What we support and defend

[Entropy]

Neither was a threat to us. Moreover, what Americans never seem to get is that their involvement in Bosnia was first and foremost about doing something together for the sake of doing something together.

Wasn't a threat to whom? Maybe not Germany, but it's hard to argue that a civil war in the Balkans wasn't a threat to Italy and bordering nations. Could Europe simply ignore what what's happening on their doorstep, or even in the foyer?

It's similar with Libya; the European forces weren't even involved enough to move some fighters to forward airfields in Southern Sicily - no wonder that additional aerial refuelling etc was required.

The reasons more fighters weren't deployed to southern Italy had to do with airbase capabilities. The bulk of tacair went to Aviano for a reason.

Regardless, European military leaders recognize there are significant gaps in European capabilities that make it very difficult for them to conduct operations like Libya and Bosnia/Kosovo. It's not just a question of "doing something together."

On the other hand, Europe is being defended by two European nuclear power with SSBNs, faces no serious military in its South and a still weakened and rotten Russian/Belorussian military in its East. Even the quickest check of numbers reveals that we're dominating our periphery with a vast military superiority without taking into account a single U.S. soldier.

I don't think there's any question that Europe is able to defend itself from invasions and such (and to deter the same). What's at question is Europe's capability to utilize military force in Europe's near-abroad to defend Europe's interests and there European capability is lacking.

[Bob's World]

A futurist advised:

"Look back twice as far as you intend to look forward": So to prepare for the next 50 years we'd be wise to look back at the past 100; for the next 100 the past 200. Most don't look into the past any deeper than the middle of the Cold War. I went to a RAND presentation of their recommendations for the future force and they stopped in the paper at the end of WWII and advised we build a force IAW what Ike faced as President in the mid-50s, at something like 3.5 % GDP. When I observed that that was a Cold War force for the threat that no longer exists, and that the emerging world looks much more like the one that existed pre-WWI than the one that existed post WWII it turns out they had run those numbers, 1.5% GDP, but apparently didn't think the customers they were courting at DoD would like them.

Lesson: Being too short sighted or ignoring inconvenient truths are both dangerous.

"Kill your own products and flee into the future" This is the advice on how Apple stays in front of technology pirates and legal rivals. They are unafraid of killing successful products and making a leap to the next thing. We too have many "successful products" such as these alliances and treaties and aircraft carriers and large standing armies, and bombers, and GCCs and rangers that now look like JSOC-lite rather than like amped up infantry, etc.

Here is our query: What must we "kill" of these dated products that served well in their time in order to "flee into the future"?

This is a scary concept, that is why there is only one Apple. Apple also always remembers their roots as they make those bold leaps forward.

We do the worst of both. We forget our roots and cling to obsolete products and concepts built for a world that no longer exists. We are no Apple when it comes to our national security.
.

[Fuchs]

Wasn't a threat to whom? Maybe not Germany, but it's hard to argue that a civil war in the Balkans wasn't a threat to Italy and bordering nations. Could Europe simply ignore what what's happening on their doorstep, or even in the foyer?

Slovenia had almost no civil war symptoms, we didn't intervene in Croatia - Bosnia and Kosovo can hardly be counted as neighbours.
The Greeks were not exactly favourable of the Kosovo intervention, so it was apparently not in their interest.

Yugoslavia could have burned down to the last man and the European NATO would not have been affected substantially. No-one from there was about to invade us, ever.

Well, save for the Kosovo-Albanian organised criminals who poured into our countries together with legitimate refugees. We only got them under control when we reduced the police pressure on domestic organised criminals who had better manners.

The reasons more fighters weren't deployed to southern Italy had to do with airbase capabilities. The bulk of tacair went to Aviano for a reason.

Utter complacency.
There were enough roads and enough civilian airports in Sicily. Close that ####, use it for the military. That's MUCH less stupid than to pay billions for additional mid-air refuelling aircraft "just in case".

Regardless, European military leaders recognize there are significant gaps in European capabilities that make it very difficult for them to conduct operations like Libya and Bosnia/Kosovo. It's not just a question of "doing something together."

Yes, European politicians want more toys to play with in stupid adventure games. That's not indicative of our security needs, of course!

