What we support and defend

[Fuchs]

Really? I think I remember some earlier ideology that used to "to leverage individuals and movements around the globe to their cause with modern information tools". They were intent on something called "world revolution" or similar.
The then-modern information tools were not the same as today, but noting this as only substantial difference means that the whole thing is trivial.


On another note, some privateers circumnavigated earth in the 16th century already.


I also recall having read about condottieri, mercenary captains who basically took over almost the entire warfare business in Italy for quite some time.


There was also an international anarchist movement that played a role in kicking off the First World War.


China was repeatedly ravaged by sects and other non-state actors, including in what was likely the second most-deadly war ever, the Taiping Rebellion.


There were also ocean-spanning "East India Trade companies" and other at times quite violent and war-making trade groups, including the Hanse.



I recommend to delete "non-state actors" and "leverage" from the vocabulary. They trigger my BS alert far too often.

[ganulv]

but I would argue that it encompasses many kinds of institutions rather than a single type. And it might be worth thinking about whether we have seen the rise of some new kinds of them over the past decade or two. Right off the top of my head, I cannot think of any post-Englightenment groups of note previous to AQ sharing their mix of anti-secularism and anti-nationalism. And there now exist corporations seemingly distinct from the East India Trading Company vis-à-vis their relationship to/with sovereign states.

[Fuchs]

Right off the top of my head, I cannot think of any post-Englightenment groups of note previous to AQ sharing their mix of anti-secularism and anti-nationalism.[/B][/URL].

I think I can, this one came to my mind before I had completed reading your sentence:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Ahmad

[ganulv]

I think I can, this one came to my mind before I had completed reading your sentence:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Ahmad

Eschatological ideology is by definition global, but the (or at least this) Mahdi’s military and political goals were about Sudan. I do believe it fair to characterize AQ as transnational in character.

[Dayuhan]

military presence is military action. Particularly in times of peace such as our nation enjoys now.

Specific action?

Less presence and less bases on the far side of the Pacific, not more.

Renegotiate all of the defense treaties of the region to reflect the world as it exists today, but with a general trend of the US taking a much smaller direct role in the security events of the region, and China taking a larger role. With the US serving more as a distant reserve and counter-balance to prevent China from abusing the sovereignty of her neighbors.

Delegate. We want to be the "global leader" according to our NSS, well it is time for a more sophisticated form of leadership. Currently we abuse the sovereignty of China to accomplish that same task through containment strategy, Empowerment strategy recognizes China's status as the most powerful nation in East Asia, and India in South Asia and reinforces their sovereignty as it supports their lead in the regions of their issue.

That's a little better, but still far from specific.

How exactly does the US "abuse the sovereignty of China"? The US at present seems to be doing exactly what you say, trying to be a "counter-balance to prevent China from abusing the sovereignty of her neighbors". It doesn't look like it's working. How does one respond if the idea of being a distant counterbalance is clearly ineffective? Move closer? Give up?

Going back to the previous...

We can empower Japan and South Korea to take on greater responsibility for their own defense, rather than primarily expecting them to serve as bases for our own containment.

We can certainly pull forces back from these countries if we decide that it's in our interest to do so. That's not "empowering" anyone to take more responsibility for their own defense, they already have the power to do that if they choose to do it. We'd be forcing a choice, not empowering: two entirely different things.

We can empower China to work with us to ensure the safe sailing of the commercial fleets of the region.

China already has that power; they don't need us to give it to them. In any event the commercial fleets of the region face no significant threat and don't need anyone to ensure safe sailing, except perhaps off Somalia, where the Chinese are already working with us. Can't see how there's any "empowerment" for us to do in that sphere.

We can empower the Philippines to actually work to resolve the disconnect between their government and their many diverse, but equally dissatisfied, populaces.

