PMC in COIN (general theme)

[Bill Moore]

SWJED I agree the contractors have largely failed (meaning they have created more harm than good) in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, some professional outfits such as Executive Outcomes and ICI have done fanastic work throughout Africa. EO made a huge dent in the violence in Sierra Leone when nations couldn't act, but they were asked to leave (long story). I think there are select cases where contractors can be effective (must be professional, vetted organizations that operate within a prescribed legal framework) and cost effective financially and politically.

[SWJED]

SWJED I agree the contractors have largely failed (meaning they have created more harm than good) in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, some professional outfits such as Executive Outcomes and ICI have done fanastic work throughout Africa. EO made a huge dent in the violence in Sierra Leone when nations couldn't act, but they were asked to leave (long story). I think there are select cases where contractors can be effective (must be professional, vetted organizations that operate within a prescribed legal framework) and cost effective financially and politically.

Bill,

Could not agree more. I just take exception to sweeping generalizations about the "value" of PMCs beyond specific tactical actions and tasks in a U.S. COIN enviornment that conventional wisdom says the solution is 80% political and 20% military. PMCs are not going to give us the 80% - at least not now or in the near future. Maybe later once we sort all this out...

Unity of effort - sometimes called unity of command - is critical and we can't get that right amongst the military and much less amongst the military and our own interagency partners. Anyone who thinks we can maintain unity of effort with PMCs playing a major role is blowing smoke.

Dave

[CaptCav_CoVan]

SWJED:
I could not agree more. Most are trained for security work and have no interest or motive for prosecuting a true "hearts and minds" counterinsurgency operation that is 80% political and 20% military. We need to move towards a CORDS-type command structure that pulls all of the miltary, economic, poltical, justice and agricultural operations under one command quickly if we are to have any hope of success in Iraq and before we even think of integrating the PMCs..

[cobot]

You have assumed, but not demonstrated, that the use of PMCs was a failure. If you can "show me the meat", your contention might hold more weight.

[SWJED]

You have assumed, but not demonstrated, that the use of PMCs was a failure. If you can "show me the meat", your contention might hold more weight.

Begin by providing examples ("meaty" and "weighty" would be best) of PMC success stories in Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, read my lips, this site is not about winning a battle here and there - PMCs can kick in doors with the best of them - it is all about winning small wars. Think more operational and strategic rather than tactical - that might help.

[cobot]

Well it was a surprise to me to hear people say that the use of contractors was a failure-especially in Iraq. Yes we've all heard (and heard and heard) in the press about the isolated problems, i.e. 4 BW guys getting killed in Fallujah, etc. But to define the use of contractors to be a failure on the basis of these incidents is very curious from my perspective. Typically you don't hear about contractors' daily positive (and usual) accomplishments-supplies they delivered, people they've trained, etc. However, when something does go wrong it gets plastered all over the press and it makes the people back home think that everything is falling apart over there with respect to the contractors. And things do go wrong in a war zone-nobody totally eludes the fog of war. But to define contractors' efforts as a failure, on the basis of a relatively few highly publicized events, is a mistake from where I stand. Having said that, I joined this forum because of its good rep as a place to engage in intelligent discussion about issues that interest me; so enlighten me if you think I'm wrong about the contractors in the mideast-especially Iraq. I'm certainly not omniscient. BTW, I don't deny that work needs to be done in terms of oversight, etc. but that will come with time.

[Jedburgh]

What role will contractors play in future COIN ops? Will their role increase, stay the same or decrease relative to the role they play today? I don't see their role doing anything but increasing given the success they are meeting in current ops. Streamline the vetting and regulating processes and almost everybody is happy.

The highlighted bit above is a gross generalization. Your perspective on the existence of substance behind that statement would be appreciated.

Afghanistan, Iraq... Contractors are playing a big role-need I say more?

Yes, you do need to say much more. The simple presence of contractors in numbers does not equate to operational success. If you are able, illuminate the specific positive impacts (beyond simple mission execution) that contractors have had in current COIN ops.