What's at question is Europe's capability to utilize military force in Europe's near-abroad to defend Europe's interests and there European capability is lacking.

The total, utter 10000%, obvious, proven cost-inefficiency of such stupid political adventures means that this 'incapability' is EXACTLY as it should be. 'capability' is in this regard = stupidity.

[Bob's World]

Gotta agree with Fuchs on this.

The US is quick to label our concern of the day as "vital" and "universal" and then tell our NATO allies that it is their interest as well and that they must come join us on some grand adventure. That is a song that grew old long ago, and at this point I suspect many are simply starting to tune out altogether.

We declare things as threats and interests that do not even pass the common sense review looking thorugh US lenses; let alone those of our allies. We are making ourselves irrelevant in many regards by this tendency.

[davidbfpo]

Entropy posted:

What's at question is Europe's capability to utilize military force in Europe's near-abroad to defend Europe's interests and there European capability is lacking.

As if to order Bob advises all:

So to prepare for the next 50 years we'd be wise to look back at the past 100; for the next 100 the past 200.

A bit of history first. In 1956 the USA opposed (rightly) the last big external operation by two European nations, the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, usually called the Suez crisis. If you exclude Bosnia & Kosovo then Europe, which is wider than NATO & the EU, has not mounted any defence of Europe's interests. The only special case that comes to mind is Cyprus, when individual nations under UN auspices contributed and today very few Europeans want to be there - Cyprus going way beyond it's best by date, as boredom set in.

Incidentally I don't think European leaders (within NATO & EU) should be forgiven for their crazy policies over Bosnia and it was a trilateral-only mission that broke the Bosnian Serbs at Sarajevo. The Dutch, French and British with heavy artillery & mortars being placed on Mount Igman.

Given the generally agreed poor state of a European capability to intervene, the best illustration of this comes with maritime border control; yes, often not a military responsibility. It is common knowledge that the Mediterranean is a major route for illegal migration, well illustrated during the Tunisian and then Libyan crises on the Italian island of Pantelleria. Fast forward to Greece and the ten of thousands of known illegals and refugees stuck in limbo there.

Border control is a European issue - using a broader definition of security.

To Bob's point to look back. Europe is no longer the fulcrum of international politics, as a continent it is "drawing in" and shrinking in many measures of power - with military coercion to the fore. It does have many non-coercive instruments of influence and power, but these remain largely used at a national level.

In some respect Europe and I exclude Russia in this - is in a very similar position to the years before 1914. Other powers were advancing, note Russia was the fastest developing economy pre-1914 and these powers were often in competition with the largest European nations: France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain. With the exception of a handful of countries, yes, the Imperial ones with far-flung and nearby colonies, Europe looked inwards and outwards in very similar proportions. Emigration was then a huge factor and remained so until 1939, for e.g. Italians going to Argentina.

[Entropy]

Yugoslavia could have burned down to the last man and the European NATO would not have been affected substantially.

and

The total, utter 10000%, obvious, proven cost-inefficiency of such stupid political adventures means that this 'incapability' is EXACTLY as it should be. 'capability' is in this regard = stupidity.

Ok, is your opinion shared by most Europeans? Doesn't appear that way to me. If you go back and look at polling at the time, the European consensus doesn't even approach letting Yugoslavia "burn to the last man." Europe was more divided on Libya, which showed in the various restrictions put on member forces, but it seems to me that most of the European public doesn't share your view. So it seems likely, to me at least, that Europe will probably want to engage in what you'd consider to be stupid adventures.

Utter complacency.
There were enough roads and enough civilian airports in Sicily. Close that ####, use it for the military. That's MUCH less stupid than to pay billions for additional mid-air refuelling aircraft "just in case".

Let's assume for a minute it's at all practical to close southern Italy to allow for the military transport of fuel, munitions, maintenance equipment etc. to save a few hundred miles of flight time. I think your assertion that this would somehow be cheaper than IFR is questionable at best, as is the assumption that IFR wouldn't be necessary if all coalition aircraft could be based in, for instance, Sicily.

Regardless, the problem wasn't simply refueling. More than that was ISR and stocks of adequate munitions. There was also the European inability to stand up a fully-staffed and capable air operations center in a timely manner, among other things.

