Africa's Commandos - new book on the RLI

[JMA]

Notes:
1. jess = jesse bush = thorny bushwillow - Combretum celastroides
2. ouen = troopie/mate/friend/comrade


Death of a boy in thick jess
by Chris Cocks

An ouen took a round in the throat that day
In the winter of ’77
In single file he was leading the way
On terrain that was rough and uneven

The horse flies were biting, the jesse bush tore
At our jump suits, our webbing and skin
Our camo cream ran, the sweat was a whore
In our eyes and our cuts it got in

The point man was yanking at creepers and vines
Visibility was down to a yard
The air was so thick, ambush played on our minds
Moving forward was so f###ing hard

Gunfire erupted to the front and the side
As we crashed to the earth seeking cover
AKs were cracking, with nowhere to hide
As a gunship came into the hover

Then our gunner came up, a hundred-round belt
On his gun he drummed out his tattoo
He blasted those f###ers right back into Hell
His aim straight and low and so true

The gunship was firing, the dust and the smoke
And the cordite were burning our eyes
Our point man was down, feebly clutching his throat
Blood gurgling and sputum and flies

The gunship withdrew to the stick leader’s screams
As the silence of death crept around
Almost incidental, for that’s what it seems
An ouen was now dead on the ground

In single file he’d been leading the way
On terrain that was rough and uneven
A boy took a round in the throat that day
In the winter of ’77


.

[JMA]

An extract from the comprehensive article on the Rhodesian Fire Force from the book:

Note: The regimental march of the RLI is "The Saints" hence the references to 'the saints' (being the serving men of the regiment) and a word play on "when the saints go marching in...".

FIRE FORCE

...

Reflections and legacy

The gain: The evolution of Fire Force as an infantry air-borne assault method and its widespread study by military academics and students in military learning institutions throughout the world bears testimony to its efficacy. However, the main lesson of Fire Force still probably has to be learned. Fire Force was the end product of a philosophy – a philosophy that ignored the inter-service rivalry, vested interests, convention, rank, petty rule books and personal agendas so prevalent in the behaviour of the modern military. Fire Force was a manifestation of an ethos that like-minded commanders of all ranks and of all arms needed to combine their considerate talents in a collective effort to constantly evaluate the battlefield, to be self-critical in all analyses, and to strive to work for the greater good.

The pain: The years 1975-1979 were the years of the RLI Fire Forces. Whilst much is made of the valour and achievements and of course the casualties, one thing was certain: no combatant of either side exposed to Fire Force action was left unscarred by the experience. Those who were left physically unscathed did not escape varying degrees of trauma which still stalks those veterans today. After 30 years, perhaps this is yet to be acknowledged. In 1978 Rhodesian society, which was overwhelmingly masculine in orientation, little was known of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and even if its presence had been acknowledged, it cannot be said that its recognition would have found universal acceptance then. Commanders, however, remained sensitive. RLI soldiers subjected to sustained bouts of conflict and battle stress often displayed classic symptoms: irrational behaviour, fits of temper, depression and moodiness, and sensitivity was needed in their handling. There were many such young men in the RLI who were managed with great skill by young troop NCOs and officers. PTSD then was simply another problem for leaders who had a great capacity for problem solving. A casualty list compiled today would include many of those who served in the Fire Forces, an experience that would determine the behavioural pattern of many young lives from that time onwards for the rest of their lives.

A final word

The years 1975-1979 were momentous – only five years, a short span in the telling of things military. They were the years when a bushfire insurgency became a vicious regional conflict. The years when a fine fighting regiment and wonderful aircrew revolutionized counter–insurgency air assault doctrine. The years when RLI Fire Forces brought a nation to the cusp of victory. The years to which men would later return and say: “Yes, who could forget those stirring times - the RLI Fire Force years - when the ‘Saints’ found immortality; the years when ‘The Saints went marching in ....’”

N D Henson
September 2010
Copyright vested in the Regimental Association of the Rhodesian Light Infantry.

[JMA]

From the book Africa's Commandos extracts from an article by the RMO (Regimental Medical Officer) on the use of an MRU:

Mobile Resuscitation Unit – the RLI lifesaver
By Cliff Webster

... The 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the then-recent Vietnam War had amply demonstrated the value of casualties receiving quick access to resuscitation and stabilization before transfer to major medical units for specialist attention. This required the medical personnel getting to the casualty in the field as soon as possible to commence resuscitation. The sooner the casualties received intravenous resuscitation fluids the better, whether in the field and/or on arrival at the MRU. During these years the international term ‘golden hour’ was coined. It referred to that critical hour after serious injury during which resuscitation should ideally commence to ensure a good outcome for the casualty. The MRU was frequently well within an hour’s helicopter flight from the battlefield. (both located in Salisbury, now Harare)...

