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Thread: What we support and defend

  1. #101
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    Bob,

    The widely held perception is that we were working to contain China before, and that we have just initiated a major effort to increase that program. Agree or disagree with that perception, fine. But to simply ignore it because the official policy is that we are not doing that is very dangerous. We only delude ourselves if that is the case, and self-delusion rarely leads to a good result.
    What are we containing China from exactly? How exactly has that effort supposedly increased?
    Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.

  2. #102
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    Bob,



    What are we containing China from exactly? How exactly has that effort supposedly increased?
    Better yet, you tell me how we haven't. I don't have time to lay out the post WWII history of US policy in the Pacific, nor to explain the latest defense strategic guidance to you line by line. But I am happy to discuss any aspect of it you have questions about.

    But just a single tangible, why do you suppose we are shifting our fleet distribution from 50/50 to 60/40 weighted toward the Pacific? How is India a better security partner in the Pacific than China? Why not both?

    Again, call it what you want, it is what it is, and perceptions are what they are. As to the many senior leaders coming on record to say we are NOT containing China in response to many reasonable queries, I "think they doth protest too much" in their defense.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  3. #103
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    I don't have time to lay out the post WWII history of US policy in the Pacific, nor to explain the latest defense strategic guidance to you line by line.
    It's a simple question, I'm not asking for regional history nor a monograph. Here's the DSG:

    Over the long term, China’’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. However, the growth of China’’s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region. The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law. Working closely with our network of allies and partners, we will continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation.
    The containment strategy for the USSR was designed to limit the spread of communism. The underpinning assumption behind Soviet containment was the belief that the USSR was an expansionist power. As Kennan said about the Soviets:

    Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power."
    Containment was:
    ...designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.
    And here's how you've described containment of China:

    The recent shift to the Pacific may not be a physical containment in name, but it is certainly being approached as a defacto physical containment by the US and China alike.
    and

    Any US strategy in the Pacific that is designed to work against China rather than with China is a form of containment, in fact if not in name.
    I think the question of containment hinges on whether or not China is an expansionist power. I don't think it is, not like the Soviets were.

    Additionally, our East Asia strategy contains two main themes:

    1. Maintain our alliances in the Pacific.
    2. Ensure freedom of the seas.

    With an expansionist China these policy options will be a de facto policy of containment, but as I said, I don't subscribe to that view. I subscribe to the alternative of peaceful coexistence with a non-expansionist China. In that case there is no containment.
    Last edited by Entropy; 06-14-2012 at 07:46 PM.
    Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.

  4. #104
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    Ok, so you remember in about 1950 when we extended containment to include the entire Sino-Soviet alliance once Nationalist China fell? Also Communist, the domino theory in SEA, etc.

    All those mechanisms put in place, our support to S. Korea and that ensuing alliance, with Taiwan, S. Vietnam, all to contain China. Any of this ringing a bell? Much of that is still in place, even though our relationship with China should be evolving.

    No we waged containment every bit as hard in Asia and perceived China's communist influence to be every bit as expansive as that of the Soviets. Now we fear their economic expansive influence every bit as much, if not more and seek to contain still. But yes, our message does not match our actions. We have a bad habit of that and it costs us influence. We act in one way and say we are acting in other ways. Seems we only fool ourselves when we do that, as we buy into our self-image as a benign force for good and rule of law. Others see us differently.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  5. #105
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Ok, so you remember in about 1950 when we extended containment to include the entire Sino-Soviet alliance once Nationalist China fell? Also Communist, the domino theory in SEA, etc.
    Of course by 1960 the Sino-Soviet alliance was history and they were at each other's throats, though many Americans clung to the fiction that Communism was a united force.

    Containment was as much about the perceived need to contain an ideology perceived as expansionist as it was about a perceived need to contain any given power. In practice of course that meant the Soviets, as the Chinese were not nearly so aggressive about supporting Communism in faraway places.

