What we support and defend

[Ken White]

Ken, at the risk of incurring your ire, I'll buy that with regard to mortars but not tank guns. No way. If you just look at a 105 round meant to be fired from a rifled gun vs. a 115 round meant to be fired from a smoothbore gun it just doesn't seem like there is any way. You'll have to provide some references before I'll accept that.

No ire, not least because I wasn't clear -- the tank guns are a question of effectiveness and engineering, not ability to use captured ammo. The 82mm Mortar and 152mm Artillery were the only ones so sized for that purpose. The 120mm Mortar which both the Germans and Russians used was not nor was the (hat tip to Fuchs) 122mm Gun and Howitzer -- that added size was to equal or surpass the German 105mm in effectiveness, which it did. So the tanks, the 120 mortar and the 122 mm had nothing to do with captured ammo.

It's also noteworthy that the primary tank gun in the USSR during WW II was an 85mm. Toward the end of the war, they want to a 100mm, both ten mm bigger than the US and German 75mm and later in the war US 90mm. The wild card is the German 88mm -- that probably killed more USSR tanks than anything, yet they didn't develop a 98mm...

What works for guns doesn't work for airplanes. For your comparison to be valid the aircraft would have to be designed for the same mission and requirements..,.

I know. I also know that applies equally to your comparison of the J-20 and F-35 which was my point...

Once a line is closed, that's basically it. You ain't going to get it going again in anything less than years and beaucoup bucks. The people all scatter to the four winds. The suppliers all are doing something else and their tooling may be gone. Their people are scattered to the four winds. That line isn't coming back

No it isn't -- but a new line with a better bird based on the old bird experience can appear given a need. Absent that need, as at the present time and in the foreseeable future, no way -- too expensive, etc. etc. . Given a need, it'll be "Hang the expense..."

We do a lot of dumb stuff lazily and with little coordination and often at cross purposes -- until there's pressure. Then we still do dumb stuff, just more of it, faster and harder with adequate coordination and some real SOBs appear and are allowed to eliminate most of the cross purpose stuff.

[carl]

Ken:

I see your points now but I can't agree on the re-opening the line. Things just won't work fast no matter how much money you throw at it. It takes time to train the workers, build the tooling, work out the bugs on the line and in the workers, design and integrate new parts because the old ones aren't made anymore and maybe can't be made anymore. That is just for the main line if you didn't modify the airplane to be a better model. So as far as putting the F-22 line back into production, I don't think it can happen, which is why shutting down that line was such a big deal. If the big tooling for the airframe is destroyed, putting the line back together is impossible. If it isn't it is almost impossible.

There is a better chance that exigencies, mortal, "we are going to die if we don't do something quick" exigencies would stimulate some original thinking and that might get into production with some speed. This is just wild thinking on my part but say you had to do something fast. You know an F-22 line re-opening isn't going to happen fast so you got to think of something else to protect tankers and C-17s flying to and from Guam, Japan, the Philippines over the ocean. So somebody figures to hang 25 AIM-120Ds on a 787 and come up with some kind of radar data link lash up to engage intruders out over the ocean. Something like that I could see happening fairly quick.

(That book about the Russian armor was great by the way.)

[Dayuhan]

you got to think of something else to protect tankers and C-17s flying to and from Guam, Japan, the Philippines over the ocean. So somebody figures to hang 25 AIM-120Ds on a 787 and come up with some kind of radar data link lash up to engage intruders out over the ocean. Something like that I could see happening fairly quick.

Protect them from what? From two prototypes using 80s-vintage Russian engines because the Chinese haven't got round to producing an appropriate power plant?

Earlier we spoke of how reflexive paranoia lead the Soviet Union to bankrupt themselves preparing for a hypothetical war. Would you have us do the same?

Have you ever asked yourself why the Chinese chose to release pictures of the J-20 when hey did? I think this guy has it about right on that score:

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA14Ad02.html

[carl]

Protect them from what? From two prototypes using 80s-vintage Russian engines because the Chinese haven't got round to producing an appropriate power plant?