... The MRU was often deployed next to a forward airfield so that fixed-wing aircraft could be made immediately available to transfer casualties back to a central hospital once they were stabilized in the MRU, usually to the Andrew Fleming Hospital via New Sarum Air Base. ...

... Injuries were broadly classified into the following groups (medevacs included):

Injury Groups.....................Number.....Percentage
Superficial injuries.................127.......... 39.1%
Orthopaedic injuries..............100...........30.8%
Multiple trauma......................24............7.4%
Burns...................................16........ ....4.9%
Head injuries.........................11............3.4 %
Chest injuries........................11............3.4%
Abdominal injuries..................11............3.4%
Other (e.g. ENT).....................8............2.5%
Medevacs............................17............ 5.1%
...

Note: in the terminology of the time the term 'MEDEVAC' (medical evacuation) related to evacuations related to sickness and disease - as opposed to CASEVAC (casualty evacuation) which included all war wounds and related injuries.

...

Of the 325 persons who were casevaced and medivaced through or from the MRU, two died en route to the MRU, two died as they arrived at the MRU and two died en route to a central hospital from the MRU. Three of these cases were multiple trauma cases, one was a gunshot wound (GSW) to the thigh with femoral artery severed, and two were GSWs through the base of the skull. This was a 1.8% death rate which emphasized the value of having such a unit in the forward area as there were clearly cases which would not have survived the long trip to a central hospital without stabilization. Sometimes the RLI MRU was close enough to a Fire Force contact to see and hear the K-Car over the contact. On a couple of occasions we received at the MRU, or were able to get to, critically injured troops within 7–10 minutes of them being hit.

In conclusion it can be said that the RLI MRU more than paid for itself as a lifesaver and also as a morale booster.

[JMA]

Included in the book with the permission of the author:

With a little help from the ‘dagga boys’
Extract from Choppertech, Leach Printers & Signs CC, Louis Trichardt, 2011,
pp 182-184
By Beaver Shaw

The incident described below took place probably on the Angwa River in the Tribal Trust Land (TTL) about 45 minutes’ flying time from Karoi. My attempt to date it makes it 6 December 1978. I was in K-Car serial number R7509 with Nigel Lamb (pilot). It was possibly airstrike 907.

Fire Force was called out from its temporary base at the junior school in Karoi to a sighting of ten to twelve terrorists by a Selous Scout observation post (OP) in the TTL adjoining the commercial farming area. It was reported that the group of terrorists were armed with AK47 rifles, an RPD machine-gun and an RPG7 rocket launcher. They were dressed in blue denims and were relaxing in the riverline after having been fed a few hours previously by local village women from a kraal about three kilometres away.

Our K-Car flew overhead of the Scout OP and pulled into an attack pattern with the Scouts speaking the gunship on to the target area. As we pulled over the riverline the terrorists began to bombshell into the thick vegetation on both sides of the riverline.

I threw smoke (a smoke-generating grenade to mark the target) and began engaging the terrorists with 20mm cannon, killing two in their camp while the remainder of the terrorists who had managed to survive the initial contact took cover and ran into thick riverine vegetation and began to give us a serious snot squirt (return fire) from a heavily overgrown reed bed on the left-hand bank of the river. I returned fire with the cannon which did not have any effect in suppressing the enemy fire, as the 20mm high explosive incendiary (HEI) rounds burst on top of the reeds and did not penetrate into the thick reeds. We were taking a lot of hits from small-arms fire and had to pull into a wider orbit to avoid being shot down. Whenever we tightened our orbit, the terrorists’ return fire became more intense.

At this stage the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) Fire Force commander called for plan Alpha (which involved the supporting G-Cars dropping their troops at pre-determined positions thus giving the K-Car crew time to sort out their immediate problems). The G-Cars orbiting the contact area turned in to drop their stops both upstream and downstream of the contact area as planned. There was no need to put stop groups on the sides of the river because the surrounding bush was open other than the line of riverine vegetation. Any breakout would have been quickly stemmed by 20mm HEI rounds fired into the open by the K-Car. The RLI Fire Force commander was worried about his Fire Force troops sweeping into the reed beds ahead of their drop-off positions, and got them to sit tight in an ambush position while the Lynx was called on to drop frantan (frangible tank - the Rhodesian version of napalm). Nigel Lamb pulled the K-Car into a wide orbit to give the Lynx an opportunity to attack the terrorist position and the Lynx immediately swooped in firing .303 Brownings and 37mm unguided SNEB rockets, and then dropped a frantan which unfortunately went a little high and caused a huge fireball, followed by a plume of sooty black smoke in the riverbed, but failed to hit the terrorists in their secure position in the reeds.

A G-Car was called into the orbit to assist by putting down flushing fire with its twin .303 Browning machine-guns. We could see the tracer streaking into the reeds which only succeeded in the gooks returning intensive fire at the aircraft in the vicinity from this position. These gooks had found a really secure position and we were going to have a job at hand to root them out without taking any casualties on our side.

