What we support and defend

[wm]

From where I sit, preventing Communist takeovers in the Pacific has had much more to do with maintaining market access than with containing the spread of an ideology inimical to the United States. What Bob describes as containment, I would describe as keeping trading opportunities available. I suppose one could describe this effort as a form of containment, but to do so would be to do violence to the customary usage of the term 'containment,' the definition of which Entropy was nice enought to share with us a few posts back on this thread.

An interesting thread with regard to China policy crosses the last 2 adminstrations with regard to China. It has nothing to do with containment as far as I can see.

Mrs Clinton wrote an article outlining her foreign policy in which she stated that America's relationship with China would be the most important bilateral relationship in the world this century [emphasis added]. . . . Speaking to the BBC on [the eve of her first trip to Asia in Feb 2009, her first as Secretary of State], Mrs Clinton said there were real opportunities to develop a good relationship with Beijing on issues such as climate change and clean energy.

The United States Ambassador to China Clark T. Randt, Jr . . . said in the 2008 Herbert G. Klein Lecture on April 21 that he and President George Bush consider U.S.-China ties to be the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century [emphasis added]. . . . Under President George W. Bush’s instructions to maintain a “candid, constructive relationship with China,” Amb. Randt reported that he’s worked continuously since his 2001 appointment to foster dialogue with the Chinese on trade, human rights and other global and regional problems. Amb. Randt’s first trip to China was in 1974 during the Cultural Revolution. Ration coupons, he remembered, were needed at that time to buy even staple foods such as rice and flour. But today, three decades after his first visit, the Chinese have become the world’s greatest collective consumers of luxury goods in the world. China has come a long way politically, culturally, and economically. China’s rise is the most significant development of our age, according to Randt, and he insisted that the U.S. welcomes China’s return to prominence.

[Bill Moore]

Below is adequate evidence for a rational person to realize our military build up in the Pacific during the Cold War was directed against the USSR, and we were actually seeking a security agreement with China, we were not "containing" China, and we're not containing China now.

I'm glad we had this debate, because I found this relatively recent history very interesting, and in some ways we're repeating it. It is also interesting to see what our leaders were saying about the Asia-Pacific region a mere 30 or so years ago.

http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_000...0000261343.pdf

AUG/SEP 84

The primary Soviet concern in East Asia is to achieve superior military power, and toward this end all other Soviet interests in the region – political, economic, and diplomatic – will be subordinated. The Soviets probably see increasing challenges, including an improving Sino-US relationship, growing Chinese military capabilities, intensified US pressure on Japan to assume a greater security role in northeast Asia, evolving Sino-Japanese trade and political ties, and a commitment by the United States to increase its military posture in the region.

The principle strategic objective of the Soviet Union in East Asia is to increase Soviet power while containing China and reducing US and Japanese influence.

In pursuit of their strategic objectives the Soviets will:
- Protect against Sino-Japanese-US strategic cooperation by striving for military advantage against such a worst case contingency.

Quite different than the U.S. containing China.

http://www.usni.org/magazines/procee...liance-pacific

July 1987 (PACOM military leadership comments)

The old alliance systems for the area are weak and lack direction. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), conceived before the Vietnam War, was finally dissolved on 30 June 1977. 1 The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Pact, dating from the immediate postwar era, appears to be finished, a victim of the Kiwis' angry withdrawal over the U. S. ship visit policy. Neither Japan nor China, each facing a significant Soviet threat, is involved in a regional security arrangement. Even the U. S.-Japanese security agreement, a cornerstone of regional security, faces continuing disagreement over spending levels and sea-lane defense.

Military Security for Ourselves and Our Allies: As Admiral James A. Lyons, Jr., the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, recently commented, "…the Soviet Pacific Fleet has increased from 200 ships in 1960 to over 500 today.” 5 With 1,000 land-based maritime bombers, major bases on their own coasts and in Vietnam, and a growing appetite for blue-water naval exercises, the Soviets now pose the principal military threat to Western interests in the region.

Other threats mentioned were North Korea and Vietnam, not China.

