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Thread: The Afghanistan National Police (ANP)

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  1. #1
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    ICG, 30 Aug 07: Reforming Afghanistan's Police
    Policing goes to the very heart of state building, since a credible national institution that helps provide security and justice for the population is central to government legitimacy. However Afghanistan’s citizens often view the police more as a source of fear than of security. Instead of emphasising their coercive powers, reform should focus on accountability, ethnic representation and professionalism, along with an urgent need to depoliticise and institutionalise appointments and procedures. It is counter-productive to treat police as an auxiliary fighting unit in battling the insurgency, as has been happening with increasing frequency in the troubled south. Afghanistan, like any other democracy, requires police service more than police force.

    The state of the Afghan National Police (ANP) nearly six years after the fall of the Taliban reflects the international community’s failure to grasp early on the centrality of comprehensive reform of the law enforcement and justice sectors, despite similar hard-learned lessons in other countries attempting to emerge from years of armed conflict. President Karzai’s government still lacks the political will to tackle a culture of impunity and to end political interference in appointments and operations. Attempts to shortcut institution building are compounded by an exploding narcotics trade – partly symptomatic of the state of policing but even more clearly a major corrupting influence on attempted reforms. At the same time, the challenges of a growing insurgency are pushing quick fixes to the fore....
    Full 35 page report at the link.

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    ...I'm posting this here rather than in the dedicated Afghan Drug thread because of the focus on the Police:

    Transcripts from the 4 Oct 07 hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia:

    Counternarcotics Strategy and Police Training in Afghanistan, Thomas A. Schweich, Acting Assistant Secretary, DoS Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan.

    Counternarcotics Strategy and Police Training in Afghanistan, Mark L. Schneider, Senior Vice President, International Crisis Group.

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    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Death rate for Afghan police force 'staggering' - Ottawa Star, 1 Oct.

    KANDAHAR–In rural Panjwaii and Zhari districts, Afghan cops are being killed faster than they can be replaced, says one of their Canadian mentors.

    That terrifying fact stands as a huge roadblock to Canada's efforts to turn over security in these troubled regions to the fledgling police force.
    "The rate at which they're losing policemen can never be replenished, unfortunately," RCMP Cpl. Barry Pitcher said.

    In Panjwaii district alone – an insurgent hotbed west of Kandahar – police officers recently had six trucks destroyed in a 20-day period through roadside bombs and ambushes.

    In July, 71 police officers were killed in regional command south, a territory that includes Kandahar province. Nationwide, 650 officers were killed from March 2006 to March 2007. Government officials say another 500 have been killed since then ...

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    Canadians pay to bolster Afghan security, Globe and Mail, 9 October 2007.

    KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — Canada has decided to sidestep the corrupt Afghan government and ensure the safety of Canadian soldiers by paying Afghan police directly, in cash.

    It's an attempt to buy stability in the dangerous districts west of Kandahar city, where Canadian soldiers stake their lives on the reliability of their Afghan allies.

    “This is brand new,” said Brigadier-General Guy Laroche, Canada's top commander in Afghanistan, during an interview Monday. “We're going to make sure our people eat.”
    Good idea, although it is a sad commentary on capacity and corruption problems in the Ministry of Interior:

    “The money did not get to these guys,” Gen. Laroche said. “Somebody is taking 10 per cent here, 10 per cent there, and at the end the poor guy is left with nothing. Would you stay in a place like that without being paid? I mean, c'mon.”
    US police mentors are doing the same.

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    Eurasia Insight, 20 Nov 07: Afghanistan: A Law Enforcement Success Story in Kabul
    ..."Corruption is rooted in economics, and so is violence. Give me the equipment, the men and the money and I can turn this force into one that can clean the crime off these streets in a matter of months. Until then, I do my best with what I have.".....

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    Quote Originally Posted by Jedburgh View Post

    Great article Jed, thanks for posting.

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    Afghan Police Struggle to Work a Beat in a War - NYTIMES, 13 January.

    Many of the problems frustrating Afghanistan’s efforts to secure its dangerous eastern and southern provinces were evident in the bizarre tour of duty of Shair Mohammad, a police officer who spent 18 months in an isolated swath of steppe.

    Until December, when a colonel arrived to replace him, Mr. Mohammad, 30, had been the acting police chief in the Nawa district of Ghazni Province. The job gave him jurisdiction over hundreds of square miles near Pakistan that the Taliban had used as a sanctuary since being ousted from power in 2001.

    But his ability to police his beat was severely compromised.

    Mr. Mohammad had no rank, no money for food and not enough clothing or gear to operate in cold weather. Two of his six trucks were broken. The ammunition the Pentagon provided him came in cardboard boxes that immediately crumbled, exposing cartridges to the elements on his storeroom’s dirty floor.

    Compounding his woes, the possibility of mutiny was on his mind. It was a natural worry, he said, because since April none of his men had been paid.
    “My commanders always just give me promises,” he said. “They never send the money ...”

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