    I don't see current moves as containment per se, more an announcement that expansionism can be met with containment if that's deemed necessary. The Chinese are doing something very similar on their side, it's not at all a one-sided picture. All the dogs, big and small, are out growling and pissing on trees, none seem very interested in a serious confrontation. Hopefully the US will not feel obligated to disrupt that status quo. That's not to say the Chinese (or someone else) might not disrupt it; no status quo lasts forever, but the US has little to gain by rocking the boat.
    “The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”

    H.L. Mencken

  6. #106
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    All those mechanisms put in place, our support to S. Korea and that ensuing alliance, with Taiwan, S. Vietnam, all to contain China. Any of this ringing a bell? Much of that is still in place, even though our relationship with China should be evolving.
    So as long as have alliances with all those nations we are containing China? Does that correctly describe your view? Well, then what would a policy of non-containment look like?

    Look, as I've said before here many times I think we really need to reexamine our alliances and try to reduce our overseas commitments. But, like Dayuhan, I don't think the status quo in East Asia is at all equivalent to the Cold War containment policy where we went to war to try to stem the spread of communism in Asia. Nor is it anything close to what we did to Russia with NATO expansion. My reading of the NSG indicates concern over China's long-term goals, nothing more, along with a desire to ensure we have access to our allies. I do not see it as a strategy to roll-back China's influence, nor stem the non-existent expansion of Chinese communism. Again, a strategy of containment is predicated on preventing an adversary from accomplishing some goal - what is it WRT China?
    Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.

  7. #107
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Dayuhan,

    I agree that neither side is aggressively pushing the other right now, but these things tend to happen in degrees, and both sides have increased the degree of chest bumping against each other, without increasing the degree of interaction with each other.

    In no way should we "abandon" our allies in the region. Equally, in now way should we continue to define those relationships by perspectives overly shaped by a world that no longer exists. Is this pivot or shift the right flavor of change for the emerging world, or is it simply a move to put more energy into old concepts based on old perspectives?

    Entropy asks what would an alternative to containment look like. A good friend of mine co-wrote a paper as "Mr. Y" that suggests a grand strategy of "sustainment," and it has some good ideas in it. I published a paper that took a slightly different tact and branded it "empowerment."

    http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j...6jEINkzKIoQfuw

    (If that link does not work, google "A Grand Strategy of Empowerment") Not intended to be the definitive answer, but merely to note that we need to make a major course change in terms of our strategic approach and to offer one new (old) concept to help shape that dialog.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  8. #108
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I agree that neither side is aggressively pushing the other right now, but these things tend to happen in degrees, and both sides have increased the degree of chest bumping against each other, without increasing the degree of interaction with each other.
    I'd say interaction with China has increased quite a bit in the last few decades, particularly economic interaction.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Entropy asks what would an alternative to containment look like. A good friend of mine co-wrote a paper as "Mr. Y" that suggests a grand strategy of "sustainment," and it has some good ideas in it. I published a paper that took a slightly different tact and branded it "empowerment."
    How would a grand strategy of empowerment be applied to today's Asia-Pacific region? Whom do you propose to empower? Certainly an empowered populace is less liable to embark on a Communist led revolution (I'd question the degree to which the US is actually capable of empowering anyone else's populace, but that's for another thread), but the Chinese aren't promoting revolution or subversion. Empowering the Chinese populace would be wonderful but it's not the most practical of objectives.

    What exactly do you propose that we do in Asia?

    I find the whole Asian pivot concept less than convincing, just because I don't see what assigning more ships to the Pacific is actually meant to accomplish, other than posing an assertive and Presidential-looking alternative to the withdrawal (some will say retreat) from Afghanistan. I don't necessarily see that as containment, but if you're going to propose an alternative, I'd be curious about what the alternative would look like in actual application.
    “The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”

    H.L. Mencken

  9. #109
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default You nailed it.

    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    I find the whole Asian pivot concept less than convincing, just because I don't see what assigning more ships to the Pacific is actually meant to accomplish, other than posing an assertive and Presidential-looking alternative to the withdrawal (some will say retreat) from Afghanistan. I don't necessarily see that as containment, but if you're going to propose an alternative, I'd be curious about what the alternative would look like in actual application. (emphasis added / kw)
    We've had up to 70% of the Fleet in the Pacific several times over the last 100 years. The preponderence of the ships go where they can best be used. This Admin wants to edge Europe into doing more for itself than most of the last few. Nothing wrong with that.