As Secretary of State George Shultz recently stated, the Pacific is "…one of the most heavily armed regions in the world, and Asian peace is still marred by continuing conflicts.”

That hasn't changed.

China has played a dominant role in the region for centuries. Although it is a controversial choice for membership in the Pacific alliance, China can make an important and growing contribution in the Pacific Basin. The Chinese armed forces are limited by outdated technology but are maturing in military skill. Naturally, there are many issues that must be worked out between China and the alliance's more traditionally Western states. The Chinese, for example, have often commented publicly that they prefer a neutral course, and simply are not interested in a security arrangement with the United States or any other major power. Nevertheless, in light of the potential for increased Chinese economic involvement in the region, and growing Soviet naval presence in the Pacific, the Chinese may reconsider.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA436509

The Soviet maritime, military presence in the Asian-Pacific region has increased dramatically in recent times. It encompasses a balanced tactical and strategic threat with formidable capabilities above, below, and on the surface of the Pacific. The modern Soviet Pacific fleet is its nation's largest, far larger than the U.8. Seventh Fleet, its likely rival.
Furthermore, the Soviet build-up has been qualitative as well as quantitative. The creation of a separate Far Eastern theater command organization in 1978 points to this direction. In the past eight years, the number of nuclear submarines has increased from 41 to 69, bringing the total number of general purpose submarines in the Pacific fleet to over i00. Major surface combatants have also increased from 64 to 84.

No surprise we have enduring interests in this critical region. It is important to point out that during the short lived Sino-Soviet block the U.S. did state it would contain that block (not China alone, only when they were affiliated with the USSR, or primary threat during the Cold War).

[Dayuhan]

Well its your right to call your approach "rigorous, " but it comes across more as intentionally obtuse and argumentative with concepts you disagree with.

And I think you embrace a deliberate vagueness to obscure weaknesses in your arguments that become more evident as the discussion becomes more specific... so I guess we're even .

For one, I was clearly talking security, which while necessary for the economic growth that all in the region have enjoyed to some degree, is not the economy directly. You surely do not believe that the US has not subsidized the security environment that allowed that growth?

I guess one could say the US has empowered the economic growth of the region at the same time we enabled many nations to take major shortcuts on security.

The extent to which economic growth in Asia has actually been "enabled" by a US security presence is infinitely debatable, and would depend largely on the extent to which any real security threat to the growing nations actually existed. Of course it's not possible to know what would have happened if (it never is), but I see no reason to suppose that the economic growth would not have happened if US forces had not been present.

Even if there was a causative relationship, it would be largely accidental. The US did not keep (and does not keep) forces in Asia to enable Asian growth and prosperity, we keep them there to advance our own perceived interests. If we withdraw them it will be because our perception of our interests has changed, not to "empower" anyone other than ourselves.

To go back to the examples cited, I'd still have to say Japan and Korea are well beyond any place where we can reasonably propose to "empower" them, and the "empowerment" proposition as applied to China and the Philippines is tenuous at best.

[Bob's World]

Bill,,
You'll get no argument from me that Nixon worked to shift our focus back to containing the soviets, but that was not my point.
1. Our alliances, treaties, posture, etc were shaped some 30 years before that to contain China jot stop the "Domino " spread of Communism into SEA and beyond.
2. Those systems did not change much when our purpose changed.
3. Current efforts with the pivot appear to China and commentators around the globe to a move to refresh that pre-Nixon focus.

Dayuhan

Tactical points and concepts must be very specific. STRATEGIC points, to have much utility, must be an assessment of many tactical points that are then generalized and converted to theory. Any smart sharpshooter can blow a tactical hole through a strategic theory, but that of itself in no way invalidates the theory. You are a persistent tactical sniper, and I value your insights as they help me tighten up concepts supporting the theory. "Containment " is a broad theory, it was not a physical siege of the Sino -Soviet pact. Likewise "Empowerment " is a broad theory as well proposed as a more appropriate alternative.

