France's war in Algeria: telling the story

[Jedburgh]

...as violence escalated around us, my men became frustrated with what they perceived to be complacency on the part of the local civilians. The question of treatment of those apprehended, and truthfully, those neighboring and surely knowledgable of enemy activity, came up from within the squad again and again. I continued to emphasize all the answers already provided above. The lowering of our own morals, the strategic implications, the impetus to create new enemies...I hit all the major points and I am sure that I would have made many proud if they had cared to be there and listen.

As my men, and truthfully, myself, watched one of our squad go home missing a leg....as we watched the remains of 2 members of our unit get policed into an FLA...it became much more difficult to keep the men focused. It became difficult for me to remain focused. I did stay focused...but not without great soul searching. If this seems unprofessional, I can only say, it is the truth. As for my men, I am not certain that they all remained convinced of the basics we are discussing. I can say that while I was their squad leader, the standard was enforced.

That you clearly recognized this effect and did your best to address it within your lane demonstrates your professionalism. You paint an excellent picture of the difficulties of counterinsurgency from the squad level. Only a soldier who has been on the ground and experienced it can appreciate it - someone else could read a dozen volumes on counterinsurgency that essentially boil down to what you just stated, but still not really appreciate the tactical leadership challenge it presents.

This type of operational environment is also extraordinarily difficult for the average HUMINT collector - whether working straightforward tactical interrogation, or the many varied missions of THTs in-country. They are your fellow soldiers, and they feel the same frustrations with the operational environment as the infantrymen. Not to mention that they also tend to receive far more pressure from above to produce while adhering to the standards of conduct we've been discussing.

However, effective mission focus for HUMINT collection requires putting aside those frustrations - even more so than it does for you and your soldiers. Because a HUMINTer deals with locals up close and personal across the spectrum from interrogation to elicitation, permitting personal emotions and frustrations to affect mission execution is death to effective collection. I remarked earlier that torture is a clear indicator of failure on the part of the interrogator. In this context, I am referring to a failure by the interrogator to keep his personal emotions and frustrations separate from execution of the task at hand. Sometimes its a damn difficult thing to do.

With HUMINT in the field, we also have the opposite problem of torture - the old "empathy vs sympathy" bit. Over the years I have seen many a HUMINTer, with "good people skills" slide across the line with a source from empathy to sympathy, losing that degree of separation and thus their effectiveness as a collector. Empathy, the understanding of an individual's perspective, is absolutely necessary in the effective application of manipulative human communications - sympathy, taking that emotional and psychological step towards a source, is also death to effective HUMINT. If an individual breaks down emotionally because a source has been murdered for speaking to the Americans, it may be human, but its not HUMINT. He needs a different job.

[GorTex6]

someone else could read a dozen volumes on counterinsurgency that essentially boil down to what you just stated,

From what I noticed, you would recieve a more positive reaction by throwing the volumes at their head. Nobody wants to give a ####(or at least the ones around me didn't)