But my point here isn't to take sides in a debate over whether and when Europe should intervene and under what circumstances. That is for Europeans to decide. I'm simply pointing out a discrepancy between what appear to be European desires to militarily influence their near-abroad and actual European military capabilities.

Bob's World,

The US is quick to label our concern of the day as "vital" and "universal" and then tell our NATO allies that it is their interest as well and that they must come join us on some grand adventure. That is a song that grew old long ago, and at this point I suspect many are simply starting to tune out altogether.

I agree, but in Libya it was the other way around.

I also personally agree with a lot of what you've said in this thread regarding where we should be headed. The problem is those proposals don't appear likely to occur anytime soon, if ever. As I get older, I increasingly find it futile to spend time debating what are probably fantasies rather than deal with difficult and unpleasant realities and probable futures. Perhaps that's unhealthy cynicism, but my tolerance for wishful thinking is pretty low.


David,

Good historical perspective, thanks.

[Bob's World]

Go to the link to see this chart of active military size (total and by service) since 1940

http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0004598.html

I'll paste the data as well, but it is easier to read in the chart at the link.

We had to carry a large military on the peacetime books to implement a Containment Strategy. If we had chosen a different strategy we would not have needed this large of a military over the years. But because we had it for so long we have grown used to having it, and have created an entirely new military culture in the US as a result. Within DoD, and within our government and society as a whole in regards to the use of military force to enact our foreign policies.

"Global Leadership" that requires the world's most powerful military to promote and enforce is not a very sophisticated brand of "leadership." Arguably the right numbers for the Army and the Air Force today are at about 250K each in the active force. Yes, that would mean many things would have to change. But that is the point. Many things need to change. Crack addicts don't get better with a big bag of crack in their pocket.

But we'll need a new strategy to go with this new military. Containment must go. Even the new "containment-lite" we are applying to China. Rebublicans and Democrats a like need to get behind such a sea change. Don't wave your pocket copy of the Consttitution at me Congressman, READ IT instead. Then do your duty. Bring home the troops, kill the unnecesary programs and resize the force. But do it will making equal cuts to the "entitlements" audiances, bloated bureaucracies, and failed domestic policies such as "the war on drugs" and "no child left behind."



Active Duty Military Personnel, 1940–20111




Year

Army

Air Force

Navy

Marine Corps

Total



1940

269,023



160,997

28,345

458,365



1945

8,266,373



3,319,586

469,925

12,055,884



1950

593,167

411,277

380,739

74,279

1,459,462



1955

1,109,296

959,946

660,695

205,170

2,935,107



1960

873,078

814,752

616,987

170,621

2,475,438



1965

969,066

824,662

669,985

190,213

2,653,926



1970

1,322,548

791,349

691,126

259,737

3,064,760



1975

784,333

612,751

535,085

195,951

2,128,120



1980

777,036

557,969

527,153

188,469

2,050,627



1985

780,787

601,515

570,705

198,025

2,151,032



1990

732,403

535,233

579,417

196,652

2,043,705



1991

710,821

510,432

570,262

194,040

1,985,555



1992

610,450

470,315

541,886

184,529

1,807,177



1993

572,423

444,351

509,950

178,379

1,705,103



1994

541,343

426,327

468,662

174,158

1,610,490



1995

508,559

400,409

434,617

174,639

1,518,224



1996

491,103

389,001

416,735

174,883

1,471,722



1997

491,707

377,385

395,564

173,906

1,438,562



1998

483,880

367,470

382,338

173,142

1,406,830



1999

479,426

360,590

373,046

172,641

1,385,703



2000

482,170

355,654

373,193

173,321

1,384,338



2001

480,801

353,571

377,810

172,934

1,385,116



2002

486,542

368,251

385,051

173,733

1,413,577



2003

490,174

376,402

379,742

177,030

1,423,348



2004

494,112

369,523

370,445

177,207

1,411,287



2005

488,944

351,666

358,700

178,704

1,378,014



2006 (June)

496,362

352,620

353,496

178,923

1,381,401



2007 (Aug.)

519,471

337,312

338,671

184,574

1,380,082



2011 (Sept.)

565,463

333,370

325,123

201,157

1,468,364


NOTE: Figures for 1998 through August 2007 include cadets/midshipmen.

