(in case it was directed at me... otherwise, nevermind, and thanks for a good post)
Jedburgh, I did not mean to advocate the use of torture and am sorry if it appeared like that. It was no more than an inquiry to gain a bit more understanding for why torture has occured, and to ask if my thoughts might be on the right track. Which you answered well.
You make sense in your post(s).
Martin
Last edited by Martin; 12-17-2005 at 07:47 PM.
I cannot speak for interrogators. I have dropped many apprehended off at the BDE cell, but I have never engaged in interrogation. I have never allowed my men to engage in interrogation. As Jedburgh states, we were not trained to do such, and left it to those who were.
That said, I would like to expound on the troops views, and again I am only speaking of my own experinces within my own unit. Before we ever crossed the berm from Kuwait into Iraq, we received ROE briefs ad nauseum. More ROE briefs than you could shake a stick at. The point driven home: EPW's were to be treated humanely. Marked, separated, secured, all the stdff normally taught, but the emphasis...humanely. I fielded many questions from within the squad after such briefs- mainly concerning what would be expected of them in specific scenarios. You can imagine the expounding of ideas and situations that took place, but know that like any 8 men, they came up with all manner of questionable situations. I gave them the unwavering stance of 'mistreatment will not be tolerated'. I gave all the good reasons, many cited in above posts, for why such behavior could and would not be tolerated. This was accepted by the men, and as is said, we drove on.
6 months later, I had a squad that was reduced in size significantly (PCS and ETS if you can believe it) as well as an increased AOR. I do not flinch in writing such, as it is common knowledge now and available open source as 'history'...no longer an operational snapshot. Anyways, as violence escalated around us, my men became frustrated with what they perceived to be complacency on the part of the local civilians. The question of treatment of those apprehended, and truthfully, those neighboring and surely knowledgable of enemy activity, came up from within the squad again and again. I continued to emphasize all the answers already provided above. The lowering of our own morals, the strategic implications, the impetus to create new enemies...I hit all the major points and I am sure that I would have made many proud if they had cared to be there and listen.
As my men, and truthfully, myself, watched one of our squad go home missing a leg....as we watched the remains of 2 members of our unit get policed into an FLA...it became much more difficult to keep the men focused. It became difficult for me to remain focused. I did stay focused...but not without great soul searching. If this seems unprofessional, I can only say, it is the truth. As for my men, I am not certain that they all remained convinced of the basics we are discussing. I can say that while I was their squad leader, the standard was enforced.
You ask a hard question Martin and am glad you have asked it. Jedburgh, I honor your belief in the principles, and am truly on your side.
Last edited by esbelch32; 12-17-2005 at 11:50 PM. Reason: spelling and grammar
That you clearly recognized this effect and did your best to address it within your lane demonstrates your professionalism. You paint an excellent picture of the difficulties of counterinsurgency from the squad level. Only a soldier who has been on the ground and experienced it can appreciate it - someone else could read a dozen volumes on counterinsurgency that essentially boil down to what you just stated, but still not really appreciate the tactical leadership challenge it presents.Originally Posted by esbelch32
This type of operational environment is also extraordinarily difficult for the average HUMINT collector - whether working straightforward tactical interrogation, or the many varied missions of THTs in-country. They are your fellow soldiers, and they feel the same frustrations with the operational environment as the infantrymen. Not to mention that they also tend to receive far more pressure from above to produce while adhering to the standards of conduct we've been discussing.
However, effective mission focus for HUMINT collection requires putting aside those frustrations - even more so than it does for you and your soldiers. Because a HUMINTer deals with locals up close and personal across the spectrum from interrogation to elicitation, permitting personal emotions and frustrations to affect mission execution is death to effective collection. I remarked earlier that torture is a clear indicator of failure on the part of the interrogator. In this context, I am referring to a failure by the interrogator to keep his personal emotions and frustrations separate from execution of the task at hand. Sometimes its a damn difficult thing to do.
With HUMINT in the field, we also have the opposite problem of torture - the old "empathy vs sympathy" bit. Over the years I have seen many a HUMINTer, with "good people skills" slide across the line with a source from empathy to sympathy, losing that degree of separation and thus their effectiveness as a collector. Empathy, the understanding of an individual's perspective, is absolutely necessary in the effective application of manipulative human communications - sympathy, taking that emotional and psychological step towards a source, is also death to effective HUMINT. If an individual breaks down emotionally because a source has been murdered for speaking to the Americans, it may be human, but its not HUMINT. He needs a different job.
From what I noticed, you would recieve a more positive reaction by throwing the volumes at their head. Nobody wants to give a ####(or at least the ones around me didn't)
Last edited by GorTex6; 12-22-2005 at 11:09 AM.
"Demoralization of the enemy's forces is an important task. The most effective way to achieve it is by employing a policy of leniency toward the prisoners."
-Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice,David Galula(Veteran of Algeria, China, Greece, Southeast Asia)
In 1978, Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro was kidnapped by members of the Red Brigade. When Italian General Della Chiesa was asked by subordinates if they could torture a few suspects who might know the whereabouts of Aldo Moro, the General replied, "Italy can survive the loss of Aldo Moro. It would not survive the introduction of torture."
Aldo Moro was later executed by the Red Brigades. Italy is still here, the Red Brigades are not.
