France's war in Algeria: telling the story

[esbelch32]

I agree with the points you have brought up Jedburgh, and hope that by posting the above article I haven't made myself out as condoning such practises. I thought some might be interested in one of the participants comments on the fighting there.

Aussaress actually published a book fairly recently, detailing what he saw and did in his time in Algeria. As a consequence, he was put on trial and stripped of military honors (retired rank and pension) and fined.

edit to add-

In reading the link you posted, Mr Fall actually suggests reading Larteguy's "The Centurions". He states that all officers in the story are real with names changed, and I have read that Ausseress is the source for a composite of one specific character in the book. And since that book has been brought up. I can't resist posting one of my favorite quotes-

"Have you noticed that in military history no regular army has ever been able to deal with a properly organized guerrilla force? If we use the regular army in Algeria, it can only end in failure. I'd like France to have two armies: one for display, with lovely guns, tanks, little soldiers, fanfares, staffs, distinguished and doddering generals, and dear little regimental officers who would be deeply concerned over their general's bowel movements or their colonel's piles: an army that would be shown for a modest fee on every fairground in the country.
The other would be the real one, composed entirely of young enthusiasts in camouflage battledress, who would not be put on display but from whom impossible efforts would be demanded and to whom all sorts of tricks would be taught. That's the army in which I should like to fight."

[Jedburgh]

An interesting resource, regarding this topic, is the US Army's Vietnam Era interrogation field manual (published in 1969). It's available for download in two parts:

FM 30-15 Intelligence Interrogation

FM 30-15 Part II

In the second link, Chapter 4, Interrogation Support for Stability Operations is of particular interest - our current FM 2-22.3 HUMINT Collector Operations does not go into this subject in the same degree of detail. In light of the topic of this thread, I'd like to quote a bit from Section 4-7, Insurgent Vulnerability to Interrogation:

Humane treatment of insurgent captives should extend far beyond compliance with Article 3, if for no other reason than to render them more susceptible to interrogation. The insurgent is trained to expect brutal treatment upon capture. If, contrary to what he has been led to believe, this mistreatment is not forthcoming, he is apt to become psychologically softened for interrogation. Furthermore, brutality by either capturing troops or friendly interrogators will reduce defections and serve as grist for the insurgent's propaganda mill.

[esbelch32]

That is an interesting resource, thanks for posting the link.

It is clear that the torture of enemy prisoners is detrimental for multiple reasons. Creating the 'grist for the insurrgent's propaganda mill' is an effect that all of us have seen recently, over there (MidEast) and at home. This was true then (Algeria), as it is now. From the sidebar notes of the 'torture to prevent terrorism' article:

The French military won the war on the ground but lost in the political circles in France. The public, which heard of the wide use of torture and summary executions, launched violent mass demonstrations. In the aftermath of Vietnam and Algeria, France was threatened with civil war. In 1959, French President Charles de Gaulle decided to allow Algeria to become sovereign. The French generals organized a coup in 1961, demanding that "Algeria must stay French." The coup failed. The violent reactions in France to the unpopular war signaled its end in 1962.

I'm not arguing that at all.

While serving as a squad leader, I never had a problem enforcing the standard. What I did have a problem with, was getting my troops to understand why it was necessary. In talking with squad leaders from multiple units in OIF 1 & 2, I noted that this was not a phenomena restricted to my squad/platoon alone...not restricted to 'Joe'.

That is not to say that our military is out of control, but this is a real issue. In order affect change, we must be honest with ourselves. I've seen a lot in the news about this very subject recently. In a way, I am surprised, as I thought that our stance on torture was always very clear. At least, that's what I always took away from the ROE briefs.

[Martin]

In a way, I am surprised, as I thought that our stance on torture was always very clear.

I haven't been on the ground and haven't talked with enough people who has, to know how you/they think about this, but:

Would like to ask you though, and anyone else reading this: Do you think this has something to do with Soldiers associating these rules with the Geneva convention, which has pretty much only been upheld by the Allied forces, and that the convention was written in another time, for another type of conflict, and that the reality they meet on the ground does not resemble the rules written, at all? Then the Human Rights organizations that equate Guantanamo with the Gulags, while ignoring the dreadful acts of the terrorists and insurgents, all the while speaking for an agenda that is not really founded on the facts on the ground... dissoluting the moral they pledge to uphold. Of course, leaving no alternatives.

Basically, if the problem is, partially, who says torture is wrong, and how they motivate it?

Martin

[Jedburgh]

Justifying the use of torture because terrorists are criminal scum and not a conventional enemy only brings us down to their level. To put this in context, think about how law enforcement deals with child molesters and serial killers all too often - just as great a blight upon the earth as any terrorist - yet they do not stoop to torture to wring out the details of their crimes.

Bluntly put, torture is both morally wrong and operationally ineffective. No matter the context. And it is very important for those who are not trained and experienced interrogators to get it into their heads that torture does not result in the collection of reliable intelligence information. There are certainly exceptions to this, but as a general rule it holds true.

Essentially, a source untrained in counter-interrogation techniques will say whatever you want when you reach a certain pain threshold - physical, psychological, or a combination. Not a reliable source. A source trained in counter-interrogation techniques (to include those who refuse to spout so much as a monosyllable under normal questioning methods) will state what he wants to when a believable threshold is reached. Disinformation or misdirection delivered in a believable manner, under significant duress is far more dangerous to us when integrated into current ops than than the information from the untrained source simply spitting out what you want to hear.