1. Military personnel on extended or continuous active duty. Excludes reserves on active duty for training.

Source: Department of Defense.


Read more: Active Duty Military Personnel, 1940–2011 — Infoplease.com http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A00045...#ixzz1xTaHiQ9r

[Fuchs]

Ok, is your opinion shared by most Europeans? Doesn't appear that way to me. If you go back and look at polling at the time, the European consensus doesn't even approach letting Yugoslavia "burn to the last man."

There were polls about pop music, best beer and many other things. Opinions voiced in polls do not necessarily prove that something is a necessary act of defence.

As harsh as it may sound; getting involved in Yugoslavia was for entertainment, not a necessity. Maybe we needed involvement (for entertainment), but we didn't need it for security.

[Entropy]

Bob,

The thing is, we don't have a containment strategy anymore, but we still have the system of global military alliances which is, only in part, a legacy of containment. But the alliances aren't and weren't simply about defending against the Soviets and they serve a lot of other purposes. Again, the point I would make is that if one is going to have a global system of active military alliances (for whatever purpose), then one needs ready forces to give those alliances credibility. This isn't to suggest we are stuck with a large military - rather, we need to be cognizant of the likely effects of a reduced military force and plan our foreign policy and change our alliances accordingly.

Fuchs,

I get that you don't think intervention in Yugoslavia was necessary. Most of your neighbors in Europe disagree with you.

[Bob's World]

I wish you were correct, but the fact is we are running on about "Containment 6.0" and have never made a serious effort to do more than slap an occasional patch on that dated product(yes, this strategy is now old enough to draw full Social Security benefits...ironically, as the funding of this strategy will likely prevent any of us from some day doing the same).

Hell, we even attempt to contain AQ in the FATA (ideologies and networked, non-state actors do not "contain" well), Russia, Iran and China influence ("We don't recognize spheres of influence - Sec Clinton) to name but a few examples. The recent shift to the Pacific may not be a physical containment in name, but it is certainly being approached as a defacto physical containment by the US and China alike. We employ a very controlling approach to foreign policy, where the US freely imposes strict red lines on others, but refuses to recognize any long established by others that we either disagree with or simply find to be inconvenient to our actions in a particular time and place.

As to the adequacy of our force, one must first come to grips with the reality of their mission before they can acurately assess their capacity for the same. We seek to sustain our military "Means" because our Policy and Strategy "Ends" and "Ways" are growing increasingly irrelvant, inappropriate, and unsupportable. When all Generals and Admrials feel they can do is salute and execute, they have little choice but to ask for more capacity. If we were to apply design theory to assessing the situation it would allow the military to come back with a more pramatic and helpful response than a simple "Yes sir!"

[Bill Moore]

Bob,

The shift to the Pacific is not about containment and great efforts are being made to prevent that perception. It isn't in our interest to contain, and as you pointed out it isn't possible. Detering aggression, protecting the commons, both enable economic growth which is in ours and other nations' interests.

I agree we have stated multiple times we are trying to contain AQ, which as you correctly pointed out is impossible. We won't deny safehaven, we won't easily, if ever, "counter" their ideology, etc., but in lieu of a better construct (help requested) we'll continue to default to those terms and the associated mentality. For AQ what are your recommendations? Defeat? Disrupt?

[Fuchs]

Fuchs,

I get that you don't think intervention in Yugoslavia was necessary. Most of your neighbors in Europe disagree with you.

One should never confuse preferences with necessities.

[Fuchs]

For AQ what are your recommendations? Defeat? Disrupt?

Grow up.

NATO boasts more than 600 million population and whatever AQ can do isn't even a real scratch on our surface.
It's at most a microscopic and temporary scratch on the surface, next to real cratches and even deep cuts.


We should begin to ignore them and everytime they actually succeed to kill some people we should take notice of it as a crime and put it into perspective. For example, we could report on a bus accident or the last month's influenza death statistic or the death rate from smoking before mentioning -ONCE- in the news that some criminals killed someone or a few people because of political hate.


Treat them as they deserve and they have already lost.

Meanwhile, everytime some fool suggests some expensive adventure or budget, make a counter-proposal, compare how many lives can be saved by investing in actual safety measures or medical research and then spend the money EVERY TIME on the more rational choice. Don't forget to expose and reprimand the fools who wanted to squander taxpayer money afterwards.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Perception is fact, and the perception inside the PACOM headquarters is not the one that matters most.