Cheers

[davidbfpo]

An article of note which starts off discussing 'Are China’s Near Seas “Anti-Navy” capabilities aimed directly at the United States?' and ends up looking far more strategically at the issues.

I've not seen such a clear explanation of the issue:

A fundamental question, then, is how China envisions the future role of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. The coincidence of America’s rise on the world stage with China’s more than a century of withdrawal from it means that China and the U.S. have never been powerful simultaneously. This unprecedented situation will require considerable adjustment in thinking on all sides, and here again the Asia-Pacific region is bearing witness to the evolution of key trends well before they characterize the world as a whole.

Link:http://www.informationdissemination....anti-navy.html

[Dayuhan]

Tactical points and concepts must be very specific. STRATEGIC points, to have much utility, must be an assessment of many tactical points that are then generalized and converted to theory. Any smart sharpshooter can blow a tactical hole through a strategic theory, but that of itself in no way invalidates the theory. You are a persistent tactical sniper, and I value your insights as they help me tighten up concepts supporting the theory. "Containment " is a broad theory, it was not a physical siege of the Sino -Soviet pact. Likewise "Empowerment " is a broad theory as well proposed as a more appropriate alternative.

"Empowerment" is a lovely word, all warm and fuzzy with a soothing new age sound to it. I just don't see any connection between the word and the proposed policy. Not that we'll ever be honest with others about the goals of our policies, but we might at least be honest with ourselves, and we should not expect that our public dishonesties will convince anyone.

I'm not personally convinced that stacking up a military presence in Asia is in our interest, neither am I convinced that the whole "pivot to Asia" is much more than a political device aimed primarily at the domestic audience. Either way, whatever alternative is presented should be described as what it is, not obfuscated by broad titles with no real connection to the policy being proposed.

[Bob's World]

"Empowerment" is a lovely word, all warm and fuzzy with a soothing new age sound to it. I just don't see any connection between the word and the proposed policy. Not that we'll ever be honest with others about the goals of our policies, but we might at least be honest with ourselves, and we should not expect that our public dishonesties will convince anyone.

I'm not personally convinced that stacking up a military presence in Asia is in our interest, neither am I convinced that the whole "pivot to Asia" is much more than a political device aimed primarily at the domestic audience. Either way, whatever alternative is presented should be described as what it is, not obfuscated by broad titles with no real connection to the policy being proposed.

I guess you would have to read the paper.

As to "the pivot" I suspect there is a significant disconnect between what the White House is thinking in terms of shifting approaches to better recognize the importance of US relations around the Pacific rim, and what the Department of Defense, the PACOM headquarters, and the respective services all interpreted through their various lenses.

As David points out in the article he offered, this is the first time there has ever been a powerful US and China at the same time. US policy and posture in the Pacific is based upon a weak China, and therefore pushes up tight against the Chinese coast. When China pushes back just a little bit we cry "Anti-Access and Area Denial" and run to Congress seeking more money for enhanced capabilities to counter this Chinese "aggression." I fear that if we draw too firm of a line, and do not make reasonable accomodaitons to recognize the shifting of power around the globe more effectively, we will wear ourselves out running from pillar to post in efforts to keep everyone else in the neat roles we have defined for them. Chinese influence will continue to expand as long as their economy does and as long as they can continue to stave off the type of major internal conflict that has sapped their strength in each of the past three centruies. Better we recognize that, accept that, and work with that, but we are still struggling to find our own focus for moving forward in this post Cold War world.

Major clues to our future lie in our past. But we have to look back to before WWII to find those clues, as the emerging world is much more a populace empowered version of that world than it is a populace empwered version of anything that has existed since. Each President since Reagan has simply made modfications to our Cold War approach. Such incremental changes in approach are inadequate to the significance of the changes of the global economic and security environment.

