The Afghanistan National Police (ANP)

[Jim Rodgers]

A long, and fairly interesting, article in the WaPo today - it's below, and linked from the 6 Aug roundup as well. Not detailed enough to really assess how things are going, but it does seem to illustrate the challenges\frustrations.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...080503531&pos=

[DaveDoyle]

Only had time to read the first 16 pages of the Wilder paper and the Washington Post article. Haven’t scanned the posts on our government’s approach to the problem. I do suspect that what we (the U.S. government) expect, as a standard for police work may be divorced from what is necessary and effective. That definition will certainly change over time as well.

Getting to the point –

If Taliban are targeting police, and they are, it is because they see the immediate threat. Police, not military, have the ability to effectively limit the Taliban control over the population. Establishing the “profession” of police work is going to be the biggest challenge to a society that distrusts authority. Young Afghans may aspire to be in the military, but at this point not many aspire to protect and serve as a member of the police force, local or national. How does one build on the idea of the importance of the police? Seems like it is going to take a lot of local work first. Work in the districts and villages like the Post article describes.

Thoughts?

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 18 Nov 08: Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy

Police reform in Afghanistan is receiving more attention and resources than ever before, but such increased efforts are still yet to be matched by significant improvements in police effectiveness and public confidence. Too much emphasis has continued to be placed on using the police to fight the insurgency rather than crime. Corruption and political appointments are derailing attempts to professionalise the force. The government and the international community need to reinforce the International Policing Coordination Board (IPCB) as the central forum for prioritising efforts and drive forward with much greater unity of effort. Tangible steps such as appointing a career police commissioner and establishing community liaison boards will build professionalism and wider outreach. A national police force able to uphold the rule of law is crucial to statebuilding and would help tackle the root causes of alienation that drive the insurgency.......

[Old Eagle]

In an insurgency, police are caught in the middle. How they are trained and equipped, who controls them, what their missions are, etc. pose massive problems for the counterinsurgent.

Ordinary crime and corruption are problems in Afghanistan (as is traffic control), so traditional police would have their hands full under any circumstances. In fact, the German training program was initially targeted on this mission set.

Then come the organized drug bosses and quickly overwhelm traditional police.

Then come the Taliban, AQ, whoever else and realy overwhelm the police. Remember -- the insurgent is not the counter-soldier, he is the counter-policeman. He doesn't want to win battles, he wants to impose control.

So now the police tend to become something that they didn't start out to be -- paramilitary forces, and in the process, lose the ability to do traditional policing functions.

Well, of course the army can fight insurgents, but there's also a problem with that: we don't want the military to be domestic enforcers. Posse commitatus and all that.

Now my head is starting to hurt.

But wait there's more. When I was working in the Afghan MOD, the senior leadership came in and started the "gotcha" round --
"didn't you say that unity of command is a principle of war?"
"yes..."
"so we need command and control of the police, not the MOI."
'now wait -- the ANA will eventually be an externally directed traditional military force, and police are not part of the military function"
"Are you nuts? We have a huge insurgency inside our borders...(gotcha!)"

Well, you get the idea.

In short, there are not clean cut solutions. Wish there were.

[Ken White]

ever pragmatic Dutch have at least a partial solution. Won't work for and in the US but it might work for some nations and for Afghanistan. The Marechaussee LINK and the Gendarmerie LINK concepts are also widely copied in the ME. Iran for example, in the days of the Shahs had two police forces; the totally civilian National Police who performed all standard police functions in the towns and cities and the paramilitary Gendarmerie who policed rural areas AND provdiced the border Guard and a paramilitary force (which coincidentally served as a counterweight and coup deterrent to the Armed Forces).

The Turks also have a Gendarmerie. LINK. Note that in all cases, there's a dual chain, civilian and military and note also that the Turks are using Gendarmes in their counterinsurgency (as did the Dutch and French in their former colonies and as did the Viet Namese use their Field Police).

We have a bad tendency to believe that only US solutions are appropriate and to apply the 'not invented here' syndrome to some good ideas that others have. Of course, one argument certain to be deployed to support that ego centric American concept is that "It's hard enough to stand up one police force, much less two." To which I respond -- when you have an absolute and demonstrated NEED for two different kinds of police forces, that's not an issue, it's simply a minor impediment.

[reed11b]

ever pragmatic Dutch have at least a partial solution. Won't work for and in the US but it might work for some nations and for Afghanistan. The Marechaussee LINK and the Gendarmerie LINK concepts are also widely copied in the ME. Iran for example, in the days of the Shahs had two police forces; the totally civilian National Police who performed all standard police functions in the towns and cities and the paramilitary Gendarmerie who policed rural areas AND provdiced the border Guard and a paramilitary force (which coincidentally served as a counterweight and coup deterrent to the Armed Forces).

The Turks also have a Gendarmerie. LINK. Note that in all cases, there's a dual chain, civilian and military and note also that the Turks are using Gendarmes in their counterinsurgency (as did the Dutch and French in their former colonies and as did the Viet Namese use their Field Police).

We have a bad tendency to believe that only US solutions are appropriate and to apply the 'not invented here' syndrome to some good ideas that others have. Of course, one argument certain to be deployed to support that ego centric American concept is that "It's hard enough to stand up one police force, much less two." To which I respond -- when you have an absolute and demonstrated NEED for two different kinds of police forces, that's not an issue, it's simply a minor impediment.

I am a fan of the Gendarmerie concept but I have to ask if A-stan has the $$ to support two national police forces. Even with massive stand-up support, just maintaining well equiped forces seems to be beyond A-stans reach. All the more reason why I see the mission as defeating AQ and the Taliban over standing up A-stan stability.
Reed

[Ken White]

...All the more reason why I see the mission as defeating AQ and the Taliban over standing up A-stan stability.
Reed

I don't think that's possible. Suppress, control to an extent? Yes. Defeat? No -- they'll just go to ground and wait out the west.

As for this:

I am a fan of the Gendarmerie concept but I have to ask if A-stan has the $$ to support two national police forces. Even with massive stand-up support, just maintaining well equiped forces seems to be beyond A-stans reach.

First, at this time, we're paying the bills, so stand up is not an issue. Second, given a cessation of western support, Afghanistan will almost certainly continue to exist and it will almost certainly have Police. Those Police will number X. Whether they're all in one agency or four different crews is of little account. Efficiency is always important -- effectiveness is usually more important.

As an aside, I'd suggest that given what I know of Afghanistan, they'd be better off with one National Gendarmerie and having the normal police functions at Province and city level -- but that's in the too hard box at this time.