Any US strategy in the Pacific that is designed to work against China rather than with China is a form of containment, in fact if not in name.

Just type a simple Google search of "Containment, Pacific, China" and see what comes up. We've been applying some form of containment (or regime change to spice it up a bit) to virtually every problem since 1947. We have come to see the lesser forms of it as just doing business as usual and not being containment at all, but as I said, our perception is not the one that matters most.

I understand the President's decision to refocus America from Europe toward Asia; but he was talking primarily commerce, not threats. How do we shed the inertia of decades of containing China as part of the Cold War, to a future of working with China as the primary security and trading partner to keep the future of that region vibrant? I don't know. Just as old allies in the Middle East keep us spun up about Iran, old allies in the Pacific keep us spun up about China. Time for the US to reach out to both on our many shared interests, rather than simply fixating on the 2-3 issues we will agree to disagree about.

If the US is the global leader we claim to be, we should be taking lead on diplomatic solutions to the sharing of duties and rights in the South China Sea; or the timeline for peaceful reintegration of China-Taiwan. Ramping up a light version of containment seems to me to be more of an obstacle than a help in getting at resolution of such points of friction and potential conflict.

China is the trading partner of choice in the region. That will not change.

The US is the security partner of choice in the region. That will not change either.

All of our partners are playing that balancing game, with their economic future tied to China, and their security future tied to the US. This is reasonable and logical. But they also fear being caught in the middle of two super powers bumping chests over matters that are not of their interest. Taiwan independence is surely a keen issue for Taiwan, but for every other state that would be affected by a conflict over that issue it is not an issue they would risk fighting over or spoiling their relationship with China over. We too need to learn how to play a balancing game, and how to recognize that our global influence is trumped in certain places by the regional influence of others, and that that can be a good thing.

Truth is, we never stopped containing China, and the latest changes increases the energy and focus behind that effort. Call it what you want at PACOM, but it walks and quacks like a duck.

[Sigaba]

@Bob's World--

I agree with your core argument that the United States needs to have a an overdue debate over America's role in the world. I also agree that Congress needs to do a better job at checking the executive branch of the federal government.

However, I am not convinced that military policy is both the cause of and cure for the present imbalance. Moreover, I respectfully disagree with your use of American history buttress what is essentially a political argument. A few examples follow.

Our Constitution was a document uniquely written by Americans for Americans. Written by men after much debate as to how to ensure stability in a fledgling country made up of to that point by 13 distinct and sovereign states. Written by men who had grown to maturity as oppressed citizens of a government they deemed as illegitimate to govern them, held in check by the regular army of that government. An army they were forced to house and feed in their very homes; and in an environment where they were denied fundamental rights to gather and express their discontent, and a government that felt no compulsion to hear or respond to their reasonable concerns.

These same men then became rebels and insurgents, and fought to free themselves and this land and these people from such oppression; then in the summer of 1786 with the Confederation crumbling in disarray around them, they came together to design a system of governance that would allow such a diverse mix of sovereign states to work together as one, and to prevent the forms and actions of government that they knew first hand to be so destructive to human dignity and liberty.

Unfortunately, this interpretation of the War of American Revolution and the founding of the United States is greatly out of step with decades of historiography. In brief, the founders did not write the Constitution for all Americans, they wrote it for some Americans while excluding others (in particular, women) and establishing mechanisms that would maintain others--as well as their descendants-- in a state of slavery for the foreseeable future.

But that path is wrong and that path is un-American, and that path ignores the issues, the intentions and the goals of the framers of our system of governance.

Did the framers broadly agree on the direction America should take? The growing cleavages among different cohorts of Americans that saw the country at the edge of ruin by the 1850s suggest otherwise.

America must secure her interests. But as I said at the start, our Ends have come to be defined in far too ideological of terms.

Is the ideologically-driven national security policy of contemporary America really less ideologically driven than the national security policy of nineteenth century America? IMO, a survey of America's entry into the Second Anglo American War, to the Mexican American War, and to the American Civil War suggests that statesmen, given the choice between interests (in a geopolitical sense) and ideology, have frequently favored the latter.