    Nothing earth shaking, either...

    Not to mention an upcoming election and a need to look busy with some justification -- but with little to no probability of major malfunctions.

  10. #110
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    We can empower Japan and South Korea to take on greater responsibility for their own defense, rather than primarily expecting them to serve as bases for our own containment.

    We can empower China to work with us to ensure the safe sailing of the commercial fleets of the region.

    We can empower the Philippines to actually work to resolve the disconnect between their government and their many diverse, but equally dissatisfied, populaces.

    There is no logical rationale for greater call to US military action in the Pacific, and to do so merely enables bad behavior by allies and competitors alike, rather than empowering positive actions.

    Ken infers that our shift works to empower Europe to stand up more for their own interests, but we can do that by bringing capacity home and standing down excesses; it does not require we shift it to the Pacific to keep it at work where no extra work need be done. But Fuchs raises a good point earlier as well, that the Europeans may not field the force we wish the did so as to better be able to join us on our exaggerated adventures around the globe, but they are fielding the force they need for the actual threats they face to their own interests as they define them.

    As America looks to the future, it needs to build that foundation on our pre-Cold War past. To build it upon the crumbled and irrelevant foundation of the remains of our Cold War posture is illogical at best, and sets the stage for the further decline of our national influence at worst.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  11. #111
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    We can empower Japan and South Korea to take on greater responsibility for their own defense, rather than primarily expecting them to serve as bases for our own containment.

    We can empower China to work with us to ensure the safe sailing of the commercial fleets of the region.

    We can empower the Philippines to actually work to resolve the disconnect between their government and their many diverse, but equally dissatisfied, populaces.
    How exactly do you propose to empower any of the above? Beyond generalities, what do you propose that we actually do.

    All the nations you mention above are independent sovereign states, and they make their own decisions. They are going to do what they want to do, not what we want them to do; they will not ask our permission and they do not need us to empower them to do anything. If they aren't doing any given thing, it's because they don't want to do it, not because we haven't empowered them. The notion that we are in a position to "empower" the Chinese or Koreans or Japanese or Filipinos seems, in all honesty, a bit pretentious to me, and I don't see how exactly we're supposed to do it.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    There is no logical rationale for greater call to US military action in the Pacific, and to do so merely enables bad behavior by allies and competitors alike, rather than empowering positive actions.
    Agreed, but I haven't seen any proposal for military action, just for a military presence... and even there I'd say the program is more politically motivated talk than anything else.
    “The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”

    H.L. Mencken

  12. #112
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Just to be clear...

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Ken infers that our shift works to empower Europe to stand up more for their own interests, but we can do that by bringing capacity home and standing down excesses; it does not require we shift it to the Pacific to keep it at work where no extra work need be done. But Fuchs raises a good point earlier as well, that the Europeans may not field the force we wish the did so as to better be able to join us on our exaggerated adventures around the globe, but they are fielding the force they need for the actual threats they face to their own interests as they define them.
    Ken didn't mean to infer that, Ken meant to say that's what the Admin would like. Not the same thing...

    Like you I don't believe that will happen and for the same general reasons.

    You are correct that no extra work needs to be done in the Pacific area -- but I think incorrect on the "require" aspect -- our system requires it; Congress, the National Security and Foreign Policy establishments Require it for self justification...

