Two months ago I traveled to Paris and spent three hours interviewing a former French paratrooper who participated in the Battle of Algiers. Here is a part of my interview with him. I hope it is valuable.

On Oct. 4, 2006, Robert Rocher, now retired and living in Paris, discussed his role in the Battle of Algiers and the use of interrogation in counterinsurgency operations.

Question: “What unit were you assigned to during the Battle of Algiers and what was your rank?”
Answer: “I was assigned to the 2nd Regiment Parachute Colonial (RPC) as a lieutenant.”
Q: “What were your duties with the 2nd RCP?”
A: “We were in charge of intelligence work—gathering information. There was an intelligence officer who directed our actions. We arrested terrorism suspects and conducted interrogations. Intelligence is like fish, you have to use it when it is fresh.”
Q: “What was the size of the unit you commanded in Algiers?”
A: “I typically commanded 25-30 paratroopers. The paras were very flexible; sometimes I controlled as many as 50 soldiers.”
Q: “When you arrested someone, what happened to him?”
A: “When the person was still in good health, we took them to our headquarters and interrogated him. If the person was not well, we interrogated him directly on the spot.”
Q: “What interrogation methods did you use?”
A: “The interrogations were conducted verbally and sometimes a certain brutality was used. We used electric shock when necessary. All the interrogations happened as fast as possible, within 24 hours. We were trying to prevent acts of terrorism”
Q: “How often would people talk during interrogation without physical abuse?”
A: “Four out of five talked right away. In some cases we gained good intelligence immediately. Many of the people were very scared and had been forced to cooperate with the terrorists.”
Q: “Were these interrogation techniques used by other units in Algiers?”
A: “All the other units used similar techniques.”
Q: “What happened to the prisoners after they were interrogated?”
A: “We sent them to prison camps in the south of Algeria. It was often for their protection. If the FLN knew someone had been interrogated, the FLN would assume he talked to us and would kill him.”
Q: “Did you ever release anyone on purpose, knowing he would be killed for talking to you?”
A: “It happened.”
Q: “Could you have defeated the insurgency without using inhumane interrogation techniques?”
A: “No, for two reasons. We had to show the native Algerians we were stronger than the insurgents. The fanatical terrorists had the information we needed. They would not talk without brutality.”
Q: “If you used the information you gained from interrogating suspects who talked freely, without the use of torture, could you eventually have beaten the insurgents?”
A: “Those who spoke freely did not have good quality information. The ones who did not want to talk had the useful information. There are two levels of information and we needed the information from the fanatics.”
Q: “How did you arrest people for interrogation?”
A: “We always acted on intelligence. We never simply swept an area and detained all the residents.”
Q: “What else can you share about your counterinsurgency experience in Algeria?”
A: “Counterinsurgency is about creating confidence in the population. Obtaining information is key. Protecting the local population is important to make their life less difficult. When insurgencies prevail, civilization disappears. People are put into slavery by insurgent forces.”
Q: “What was the long-term impact of losing the Algerian War for the French military?”
A: “The army lost its morale after the war. Many officers resigned from the service and the loss fostered a corrosive attitude at the national level of government.”