There are a terrible lot of lies going around the world, and the worst of it is half of them are true.
-Winston Churchill
minor footnotes
Reverence the comment on Larteguy's "The Centurions" (and "Praetoriens"). The characters in the book are all composites. Thus Raspeguy is based largely upon Marcel "Bruno" Bigeard, but likewise includes bits of Langlais, Brechignac, and several other colourful airborne commanders. Julien Boisferas, the fictional 10th Colonial Para's intelligence officer, was partly based on Aussaresses, who knew Bigeard from their WWII FFI service, but also on Roger Trinquier and Decorse. The real Aussaresses served in a totally different regiment in Algeria. (Bigeard commanded the 3rd RPC, Trinquier was on the 10th Abn Div staff, but followed Bigeard into the 3rd RPC/RPIMa whereas Aussaresses served with the 11th Para "Choc' Regiment.) What Larteguy's two most excellent novels fails to capture is the success of the 3rd RPC/RPIMa (renamed in 1958) in converting captured "fells" to their cause end enlisting them into a 5th parachute rifle company within the 3rd RPIMa. You don't enlist former enemy combattants to your cause by torturing them. And their loyalty to the 3rd Colonial/Marine Paras included participating what was to have been a combat jump into Tunisia in 1961 (changed to airlanding at the last minute).
Which brings me to this point. Many French units were able to distinguish between terrorists, who targeted civiians with bombs, and enemy combattants, who fought openly against the French. And many of these same French units often included commando and partisan units composed of captured ALN cadred by an officer and a few really good NCOs who led these former "fells" on operations against the FLN infrastructure and ALN units in the field. A far better view than that in Larteguy's very excellent fiction can be found in such accounts as Jean Pouget's "Bataillon RAS", Henry-Jean Loustau's memoirs on Algeria (my apologies, title forgotten). The battle of Algiers was fought against terrorists who were targeting civilians. While I greatly respect Gen. Paris de la Bollardiere's moral principles, I do not condemn Aussaresses or the others who engaged in torture to break their way into the cells. They were trying to save innocent civilian lives, both Colon and Arab. The fact that they broke those clandestine cells speaks for the efficiency of their methods. But a contemporary eyewitness account I read long ago notes in an aside that those who often volunteered for services that required the application of torture were not the better elements of their units. Such methods were likely not applied across the spectrum. Otherwise the French would have had little success in recruiting former FLN for their partisan and commando units. Pouget (the model for Philippe Esclavier, and to whom Larteguy dedicicated The Centurions) is emphatic that captured ALN must be treated as combattants, and not as criminals. To extrapolate that experience, I would suggest that those Iraqi insurgents using car bombs and other devices to target U.S. Forces are legitimate combattants, while those who do so to target mosques, polling places, and other civilian targets are terrorists, despite the similarity of their TTP.
Bigeard's methods in Algiers
Just a follow-up to my previous. I ran through Erwan Bergot's bio of Bigeard last night for the battle of Algiers. Of interest, Bigeard emphasizes what an intelligence analyst would call the "pattern analysis" approach to cracking the cells. He lays out the problem that the police had in dealing with insurgents using the existing French legal code, and emphasizes that the Army was not going to be bound by rules of evidence or criminal procedure, and that they were not going to fail. Bigeard attributes his success in Algiers to the fact that his company commanders were given specific pieces of territory and challenged to ferret out the information needed to identify the FLN cells within his regimental area, which included the Casbah. Specifically, he had his intelligence officer prepare a briefing for the unit commanders which detailed all that was known about the FLN and its organization, and capturing that in an organizational diagram with blank spaces showing for persons unknown. The S-2 had gained his information from the Police records, but the individuals were at that time out on the street. At the briefing, Bigeard informed his commanders that it was their jobs to fill in the spaces on the chart, not the S-2's, and that they would be judged accordingly. He emphasized that all they had were the very lowest ranking members of the organization, and that the nature of the organization was that each man would know only the members of his cell, and with luck, perhaps a member of another cell. The cell leader would know the name only of his higher contact. But, with the information they had, they held the keys to filling in the blanks. The advantage of the Army over the police was that the Army, under martial law, could be far more flexible and much quicker to exploit intelligence. They did not need to go to a judge to get a search order, and the same commander who picked up reportable information was the same entity who would be reacting to it. The units subsequently fanned out through their assigned areas, and began bringing in suspects. Deprived of their access to a defense attorney, and in total ignorance of how long and under what conditions they would be held, many of the suspects began to drop snippets of information, which the units immediately followed up on. It was a laborious method, but it allowed his regiment to accumulate enough information to begin piecing a more comprehensive picture together, which in turn generated more operations, more suspects in custody,and more information. The end result was a picture accurate enough to allow a patterned analysis of the insurgents infrastructure, resulting in the arrest and neutralization of its leaders. In the short term, Massu's 10th Abn Div won the battle of Algiers, but Bigeard warned that the victory was only operational, and that enough of a structure had fled to allow the FLN to return and reconstitute their networks, thereby resuming operations. As I understand his take on torture, which he neither denies nor endorses, the issue of torture was greatly exaggerated by both the FLN and the government's enemies in order to discredit the Army and thus build the political consensus in French political circles necessary to prevent the Army from ever undertaking such operations again.
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