Earlier we spoke of how reflexive paranoia lead the Soviet Union to bankrupt themselves preparing for a hypothetical war. Would you have us do the same?

Have you ever asked yourself why the Chinese chose to release pictures of the J-20 when hey did? I think this guy has it about right on that score:

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA14Ad02.html

Please Dayuhan, please. I was obviously commenting about the future, the future, years down the road. Things that may happen, not things that are.

The most critical planes in our inventory are the tankers, the big E aircraft and the C planes. They would be very hard to protect out over the open ocean because the open ocean is so far from land. So if, if the mission of the J-20 was to get those airplanes over water, it could do it no matter how far their engine tech lagged ours. It is a great big thing and that often means a lot of range.

Now that isn't a worry today, but in 6-8 years, it could be a big worry. Then you would need something to protect them since there won't be enough F-22s.

The comment was also a just a thought about what might be possible to do quick if the need arose. It was not an argument to go do that right now. And it was also an idea about how a very limited mission, protecting those big planes as they transited over the open ocean, could be done less expensively. Something like the 787 idea I posited wouldn't be good for much if anything else. Making something for a very limited mission can be a lot cheaper.

I have asked myself what the Red Chinese were up to by allowing the aircraft to be photographed when it was. One thing I believe is it was just good fun to stick to the big nosed Yankee. The other thing I, and others, asked is whether those were actually the first flights or just the first time they showed it. Also whether those are actually the only two flying right now. We mostly know what the Red Chinese want us to know, which I would guess isn't much.

I read the article you cited and I judged it to be more sniffing dismissiveness than not. It reminded me a little of an article in Air Progress magazine I read about the MiG-21 in 1964 or 65. That article concluded that the MiG would present little if any problem to our fighters over the DRV. The actual case was rather different. It also reminded me of some of the judgments of Japanese aircraft capabilities prior to WWII. My reading of history makes me a bit nervous when people are so cocksure that the other guy won't be able to do it.

One thing that may have been brought up before about the F-35 but needs to be kept in mind. The original title of the program was JSF, Joint Strike Fighter. Strike Fighter is a gold and silver winged zoomie code word for Light Bomber. They call it that because the zoomies would die of shame if somebody called them bomber pilots. The F-35 is primarily a light bomber, secondarily a fighter. It just doesn't have the performance for 1st class fightering. I don't really mean turn & burn performance, though I've read it doesn't have that either, I mean it isn't all that fast and can't go high. If you were up against something like a really long range MiG-31, it could not do anything about it but watch it go by. If, I say if again, the J-20 is sort of like that, the F-35 can't harm it because it isn't really reasonable to expect a light bomber to do that.

[Dayuhan]

Please Dayuhan, please. I was obviously commenting about the future, the future, years down the road. Things that may happen, not things that are.

Exactly. That's why all of this needs a does of calm, something that isn't achieved by stringing together long chains of hypotheticals aimed at the pre-ordained conclusion that we're in deep $#!t. Certainly one can imagine a situation that might require greater capacities than those now deemed affordable. One can always imagine such a situation. Acting as if those imaginings are real or likely to become real is not always advisable.

The most critical planes in our inventory are the tankers, the big E aircraft and the C planes. They would be very hard to protect out over the open ocean because the open ocean is so far from land. So if, if the mission of the J-20 was to get those airplanes over water, it could do it no matter how far their engine tech lagged ours. It is a great big thing and that often means a lot of range.

Now that isn't a worry today, but in 6-8 years, it could be a big worry. Then you would need something to protect them since there won't be enough F-22s.

Again, you're assuming a situation and assuming a set of parameters that seems designed to advance a conclusion you've already reached. What makes you think such a situation will occur? What makes you so sure there won't be enough F-22s? What convinces you that such a situation can only be managed through deployment of large numbers of fighters that are superior to what you imagine the J-20 to be?

We mostly know what the Red Chinese want us to know, which I would guess isn't much.

Are you assuming that the US has no espionage capacity whatsoever? If so, on what basis do you make that assumption? If by "we" you mean those of us here on SWJ, you're probably right, but how much does that mean?