So far the American approach to staying on top is far too much like this scene for my comfort:

http://youtu.be/1GMHzN8FrhU

[Dayuhan]

As David points out in the article he offered, this is the first time there has ever been a powerful US and China at the same time. US policy and posture in the Pacific is based upon a weak China, and therefore pushes up tight against the Chinese coast. When China pushes back just a little bit we cry "Anti-Access and Area Denial" and run to Congress seeking more money for enhanced capabilities to counter this Chinese "aggression." I fear that if we draw too firm of a line, and do not make reasonable accomodaitons to recognize the shifting of power around the globe more effectively, we will wear ourselves out running from pillar to post in efforts to keep everyone else in the neat roles we have defined for them. Chinese influence will continue to expand as long as their economy does and as long as they can continue to stave off the type of major internal conflict that has sapped their strength in each of the past three centruies. Better we recognize that, accept that, and work with that, but we are still struggling to find our own focus for moving forward in this post Cold War world.

I have no argument with any of this, neither do I see any connection to "empowerment".

[Bob's World]

Again, you have to read the paper. "Empowerment," like "containment" is just a word employed to broadly describe a grand strategy level approach to how our nation thinks about foreign policy and security. One is positive and the other is negative. It's just a concept. Here is a quick summary of how the two concepts compare:

[Bill Moore]

Bob, this is entertaining, you have created the myth that the U.S. is trying to contain China, and then developed a paper on why that is a bad idea and suggested recommendations to a non-existent problem. This is nothing more than strategic snake oil. Looking beyond China, yes we still have clumsy foreign policy that is missionary in its zeal as we attempt (with some effect) to remake the world in our image. Guess it could be worse, we could have the Soviet model instead. Again China isn't pushing its moral agenda or ideology, so there is nothing to contain, but if you insist on this myth I guess you can have fun with it.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

I haven't "created" anything, except a thread to discuss a very important topic.
Actually that topic was the clear constitutional distinction between the Army and the Navy, but this topic of US defense policy in the Pacific in regards to China is certainly important as well.

The fact is that China is growing in power in the Asia-Pacific region and that it perceives itself as emerging from "100 years of humiliation," with that emergence beginning with success over the "Nationalists" (I put in quotes, as Mao and his party were arguably the true promoters of Chinese nationalism) who had cozied up to those Western humiliators. The fact is also that China perceives US actions over the past 60 years as being designed to contain them, and also perceives this current shift in policy as a redoubling of that effort to match China's growth in power in recent years. The US is well within its rights to disagree with Chinese perceptions, as are you; but such parties are equally foolish to simply ignore those perceptions as unimportant. They shape how China will perceive actions and respond to those actions, regardless of if we agree or not.

Now equally it is fact, that the stated purpose of the pivot is not to increase containment effort and that equally many smart officials working to execute that mission, to include yourself, do not see it as containment at all.

So, we have two powerful nations, one increasing activities seen as offensive, as crossing clearly communicated red lines and containment by the other, but not as imposing, not as crossing red lines and not as containment by the implementer. Just how do you suppose that ends?? Do we have to lose a carrier to a Chinese missile over the enforcement of something as silly as fishing rights to finally hear what they are telling us??

PACOM has their head in the sand on this one Bill. They are going to push China into a violent reaction, and then we are going to get our pride hurt and we will likely over-react in response (as you know we are apt to do). Is there anyone there at all not drowning in Kool-Aid who is able to red team this and provide any kind of balanced perspective to the situation?? I realize Navy culture is that no one questions the Admiral, but Admirals make mistakes too. In fact, they make Admiral-sized mistakes.

[Bill Moore]

This was a speech made in 1966

http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/4038

By peace in Asia I do not mean simply the absence of armed hostilities. For wherever men hunger and hate there can really be no peace.

I do not mean the peace of conquest. For humiliation can be the seedbed of war.

I do not mean simply the peace of the conference table. For peace is not really written merely in the words of treaties, but peace is the day-by-day work of builders.

So the peace we seek in Asia is a peace of conciliation between Communist states and their non-Communist neighbors; between rich nations and poor; between small nations and large; between men whose skins are brown and black and yellow and white; between Hindus and Moslems and Buddhists and Christians.

