Africa's Commandos - new book on the RLI

[JMA]

From the book Africa's Commandos extracts from an article by the RMO (Regimental Medical Officer) on the use of an MRU:

Mobile Resuscitation Unit – the RLI lifesaver
By Cliff Webster

... The 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the then-recent Vietnam War had amply demonstrated the value of casualties receiving quick access to resuscitation and stabilization before transfer to major medical units for specialist attention. This required the medical personnel getting to the casualty in the field as soon as possible to commence resuscitation. The sooner the casualties received intravenous resuscitation fluids the better, whether in the field and/or on arrival at the MRU. During these years the international term ‘golden hour’ was coined. It referred to that critical hour after serious injury during which resuscitation should ideally commence to ensure a good outcome for the casualty. The MRU was frequently well within an hour’s helicopter flight from the battlefield. (both located in Salisbury, now Harare)...

... The MRU was often deployed next to a forward airfield so that fixed-wing aircraft could be made immediately available to transfer casualties back to a central hospital once they were stabilized in the MRU, usually to the Andrew Fleming Hospital via New Sarum Air Base. ...

... Injuries were broadly classified into the following groups (medevacs included):

Injury Groups.....................Number.....Percentage
Superficial injuries.................127.......... 39.1%
Orthopaedic injuries..............100...........30.8%
Multiple trauma......................24............7.4%
Burns...................................16........ ....4.9%
Head injuries.........................11............3.4 %
Chest injuries........................11............3.4%
Abdominal injuries..................11............3.4%
Other (e.g. ENT).....................8............2.5%
Medevacs............................17............ 5.1%
...

Note: in the terminology of the time the term 'MEDEVAC' (medical evacuation) related to evacuations related to sickness and disease - as opposed to CASEVAC (casualty evacuation) which included all war wounds and related injuries.

...

Of the 325 persons who were casevaced and medivaced through or from the MRU, two died en route to the MRU, two died as they arrived at the MRU and two died en route to a central hospital from the MRU. Three of these cases were multiple trauma cases, one was a gunshot wound (GSW) to the thigh with femoral artery severed, and two were GSWs through the base of the skull. This was a 1.8% death rate which emphasized the value of having such a unit in the forward area as there were clearly cases which would not have survived the long trip to a central hospital without stabilization. Sometimes the RLI MRU was close enough to a Fire Force contact to see and hear the K-Car over the contact. On a couple of occasions we received at the MRU, or were able to get to, critically injured troops within 7–10 minutes of them being hit.

In conclusion it can be said that the RLI MRU more than paid for itself as a lifesaver and also as a morale booster.

[JMA]

Included in the book with the permission of the author:

With a little help from the ‘dagga boys’
Extract from Choppertech, Leach Printers & Signs CC, Louis Trichardt, 2011,
pp 182-184
By Beaver Shaw

The incident described below took place probably on the Angwa River in the Tribal Trust Land (TTL) about 45 minutes’ flying time from Karoi. My attempt to date it makes it 6 December 1978. I was in K-Car serial number R7509 with Nigel Lamb (pilot). It was possibly airstrike 907.

Fire Force was called out from its temporary base at the junior school in Karoi to a sighting of ten to twelve terrorists by a Selous Scout observation post (OP) in the TTL adjoining the commercial farming area. It was reported that the group of terrorists were armed with AK47 rifles, an RPD machine-gun and an RPG7 rocket launcher. They were dressed in blue denims and were relaxing in the riverline after having been fed a few hours previously by local village women from a kraal about three kilometres away.

Our K-Car flew overhead of the Scout OP and pulled into an attack pattern with the Scouts speaking the gunship on to the target area. As we pulled over the riverline the terrorists began to bombshell into the thick vegetation on both sides of the riverline.

I threw smoke (a smoke-generating grenade to mark the target) and began engaging the terrorists with 20mm cannon, killing two in their camp while the remainder of the terrorists who had managed to survive the initial contact took cover and ran into thick riverine vegetation and began to give us a serious snot squirt (return fire) from a heavily overgrown reed bed on the left-hand bank of the river. I returned fire with the cannon which did not have any effect in suppressing the enemy fire, as the 20mm high explosive incendiary (HEI) rounds burst on top of the reeds and did not penetrate into the thick reeds. We were taking a lot of hits from small-arms fire and had to pull into a wider orbit to avoid being shot down. Whenever we tightened our orbit, the terrorists’ return fire became more intense.