You have assumed, but not demonstrated, that the use of PMCs was a failure. If you can "show me the meat", your contention might hold more weight.

Hello, Pot calling Kettle, do you read me Kettle? You have assumed even more egregiously on your side of the equation.

In fact, Bill is the only one who mentioned "failure", and it was certainly not in the form of an assumption. He stated clearly that the contractors have largely failed (meaning they have created more harm than good) in Iraq and Afghanistan, while going on to positive reflections of PMC impacts in other arenas.

Again, you demand detail from others to support their point of view, but have provided absolutely no context to your own stated perceptions. Reread SWJED's post about your direction of thought.

Well it was a surprise to me to hear people say that the use of contractors was a failure-especially in Iraq. Yes we've all heard (and heard and heard) in the press about the isolated problems, i.e. 4 BW guys getting killed in Fallujah, etc. But to define the use of contractors to be a failure on the basis of these incidents is very curious from my perspective. Typically you don't hear about contractors' daily positive (and usual) accomplishments-supplies they delivered, people they've trained, etc. However, when something does go wrong it gets plastered all over the press and it makes the people back home think that everything is falling apart over there with respect to the contractors. And things do go wrong in a war zone-nobody totally eludes the fog of war. But to define contractors' efforts as a failure, on the basis of a relatively few highly publicized events, is a mistake from where I stand...

Here, you are the one making a huge assumption. If you believe the members of this board - especially individuals like Bill Moore and SWJED - are less than enthusiastic about the overall impact of contractors on ops in Iraq due to a few media stories, you are sorely mistaken.

As for myself, I am pretty much in line with the others that have responded. Not just the guns for hire, but the loggie guys, drivers, mechanics, tech geeks and other contractors in theater are there simply because we don't have the bodies in uniform to execute every necessary supporting mission in the larger op. Having people that can ably (more or less) fill those roles is a good thing - in the short term. However, the use of contractors in several of those roles raises many troubling operational issues; i.e. from my perspective, the over-reliance on contractors in many intelligence roles is doing long-term damage to the MI field, from which it will take a tremendous effort to recover. This is a significant negative impact that ripples well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.

To paraphrase what SWJED already told you - take a breath, step back from the base-line issue and look at the big operational picture. Think before you discuss.

And don't assume that the members of this board develop their perspectives from media feeds. Even in the best of interpretations, that is insulting.

[Ray Levesque]

The use of contractors will continue to grow for the following reasons:
1. High-tech: for tech contractors the government can no longer compete on the open market. High-tech contractors are rare within military ranks today, and are rare even within civil service.
2. Perception of decreased cost: although the short term cost of a contractor is high, the government doesn’t have to worry about keeping on a long-term employee, especially one that requires retirement. (I use the word “perception” because there’s still a debate about whether contractors are cheaper than regular employees.
3. Contractors vs. military: this administration does not want to increase the end-strength of the US military so it has to use contractors for all kinds of work, from info-tech to security.
4. Contractors create less of a PR problem if they are killed or captured: using contractors for all kinds of security duties means you don’t need to put soldiers. And if a contractor is killed or captured, it’s no big deal to the public at large. (Remember that there are still three US contractors being held by the FARC in Colombia – how many Americans know or care? But if they were soldiers, politicians would make an issue of it periodically.

I don’t think the issue of “success” or “failure” is a big factor. In the end I think cost, public perception, and politics will trump “success” or “failure” because there are no standardized measurable criteria to make a valid determination – people have opinions generally based on anecdotes. In situations like that politics, public perception, and cost drive all.

[BronwenM]

I am sorry that I am responding 7 months later to this great thread but want to share some ideas I have been harboring for awhile....

My response is particularly directed to the seemingly elusive quest to find a solution to the perceived USG resource gap for the political element of COIN operations. As stated below, conventional wisdom notes that successful COIN solutions are 80% political and 20% military.