Earlier, as we were pulling up into the initial attack pattern, I had noticed two dagga (mud) boys (solitary old buffalo bulls who had been rejected from the herd due to their advancing years) wallowing in some swampy ground in an open area to the left of the river. These old buffalo were now milling about in the vicinity of the reed bed close to the contact area and it was obvious that they had become very agitated by all the activity, noise and smoke emanating from the contact in the area.

I had devised a plan which seemed out of the ordinary, but which could just swing things our way, and discussed it with the K-Car crew over the intercom. This plan was to attempt to drive these old dagga boys towards the terrorist position while I fired the cannon close to the buffalo without killing or wounding them in the hope it would scare and drive them into the thick reeds, which in turn would drive the terrorists out into the open where we would be able to take care of business.

The plan was accepted which resulted in me firing one 20mm round a time near the two old buffalo. As the dust from the strikes settled, the dagga boys charged for the nearest cover in that loping, bouncing run that only buffalo can do, with their tails in the air. As they entered the reed bed in which the gooks were hiding, the terrorists began to fire at the buffalo which incensed them even more. All we could see from above was the reed bed swirling as the buffalo charged at the gooks.

Stop 1 reported hearing gunfire from that area and thought the second stop group was in contact with the enemy. A few seconds later I saw three terrorists running towards Stop 1 at the top of the riverline with one of the buffalo in hot pursuit. Three terrorists were shedding themselves of their packs as they ran. I opened fire with the 20mm cannon, double tapping at the fleeing terrorists in the riverbed and dropped one as they tore away from the reed bed in an attempt to escape the enraged buffalo. The 20mm fire had unnerved one of the buffalo which once more crashed back into the reed bed where he remained. Stop 1 called on the radio to say that they had shot two of the terrorists attempting to run down the riverbed about 200 metres from the initial contact area. I don’t think these terrorists even knew or cared about the stop groups in their attempt to escape those buffalo which were now milling about in the reed bed. It was decided that it was not a good idea to sweep through the reed bed and suffer the same fate as the terrorists.

The stop groups swept the area surrounding the reed bed and the riverline and dragged the five bodies out for pick-up, together with one RPD machine-gun, two AK47 rifles, one RPG7 rocket launcher with three rockets, and an SKS rifle.

A few days later we flew over the contact area on the way to another call-out in the area and saw the dagga boys lying in the riverline chewing the cud as if nothing had happened.

The Scouts had a grandstand view of what must have been one of the strangest Fire Force contacts ever seen.

[Bill Moore]

JMA, Many serious comments preceding, but that last report verifies that truth can be stranger than friction.

[JMA]

JMA, Many serious comments preceding, but that last report verifies that truth can be stranger than friction.

Maybe it also indicates that in the absence of own forces casualties war can be fun at times...

... like when the 'A-Team' (on TV) used to talk about how great it is when a plan comes together.

Oh yes talking about using animals...

... our enemy used baboons as early warning of airstrikes. They kept baboons chained to a tree in their camps and if they had survived a camp attack they were valuable as they could pick up the approach of the jets long before the human ear and would start to get really agitated. This would allow the leadership to jump into a vehicle and escape to be able to run another day. I kid you not.

[JMA]

A comment from one who served:

From an American trooper
By Ken Gaudet

When I attend military reunions with the unit I served with in Vietnam, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, I am often asked what it was like to have been a soldier in Africa.
My answer has always been that it was a time to be a soldier and one of the most memorable experiences of my time in the military. I reflect back when I was in Vietnam as a 19-year-old sergeant patrolling in our area of operations. The US armed forces had all the military firepower but not the will of the American people to win in Vietnam. Often in the RLI we thought how different the war would have been if the Rhodesians had had more helicopters, planes, modern equipment and troops to defeat the terrorists. What I saw was the Rhodesians making do with what they had because they had no other choice.

When I joined the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) right after the internal elections in April 1979, everything was changing except the morale of the combat troops. The mission was to continue to take the fight to the enemy, find them and do your job as a soldier. The RLI guys in Support Commando were a mixture of Rhodesian national servicemen, foreign soldiers from various armies, and Rhodesians who had been fighting since the beginning of the terrorist war. What a group to say the least. We were beyond fearless: it did not matter if we were on Fire Force, combat ops with the Special Air Service (SAS) or Selous Scouts – we were there to take the fight to the enemy.

The RLI soldiers can easily be compared to a modern US Army Ranger battalion. The RLI made numerous combat para jumps, not only inside Rhodesia on Fire Force operations, but para drops into Zambia and Mozambique into some of the biggest terrorist base camps of the war. The RLI will always be remembered as one of the finest fighting forces in modern times. I am proud to say for a time I was part of ‘The Incredibles’.