At this stage the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) Fire Force commander called for plan Alpha (which involved the supporting G-Cars dropping their troops at pre-determined positions thus giving the K-Car crew time to sort out their immediate problems). The G-Cars orbiting the contact area turned in to drop their stops both upstream and downstream of the contact area as planned. There was no need to put stop groups on the sides of the river because the surrounding bush was open other than the line of riverine vegetation. Any breakout would have been quickly stemmed by 20mm HEI rounds fired into the open by the K-Car. The RLI Fire Force commander was worried about his Fire Force troops sweeping into the reed beds ahead of their drop-off positions, and got them to sit tight in an ambush position while the Lynx was called on to drop frantan (frangible tank - the Rhodesian version of napalm). Nigel Lamb pulled the K-Car into a wide orbit to give the Lynx an opportunity to attack the terrorist position and the Lynx immediately swooped in firing .303 Brownings and 37mm unguided SNEB rockets, and then dropped a frantan which unfortunately went a little high and caused a huge fireball, followed by a plume of sooty black smoke in the riverbed, but failed to hit the terrorists in their secure position in the reeds.

A G-Car was called into the orbit to assist by putting down flushing fire with its twin .303 Browning machine-guns. We could see the tracer streaking into the reeds which only succeeded in the gooks returning intensive fire at the aircraft in the vicinity from this position. These gooks had found a really secure position and we were going to have a job at hand to root them out without taking any casualties on our side.

Earlier, as we were pulling up into the initial attack pattern, I had noticed two dagga (mud) boys (solitary old buffalo bulls who had been rejected from the herd due to their advancing years) wallowing in some swampy ground in an open area to the left of the river. These old buffalo were now milling about in the vicinity of the reed bed close to the contact area and it was obvious that they had become very agitated by all the activity, noise and smoke emanating from the contact in the area.

I had devised a plan which seemed out of the ordinary, but which could just swing things our way, and discussed it with the K-Car crew over the intercom. This plan was to attempt to drive these old dagga boys towards the terrorist position while I fired the cannon close to the buffalo without killing or wounding them in the hope it would scare and drive them into the thick reeds, which in turn would drive the terrorists out into the open where we would be able to take care of business.

The plan was accepted which resulted in me firing one 20mm round a time near the two old buffalo. As the dust from the strikes settled, the dagga boys charged for the nearest cover in that loping, bouncing run that only buffalo can do, with their tails in the air. As they entered the reed bed in which the gooks were hiding, the terrorists began to fire at the buffalo which incensed them even more. All we could see from above was the reed bed swirling as the buffalo charged at the gooks.

Stop 1 reported hearing gunfire from that area and thought the second stop group was in contact with the enemy. A few seconds later I saw three terrorists running towards Stop 1 at the top of the riverline with one of the buffalo in hot pursuit. Three terrorists were shedding themselves of their packs as they ran. I opened fire with the 20mm cannon, double tapping at the fleeing terrorists in the riverbed and dropped one as they tore away from the reed bed in an attempt to escape the enraged buffalo. The 20mm fire had unnerved one of the buffalo which once more crashed back into the reed bed where he remained. Stop 1 called on the radio to say that they had shot two of the terrorists attempting to run down the riverbed about 200 metres from the initial contact area. I don’t think these terrorists even knew or cared about the stop groups in their attempt to escape those buffalo which were now milling about in the reed bed. It was decided that it was not a good idea to sweep through the reed bed and suffer the same fate as the terrorists.

The stop groups swept the area surrounding the reed bed and the riverline and dragged the five bodies out for pick-up, together with one RPD machine-gun, two AK47 rifles, one RPG7 rocket launcher with three rockets, and an SKS rifle.

A few days later we flew over the contact area on the way to another call-out in the area and saw the dagga boys lying in the riverline chewing the cud as if nothing had happened.

The Scouts had a grandstand view of what must have been one of the strangest Fire Force contacts ever seen.

[Bill Moore]

JMA, Many serious comments preceding, but that last report verifies that truth can be stranger than friction.

[JMA]

JMA, Many serious comments preceding, but that last report verifies that truth can be stranger than friction.

Maybe it also indicates that in the absence of own forces casualties war can be fun at times...

... like when the 'A-Team' (on TV) used to talk about how great it is when a plan comes together.

Oh yes talking about using animals...

... our enemy used baboons as early warning of airstrikes. They kept baboons chained to a tree in their camps and if they had survived a camp attack they were valuable as they could pick up the approach of the jets long before the human ear and would start to get really agitated. This would allow the leadership to jump into a vehicle and escape to be able to run another day. I kid you not.

[JMA]

A comment from one who served:

From an American trooper
By Ken Gaudet

When I attend military reunions with the unit I served with in Vietnam, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, I am often asked what it was like to have been a soldier in Africa.
My answer has always been that it was a time to be a soldier and one of the most memorable experiences of my time in the military. I reflect back when I was in Vietnam as a 19-year-old sergeant patrolling in our area of operations. The US armed forces had all the military firepower but not the will of the American people to win in Vietnam. Often in the RLI we thought how different the war would have been if the Rhodesians had had more helicopters, planes, modern equipment and troops to defeat the terrorists. What I saw was the Rhodesians making do with what they had because they had no other choice.