Bill,

Could not agree more. I just take exception to sweeping generalizations about the "value" of PMCs beyond specific tactical actions and tasks in a U.S. COIN enviornment that conventional wisdom says the solution is 80% political and 20% military. PMCs are not going to give us the 80% - at least not now or in the near future. Maybe later once we sort all this out...

Dave

What is not widely known in military circles is that there exists an extensive cadre of private firms that have been implementing the EXACT requirements of the political/civilian element of COIN/Stability Operations for over 30 years. But, sadly, due to interagency turf wars and a myopic understanding of the civilian capacity, this private resource is either entirely invisible to most or tends to get readily dismissed and lumped into the category of "soft" NGOs (ie. humanitarian organizations that have a deep aversion to directly coordinating and closely working with the military).

From my observations, the military policy discourse (and those of RAND and other think tanks) on the role of civilians in The Long War suffers greatly from this near sightedness. The civilian contribution seems to be framed from what "is known" or "has been in front of us" versus "what is out there" but not yet seen first hand (or misunderstood if it is seen). The usual definition of civilian contributions is it comes from either contractors from the private sector or NGOs. The definition of private sector contribution seems to be soley focused on what is known - firms that provide operational surge capacity (logistics, supply, camp ops, security) and operational support or implementation firms (engineering/construction). NGOs are all lumped as non profits that implment humanitarian programs and are a good USG resource to coordinate with at a national level through OFDA/USAID and directly within local AORs. What is missing is the inclusion of the multitude of private sector companies that provide the 80% COIN types of activities in pre-current- post conflict/war zones.

This brings me to the Who, What, Where, When, How of these companies.

WHO:

Field and headquarter staff and consultants are veteran conflict zone implementers of a variety of political/economic/social programs. Most have advanced degrees but more importantly all are chosen due to their cultural and regional expertise. Some come from USG (military agencies, State, USAID) or former UN peacekeeping staff and many got their start in Peace Corps.

Most if not all US based companies are predominately implementing partners of USAID. Yet, many have also implemented programs for the World Bank, Asia Development Bank, UN agencies, and have also been funded by the State Department to fully staff UN or OSCE civilian operations (civilian police or election administrators - not to be confused with circuit junkie election monitoring gigs).

WHAT
Services provided have been in rapid response economic development (national level and micro-finance/micro enterprise, workforce development, vocational training, private sector development), community basic services/infrastructure, governance, rule of law, democratic institution building (including civil military institutions), agriculture/natural resources, health, education, etc.

WHERE
Even prior to Iraq and Afghanistan, many private firms have been implementing critical COIN like activities in Bosnia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Kosovo, East Timor, Congo, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Mindanao, etc etc.

WHEN
The prevelant assumption is that development firms implement activities after the dust has well settled. This is not the case. In Iraq for example, through the USAID Office of Transitional Initiatives funding, a private firm (DAI) implemented quick impact essential services projects that utilized rapid employment in places such as Sadr City, Talafar, Falujah, etc. This was all done in direct coordination with the military.

How
COIN like activities are all based on Do No Harm principles which essentially is "be cognizant of local culture, history, norms, social fabric to avoid causing more conflict" and are steeped in participatory community engagement methodology. What is crucial is that the "Western" face is kept to a minimum and that local partners are engaged to assure access, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Typical engagements relevant to COIN include:


Conflict/Situational Analysis Assessments of Operating Environments (to focus on political, historical, cultural, socio-economic, social and informal governing networks);

Community Level Engagement including Quick Impact (QIP) basic services/infrastructure Projects with heavy emphasis on rapid job creation; community economic development (microfinance/enterprise/agribusiness); private sector development (vocational training, workforce development, etc)..

Public Information Campaigns through all media elements - FM, AM, Short wave radio, tv, street theatre, etc.

Small Grants and Local Subcontracting Management - for example, a QIP Iraq program totaled over $300 million in local grants/subcontractors in 2 years;

Remote implementation of programs through the use of vetted local

Rapid Response - many can deploy 72 hours after contract signature and often can cut grants within a week;


The "so what" question

Many of these private sector development firms recognize that the USG Civilian Agencies are understaffed and under-resourced and will not be able to assume the leadership required to engage at the levels required. As some of these firms have already closely coordinated with the military, many recognize the inherent need to more directly engage with the military so that the totality of the USG response is more targeted and more efficient.

