What we support and defend

[Dayuhan]

Please Dayuhan, please. I was obviously commenting about the future, the future, years down the road. Things that may happen, not things that are.

Exactly. That's why all of this needs a does of calm, something that isn't achieved by stringing together long chains of hypotheticals aimed at the pre-ordained conclusion that we're in deep $#!t. Certainly one can imagine a situation that might require greater capacities than those now deemed affordable. One can always imagine such a situation. Acting as if those imaginings are real or likely to become real is not always advisable.

The most critical planes in our inventory are the tankers, the big E aircraft and the C planes. They would be very hard to protect out over the open ocean because the open ocean is so far from land. So if, if the mission of the J-20 was to get those airplanes over water, it could do it no matter how far their engine tech lagged ours. It is a great big thing and that often means a lot of range.

Now that isn't a worry today, but in 6-8 years, it could be a big worry. Then you would need something to protect them since there won't be enough F-22s.

Again, you're assuming a situation and assuming a set of parameters that seems designed to advance a conclusion you've already reached. What makes you think such a situation will occur? What makes you so sure there won't be enough F-22s? What convinces you that such a situation can only be managed through deployment of large numbers of fighters that are superior to what you imagine the J-20 to be?

We mostly know what the Red Chinese want us to know, which I would guess isn't much.

Are you assuming that the US has no espionage capacity whatsoever? If so, on what basis do you make that assumption? If by "we" you mean those of us here on SWJ, you're probably right, but how much does that mean?

I read the article you cited and I judged it to be more sniffing dismissiveness than not. It reminded me a little of an article in Air Progress magazine I read about the MiG-21 in 1964 or 65. That article concluded that the MiG would present little if any problem to our fighters over the DRV. The actual case was rather different. It also reminded me of some of the judgments of Japanese aircraft capabilities prior to WWII. My reading of history makes me a bit nervous when people are so cocksure that the other guy won't be able to do it.

I would be more nervous if we were overreacting and churning out newer and better weapons to meet threats that we don't need to meet. Our domestic economic problems are a greater threat to us than any foreign power, and those are not going to be improved by charging into an arms race that we don't need to be in.

One thing that may have been brought up before about the F-35 but needs to be kept in mind. The original title of the program was JSF, Joint Strike Fighter. Strike Fighter is a gold and silver winged zoomie code word for Light Bomber. They call it that because the zoomies would die of shame if somebody called them bomber pilots. The F-35 is primarily a light bomber, secondarily a fighter.

On what do you base that conclusion? I seem to recall that in its day the relatively small, single-engined F16 functioned quite capably both as a fighter and in attack configuration. Why should the F-35 not do the same?

Of course if you choose to believe all the worst possible assessments of the F-35 and all the best possible assessments of the J-20, you'll come to certain conclusions. ow realistic those conclusions are is another question. When I hear someone in the aviation industry talking up how our aircraft are lame and somebody else's are soooo much better, I hear a bid for money, usually a whole lot of it. Such things must be taken with multiple grains of salt.

In any event a lot of what makes an air force effective isn't just about the plane, as described here:

http://defensetech.org/2010/12/31/j-...s-perspective/

I would gauge a modern combat aircraft’s capabilities by looking at the following features:

1. Access to offboard space, ground, and air-based sensors, particularly a capable AEW/AWACS system with a well-trained crew and robust data links.

2. Effective sensor fusion to allow the pilot to make use of all this information, as well as information from onboard sensors.

3. An integrated EW system.

4. An AESA radar with a high level of reliability.

5. Training and doctrine necessary to make effective use of all this data and equipment. Plenty of flight hours for pilot flight training, too.

6. Powerful engines (ideally capable of supercruise), with a high mean time between overhaul and failures.

7. An airframe with low-observable characteristics.

8. A robust air-to-air refueling capability (equipment, readiness, training).

9. Sophisticated and reliable precision guided weaponry.

10. A robust software and hardware upgrade roadmap, to keep this plane effective in 5, 10, and 30 years.

11. Maintenance procedures in place to keep the plane operating with a high mission-capable rate. And of course equipment that has been designed with easy access for maintenance and easy access for electronic diagnostic tools, and ideally a sophisticated health-usage monitoring system (HUMS).

This list is not in any particular order of magnitude. And I’m sure I’ve missed quite a few other key items.

The J-20 offers one item from this list (#7). I’m not convinced that the PLAAF has any other items from this list, although China seems to be making some progress with #9.

It’s kind of fun to watch the world fixate on this one item (#7). Then again, I still enjoy air shows, too. Pugachev’s Cobra maneuver, for example. Drives the crowd wild. Relevance to modern combat? Zero.