When I joined the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) right after the internal elections in April 1979, everything was changing except the morale of the combat troops. The mission was to continue to take the fight to the enemy, find them and do your job as a soldier. The RLI guys in Support Commando were a mixture of Rhodesian national servicemen, foreign soldiers from various armies, and Rhodesians who had been fighting since the beginning of the terrorist war. What a group to say the least. We were beyond fearless: it did not matter if we were on Fire Force, combat ops with the Special Air Service (SAS) or Selous Scouts – we were there to take the fight to the enemy.

The RLI soldiers can easily be compared to a modern US Army Ranger battalion. The RLI made numerous combat para jumps, not only inside Rhodesia on Fire Force operations, but para drops into Zambia and Mozambique into some of the biggest terrorist base camps of the war. The RLI will always be remembered as one of the finest fighting forces in modern times. I am proud to say for a time I was part of ‘The Incredibles’.

[JMA]

In November 1977 The Rhodesian forces two major ZANLA military bases in Mozambique in Op Dingo. In two phases, this joint SAS/RLI operation; Zulu 1 was the attack on the Chimoio complex - killing in excess of 1,200 insurgents - and a few days later Zulu 2, being the attack on the Tembue complex - 220 km into Mozambique where in excess of 500 insurgents were killed. Audacious is not a strong enough word to describe these actions but perhaps to borrow from the SAS it was certainly a case of 'who dares wins'.

Extract from book...

Reflections on Operation Dingo
The RLI lost its innocence during Operation Dingo. The audacious plan, which a week before had drawn gasps of amazement, had been met with shaking of heads or total disbelief, had tested the regiment in a way it had never been tested before. The RL1 as a unit had emerged with much deserved credit, new-formed confidence and secure in the knowledge that it had a right to be described as ‘The Incredible RLI’.

For the first time, the regiment began to see the conflict’s wider picture: there was more to this war than the occasional Fire Force action; the numbers given by Special Branch in their ‘Threat’ briefings were not figments of imagination. The danger was now tangible. The RLI was in a toe-to-toe knockdown struggle that was a long way from being concluded.

Air power in Operation Dingo
The conduct of the Rhodesian Air Force in Operation Dingo was remarkable. This ambitious, audacious - some say outlandish - plan could never have been achieved without their planning, their professionalism, their devotion to duty, their passion to use every fibre of their being to employing their machines for their destined purpose and beyond.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF) on Commonwealth deployments in Aden and Cyprus achieved aircraft availability that had Britain’s Royal Air Force shaking their heads in disbelief. The availability of aircraft on the flight line for Operation Dingo matched and exceeded these figures; the flawless execution of two back-to-back airborne assaults within three days of each other employing eight different aircraft types whilst leaving nothing in reserve was a remarkable demonstration of the Rhodesian Air Force’s fighting resolve.

Lt Mark Adams, 3Cdo, who took part in Zulu 1 – Chimoio, has commented on the technical expertise of the chopper techs as follows:

“In the opening minutes of the Chimoio attack one of the trooping G-Cars was damaged by ground fire requiring a tail rotor assembly to be replaced. In addition the command helicopter damaged by 12.7mm heavy machine-gun fire limped away with damage requiring a full rotor change. The chopper techs on the ground waited for a full set of rotors and a tail rotor assembly to be flown in from Grand Reef airfield to repair the damaged choppers in the field. This they achieved while working in the bush and both choppers were repaired and able to fly back to Grand Reef that night.

“The day between the Chimoio and Tembue raids required extensive repair and maintenance work on the 31 choppers as every one of the ten K-Cars had sustained hits during the day. Bearing in mind that troops had stayed overnight at Chimoio to mop up any gooks who had drifted back into the area, they also had to be withdrawn the next morning by chopper.

“During the Tembue attack, 220km into Mozambique, the Forward Admin Base was only six kilometres from the camp itself. One K-Car had taken a strike to its engine and needed a replacement. The replacement engine was flown in to the admin base where the chopper techs changed the engine in the bush using empty fuel drums as their workbench. The repaired K-Car was able to fly out by the end of the day.

“Maybe we need to pause for a moment and remember the skill that these ‘chopper techs’ displayed both with machine-guns and 20mm cannons and technically. The Rhodesian Air Force ‘chopper techs’ were definitely the unsung heroes of the bush war.”

No country - no army - no regiment was ever served and supported by a more devoted Air Force who gladly risked life and machine in support of their troops on the ground. To a man, the RLI would have died for the men in Blue, whom they loved, honoured and revered.

Footnote: of course at the time the left wing propaganda was that Op Dingo was launched against refugee camps. Over the past 30 years this pretense has been dropped by all but a small group die-hard 'useful idiots' in North American and Europe who continue to perpetuate the lie.