Under the current situation, private companies contributions to stability operations are confined to the stove pipes of USAID and State. If and only if personalities in the field mesh, one will see seamless coordination of USAID funded programs with Regional COs and or Battalion COs or the occasional IDAs of Special Operations Forces.

My argument for direct contracting by US military agencies is based on the following:

1. The National Defense Strategy, QDR, and Directive 3000.05 point to the need of "out of box thinking for irregular warfare"

•“need to reorient our military capabilities to contend with . . . irregular challenges more effectively”
•National Defense Strategy 2005, at 3

2. Private development firms provide the services required as outlined in Directives...

•“Immediate goal . . .to provide . . . local populace with
–Security
–Restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs.”
DoD Dir. 3000.05, sec.4.2

•“Long-term goal to help develop indigenous capacity” for

–Essential services

–Viable market economy

–Rule of law

–Democratic institutions,

–Robust civil society

DoD Dir. 3000.05, sec.4.2

3. The military is moving ahead to prepare itself to address tasks when "civilians cannot". Directive 3000.05 This statement refers to the civilian agency leads - USAID and Department of State. USAID has a severe lack of officers and a continous cutback in funds so there is a hiring freeze. What many do not realize is that USAID officers themselves do not implement but they set scopes of work based on negotiations/diplo efforts. They also are the contractors that manage the administrative details. Thus, there are not enough of them to subsequently hire private development firms to implement programs. As an aside, many observers tend to think State officials and USAID officials are interchangeable. They are not. State has never been in the business of designing, contracting and managing stability operations development programs. They have had experience with funding humanitarian programs but by and large, State officials do not have the training required to oversee such a program. This is why when Bing West asked the State Department official in Iraq if they had a "economic development model" to be distributed to commanders...the response was no....they would and do not...this is not their business. Private development firms/Implementing partners have them however...

Instead of the Military re-creating the wheel, it seems to me that engaging contractors to assist in this arena makes infinite sense and makes for a more expeditious response/solution.

What is exciting is that some have already started to see the connection of the dots. As previously cited, the Quick Impact Projects in Tal Afar Iraq that targeted rapid job creation (and was implemented in lock step with the 3rd Cav) was cited as a successful model for Clear, Build and Hold in the recently released COIN Field Manual. Over 50% of the 300 million in grants in Iraq were conducted in strict coordination with the military. The program was such a success, the Commanding General (Chirelli) inquired as to how he may directly obtain the services of the private firm (DAI) to continue the important work (as USAID funding had ended). Sadly, the idea was too new to overcome bureacratic hurdles.

Look forward to hearing your thoughts.

Thanks,
Bronwen

[Tom Odom]

What is not widely known in military circles is that there exists an extensive cadre of private firms that have been implementing the EXACT requirements of the political/civilian element of COIN/Stability Operations for over 30 years. But, sadly, due to interagency turf wars and a myopic understanding of the civilian capacity, this private resource is either entirely invisible to most or tends to get readily dismissed and lumped into the category of "soft" NGOs (ie. humanitarian organizations that have a deep aversion to directly coordinating and closely working with the military).

And what exactly would that firm (or those firms) be? KBR? Raytheon?

I served in the Stability Operations environment for 15 of those 30 years. I would be most curious to know about whom you are speaking.

Tom

[BronwenM]

Thanks Tom for your question. SHould have included these specific names earlier...big oversight. Thanks for pointing out...

I am not sure if my previous post was successful so wanted to jot down the names of a few of the major firms again... sorry for inconvenience if repeated...