I read the article you cited and I judged it to be more sniffing dismissiveness than not. It reminded me a little of an article in Air Progress magazine I read about the MiG-21 in 1964 or 65. That article concluded that the MiG would present little if any problem to our fighters over the DRV. The actual case was rather different. It also reminded me of some of the judgments of Japanese aircraft capabilities prior to WWII. My reading of history makes me a bit nervous when people are so cocksure that the other guy won't be able to do it.

I would be more nervous if we were overreacting and churning out newer and better weapons to meet threats that we don't need to meet. Our domestic economic problems are a greater threat to us than any foreign power, and those are not going to be improved by charging into an arms race that we don't need to be in.

One thing that may have been brought up before about the F-35 but needs to be kept in mind. The original title of the program was JSF, Joint Strike Fighter. Strike Fighter is a gold and silver winged zoomie code word for Light Bomber. They call it that because the zoomies would die of shame if somebody called them bomber pilots. The F-35 is primarily a light bomber, secondarily a fighter.

On what do you base that conclusion? I seem to recall that in its day the relatively small, single-engined F16 functioned quite capably both as a fighter and in attack configuration. Why should the F-35 not do the same?

Of course if you choose to believe all the worst possible assessments of the F-35 and all the best possible assessments of the J-20, you'll come to certain conclusions. ow realistic those conclusions are is another question. When I hear someone in the aviation industry talking up how our aircraft are lame and somebody else's are soooo much better, I hear a bid for money, usually a whole lot of it. Such things must be taken with multiple grains of salt.

In any event a lot of what makes an air force effective isn't just about the plane, as described here:

http://defensetech.org/2010/12/31/j-...s-perspective/

I would gauge a modern combat aircraft’s capabilities by looking at the following features:

1. Access to offboard space, ground, and air-based sensors, particularly a capable AEW/AWACS system with a well-trained crew and robust data links.

2. Effective sensor fusion to allow the pilot to make use of all this information, as well as information from onboard sensors.

3. An integrated EW system.

4. An AESA radar with a high level of reliability.

5. Training and doctrine necessary to make effective use of all this data and equipment. Plenty of flight hours for pilot flight training, too.

6. Powerful engines (ideally capable of supercruise), with a high mean time between overhaul and failures.

7. An airframe with low-observable characteristics.

8. A robust air-to-air refueling capability (equipment, readiness, training).

9. Sophisticated and reliable precision guided weaponry.

10. A robust software and hardware upgrade roadmap, to keep this plane effective in 5, 10, and 30 years.

11. Maintenance procedures in place to keep the plane operating with a high mission-capable rate. And of course equipment that has been designed with easy access for maintenance and easy access for electronic diagnostic tools, and ideally a sophisticated health-usage monitoring system (HUMS).

This list is not in any particular order of magnitude. And I’m sure I’ve missed quite a few other key items.

The J-20 offers one item from this list (#7). I’m not convinced that the PLAAF has any other items from this list, although China seems to be making some progress with #9.

It’s kind of fun to watch the world fixate on this one item (#7). Then again, I still enjoy air shows, too. Pugachev’s Cobra maneuver, for example. Drives the crowd wild. Relevance to modern combat? Zero.

[carl]

Exactly. That's why all of this needs a does of calm, something that isn't achieved by stringing together long chains of hypotheticals aimed at the pre-ordained conclusion that we're in deep $#!t. Certainly one can imagine a situation that might require greater capacities than those now deemed affordable. One can always imagine such a situation. Acting as if those imaginings are real or likely to become real is not always advisable.

Too bad life forces you to make decisions about things before they become certain. Because often when things become certain it is too late to do anything about it.

Again, you're assuming a situation and assuming a set of parameters that seems designed to advance a conclusion you've already reached. What makes you think such a situation will occur? What makes you so sure there won't be enough F-22s? What convinces you that such a situation can only be managed through deployment of large numbers of fighters that are superior to what you imagine the J-20 to be?