How do you propose to do that? Please don't think that a US withdrawal from the Philippines would force (oh, sorry, "empower") the Philippine government to "resolve the disconnect between their government and their many diverse, but equally dissatisfied, populaces". That would not happen. If we weren't around the Philippine government would revert to its previous methods and take more of a Sri Lanka-style approach to its various insurgencies, from which they've temporarily stepped back because going all touchy-feely pop centric is seen as the way into the US pocketbook. I suppose it could be said that we'd be empowering them to do that, but I'm not sure any of the dissatisfied populaces would thank us for it.

[Bill Moore]

This was one method attempted, I'm not sure it worked as planned, but our presence in East Asia probably prevented some states from falling to communism, but again we'll never know. It is like deterence, our forward presence may have deterred, or maybe the USSR didn't act for other reasons. Like most things in the world there are multiple factors that influence the behavoir/decisions that states make.

http://www.pearsonschoolsandfecolleg...75Chapter2.pdf

One fundamental strategy used by successive US administrations was to attempt to create model states in Asia, to show that democracy and capitalism would bring economic prosperity, freedom and happiness. The USA felt that their political system was the best in the world, and that no country would choose communism when they saw the benefits democracy had brought to these model states. They began with their own ex-colony of the
Philippines. This artificial imposition of western culture onto another country is an example of cultural imperialism.

President Truman used Filipino independence as a means of ensuring US dominance in the PaciŸfic and so strengthening the Pacific Rim Defensive Perimeter Strategy. However, he resisted any suggestion that the USA was in
fact treating it as a colony, in case this provoked a revival of European imperialism. Instead, he emphasised two features of the newly-independent state:
1. Its measures to prevent European dominance of its markets and materials
2. Its democratic values of freedom and liberty. It was intended to be a shining example of capitalist prosperity and democracy to encourage other states in the area to resist the spread of communism.

Break, Bob, our war nor our containment policy was directed at China:

http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/dat...y.cfm?HHID=488

In mid-October, the first of 300,000 Chinese soldiers slipped into North Korea. When U.S. forces began what they expected to be their final assault in late November, they ran into the Chinese army. There was a danger that the U.S. Army might be overrun. The Chinese intervention ended any hope of reunifying Korea by force of arms.

General MacArthur called for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to unleash American air and naval power against China. But the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Omar Bradley, said a clash with China would be "the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."

Emphasis is mine.

[Bob's World]

Bill - Containment and war are two different things. We absolutely worked every bit as hard to contain China as Russia; which has nothing to do with Mac being told not to go to war with China over Korea. His mission was to contain, he wanted to do more and got fired.

Dayuhan, you apply, intentionally I believe far too narrow a definition on "empower." To empower does not mean that one was powerless previously, just that they felt no need to do what they already know they should be doing. Like a 24 year old son still living with his parents. He knows he should be paying for his own place, cooking his own food, and doing his own laundry, but he is enabled to take the easy way out. Is it "abandonment" of such a son to tell them it is time to move out and get a job? No, to do so is to empower them to stand up and be a man. To continue the status quo is to enable behavior that isn't good for anyone in the long run. This is where we are with many of our Pacific Allies.

We are like a mother who is afraid to let them go, and they are happy to allow us to keep subsidizing a comfortable status quo. It is time for everyone to move on. We do not abandon allies when we do this, we empower them. Same when we share regional power duties with China. We do not give up power to them when we do this, we actually make our situation stronger, as we share onerous duties that profit everyone, and at the same time take away much of the rationale China employs currently to justify much the current military buildup that we in turn build up to match. End the arms race, it serves no (good) purpose. Sure it strengthens Chinese politicians position as they stand up to this affront, sure it keeps US defense contractors churning on tactical fighters and "A2/AD" systems that we really don't need. Those are purposes, but they are not good purposes, and they make our nation weaker, not stronger.

[Bill Moore]

Containment and war are two different things. We absolutely worked every bit as hard to contain China as Russia; which has nothing to do with Mac being told not to go to war with China over Korea. His mission was to contain, he wanted to do more and got fired.

