanPride]

USN Strength and Budget


Here is a quick look at USN strength. I think the glance at the USA, USAF, and USN trends suggests that the post-Cold War cuts did in fact significantly hollow out America's military power. Problems in cost growth, combined with the start of the GWoT, has had an upward pressure on the budget without producing any notable increase in military power. In other words, over time the US is purchasing less military power per dollar. Additionally, the capacity for the US to actually sustain its military forces in combat operations is also shrinking.

I don't think we need to go into detail of the decline of the US manufacturing sector, since this is probably generally accepted. Given increasing US reliance on advanced technologies for much of its military inventory, there is a question of how much and quickly the relevant parts of the economy can be converted for war-time production. Is there enough capacity to replace attrition and increase inventory in a conflict? Can that be accomplished before the termination of a conflict?

The next graph I produce will compare the growth of US GDP with the growth of the defense budget. Also, on a side note, I would be interested in seeing data comparing US, Chinese, Russian, Indian, and UK military flight hours and accident rates for this time period (1973 - 2009). So, if anyone has that data or knows where to find it, please let me know.

I'll never get why Americans are so much focused on national military power while being allied or befriended with the majority of foreign military power.

There is no guarantee that allied military power will be available for any conflict in the future, for whatever reason allies decide not to participate. There is also the problem that US military power is decreasing relative to the amount of money needed to sustain it.

[Fuchs]

There is no guarantee

The other stuff was superfluous. Understand this quote and you'll probably get my view on military spending.

I think the glance at the USA, USAF, and USN trends suggests that the post-Cold War cuts did in fact significantly hollow out America's military power.

Entirely wrong metric. Watch the difference between "to hollow out" and "to shrink".

For a change, I will refer not to my blog but to another useful one, "Ink Spots":
http://tachesdhuile.blogspot.de/2011...-and-isnt.html

A "hollow force" is a force that supposes to be more than it is. It's not a small force. Insufficient training and repair budgets lead to a hollow force, a budget cut does not need to do the same at all.
A hollow force is a failure of high-level leadership to adjust properly to a budget, it's about "not all is gold that shines" problem.