I don't know anything WILL occur. That is the problem with the future. You don't know it yet. So that being the case, you have to figure what might happen. And if you really wanted to hurt us, hitting those planes out over the ocean where they would be hard to protect might be a good way to do it. If little ol' me can figure that, the rest of the world figured it long ago. So if they thunk it, it might be wise to think about how to counter it. That is called looking ahead and being prepared by me. You, I know, call it something different.

There are only 183 or so F-22s. The line is closed. There won't be any more. In a serious conflict with a big nation, 183 of anything won't be enough. 183 St. Michaels complete with flaming sacred swords wouldn't be enough.

What convinces me that the situation can only be handled with large numbers of superior fighters? Well, it won't be because we won't have large numbers of superior fighters. We'll have to figure another way if we can, which was the point of my idea (horribly bad as it was, see WM's opinion above). But as far as large numbers of superior fighters handling such situations goes...let's see 1914 was when airplanes started shooting at each other and that's been...98 years of aviation history convinces me that large numbers of superior fighters are good for handling such situations.

Are you assuming that the US has no espionage capacity whatsoever? If so, on what basis do you make that assumption? If by "we" you mean those of us here on SWJ, you're probably right, but how much does that mean?

I don't assume we have no spy capability whatever. I just assume that what we do have is, in total, inferior. Historically our human intel capability has been terrible, despite the CIA types hinting about great successes they can't tell us about. Our satellites and commo intercept stuff is pretty good. But satellites are predictable and all you have to do is cover something with a tarp when it comes overhead to frustrate that. Watch what you say to the extent practicable or use land lines may do a lot to frustrate the sigint stuff. Iran has done a very good job of mystifying and bedazzling us as to what they are up to so I figure, assume if you will, that the Red Chinese are even better at it.

I would be more nervous if we were overreacting and churning out newer and better weapons to meet threats that we don't need to meet. Our domestic economic problems are a greater threat to us than any foreign power, and those are not going to be improved by charging into an arms race that we don't need to be in.

Your nervous about that and I'm nervous when people are cocksure about what the other guy can't do. Together our neurotic concerns cover all there is to worry about.

On what do you base that conclusion? I seem to recall that in its day the relatively small, single-engined F16 functioned quite capably both as a fighter and in attack configuration. Why should the F-35 not do the same?

If you remember that then you also remember that the USAF always used F-15s as the primary air to air fighters. F-16s were used to supplement when needed but were/are primarily bombers. The F-35 will not be a top flight fighter because it was doesn't have the flight performance needed and it doesn't have the flight performance needed because it is designed primarily to be a light bomber. I thought I already said that.

Of course if you choose to believe all the worst possible assessments of the F-35 and all the best possible assessments of the J-20, you'll come to certain conclusions. ow realistic those conclusions are is another question. When I hear someone in the aviation industry talking up how our aircraft are lame and somebody else's are soooo much better, I hear a bid for money, usually a whole lot of it. Such things must be taken with multiple grains of salt.

I guess so. But numbers are numbers and air molecules always act the same way. The F-35 ain't got the performance. Wasn't designed to. So it could be just a bid for money. It might also be a bid to get something that will compete with the opposition.

In any event a lot of what makes an air force effective isn't just about the plane, as described here:

http://defensetech.org/2010/12/31/j-...s-perspective/

Another article of the sniffing dismissal school. "This is what they need. They ain't got it. They won't get it. I have spoken." You might want to read some of the over 200 comments that went with that article, many of which disagreed somewhat.

[Dayuhan]

Too bad life forces you to make decisions about things before they become certain. Because often when things become certain it is too late to do anything about it.

That's a poor reason to bankrupt yourself over a distant hypothesis.

And if you really wanted to hurt us, hitting those planes out over the ocean where they would be hard to protect might be a good way to do it. If little ol' me can figure that, the rest of the world figured it long ago. So if they thunk it, it might be wise to think about how to counter it. That is called looking ahead and being prepared by me. You, I know, call it something different.

The rest of the world also knows that we have asymmetrical options at hand that do not require direct threat-to-threat engagement. We can, for example, cut off the economic lifeline of the offending party without coming anywhere near the effective range of their military forces. Why would you prepare to fight someone where they are strongest when you can fight them where they are weak? Unless, of course, you need to justify spending a whole lot of money.