The containment policy was directed at the USSR, we tried to pull China into our sphere to help contain the USSR. The USSR did aggressively expand (using force), and continued to do so, so our containment policy was appropriate. Where exactly did China try to expand to that we needed to contain it? China is expanding its influence far beyond its borders now, and an argument could be made that China is trying to contain us.

War and containment may be different, or it war may be a sequential step to implement containment, the point of the quote was that U.S. leaders didn't view China as an enemy. China's actions in North Korea and North Vietnam were in response to U.S. actions, they were not expanding in those situations.

Red China was immoral, it murdered millions of its own citizens, it was bankrupt, there is nothing good to say about it, but I can't find any evidence that were containing it, and the only reason is it wasn't expanding.

[Bob's World]

The containment policy was directed at the USSR, we tried to pull China into our sphere to help contain the USSR. The USSR did aggressively expand (using force), and continued to do so, so our containment policy was appropriate. Where exactly did China try to expand to that we needed to contain it? China is expanding its influence far beyond its borders now, and an argument could be made that China is trying to contain us.

War and containment may be different, or it war may be a sequential step to implement containment, the point of the quote was that U.S. leaders didn't view China as an enemy. China's actions in North Korea and North Vietnam were in response to U.S. actions, they were not expanding in those situations.

Red China was immoral, it murdered millions of its own citizens, it was bankrupt, there is nothing good to say about it, but I can't find any evidence that were containing it, and the only reason is it wasn't expanding.

Bill,

I'm not sure what to say to a post that is so disconnected from the post-WWII history of US foreign policy and strategy in the Pacific. You have been working most of your adult life to support the US policy of containment in the Pacific.

Yes, we very much saw China, and Russia as well, as two of our strongest allies coming out of WWII and President Roosevelt imagined a world where they would work with the US and Great Britain as "Four Policemen" to replace the failed League of Nations and provide a united force for security around the globe. In a way his vision came true, only it broke up into first three teams as the events of 1947 made clear that the Soviets were on their own agenda, then two in 1949 with Maoist China prevailed over the Nationalists and made it very clear that they saw America just as they saw all other Western Colonial powers and were very much not interested in the type of alliance that we offered them. The Cold War was on in full strength, and this before the first Russian tank manned by North Koreans rolled across the line we had drawn through the heart of that country.

The "domino theory" was not an abstract, it was specifically about the nations of SEA, and the great debate was if we should draw the line of containment on the Chinese border and include them all, or if we should cut our losses and draw that line at Thailand. The decision was to include them all, and drove our support to first the French, and then Diem, et al in Vietnam. It drove our support to the Nationalist Chinese taking refuge on Taiwan. It shaped the nature of our relationships with Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand to name but three.

Us old guys are all born and bred Cold Warriors, so it is natural that we see Cold War policy, strategy and relationships as natural. But they are not any more natural than any other policies, strategies and relationships tied to any other particular time and place.

To assume them as a baseline for "normal" is to fall into the age old trap of attempting to sustain the unsustainable.

We live in new times and that calls for new approaches. The President's recently announced new strategy to place more emphasis on the Pacific due to its rising importance to the US economy recognizes this.

But inertia drives us forward from where we already are. And where we already are is based upon three generations of containment in the Pacific. It is hard to break free from that type of inertia. Instead of building new strategy on top of old, we really need to break out the proverbial "clean slate." The world has changed dramatically since the lines on the current slate were drawn, and continues to change at an increasing rate.

This is the essence of what Operational or Strategic Design is supposed to do for us. This is the promise of that school of analysis. To look at problems with fresh eyes and to see them with new understanding. One cannot undertake such an effort with any purity if it draws "no think areas" around certain critical policies, relationships, plans, capabilities, or paradigms.