Unfortunately as you read through the speech you'll see it is a justification for our involvement in Vietnam, and some of the proclamations now appear sadly laughable. Still very interesting to look back at our official views a few decades ago, and seem how they constrast or parallel to today's views. What I found most interesting was our efforts to engage China academically, and otherwise and their rejections to it. Obviously that started to change 6 years later.

However, the comments about who is the aggressor jumped out at me, putting Vietnam aside because rational arguments can be made both ways. Let's jump forward to 2012 and we will see that China has recently been the aggressor state in the SCS and it is using its military to expand territorial claims. It is not doing this because of anything the U.S. military is doing, except possibly stepping to the side and hoping the diplomats will work it out. It won't be the U.S. that over reacts, it is China that is the immature actor in the current situation. The U.S. has made a lot of mistakes around the world, maybe more in the Asia-Pacific than anywhere else, and because of this we seem to too easily default that this must be our fault. In this situation I don't think so.

[Bob's World]

Well, for one, Vietnam was never about the US or China, it was about Vietnam getting to a self-determined, legitimate system of governance free from outside manipulation of any sort. They did not want France, nor did they want China, US or Russia. Quests for liberty often make for strange bedfellows, and the conflicts are always the end of the beginning, rather than the beginning of the end.

As to China and the US today? We do not see things from the same perspective. The US Navy and Air Force point to growing Chinese ability to prevent US planes, missiles and ships from penetrating their airspace, extending a few hundred miles into the Pacific and lobby for Billions in new defense spending (with money borrowed from China, to complete the irony); yet our own "A2AD" extends across the entire Pacific and well into China proper and we see that as normal and the standard to sustain. It's not normal and it is a standard for an era and mission that is behind us.

I just think that instead of looking at how we adjust from where we are, there needs to be a complete cleaning of the slate and a fresh assessment or all of our national policies, treaties, etc for the world that exists today and that continues to emerge around us. Incremental patches across the board are not cutting it. Making it worse, the policy people keep ratcheting up the ideological rhetoric; and the defense people appear to set the high water mark of US power as the bar to sustain or build upon, regardless of how irrelevant or unsustainable those positions may be today. We must be more realistic and set clearer priorities and rely more on greater flexibility and agility rather than upon mass and presence.

[Fuchs]

Well, for one, Vietnam was never about the US or China, it was about Vietnam getting to a self-determined, legitimate system of governance free from outside manipulation of any sort.

A lot of nationalist or anti-colonialist movements were mistaken for being communist.
The problem was that the capitalist countries were also the old colonial powers, so the 2nd World assumed the role of the enemy of the enemy.


The tragedy is that few countries were offered to become bloc-free or Western-friendly after the issue of colony or not was settled.

[Dayuhan]

Again, you have to read the paper. "Empowerment," like "containment" is just a word employed to broadly describe a grand strategy level approach to how our nation thinks about foreign policy and security. One is positive and the other is negative. It's just a concept. Here is a quick summary of how the two concepts compare:

The question, of course, is how that "grand strategy" approach is going to be translated to actual, practical strategies, and whether or not those strategies are consistent with the "empowerment" tag.

I confess to some bias against the word "empowerment"; it seems wildly paternalistic, like a new age translation of the white man's burden. Like so many words beloved by the aid industry, it's also commonly met by rolled eyes and a thinly muffled groan from the people on the receiving end. Always good to ask them when was the last time somebody came round proposing to empower them, and what came out of it.

[Bob's World]

Well, like all grand strategies, it isn't for the people it affects on the action end, it is for the people it protects at the point of origin.

I think most would prefer that when the US comes to their area in the belief that it must impose some set of actions to secure US interests for that approach to be one that is generally positive and rooted in the idea of mutual success, rather than one that is generally negative in nature and rooted in systems of control imposed on one group with the intention of preventing a neighboring group from some action that the US feels would be harmful to us.

As you point out, China is not indicating a great desire to dominate others, so much as a great desire to no longer be dominated or hindered by others. China's actions are largely reasonable. The only problem is that they push upon the systems we've placed so tightly around them and we see that as a challenge to us. China's perspective has hundreds, even thousands of years of inertia behind it and will not likely change. Our position has 65 years of inertia behind it, yet we seem equally committed.