DAI - www.dai.com - econ development, agriculture, governance, conflict mitigaton/community development

Chemonics - www.chemonics.com - similiar set of services

RTI (Research Triangle Institute) - North Carolina - IR division - governance and education

IRG - International Resources Group - disaster response, governance, economic development

PADCO / AECOM - reconstruction, governance,

ARD - Associates in Rural Development - agriculture, governance, econ development

ABT - Health

Bearing Point - finance / econ growth

MSI - Management Systems International - Institutional Support / Governance

Nathans and Associates - Economic Development

PA - infrastructure / energy / governance

PAE - police and election administration deployments

Louis Berger

Creative Associates - education and governance

RONCO - in addition to mine clearing, they have been USAID partner on community development programming

There are also a few Non Profits that will enter into contracts such as CHF (community development), IFES (election administration and governance), AIR (education) and AED (education), IRD (international resources development group - community rehabilitation)

Also, IOM (International Organization of Migration) enters into contracts with the US to implement community development programming.

I was not familiar with this world when I worked in UN peacekeeping missions in the field and was surprised to find a very large parallel universe so to speak out there.

Best,
Bronwen

[Mark O'Neill]

Hi Bronwen,

I see where you are coming from, and I agree that many of these organisations can offer an array of really useful capabilities. However, I would also offer the following observations from personal, practical experience of working with INGO and Corporate Service providers on stability and development activities:

1. Many of these organisations work best (that is, are effective) in what could only be regarded as very benign security situations.

2. If the security situation is not benign, providing security to enable them to achieve their programs can be a very taxing experience. This task is not helped by the fact that the majority of them have no collective corporate culture - you can almost guarantee that if you have three of them in your AO they will want to go three different, mutually counter -productive directions simeltaneously in order to meet their own perceptions of priority (and, frequently, their own perceptions of importance). It makes herding cats seem like a simple activity.

3. Another factor if the security situation is not so flash is that, understandably perhaps, they do not want to associate with the security forces for fear of being 'linked' to them by belligerants, and subsequently attacked. This is one of those 'no-win' situations for everyone involved.

4. Many (that is, 99%) of them cannot be trusted with intel related material. This can be a major problem when attempting coordination. Apart from the ones that inadvertently leak information and intel like a sieve, I am aware of other actors who have , for reasons often best known to themselves, deliberately compromised missions.

5. INGOs, despite themselves, often act in a way that is counterintuitive to what they should be achieving. I have personally seen examples that range from minor issues like poor personal examples being set by overpaid and immoral expatriate staff through to corruption, overt criminal activity and payment of 'protection' to militias and criminal gangs. All of which is the antithesis of what should be happening in a COIN/ Stability environment.

6. Some organisations have a disproportionate number of incompetent staff. They sail from conflict zone to conflict zone, leaving chaos in their wake. Many are 'found out' and have to move on because of this, but they invariably are attracted back to the next conflict because they become addicted to either the money (no one else would pay them that much) or the ego trip. They always get a job because 1) there is an effective 'old boys' ( or girls) net, or 2) Many people of ability are not willing to accept either the risks or compromises that these people are.

7. Many organisations are ultimately only there to make money. This can lead to dodgy actions. One well known organisation that provided 'services' to a humanitarian project I was once associated with provides a ready example. During the work year, when donors turned up for inspections, everything was 'roses' - they were only too willing to parade their success with the indigenes we were training. Then, every year when contract renegotiation time came around - lo and behold, everything was 'disaster' and would require more time, money and services. We got jack of this and undertook an independent audit -only to find out that things were fine. This example is just one of many I am aware of where commercial firms routinely rort hard won humanitarian funds in order to satisfy their bottom line.

Summing up, INGO and corporates can be very useful and do great good. However the rosy 'pollyanna' - like picture that you depict defies reality.

Just like Government Agencies and Militaries, there is a fair bit of room for improvement of their performance in a range of activities. They are not a panacea, rather a useful part of the response mix that needs to continually improve its game in concert with state actors and agencies.

Cheers,

Mark

[tequila]

Just of note, the British national who was kidnapped along with 4 GardaWorld private security contractors from the Interior Ministry in Baghdad was a Bearing Point contractor.