Of course once you start with the premise that China is our enemy and we must prepare to fight them, you automatically bias yourself in a certain direction.

There are only 183 or so F-22s. The line is closed. There won't be any more. In a serious conflict with a big nation, 183 of anything won't be enough. 183 St. Michaels complete with flaming sacred swords wouldn't be enough.

There are only 2 J-20s, of uncertain capability. We don't even have an accurate assessment of where that program really is, what bugs and problems it's encountered, etc... "we" meaning you and I, that is, I expect some others on our side know a lot more about that than we do.

What convinces me that the situation can only be handled with large numbers of superior fighters? Well, it won't be because we won't have large numbers of superior fighters. We'll have to figure another way if we can, which was the point of my idea (horribly bad as it was, see WM's opinion above). But as far as large numbers of superior fighters handling such situations goes...let's see 1914 was when airplanes started shooting at each other and that's been...98 years of aviation history convinces me that large numbers of superior fighters are good for handling such situations.

Look at the state of our economy, our public sector deficit, and the cost of large numbers of superior fighters, and recall that these are known factors, not hypotheticals. Do those realities convince you of anything?

I don't assume we have no spy capability whatever. I just assume that what we do have is, in total, inferior.

Basis for that assumption?

Your nervous about that and I'm nervous when people are cocksure about what the other guy can't do. Together our neurotic concerns cover all there is to worry about.

You're worried about something that might happen in the future based on certain assumptions. I'm worried about the present reality of what we can and cannot afford to spend. There's a difference.

If you remember that then you also remember that the USAF always used F-15s as the primary air to air fighters. F-16s were used to supplement when needed but were/are primarily bombers. The F-35 will not be a top flight fighter because it was doesn't have the flight performance needed and it doesn't have the flight performance needed because it is designed primarily to be a light bomber. I thought I already said that.

Yes, you did say it. I'm just not convinced that it's an accurate statement.

What is it, exactly, that you propose to do?

[wm]

So somebody figures to hang 25 AIM-120Ds on a 787 and come up with some kind of radar data link lash up to engage intruders out over the ocean. Something like that I could see happening fairly quick.

Nice idea, provided you could get all the 787 sub-assemblies that are made all around the world--France, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, and Sweden to Washington state to build more once the initial fleet was shot up by opponents with longer range systems than the 100 miles or so that a Slammer has. BTW, the AIM-120D costs about $700K/missile. Pretty hefty price tag. An opponent could surely spend a lot less money to equip some patrol boats (or even old freighters) with SAMs and send them out under the expected orbits that your protection force would need to fly to cover the tankers etc. That 787 would be unable to do much to counter that threat other than to use LAIRCM (another price item to add to the cost of your quick fix) and other devices to try to protect itself from the SAM threat.

[carl]

Nice idea, provided you could get all the 787 sub-assemblies that are made all around the world--France, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, and Sweden to Washington state to build more once the initial fleet was shot up by opponents with longer range systems than the 100 miles or so that a Slammer has. BTW, the AIM-120D costs about $700K/missile. Pretty hefty price tag. An opponent could surely spend a lot less money to equip some patrol boats (or even old freighters) with SAMs and send them out under the expected orbits that your protection force would need to fly to cover the tankers etc. That 787 would be unable to do much to counter that threat other than to use LAIRCM (another price item to add to the cost of your quick fix) and other devices to try to protect itself from the SAM threat.

So I take that an off the wall idea I considered for about 10 seconds to illustrate the kind of thinking that might have to be done in an emergency should become an immediate national defense priority then do you. And here I thought I'd get a six figure consultants job out of it. Darn.

You got any ideas?

[wm]

So I take that an off the wall idea I considered for about 10 seconds to illustrate the kind of thinking that might have to be done in an emergency should become an immediate national defense priority then do you. And here I thought I'd get a six figure consultants job out of it. Darn.

You got any ideas?