[JMA]

On 17 October 1980 the RLI held a final parade and laid up the colours prior to being officially disbanded on 31 October 1980. The Commanding Officer's speech on that parade is memorable.

CO's Speech on Final Parade - 17 October 1980

Officers and men on parade, distinguished guests and former members, ladies and gentlemen.

In a few minutes time this battalion, known to the country and to the world, for a short but golden period of history, as the first battalion, the Rhodesian Light Infanty, will march off the square and into history. To mark this dramatic and to many of us heart rending occasion we will shortly pay a last tribute and say farewell to our colours which we have carried aloft with such pride and honour for more than 14 years of war.

There is so very much that one can say at a time like this: yet it is a sacred moment. A moment for personal meditation and reflection. There is little I can say to alleviate our sorrow.

If the world neither knows nor mourns our passing, let us rest assured that the great captains of history and those who study military affairs will know that a fine regiment is lost to the honourable profession of arms this day.

I should simply add that we, the final team of this wonderful regiment must leave this square not only in grief but with intense pride, dignity and honour. We have much to be grateful for. I am eternally grateful to those fine men who served these colours before we did: to those amongst us who lost loved ones: to those who, to this day, bear the scars of war received whilst fighting under these colours : to those friends — and there are many of them - who have stood by us in adversity : to those who fought with such courage beside us.

I am grateful that we can shout to the world this day: “There are our colours. They are unstained, undefeated, triumphant. They are covered in glory”.

I would like to think that those of our number who lost their lives are paraded with us this afternoon. I believe they would be proud. We have not let them down.

I am reminded of Butch Fourie, an ordinary RLI soldier, who turned the words of a well known song to capture the spirit that prevails today:

“Far have I travelled
on land and through sky,
dark are the mountains
the valleys are green,
and oh our colours
fly higher than high,
for we are the boys of the RLI.”

Our colours will continue to fly higher than high. We know that in years to come we will say to our children and to our loved ones with the greatest pride: “I served in the RLI”.

Finally I offer a personal and humble prayer.

May god bless our beloved regiment and those who on this day and in the past have served her with such honour. I thank god that we have done our duty.

Amen.

(JCW Aust) Lt Col
CO 1RLI
17 October 1980

[JMA]

A comment from one who served:

American Ken Gaudet eating a melon in the Angolan bush circa 1981:



The yanks who came to the RLI were certainly up for the fight. Their contribution (and in some cases, their sacrifices) are remembered with deep and sincere appreciation.

[JMA]

.. except for the farmer and his wife, Trooper Jim Buckley and the gooks that is.

Notes:
K-Car = Alouette III helicopter gunship - armed with 20mm cannon
G-Car = Alouette III trooping helicopter - carrying stick of 4 men.
Radio relay station = manned station on high feature to relay VHF radio comms
kopje = small hill (normally isolated)
"culling" = what the RLI did to the CTs contacted by the Fire Force

Extract from the book:

The perfect contact

1 Commando (1Cdo) were on Fire Force duties at Grand Reef in January 1978. This trip had been busy, starting off with the attack on Grand Reef by a large concentration of communist terrorists (CTs) during the first night in camp.

On the morning of 18 January 1978, a radio relay station was positioned by helicopter in the white farming area just to the south of Grand Reef. At about 1700hrs, the commando had just finished its daily PT session when the siren sounded. Amidst the normal groans and mumbling about it being “too late” to be called out, we assembled in the ops room and were told that the relay station deployed that morning had just witnessed a gang of ten CTs ambush a farmer’s vehicle directly below their position. The gang were now sauntering down the road toward the nearby tribal trust land (TTL) without a care in the world. As the relay station was only five minutes’ flying time from Grand Reef, the Fire Force was immediately deployed to contact the CTs.

The Fire Force consisted of the normal K-Car and three G-Cars. Because of the proximity to the airfield no paras were required. On pulling up over the target, it was found that the area consisted of open ploughed fields with the odd isolated rocky kopje. It was perfect ‘culling’ terrain. It was into one of these kopjes that the gang had bolted. During the initial deployment of stop groups around the kopje, Stops 1 and 2 came under fire from an RPD gunner, severely wounding Trooper Jim Buckley. In the initial firefight five of the CTs were eliminated, but as light was fading fast the action was broken off and extra stops were flown in to encircle the remaining gang still holed up in the kopje.

During the night a further three CTs were eliminated by stop groups as they tried to break out of the cauldron. At first light the next morning, with K-Car back overhead, sweeps of the kopje resulted in the killing of a final CT holed up under a rock overhang. The final score was nine CTs killed in return for two 1Cdo wounded. One CT escaped. The death of the farmer and his wife had been avenged within minutes of their murder and Jim Buckley, after a long battle, eventually recovered from his wounds.