[Tom Odom]

Hi Bronwen,

I see where you are coming from, and I agree that many of these organisations can offer an array of really useful capabilities. However, I would also offer the following observations from personal, practical experience of working with INGO and Corporate Service providers on stability and development activities:

1. Many of these organisations work best (that is, are effective) in what could only be regarded as very benign security situations.

2. If the security situation is not benign, providing security to enable them to achieve their programs can be a very taxing experience. This task is not helped by the fact that the majority of them have no collective corporate culture - you can almost guarantee that if you have three of them in your AO they will want to go three different, mutually counter -productive directions simeltaneously in order to meet their own perceptions of priority (and, frequently, their own perceptions of importance). It makes herding cats seem like a simple activity.

3. Another factor if the security situation is not so flash is that, understandably perhaps, they do not want to associate with the security forces for fear of being 'linked' to them by belligerants, and subsequently attacked. This is one of those 'no-win' situations for everyone involved.

4. Many (that is, 99%) of them cannot be trusted with intel related material. This can be a major problem when attempting coordination. Apart from the ones that inadvertently leak information and intel like a sieve, I am aware of other actors who have , for reasons often best known to themselves, deliberately compromised missions.

5. INGOs, despite themselves, often act in a way that is counterintuitive to what they should be achieving. I have personally seen examples that range from minor issues like poor personal examples being set by overpaid and immoral expatriate staff through to corruption, overt criminal activity and payment of 'protection' to militias and criminal gangs. All of which is the antithesis of what should be happening in a COIN/ Stability environment.

6. Some organisations have a disproportionate number of incompetent staff. They sail from conflict zone to conflict zone, leaving chaos in their wake. Many are 'found out' and have to move on because of this, but they invariably are attracted back to the next conflict because they become addicted to either the money (no one else would pay them that much) or the ego trip. They always get a job because 1) there is an effective 'old boys' ( or girls) net, or 2) Many people of ability are not willing to accept either the risks or compromises that these people are.

7. Many organisations are ultimately only there to make money. This can lead to dodgy actions. One well known organisation that provided 'services' to a humanitarian project I was once associated with provides a ready example. During the work year, when donors turned up for inspections, everything was 'roses' - they were only too willing to parade their success with the indigenes we were training. Then, every year when contract renegotiation time came around - lo and behold, everything was 'disaster' and would require more time, money and services. We got jack of this and undertook an independent audit -only to find out that things were fine. This example is just one of many I am aware of where commercial firms routinely rort hard won humanitarian funds in order to satisfy their bottom line.

Summing up, INGO and corporates can be very useful and do great good. However the rosy 'pollyanna' - like picture that you depict defies reality.

Just like Government Agencies and Militaries, there is a fair bit of room for improvement of their performance in a range of activities. They are not a panacea, rather a useful part of the response mix that needs to continually improve its game in concert with state actors and agencies.

Cheers,

Mark

Bronwen,

What Mark said, especially on security and reliabilty.

FYI I had RONCO working for me in Rwanda and I have seen many of the firms you list in the field. As I suspected, you are confusing a stability/support operation with COIN. Most of these firms are ill-suited to doing the "armed civil affairs" that is necessary for COIN. In fact, the security threat against such firms in Goma was a major headache for all of us dealing with the issue.

Others like NGOs are agenda driven -- that of proving they are needed in the case of NGOs or for commercial firms the almighty dollar. IN COIN--as Rob Thornton has said in discussing advisors--the ideal is to work oneself out of a job. I have yet to meet an NGO who truly has that as a goal. Don't get me wrong, NGOs do good work; it is however work that must have set goals and limits otherwise it is a self-licking ice cream cone.

Best

Tom

[wm]

And what exactly would that firm (or those firms) be? KBR? Raytheon?

I served in the Stability Operations environment for 15 of those 30 years. I would be most curious to know about whom you are speaking.

Tom

Tom,

Check out the companies posting jobs at this link to get an idea.

http://www.developmentex.com