I gave you an alternative in my response. If it would work for an opponent uit would work for us. Use a bunch of cheap shipping (not sure whether the mothball fleets still exist, if they do they'd be a source for the platforms) equipped with SAMs to provide a seabased AD umbrella as the equivalent of a CAP for the mission aircraft transitting/orbitting overhead. Much easier to protect the KC fleet than the basic C- aircraft as they tend to fly in fixed orbits vice long laps. Mix this with combat aircraft that attack the bad guys tanker fleet to limit the ranges at which US aircradft would need to be protected by the shipping. BTW, the AD assets on the freighters also provide self-protect from attack by enemy aircraft. Give them some anti-ship missiles and maybe a few cruise missiles (modified SLCMs) and you have a multithreat platform for both attack and defense. Prtobably won't float though as who wants to resurrect an old rust bucket when they could spend a bunch of bucks on some more Aegis cruisers.

[slapout9]

I gave you an alternative in my response. If it would work for an opponent uit would work for us. Use a bunch of cheap shipping (not sure whether the mothball fleets still exist, if they do they'd be a source for the platforms) equipped with SAMs to provide a seabased AD umbrella as the equivalent of a CAP for the mission aircraft transitting/orbitting overhead. Much easier to protect the KC fleet than the basic C- aircraft as they tend to fly in fixed orbits vice long laps. Mix this with combat aircraft that attack the bad guys tanker fleet to limit the ranges at which US aircradft would need to be protected by the shipping. BTW, the AD assets on the freighters also provide self-protect from attack by enemy aircraft. Give them some anti-ship missiles and maybe a few cruise missiles (modified SLCMs) and you have a multithreat platform for both attack and defense. Prtobably won't float though as who wants to resurrect an old rust bucket when they could spend a bunch of bucks on some more Aegis cruisers.

That basic idea was one of the original concepts(1960's) for USMC deployment of the Harrier Aircraft. It had and has a lot of merit I thought but as you say it is very economical so it went KIA

[carl]

WM:

That's not a half bad idea. Both it and my terrible idea depend on the capability being built into the weapon and having a lot of shots available. That is one of the things I believe ADM Greenert might have been getting at in his recent article. Both ideas would require the sea be held. Neither could tolerate hostile surface vessels hanging about.

I still like my idea but yours would be much better for protecting the tanker orbits, specific spots. The ocean is rather large so it may be to big to establish a really long BAR-CAP kind of thing. I like my idea for protecting the cargo airplanes though because you could fly them in groups, convoys sort of, and change the routing around to make it harder for the bad guys. A big missileer kind of plane could stay with them and only fly when escort was needed. That would complicate the enemy's task a lot.

The British did the sort of thing you suggest in the Falklands I believe and more recently the Malaysian Navy bought some container ships and armed them for anti-piracy work. 20,000 to 40 or 50,000 tons container ships with reasonable speed might be just the ticket. My displacement estimate was just a guess. What kind of speed would be useful, around 20 knots?

[Fuchs]

It's also noteworthy that the primary tank gun in the USSR during WW II was an 85mm. Toward the end of the war, they want to a 100mm, both ten mm bigger than the US and German 75mm and later in the war US 90mm. The wild card is the German 88mm -- that probably killed more USSR tanks than anything, yet they didn't develop a 98mm...

85 mm was only important in late '43 to '45. most of the time the Soviets used much more of several 76.2 mm gun types (interchangeable ammo tank <-> field gun) and the 76.2 mm calibre remained very important until post-war (no wonder with more than 100,000 guns built!).

The Soviet 100 mm (D-10) proved to be superior to even the L/71 88 mm in post-War tests. the long 88 couldn't take on a T-54 frontally with an acceptable chance of success.
The U.S. insistence on 76 mm for a long time after the war was likely a result of the British great success with the 17 pdr gun (~77 mm IIRC) which equalled the German long (L/70) 75 mm gun in performance which in itself was almost identical to the early war (L/56) 88 mm in penetration. So basically the U.S. was stupid enough to stick for a decade with a gun that couldn't defeat an IS-2 or T-44 head-on and had at most adequate HE effect. South Korea would probably be gone if the North Koreans had had T-44's instead of T-34/85s in 1950. The normal (60mm) Bazookas were inadequate against T-44's from almost all angles.


