Combat Power, Conflict Resolution, and US Economy

[AmericanPride]

I wouldn't put too much stock in that "unprecedented dangerous world." It's been far worse several times. !942 was not a good year. Even 1962 was fearful to many. There have been others in the last 70 years or so. The system requires danger or an approximation thereof to keep the budget up to the maximum possible extent. DoD and the JCS are not above hyping the 'threat' to do that. Way the game is played in Washington...

I agree in principle, but I also must finding a starting point in measuring security threats, and the testimony of the highest ranking military officer and the highest ranking intelligence official seems like a good place to start. Later on, I will look more specifically into the claim of threat proliferation to test whether or not America's combat power is in decline from that perspective. Right now, I am focusing on combat power and military expenditures.

There's a direct relationship between tax revenue and military expenditures. Precisely what that relationship happens to be varies from time to time depending on Administration and perceived threat levels. There's an indirect relationship between wealth concentration and the other economic factors but it also can vary considerably over time due to many things. The relationship between any of those -- including military expenditures -- and combat power is tenuous and infinitely variable.

I am withholding my opinion on this subject until I lay out the data. It would seem, at least superficially, that there is a direct relationship between tax revenue and military expenditures, but the last ten years of a simultaneous increase in military expenditures and decrease in tax revenues calls into question the nature of that relationship.

That said, Of the Troops has a point. Ship, Aircraft, all Equipment -- and soldier -- capability (not performance allowed...) today is far greater than was the case in 1973 so straight line comparisons can be very misleading. To use one factor I've mentioned elsewhere, the average infantryman in Viet Nam walked around with about $2,500 (inflation adjusted) worth of gear on his body; his counterpart today has about ten times that and near concomitant capability.

This is a problem of space, which the DoD/NATO definition of combat power does not acknowledge. Whatever the firepower capability of a soldier, aircraft, or warship, it can only be applied in one geographic space at any one time; so, the number of soldiers, etc must be compared to the number of geographically disparate threats. So how we measure relative combat power between, say, the 1973 aircraft and the 2012 aircraft is to find their ratio of cost-per-unit to how many units are active. The F-35 costs between 197 and 237 million dollars. One of the aircraft it will replace is the F-16, which cost 14 - 18 million dollars per unit. If we assume that the amount of combat power that a dollar can buy is fixed, then in order for the F-35 to be "worth it", it must provide at least 1,316% more combat power than the F-16. By anyone's definition of combat power, does it? The US has 2,230 F-16s, 335 A-10s, and 409 F/A-18s (the other two aircraft the F-35 will replace), for a total of 2,974 aircraft. The official plan is to buy around 2,400 aircraft. If we assume that to be the case (even though procurement has been both delayed and reduced because of cost of growth), and use the DoD/NATO definition of combat power, then even though the US intends to buy 20% less aircraft than current inventory, for now it is purchasing an equal or greater amount of combat power. For the US to replace F-16 combat power 1:1 (assuming the F-35 can provide 1,316% more combat power), the US must purchase at least 1,600 new F-35s. These are numbers that I will look at in the near future.

Well, the defense numbers in your chart include the costs of actually fighting wars. Fighting a war does tend to use up combat power and, at the same time, cost a lot of money. You'll notice there is an uptick in 1991 which was the First Gulf War and another in 1999 for Kosovo, then it exploded after 9/11. Therefore I don't think it shows a death-spiral but the financial reality of fighting two large land wars in Asia. Peacetime and wartime defense costs are apples and oranges IMO.

Operational expenses and the base budget are calculated separately, so we can see clearly in the documentation that the increase in spending is related to the cost of maintaining the forces in the field after they have already been trained and equipped. Yes, war is expensive, and for the US Army at least (I have not looked at USAF and USN numbers yet), it is become more expensive to actually use combat power. The data so far strongly suggests that the cost to maintain forces in the field has far outpaced military appropriations and US economic capacity to finance it. This means, if trends continue, the amount of combat power that the US can deploy or the amount of time such forces can be sustained will diminish. This is a major economic and security problem if true.

Yes, it's call GDP. The more you have, the more military you can afford.

This is true if we assume that the growth in cost-per-unit is lower than than the growth in US GDP. If that assumption is false, then with every budget cycle, the US will actually be purchasing less combat power per dollar.

Exactly what are these "unprecedented" dangers?

Read the document.

Te extent to which military spending is proportional to our ability to avert or preempt danger would depend on the nature of the probable threats. A large inventory of ships or aircraft is not going to do much to control the threat of a terrorist group with WMD.

This is not necessarily true. How many soldiers, aircraft, and ships has the US used in combating Al-Qaeda and the Taliban? There are X amount of soldiers on the ground, Y amount of aircraft providing tactical, logistical, intelligence, etc support, and Z amount of ships moving to and fro (at times with escort) moving supplies, combat aircraft, etc. Then there are overhead assets that enable communication, etc, with their operators also. Whether or not all of this is necessary for defeating a terrorist group (with or without WMD) is besides the point; it can and is being used for that purpose. Your objection is one of military effectiveness, which will be looked at when I investigate conflict resolution.