Sometimes doing less is doing more. But that is a concept that is largely foreign to our current military senior leadership. How can one put "I did less" on their evaluation and make the next grade? So we do more. We value action over effectiveness.

[davidbfpo]

An Australian viewpoint, courtesy of the Lowy Institute and opens with:

US strategic thinking about the Indian Ocean is in a state of flux. While it is not at all clear where it will go, we can nevertheless understand some of the basics of US strategy in the region.

Shortly afterwards:

a coherent strategy in the IOR is still the subject of debate, and there are many questions to be answered:

1)Should the Indian Ocean region be seen as an extension of the Pacific?
2)What to do with China (constrain or cooperate)?
3)Should the US attempt to develop a region-wide security architecture?
4)Should be US adopt a 'Neo-Nixonian' doctrine in the region (encouraging 'self help' by friends and allies in a manner similar to US policy in the years following the Vietnam war)?

I cannot comment on what policy the UK has, if any in the region post-Afghanistan and our parlous public finances; caveat aside I did note this:

There is likely to be greater reliance on Diego Garcia as a staging point for resources brought into the region in response to specific threats.

Ah there maybe life in the 'Special Relationship' still?

Link:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...ian-Ocean.aspx

[AmericanPride]

The question, of course, is how that "grand strategy" approach is going to be translated to actual, practical strategies, and whether or not those strategies are consistent with the "empowerment" tag.

"Empowerment" is neither a new term or a new concept in foreign policy discussion. There is a large body of work that discusses the ins and outs of the two strategies discussed by Bob. Most of that conversation emerged at the end of the Cold War when the Soviets quit the fight and left us holding the bag. I don't know where Bob got his table but its relatively consistent with the earlier literature about "empowerment"-like strategies. These strategies emphasize market engagement, public diplomacy, collective defense (including bilateral military aid), and cultural exchanges within a larger international framework of global/regional norms, laws, and institutions. Perhaps the greatest point is that these policies are not subordinated to "national security" because they are not threat-focused.

I confess to some bias against the word "empowerment"; it seems wildly paternalistic, like a new age translation of the white man's burden. Like so many words beloved by the aid industry, it's also commonly met by rolled eyes and a thinly muffled groan from the people on the receiving end. Always good to ask them when was the last time somebody came round proposing to empower them, and what came out of it.

Granted, given the end of the decolonizing process and the firming constitutions of the newest members of the international community, "empowerment" may be poorly translated. "Enabling" might be a better word, since the aim is to facilitate the participation of states in the US-led liberal system. This is already occurring to a significant extent, despite the militarization of US policy in some parts of the world. The real challenge for the US will be what to do when these emerging powers "come of age" and exert their interests within the US established rules. This has happened on a limited scale between the US and France, and US and Japan as two examples, since the recovery of these nations post-WW2 was more rapid than building new states after colonialism. China isn't the only challenge, but so are Brazil and India. Mexico and Argentina are potential distant contenders also. During this time, it will be the most difficult for the US to suppress the threat-focused tendency that skews political decision-making.

[Bob's World]

I made the table up. It's just how I think and feel. Any overlap with what anyone else has put forth is purely coincidental.

Call it what you want. While we will always need to guard against actual threats, I believe our overall approach to the world should be positive rather than negative. Containment-based strategies are negative. Most of our international institutions are rooted in this negativity, as is most of our current outreach to the world. Where is that damn "reset button" when you really need it?

[Bob's World]

A couple of keen insights worth remembering (and even more true today than when originally spoken):

"America will never be destroyed from the outside. If we falter and lose our freedoms, it will be because we destroyed ourselves." Abraham Lincoln

"Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant, to step over the ocean, and crush us at a blow? Never! -- All the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest; with a Bonaparte for a commander, could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a Thousand years. At what point, then, is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer, if it ever reach us, it must spring up amongst us. It cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen, we must live through all time, or die by suicide." Abraham Lincoln

"The means of defense against foreign danger historically have become the instruments of tyranny at home."
James Madison