About 98 mm; funny story. Due to the modern arms limitations treaty (forget the abbreviation, but it restricted all ordnance 100 mm or bigger), there are now a couple 98 mm mortars which are perfectly in between 81.4/82 mm and 120 mm in mortar bomb weight...
This makes as much sense as did all the Washington Treaty light cruisers; 10,000 tons but only 6" guns...

[Ken White]

85 mm was only important in late '43 to '45.

True -- but that's when WW II was 'decided.'

The U.S. insistence on 76 mm for a long time after the war was likely a result of the British great success with the 17 pdr gun (~77 mm IIRC) which equalled the German long (L/70) 75 mm gun in performance which in itself was almost identical to the early war (L/56) 88 mm in penetration. So basically the U.S. was stupid enough to stick for a decade with a gun that couldn't defeat an IS-2 or T-44 head-on and had at most adequate HE effect.

Uh, no. That's rather incorrect...

The US had adopted the 90mm as Standard A in late 1943, production started on the 90 mm M3 towed antitank gun, on the M36 Tank Destroyer and on the M24 Tank. All were in full production when the war ended. The lines were closed at Congressional insistence -- that meant reliance on the many still around but now obsolete M4A3E8s with the 76 up until early in Korea when M24 / M26 production was restarted and by mid '52, the M4s were history.

South Korea would probably be gone if the North Koreans had had T-44's instead of T-34/85s in 1950. The normal (60mm) Bazookas were inadequate against T-44's from almost all angles.

Not likely, most NK Tanks in 1950 were destroyed by Aircraft. The 2.36" / 60mm Rocket launchers were not effective against the T34 unless the Launcher gunner was less than 100 meters away due more to inaccuracy of the weapon than anything else, though few RLs work against any real degree of frontal armor with a decent slope -- glacis plates are thick for a reason. Both better training and the arrival of the 3.5" / 89mm Rocket Launcher (relatively accurate to about 200 m) fixed that by early to mid 1951. In the interim, after September of 1950 when they arrived in theater, after being pulled out of storage, those 90mm Towed AT guns were used with Tungsten hyper shot and they would literally blow a T34 apart.

About 98 mm; funny story. Due to the modern arms limitations treaty (forget the abbreviation, but it restricted all ordnance 100 mm or bigger), there are now a couple 98 mm mortars which are perfectly in between 81.4/82 mm and 120 mm in mortar bomb weight...
This makes as much sense as did all the Washington Treaty light cruisers; 10,000 tons but only 6" guns...

Very little makes much military sense -- too much political involvement...

[Fuchs]

True -- but that's when WW II was 'decided.'

In the American world view ... because they showed up too late to play a role in the widely recognized turning point battles...

Uh, no. That's rather incorrect...

The US had adopted the 90mm as Standard A in late 1943, production started on the 90 mm M3 towed antitank gun, on the M36 Tank Destroyer and on the M24 Tank.

Aside from the M24 being equipped with a 76 mm* (based very much on the first quick-firing gun ever; a rather weak calibre comparable to the T-34 M1940's gun) and 90 mm guns playing no role in U.S. WW2 mediums, I think you read a bit more into "insistence" than I meant to.
The U.S. kept 76 mm as a calibre in the M41 and in some post-war prototypes, and the ~76 mm-equipped Shermans were the almost exclusive medium tank of the U.S. until the Korean War wartime production mode kicked in.

*: I think you meant M26, which saw WW2 only in prototype-like quantities.

[Ken White]

In the American world view ... because they showed up too late to play a role in the widely recognized turning point battles...

Which, aside from Kursk was really what?

Aside from the M24 being equipped with a 76 mm* (based very much on the first quick-firing gun ever; a rather weak calibre comparable to the T-34 M1940's gun) and 90 mm guns playing no role in U.S. WW2 mediums, I think you read a bit more into "insistence" than I meant to.
The U.S. kept 76 mm as a calibre in the M41 and in some post-war prototypes, and the ~76 mm-equipped Shermans were the almost exclusive medium tank of the U.S. until the Korean War wartime production mode kicked in.