Of course, as we've been discussing, the use of torture detracts significantly from the legitimacy of the counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency effort. The strategic effects of that cannot be overstated.

As I've already stated, effective interrogation supporting counterterrorism is far more complex and difficult than everyday LE interrogation or military PW interrogation in a conventional conflict/war of maneuver. To repeat myself yet again, torture does absolutely nothing to facilitate the effective collection of intelligence information in support of that effort. In the long-term, it is counterproductive.

The use of torture is indicative of poor supervision and poor training of interrogators - both of which boil down to a leadership failure. Without going into specifics, I'll just say that it takes a while to train an effective interrogator. Graduation from one of the LE or military courses available, or attending the Reid or any other contract courses on the market, does not produce an effective interrogator right off the bat. There is no substitute for experience - getting live feedback in working with real sources tempered with professional mentoring. Manipulative human communications takes time to refine to the point where an individual can deal effectively with the hard cases. Some people, no matter how much training they receive, or how hard they try, will never become effective interrogators. Its not something that is in everyone's nature to apply effectively.

Torture, on the other hand, is easy. In this context, torture is an act of desperation and an admission of failure on the part of the interrogator. Besides being a crime, that is....

From Joint Forces Quarterly: Guantanamo Bay: Undermining the Global War on Terrorism

In addition to undermining the rule of law, the consequence of the policy at Guantanamo has been to fuel global anti-Americanism, which undermines U.S. influence and effectiveness, degrades the domestic support base, and denies the United States the moral high ground it needs to promote international human rights. It appears that these costs have far outweighed the operational benefits that the detainee operations have generated.

From Parameters: Six Floors of Detainee Operations in the Post 9/11 World

There is good reason for the international community to agree upon more understandable and more stringent measures against unlawful combatants and terrorists in order to deter hostile forces from adopting such tactics. But we must not legitimize inhumane measures and debase ourselves by adopting anything like the tactics of the common enemies of mankind.

From Military Review: Defining Success at Guantanamo Bay: By What Measure?

Success in the struggle against terrorism will be measured in generations. When future strategists look back on the early years of this decade, they will not judge Camp Delta on the relative value of intelligence reports but on humanitarian issues, how detainees were treated, the legitimacy of the trial process, whether laws reflected evolving definitions of “combatants”, and how detainees were ultimately dealt with when America dismantled terrorist groups. As we discover what the law will not allow, serious action to define what is permissible will follow. Justice—evidenced by whether criminal defendants were successfully defended or prosecuted, acquitted or convicted, fairly sentenced and safely incarcerated or repatriated—will be the enduring legacy of America’s actions at Guantanamo.

[Martin]

(in case it was directed at me... otherwise, nevermind, and thanks for a good post)
Jedburgh, I did not mean to advocate the use of torture and am sorry if it appeared like that. It was no more than an inquiry to gain a bit more understanding for why torture has occured, and to ask if my thoughts might be on the right track. Which you answered well.

You make sense in your post(s).

Martin

[esbelch32]

I cannot speak for interrogators. I have dropped many apprehended off at the BDE cell, but I have never engaged in interrogation. I have never allowed my men to engage in interrogation. As Jedburgh states, we were not trained to do such, and left it to those who were.

That said, I would like to expound on the troops views, and again I am only speaking of my own experinces within my own unit. Before we ever crossed the berm from Kuwait into Iraq, we received ROE briefs ad nauseum. More ROE briefs than you could shake a stick at. The point driven home: EPW's were to be treated humanely. Marked, separated, secured, all the stdff normally taught, but the emphasis...humanely. I fielded many questions from within the squad after such briefs- mainly concerning what would be expected of them in specific scenarios. You can imagine the expounding of ideas and situations that took place, but know that like any 8 men, they came up with all manner of questionable situations. I gave them the unwavering stance of 'mistreatment will not be tolerated'. I gave all the good reasons, many cited in above posts, for why such behavior could and would not be tolerated. This was accepted by the men, and as is said, we drove on.

6 months later, I had a squad that was reduced in size significantly (PCS and ETS if you can believe it) as well as an increased AOR. I do not flinch in writing such, as it is common knowledge now and available open source as 'history'...no longer an operational snapshot. Anyways, as violence escalated around us, my men became frustrated with what they perceived to be complacency on the part of the local civilians. The question of treatment of those apprehended, and truthfully, those neighboring and surely knowledgable of enemy activity, came up from within the squad again and again. I continued to emphasize all the answers already provided above. The lowering of our own morals, the strategic implications, the impetus to create new enemies...I hit all the major points and I am sure that I would have made many proud if they had cared to be there and listen.

As my men, and truthfully, myself, watched one of our squad go home missing a leg....as we watched the remains of 2 members of our unit get policed into an FLA...it became much more difficult to keep the men focused. It became difficult for me to remain focused. I did stay focused...but not without great soul searching. If this seems unprofessional, I can only say, it is the truth. As for my men, I am not certain that they all remained convinced of the basics we are discussing. I can say that while I was their squad leader, the standard was enforced.

You ask a hard question Martin and am glad you have asked it. Jedburgh, I honor your belief in the principles, and am truly on your side.