We do not act out as we do because we are in danger, we act out because we have defined our strategy in such outrageous expansive terms of ideological Ends and overly controlling ways that the only way we can get others to conform with what we want them to do is by applying excessive Military Means. That too, I argue, is un-American.

How does this current approach to global affairs differ from America's approach during the nineteenth century? Was James Madison was out of touch with the principles of the founders when he ordered the invasion of Canada during the Second Anglo American War?

Name a single situation, other than the deterrence of the Soviet Union in Western Europe during the Cold War, that has demanded our possession of a large standing peacetime Army in the history of the US. Just one.

Show me where America ever suffered more than a black eye for not having a large standing army ready to fight.

Although this question wasn't directed at me, the clear answer is: Reconstruction. The premature demobilization of the American army not only had catastrophic consequences for freedmen and their descendants, the "Compromise of 1877" set the stage for the metastization of white supremacy on a global scale.

[Additionally, as David F. Trask argues persuasively in The AEF and Coalition Warmaking 1917-1918 (1993), the U.S.'s tradition of wartime mobilization not only hampered the AEF's initial operational effectiveness, it also impacted negatively America's ability to shape the end of the war. Moreover, America's wartime mobilization during the Second World War adversely impacted the U.S.'s ability to shape grand strategy as well as our relationship with the USSR.]

I strongly encourage those who have an interest in this topic to read the two histories of the American Army written by Edward M Coffman. He gives a very detailed account of the peacetime history of our Army and the nature and outcomes of these debates over time.

Are you referring to The Old Army (1986) and The Regulars (2004)? MOO, the works of Russell Weigley and ongoing scholarship of Richard Kohn provide a better starting point for your line of argument.

So, show me where my understanding of our founding is wrong.

MOO, your understanding of the founding--and other chapters of American history--harkens back to a trajectory of historical inquiry that was a by product of the Second World War. This trajectory argued that from the jump, Americans broadly agreed on core values, means, and ends. This "consensus" was, according to many historians, the foundation of American Exceptionalism. However, over time, subsequent generations of historians have demonstrated convincingly that there was no "consensus," and that conflict has always characterized American history. (MOO, they've been markedly less successful at disproving American Exceptionalism.)

[Bob's World]

Good input, but I find your own interpretations of history to be as off base as you believe mine to be.

There was one major topic that was quite intentionally not debated, or even discussed, during the summer of 1786. Everyone in the room knew that the issue of slavery was unsolvable and that to discuss it at all would put the entire enterprise, and thus the nation, at risk. So they ignored it. I understand why they did not take it on, but I wish they would have at least addressed it to the degree of recognizing the institution and setting a date at some agreeably distant point in time to resolve it, say 100 years. This would have allowed a low-threat dialog to take place over time and I think could have prevented the war that almost destroyed us.

As to peacetime armies, do you really think we needed a large army to impose our will on the people of the South? Nations who use military force to make populaces comply are not my model of success. As to wars, it is not who wins the first battles that matters, it is who wins the final battles. The American approach has served that end well without subjecting our populace to excessive burden of the wars of others.

Also I believe you confuse "Principles" and "Values." Principles are enduring and fundamental, but values evolve over time. We espoused principles, such as "all men are created equal" while clearly our values at the time were hardly equal, and certainly not fair. But they were in synch with the culture of the populace at that time. Much of our success is that we created a principle-based framework that allowed our values to evolve along with our cultural. But now we seek to deny other cultures that same opportunity by pushing values designed for us upon cultures that are in a very different place in their own evolutionary journeys.

I simply suggest that we are better served by holding ourselves to our espoused values better than we currently do, and save our evangelical efforts to simply promoting the much more universal principles we demanded for ourselves. Other cultures need time to evolve as well, and such evolution can not be forced by outsiders, but we can provide a better example (true leadership), and perhaps help hold off those who would work to prevent such evolution from being able to occur. In short, to help others to be more like themselves, rather than working to make them more like us.

Cheers!

Bob

[Sigaba]

Good input, but I find your own interpretations of history to be as off base as you believe mine to be.

Okay, then the next question to ask is: What are your sources and how do they fit in the ongoing historiographical debates?