I don't have the answer for how the US should approach the Pacific, but I do feel strongly that the current solution we seek to apply is far too rooted in in its Cold War history and suffers from an inertia of containment thinking that dooms it to make our situation worse in the Pacific rather than better. This is far bigger than PACOM, and if I were the PACOM commander I would be doing a few things.

1. Continue to prepare to execute the plans and policies with which we are tasked.

2. Stand up an elite, multi-discipline, operational planning team that answers to me directly to conduct a comprehensive strategic design of the entire theater. No sacred cows, everything on the table.

3. Task the Asia-Pacific Center to do the same thing, but with a multi-national and multi-disciple approach that include representatives from every major nation in the region, and as many minor ones as will come.

4. Engage the SecDef and the Chairman of my concerns and what I am doing to get a better grasp on this. Tell them that my belief is that building new strategy on the foundation of old containment strategy is inappropriate to what it is the President is truly asking us to do, and that it may well make us more at risk rather than safer. That we are studying the problem in detail and that I will be coming to them with what may well be bold new concepts that are far beyond my, or their, lane to implement. That we need to see the President now to discuss these concerns and efforts to address them, and that we will want follow-ups as our results begin to materialize.

5. Emphasize that there is much good new in this. That if my instincts are correct we will be able to craft new plans and strategies that could trim hundreds of billions of dollars in current "requirements" from the overall defense programing between now and 2020. But that all of this will require significant increase in diplomacy and parallel revision of policy to replace what has become overtime a predominantly militaristic approach to the region.

Probably more, but off the top of my head that is where I would start. But this is why SF Colonels, particularly ones with eclectic backgrounds such as mine, are not PACOM commanders. We pick Navy Admirals who grew up as commanders of surface fleets, or as fighter pilots. Men with 35 years of containment experience under their belts, who understand what right looks like and how to make it happen.

But is the world is indeed changing as so many claim it is, how could such perspectives so heavily rooted in what it used to be still be the "right" we are looking for or needing for today and tomorrow??

[Bill Moore]

Bob,
As you well know the situation was not as black and white as you make it out to be, and while we all over simplify our comments on blogs to capture our main ideas on short posts, in this case your comments misleading. Your comments inaccurately create the perception that we are still focused on containment, and that is not true.
I simply asked for you to provide some evidence that our containment policy was directed at China, instead you jump up on a soapbox and tap dance all around the question and just claim that it is. You claim we’re practicing containment now, what is your evidence?
Partly I’m playing devil’s advocate, because I also know to varying degrees we did practice a containment policy by trying to prevent China from obtaining a seat in the UN, and in the early 1960s the U.S. considered pre-emptive strikes to prevent China from becoming a nuclear power. We also pushed for economic sanctions, etc. I guess that is a form of containment also, but we didn’t pursue it. We
However, our containment policy clearly directed at the USSR, especially since our containment policy was formed “before” China fell to the communists. When China signed a friendship treaty with the USSR in 1950 they became part of the global communist movement we directed our containment policy at, but in the late 50s China’s relationship with the USSR fell apart. In the 1972 the U.S. and China established a relationship (to help contain the USSR), and that was in the middle of the Cold War. Shifting alliances for enduring interests, which is different than your black and white view that we always pursued containment with the PRC.
I can’t state this as fact, but I believe (and I will research it) the USSR was more active promoting the spread of communism in the Asia-Pacific than China.
You wrote,

“Us old guys are all born and bred Cold Warriors, so it is natural that we see Cold War policy, strategy and relationships as natural. But they are not any more natural than any other policies, strategies and relationships tied to any other particular time and place.”

I think you are blinded by “your” perception, and confuse your perception with the actual views of our leadership. Personally I hear very few old timers that actually promote containment, they transitioned into the post Cold War era in the 1990s, but we haven’t done is clearly articulate our enduring interests. Actually I hear the word containment more from younger officers who are inappropriately trying to template historical solutions as a way forward, since as you correct point out we don’t have another strategy yet (but that doesn’t mean we’re still promoting containment. In response to your recommendations, most of them are spot on, and most of them have already been implemented. We can’t have a real strategy until we have comprehensive policy. Gets back to what are our enduring interests in the region? As you know relationships in this part of the world have been shifting for years (based on enduring interests), so it isn’t as near black and white as you make it out to be.