    Dumbbb -- with three 'bs.' We have indeed lost the bubble.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Posted by Fuchs



    While I don't disagree with your recommendation to not over react, yet I very much disagree with your quote above. Case in point, the attacks on 9/11 created the political conditions that led to two wars. The attack in Madrid determined the outcome of a national election, and the attacks in London on 7/7 were more than a scratch. These groups and individuals over time will acquire new technologies and innovate in ways that enhances their lethality, so the threat will likely increase over time. That doesn't mean the answer is to invade other nations in the naive pursuit of eliminating safe havens, but it doesn't mean ignoring the threat is the best option. I think it will require constant effort from law enforcement, intelligence and special operations to protect "our" people, but this can largely be done in the shadows. Our last administration used the war on terror for political gain instead of keeping it in the shadows, and it has only gotten worse with this administration. Of course after the 9/11 attacks we were obligated to show the American people something was being done and the attack was being revenged, not sure we needed to keep it in the press for 10 plus years.
    Or 9/11 created conditions a US government needed to start two wars, of which at least one was in reality totally disconnected to 9/11.
    BTW the coversion of the first war into a large soccial experiment - instead of retreating after two years- was neither connected to 9/11.

    AQ had a success because of the disproportional reaction the USA, not because of AQs clever long-term strategy. One side effect was that most of the US soft power became useless.

    Therefore, I agree that AQ should be seen and prosecuted as criminals, not more. Let us not give them a political stage that converts them into a political power.

  14. #114
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    Default Reinhold Niebuhr

    I've long thought that we needed a Serenity Prayer for our Foreign Policy. As it turns out, the author of that prayer was one of the moral forces/grandfather to 20th century thoughts to include containment.

    Y'all might find this of interest.

    Finding Niebuhr


    The Serenity Prayer was penned by Reinhold Niebuhr, the most influential American theologian of the 20th Century. Originally a German-American socialist and pacifist who spent his youth striving for social justice for factory workers of Detroit’s auto plants, Niebuhr in his middle years became a liberal interventionist.

    He advocated armed American intervention to defeat the evil of Nazi Germany. In his silver years, he also provided the philosophical and moral bedrock of America’s containment policy against the Soviet Union. As such, the Calvinist evangelical preacher helped to articulate the meaning of our nation’s new-found political, economic, and social power in the mid-20th Century.

    For a generation of Cold Warriors, Niebuhr became a trusted counsel, explaining to them just war theory, the meaning of freedom and the need for social justice, both here and abroad.

    A key architect of the Truman Doctrine, American diplomat George Kennan rightly proclaimed Niebuhr “the Father of us all.” The Rev. Martin Luther King wrote in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail that Niebuhr’s gift to us was the terse reminder that ultimately “groups are more immoral than individuals.”

  15. #115
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    military presence is military action. Particularly in times of peace such as our nation enjoys now.

    Specific action?

    Less presence and less bases on the far side of the Pacific, not more.

    Renegotiate all of the defense treaties of the region to reflect the world as it exists today, but with a general trend of the US taking a much smaller direct role in the security events of the region, and China taking a larger role. With the US serving more as a distant reserve and counter-balance to prevent China from abusing the sovereignty of her neighbors.

    Delegate. We want to be the "global leader" according to our NSS, well it is time for a more sophisticated form of leadership. Currently we abuse the sovereignty of China to accomplish that same task through containment strategy, Empowerment strategy recognizes China's status as the most powerful nation in East Asia, and India in South Asia and reinforces their sovereignty as it supports their lead in the regions of their issue. We also abuse the sovereignty of several nations in our efforts to contain AQ in the FATA and to defeat, disrupt, deny them in many nations elsewhere. A definition of global leadership that means US direct action on US terms for US interests regardless of the impact on the countries and populaces it impacts, that is no type of leadership we really want our "USA" brand applied to, IMO. It is time for the US government to learn delegated leadership.

    Lead a major reorg of the UN to make it in fact what it is supposed to be in principle. Rebalance what and how countries have a voice to make it more equitable and better tuned to the post Cold War world. Consider regional groupings with regional leadership that have primary responsibility for security and disaster and economic relief in their respective regions. Couple this with a logical plan to keep such regional bodies within certain limits, and to reinforce them as necessary for larger events.

    BLUF is we need to reassess the entire kit bag of programs, organizations, treaties, etc, etc, etc, designed by the West to contain the East, and convert them to things designed by the entire world for the entire world. The US may lose some control, but we will gain a whole lot of leadership and influence.