As an example, the interpretation that slavery was "intentionally not debated, or even discussed" during the constitutional convention of 1787 has withered in the face of recent research by David Waldstreicher and George William Van Cleve (among others) who have demonstrated that, as ratified, the U.S. Constitution was a document that protected slave holders' interests. (FWIW, I never debate history with a QP without a few dozen bankers' boxes of books nearby and Google Desktop Search pointed at the 31k or so history-related files on my HDD. Sometimes, being an egghead has its advantages.)

As to peacetime armies, do you really think we needed a large army to impose our will on the people of the South?

It depends upon which people of the South matter. Those who wished to live by the rule of law or those who wished to supplant the rule of law with economic dominance, political exclusion, extralegal violence, and terror to advance notions of white supremacy. (Counterfactually speaking, where might America be today if the federal army had been used better during Reconstruction and the freedmen and their descendants had been allowed to integrate politically, economically, and legally into the mainstream of American society before the turn of the century? Would the First and Second Great Migrations have occurred? Would black Americans have left the Republican party? Would America have fought two world wars with segregated armies? Would Americans still be as focused on the politics of race and racial identity as they were during the 2008 national election cycle?)

As to wars, it is not who wins the first battles that matters, it is who wins the final battles. The American approach has served that end well without subjecting our populace to excessive burden of the wars of others.

I respectfully disagree with you on both of these points. For example, Central and Eastern Europe was a slaughterhouse in the last years of the Second World War in no small part because the Germans sought a racial war of annihilation.

As for your second point, the absence of a large enough standing professional army has proven remarkably disruptive to the way of life you want America to practice. The mobilization of American society for modern warfare and widespread use of propaganda stemmed from the need to raise, to equip, and to train an army of citizen soldiers during World War I.

Also I believe you confuse "Principles" and "Values." Principles are enduring and fundamental, but values evolve over time. We espoused principles, such as "all men are created equal" while clearly our values at the time were hardly equal, and certainly not fair. But they were in synch with the culture of the populace at that time.

I will accept your correction on the differentiation between principles and values. However, I respectfully reject your interpretation of the "culture of the populace at that time." That view is sustainable ONLY if one disregards significant cohorts who were systematically denied the opportunity to voice their views.

Much of our success is that we created a principle-based framework that allowed our values to evolve along with our cultural. But now [emphasis added] we seek to deny other cultures that same opportunity by pushing values designed for us upon cultures that are in a very different place in their own evolutionary journeys.

How is now any different from then?

I simply suggest that we are better served by holding ourselves to our espoused values better than we currently do, and save our evangelical efforts to simply promoting the much more universal principles we demanded for ourselves. Other cultures need time to evolve as well, and such evolution can not be forced by outsiders, but we can provide a better example (true leadership), and perhaps help hold off those who would work to prevent such evolution from being able to occur. In short, to help others to be more like themselves, rather than working to make them more like us.

I think a core difference between our viewpoints is that you see present day America's conduct in international affairs as markedly different from the best practices of a fixed interval in the past. By contrast, I am of the view that we're just living through another episode in an established narrative. That is, America has always struggled to balance its ideas with interests and has left a lot to be desired when it comes to matching ends to means.

I also think that debates over policy preferences should not be situated in historical interpretations of the early Republic. Saying we should adhere to our values is different than saying we should adhere to our values like we used to. That is, a 'more perfect union' lies in our future, not in our past.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Fuchs

NATO boasts more than 600 million population and whatever AQ can do isn't even a real scratch on our surface.
It's at most a microscopic and temporary scratch on the surface, next to real cratches and even deep cuts.

While I don't disagree with your recommendation to not over react, yet I very much disagree with your quote above. Case in point, the attacks on 9/11 created the political conditions that led to two wars. The attack in Madrid determined the outcome of a national election, and the attacks in London on 7/7 were more than a scratch. These groups and individuals over time will acquire new technologies and innovate in ways that enhances their lethality, so the threat will likely increase over time. That doesn't mean the answer is to invade other nations in the naive pursuit of eliminating safe havens, but it doesn't mean ignoring the threat is the best option. I think it will require constant effort from law enforcement, intelligence and special operations to protect "our" people, but this can largely be done in the shadows. Our last administration used the war on terror for political gain instead of keeping it in the shadows, and it has only gotten worse with this administration. Of course after the 9/11 attacks we were obligated to show the American people something was being done and the attack was being revenged, not sure we needed to keep it in the press for 10 plus years.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World,

Just type a simple Google search of "Containment, Pacific, China" and see what comes up. We've been applying some form of containment (or regime change to spice it up a bit) to virtually every problem since 1947. We have come to see the lesser forms of it as just doing business as usual and not being containment at all, but as I said, our perception is not the one that matters most.