[Bob's World]

Bill you are living the evidence. Just because we stopped calling an approach by a certain name does not change the approach from what it is. Just because we see it as "normal" and take it for granted as a baseline for operations does not mean it is not abnormal.

I am not tap dancing. Our current policies, plans and postures regarding every land mass from the Philippines to Japan and all the water in between were designed SPECIFICALLY to contain China (and the spread of their influence as well as physical presence). That is not my perception, that is a matter of historical fact. The conventional force never lost that focus throughout the GWOT even as SOF focused on other things.

We did not think about the Pacific in this way during the first half of the last century when we first reached out into the region. Then we looked for ways to extend our naval presence to better secure our commercial interests. Not to contain anyone, we did not even work to contain Japan as it spread its empire. That era and mission is far more in line with what the President is talking about now that what we have done since the end of WWII.

[Entropy]

Bob,

Containment: "the policy, process, or result of preventing the expansion of a hostile power or ideology"

What expansion are we trying to prevent? Again, a policy of containment presumes the adversary is expansionist or at least perceived to be expansionist. So, where is China being an expansionist and what,exactly, are we doing to try to contain that expansion?

Also, you might be confusing containment of China with containment of North Korea. We certainly do have a policy of containment there.

Also, the Chinese, Japanese and Koreans often don't play well together. Are Japan and Korea willing to accept us "empowering" the Chinese (whatever that means) to promote stability in the region? Your previous comments on Asian leadership give the impression that we can simply hand the baton of regional stability off to the Chinese. Do you think that will actually promote regional stability?

Related to that is how our alliances contain our allies, especially on the question of nuclear weapons.

[Bill Moore]

We did not think about the Pacific in this way during the first half of the last century when we first reached out into the region. Then we looked for ways to extend our naval presence to better secure our commercial interests. Not to contain anyone, we did not even work to contain Japan as it spread its empire. That era and mission is far more in line with what the President is talking about now that what we have done since the end of WWII.

Bob,

It may not have been containment, but we definitely had a plan for dealing with Japan as early as 1911 called Plan Orange, and we had bases in the Pacific to support it.

Our posture in the Pacific was mostly to contain the USSR, much less China since again China was NOT expanding. We tried to contain communism in the region regardless of what color it was (Lenenist or Maoist), but the threat to the U.S. was primarily the USSR and that was our focus. Show me a historical document that states otherwise? Japan was much more concerned about an attack from the USSR than China during the Cold War.

We provided support to China to fight the Japanese well before we entered the war.

[Fuchs]

The Germans assisted China as well (till 1937 IIRC), the Soviets assisted China (1939-1940 for gold IIRC), and the US. did very little in comparison prior to 1941. That doesn't mean much.

[Bill Moore]

Fuchs, I was simply demonstrating that the U.S. did try to contain or counter Japan's aggression. You are correct, support was limited until 1941, but we did support with some funding and economic sanctions directed against Japan.

[Bob's World]

"Dealing with" and "containing" as a strategy for "dealing with" are two very different things. Certainly we were thinking about how to deal with a rising Japan then, and certainly we need to think about how to deal with a rising China in a post Cold War World now. No arguments.

My point is simply that your assessemnt of the history of Cold War containment runs counter to every serious coverage of the topic that I have ever read (and I have read several); and that our current efforts for the "pivot" build upon a family of plans, programs, postures and policies that were originally put in place to contain the "Sino" aspect of the Soviet-Sino pact. I think we should start fresh with a concept designed for the world we live in today, rather than building upon the remains of one that is long past.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan, you apply, intentionally I believe far too narrow a definition on "empower." To empower does not mean that one was powerless previously, just that they felt no need to do what they already know they should be doing. Like a 24 year old son still living with his parents. He knows he should be paying for his own place, cooking his own food, and doing his own laundry, but he is enabled to take the easy way out. Is it "abandonment" of such a son to tell them it is time to move out and get a job? No, to do so is to empower them to stand up and be a man. To continue the status quo is to enable behavior that isn't good for anyone in the long run. This is where we are with many of our Pacific Allies.