]*: I think you meant M26, which saw WW2 only in prototype-like quantities.

I did indeed mean the M26 -- that should also have been M26 and M46 with reference to Korea.. I'm old...

The M26 was indeed only in theater in small quantities but it did see combat and was headed for major production runs when the war ended and Congress stopped the procurement

The M24 didn't have a 76, it had a 75. The M41 did have a 76 but both were light tanks, scouting tanks to some and were not intended to engage other nations main battle tanks -- that was the job of the M26, 46, 47,(90s) 48, 60 (90 / 105) and 1 (105 / 120). We both agree that the Sherman was the principal de facto US tank until mid 1952 -- but that was because there was no war and, in the view of Congress, no need to produce more powerful tanks until then. Korea obviously changed that but still, once again, the US Army went to war with obsolete gear from the last war. My point was and is that is true but it was NOT because the Army wanted it that way and no one was stupid about it -- except Congress.

Nothing new in that.

[Steve the Planner]

I, for one, enjoyed flipping the turrets off of all of those little tanks with 105s and 152s (M60A1s and A2s) at Hohenfels.

Another Old Guy, I guess.

[Ken White]

I, for one, enjoyed flipping the turrets off of all of those little tanks with 105s and 152s (M60A1s and A2s) at Hohenfels.

Another Old Guy, I guess.

How you think an M4A3E8 Gunner and an M41 TC feel...

Not long before I retired, I was a Controller in an exercise and watched one 60A2 knock out two platoons of A1s (with MILES, of course)...

[Fuchs]

Which, aside from Kursk was really what?

Turning points of European WW2:

El Alamein for Commonwealth guys.
D-Day for Americans.
Stalingrad for everyone else.


The war was lost by Germany by late '41, though.
Almost nobody is going to discuss the loss of motor vehicles and quality horses in fall '41 as the final failure that made defeat inevitable, that's too complicated. Most people prefer simple battles (symptoms) as turning point markers.




Fig leaf for on-topic-ness:

The U.S. military expanded, and I see a couple main reasons for why it's not going to shrink to anything similar as envisioned 200+ years anytime soon:
(1) A childish belief that you can go to a war of choice and be better off afterwards than you would be without

(2) An exaggerated intolerance for distant phenomenons (no matter what size; only a handful distant phenomenons have the attention, and it's about the same attention no matter Red Army or a bunch of guys with fertiliser bombs)

(3) Bureaucratic self-preservation instinct

(4) Congressional corruption of the system (exploitation of budgets as a means to funnel money to the own district/state and donors)

(5) True conservatism that prefers the status quo over the experiment of not getting involved in so much (coupled with wild fantasies about the indispensability of U.S. military power)

[wm]

Turning points of European WW2:

El Alamein for Commonwealth guys.
D-Day for Americans.
Stalingrad for everyone else.


The war was lost by Germany by late '41, though.
Almost nobody is going to discuss the loss of motor vehicles and quality horses in fall '41 as the final failure that made defeat inevitable, that's too complicated. Most people prefer simple battles (symptoms) as turning point markers.

WWII was lost for all intents and purposes when Public Law 77-11, the Lend-Lease Act, was signed on 11 Mar 1941. After that, it was just a matter of time before the limited access to the natural resources need to fuel German industrial capability was swamped by the, for all practical purposes, unlimited access available to the US industrial base, which, BTW, was impervious to attack by the Axis powers. A second milestone in the path to victory was the establishment of the Persian Corridor and the deposing of the Shah in 1942 to ensure the path stayed open. The Arctic route to Murmansk/Archangel was open to attack by Germany naval forces and land-based aircraft. Even though the route Vladivostok accounted for over 50% of lendlease shipments to Russia, it was realitively open to interdiction by Japan (had Germany and Japan chosen to cooperate in the war against Russia). The route through Iran was out of the reach of both Japan and Germany.