It is 2012 and there are hundreds of blogs, along with hundreds of think tanks and their associated websites, and individuals who post on these sites, so typing containment and China into Google is hardly an indicator of what our policy or strategy is.

How do we shed the inertia of decades of containing China as part of the Cold War, to a future of working with China as the primary security and trading partner to keep the future of that region vibrant? I don't know. Just as old allies in the Middle East keep us spun up about Iran, old allies in the Pacific keep us spun up about China. Time for the US to reach out to both on our many shared interests, rather than simply fixating on the 2-3 issues we will agree to disagree about.

I think the USG is reaching out to and working well with China on a number of issues, but of course only the sexy issues get the headlines. I think you would be hard pressed to make a case that we were focused on containing China during the Cold War because China wasn't interested in expanding, it was too busy killing its own people by the millions. China has only recently (at least in the past three centuries) aggressively expanded its influence beyond its borders.

If the US is the global leader we claim to be, we should be taking lead on diplomatic solutions to the sharing of duties and rights in the South China Sea; or the timeline for peaceful reintegration of China-Taiwan. Ramping up a light version of containment seems to me to be more of an obstacle than a help in getting at resolution of such points of friction and potential conflict.

Beyond Google, where is the containment effort? If you find it, it will only be figment of Google's imagination.

China is the trading partner of choice in the region. That will not change.

The US is the security partner of choice in the region. That will not change either.

Both comments are true currently, but there is no reason why this will not change, everything changes over time.

[Bob's World]

Bill, I am talking perception, not express intent. The very fact that you see our Cold War activities as not actively working to contain China in that era demonstrates how much such activities have become part of the American fabric for how we approach the world in general.

The widely held perception is that we were working to contain China before, and that we have just initiated a major effort to increase that program. Agree or disagree with that perception, fine. But to simply ignore it because the official policy is that we are not doing that is very dangerous. We only delude ourselves if that is the case, and self-delusion rarely leads to a good result.

Sigaba, my sources are many, some directly on point and many other merely indirectly reinforcing. Perhaps one of the best ones on the formation of our Constitution is David Stewart's "The Summer of 1787" for those who only have the time or inclination to read a single book to explore that fascinating time and event. But I recognize we all study history through the lens of our background, training, experience, and purpose for study. Most of my study in recent years has been in pursuit of greater understanding of insurgency, and what makes some societies inherently stable, while others remain inherently unstable. As a nation we make as many mistakes as any in our execution of policy, but we got the foundation right, and that sustains us.

But, please, save me from examples of suffering in Eastern Europe in the trailing years of WWII as an example for why the US should have a warfighting army on the books at all times. How was sustaining the capacity of somehow deterring such events from happening possibly in the vital interests of a United States struggling to get through the hard economic years of the great depression? Bad things happen in the world. The purpose of the American Army is to fight and win America's wars on terms so that those bad things don't happen to us

Reconstruction is not the brightest chapter in American history, but in the big scheme of things compared to other such conflicts around the world over time, it went amazingly well. In that same era we implemented a campaign of genocide to remove the native Americans from the West, another dark chapter that we prefer to ignore, but that ultimately served to consolidate the US as a continental nation. We have done hard things to good people, we have made mistakes, in short, we are in many respects just like everyone else. But we also have some unique differences and we put ourselves at unnecessary risk when we ignore our unique strengths or weaknesses either one.

Our foundation of governance and our geography are strengths. Our belief that our actions are inherently benign is a weakness. Ignoring both puts us at risk.

One thing that does not change (at a rate that matters) is geography. We are blessed with global key terrain. We piss away that advantage when we act like we are a landlocked nation trapped between powerful competitors. We have the luxury of time and space. Certainly with space and cyber enabled weapons the factor of "time" is greatly reduced, but those types of attacks are not attacks deterred or defeated by a large army.