I do tend to define terms narrowly: rigorous definition is needed for precision and for keeping discussion on track.

I don't think any of our Asian allies are even remotely analogous to a 24 year old son living with his parents. For one thing, none of them are economically dependent on us. If we choose to station military forces on their soil we do so for our own reasons, with their consent. If our assessment of our interests changes, certainly we can place those forces anywhere, but again we'd be doing it for our own reasons and I see no point is dragging terms like "empowerment" into the picture.

Same when we share regional power duties with China. We do not give up power to them when we do this, we actually make our situation stronger, as we share onerous duties that profit everyone, and at the same time take away much of the rationale China employs currently to justify much the current military buildup that we in turn build up to match.

What "regional power duties" do you propose to share with China? Neither China nor the US has any duty to defend regional commerce, which is under no real threat, excpt possibly from conflicts involving China and/or the US.

I don't see that either the Chinese or the Americans have any particular interest in "regional power duties": they are pursuing their own strategic objectives. They may try to spin these objectives as duties, but there's no need to buy into that.

[Bob's World]

Well its your right to call your approach "rigorous, " but it comes across more as intentionally obtuse and argumentative with concepts you disagree with. For one, I was clearly talking security, which while necessary for the economic growth that all in the region have enjoyed to some degree, is not the economy directly. You surely do not believe that the US has not subsidized the security environment that allowed that growth?

I guess one could say the US has empowered the economic growth of the region at the same time we enabled many nations to take major shortcuts on security.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World

Dealing with" and "containing" as a strategy for "dealing with" are two very different things. Certainly we were thinking about how to deal with a rising Japan then, and certainly we need to think about how to deal with a rising China in a post Cold War World now. No arguments.

My point is simply that your assessemnt of the history of Cold War containment runs counter to every serious coverage of the topic that I have ever read (and I have read several); and that our current efforts for the "pivot" build upon a family of plans, programs, postures and policies that were originally put in place to contain the "Sino" aspect of the Soviet-Sino pact. I think we should start fresh with a concept designed for the world we live in today, rather than building upon the remains of one that is long past.

Bob I think we are coming closer to general agreement. My point was our containment policy was formed before China fell to the communists, in fact the whole of issue of "allowing" China to fall to the communists led to extreme political views within our system and created an environment where political leaders were forced to take a much tougher stand against communist insurgencies even in locations where it didn't make sense because you didn't want your party to be blamed for another failure. Not unlike some of the unreasonable rhetoric associated with our former GWOT.

Second, the Soviet-Sino pact was relatively short lived (no more than two decades), and since the early 70s we formed some sort of relationship with China to keep them out of USSR's sphere of influence. We made deals with the devil back then quite frequently as you know.

Third, I still argue, but remain open to be convinced otherwise, so really I'm arguing to provoke counter-arguments, that our force posture in the Asia-Pacific was "mostly" directed at the Soviets. I found several documents from that era that focused on the Soviet threat in Asia (especially their Navy), very little that focused on China. If you have official historical policy documents, or strategy documents that state otherwise please post them. I'm eager to learn.

[Bob's World]

I believe Russian aspirations in the region were sunk along with their fleet by Japan long before the US became a major player on the scene.

We forget that the biggest hedge against Russian adventures are her neighbors (China and Japan have done that well on their own), and the same for China as demonstrated by Vietnam.

We got here by inches over decades, now we must change by miles over months. I don't see us seeking that hard right, but rather I see us taking the easy path of simply reinforcing a concept that has already long expired.