    This is not retrenchment or isolationist at all. This is just being a smart leader for others without overstepping important boundaries that we demand for ourself, but too often ignore for others. Somethings will happen that we won't like or approve of. But when did anyone annoint the US as having to hit the "like" button on every action, or give other nations our approval to act??
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  16. #116
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Bill, I am talking perception, not express intent. The very fact that you see our Cold War activities as not actively working to contain China in that era demonstrates how much such activities have become part of the American fabric for how we approach the world in general.

    The widely held perception is that we were working to contain China before, and that we have just initiated a major effort to increase that program. Agree or disagree with that perception, fine. But to simply ignore it because the official policy is that we are not doing that is very dangerous. We only delude ourselves if that is the case, and self-delusion rarely leads to a good result.

    Sigaba, my sources are many, some directly on point and many other merely indirectly reinforcing. Perhaps one of the best ones on the formation of our Constitution is David Stewart's "The Summer of 1787" for those who only have the time or inclination to read a single book to explore that fascinating time and event. But I recognize we all study history through the lens of our background, training, experience, and purpose for study. Most of my study in recent years has been in pursuit of greater understanding of insurgency, and what makes some societies inherently stable, while others remain inherently unstable. As a nation we make as many mistakes as any in our execution of policy, but we got the foundation right, and that sustains us.
    I agree with you on the different approaches to history. Because of these different approaches, I don't think that using history to "prove" why one contemporaneous policy preference should be supported over another is politically or intellectually sustainable.

    Here's why. Those, such as yourself, who study history for utilitarian purposes (that is, for the "lessons" of history) are likely to have a drastically different approach to the past than those who study history largely for its own sake. For example, professional academic historians are driven by a different set of sensibilities. These sensibilities allow for the reinterpretation of historical events over time as more primary source materials come available and as questions and answers are debated.

    In contrast, those who take a "lessons of history" based approach to the past do not have the same flexibility because they're basing their policy preferences upon the "lessons" of the past. If the "lessons" end up being unsustainable, then the intellectual foundation of the preference is compromised.

    This current thread provides two good examples of this dynamic in action. While you and carl are on different sides of the issue you've raised, you both use of anachronistic (and/or ahistoric) interpretations of the past to support your positions. A moderately-well trained historian could play serve and volley to raise enough doubts about the "lessons" you two have presented and to raise doubts on your respective views on contemporaneous military policy.
    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    But, please, save me from examples of suffering in Eastern Europe in the trailing years of WWII as an example for why the US should have a warfighting army on the books at all times. How was sustaining the capacity of somehow deterring such events from happening possibly in the vital interests of a United States struggling to get through the hard economic years of the great depression?
    With respect, I believe you're misreading my posts. I offering any totalizing generalizations about what the United States should do "at all times." I'm merely taking issue with your use of history to support your central argument, not with your central argument.

    In regards to the Second World War, I believe that you're conflating two separate counterpoints to two points that you made.
    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    As to wars, it is not who wins the first battles that matters, it is who wins the final battles. The American approach has served that end well without subjecting our populace to excessive burden of the wars of others.
    By my reading, you offered a historical interpretation of military history and a historical interpretation of American military history. In my reply, the use of the Eastern front was in reply to your first interpretation to provide an example of how the shape and tone of a war's initial battles does matter even if the victor in those initial engagements ends up losing the war.

    Neither that point and the historiographically sustainable interpretation that the U.S.'s military effectiveness was undermined in World War II because it did not maintain a large (enough) standing army during the 1930s do not mean that there's a "lesson" to be learned for the present and near future. The two points simply mean that you're using interpretations of the past to support your policy preferences, that these interpretations are historiographically controversial, and that by using such controversial interpretations, you shift the focal point of debate from the present to the past. And by making this shift, you weaken unnecessarily an otherwise eloquent argument.

    Another, and perhaps more problematic, example of your use of historical interpretations is your discussion of "containment." In a number of posts, you characterize American policy towards the PRC of "containment" without differentiating among different interpretations of that word. (For example, George Kennan's vision of containment was strikingly different than John Foster Dulles's.) Nor do you square your interpretation "containment" with America's pre-existing (and continuing) support for the Open Door, or America's post World War II aim of maintaining a "preponderance of power" that predated the Cold War against the USSR and re-emerged after the Soviet Union's collapse.

    Consequently, when you say:
    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Again, call it what you want, it is what it is, and perceptions are what they are. As to the many senior leaders coming on record to say we are NOT containing China in response to many reasonable queries, I "think they doth protest too much" in their defense.
    You raise as many questions about your perception of what "it is" as you do of the "many senior leaders."
    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Our foundation of governance and our geography are strengths. Our belief that our actions are inherently benign is a weakness. Ignoring both puts us at risk.
    MOO, these points--not a collection of highly controversial interpretations of the past-- should be the foundation of your argument.

    My $0.02
    It is a sad irony that we have more media coverage than ever, but less understanding or real debate.
    Alastair Campbell, ISBN-13 9780307268310, p. xv.
    There are times when it is hard to avoid the feeling that historians may unintentionally obstruct the view of history.
    Peter J. Parish, ISBN-10 0604301826, p. ix.
    Simple answers are not possible.
    Ian Kershaw, ISBN-10 0393046710, p. xxi.

  17. #117
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Sigaba,

    There is nothing "controversial" about my interpretation of history, as I change no facts, I just highlight certain aspects that are important for better understanding how the events of those times relate to events of our times based upon my trained, education and experience. You can find value in that or not as you chose as you interpret these insights from your own training, education and experience. I don't expect everyone to agree with me, but nor does your disagreement with me make me wrong.

    I'm comfortable with my assessment, and refine it constantly as new, helpful ideas and information are presented. So far you haven't helped me refine it much.

    Containment is an effect, and end. It has gone through multiple official variations and certainly has been interpreted uniquely by literally billions of people over the past 65 years. What we do currently in the Pacific is layered upon what we have historically in the Pacific post 1949 to contain China. China (and many other observers around the world) perceive recently announced US strategy and actions as an escalation of US-led containment of China. Those are facts. What everyone perceive or intends? That is another thing altogether.

    I don't think working to contain China is unconstitutional, I just think it is unwise and unnecessary. I do think that thinking about and resourcing the Navy and the Army equally is unconstitutional as well as unwise and unnecessary. We are caught up in a great inertia of foreign policy that is driving us in a form designed for a short, anomaly of time known as the Cold War into a bold new era of empowered populaces and non-state actors and a greater balancing of regional power among a dozen states. How we thought about ourselves and how we engaged the world prior to WWII is more appropriate for this emerging world than how we came to think about ourselves and how we engaged the world during the Cold War and post Cold War era. Problem is we have short memories and have a hard time differentiating between the two.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Dunno if talk about "non-state actors" really makes sense. The 60's and 70's were full of them, too. See all those counter-imperialist uprisings in Africa.

    And yes, they were regularly called "terrorists".

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Others look at these things from their own perspectives as well.

    From the former Pakistan Ambassador to the UN:
    http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012...ment-of-china/

    A Russian perspective:
    http://www.defimedia.info/news-sunda...-of-china.html

    A variety of perspectives:
    http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_06_15/78229791/

    A Turkish perspective
    http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/13...china-sea.html

    Just few of many
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Dunno if talk about "non-state actors" really makes sense. The 60's and 70's were full of them, too. See all those counter-imperialist uprisings in Africa.

    And yes, they were regularly called "terrorists".
    Fuchs,

    Agree best not to exaggerate nor to under estimate. The ability of NSA such as AQ to conduct global UW to attempt to leverage individuals and movements around the globe to their cause with modern information tools is new. This used to be the realm of states, now non-state groups play too, and being non-states hold no infrastructure that the states they compete with can hold at risk, contain or otherwise apply leverage to. That frustrates states.

    So, yes, NSAs are a new empowered type of group that must be accounted for. Be it legal NSAs such as corporations who increasingly owe their loyalty to no state, or illegal NSAs such as AQ.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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