Justifying the use of torture because terrorists are criminal scum and not a conventional enemy only brings us down to their level. To put this in context, think about how law enforcement deals with child molesters and serial killers all too often - just as great a blight upon the earth as any terrorist - yet they do not stoop to torture to wring out the details of their crimes.

Bluntly put, torture is both morally wrong and operationally ineffective. No matter the context. And it is very important for those who are not trained and experienced interrogators to get it into their heads that torture does not result in the collection of reliable intelligence information. There are certainly exceptions to this, but as a general rule it holds true.

Essentially, a source untrained in counter-interrogation techniques will say whatever you want when you reach a certain pain threshold - physical, psychological, or a combination. Not a reliable source. A source trained in counter-interrogation techniques (to include those who refuse to spout so much as a monosyllable under normal questioning methods) will state what he wants to when a believable threshold is reached. Disinformation or misdirection delivered in a believable manner, under significant duress is far more dangerous to us when integrated into current ops than than the information from the untrained source simply spitting out what you want to hear.

Of course, as we've been discussing, the use of torture detracts significantly from the legitimacy of the counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency effort. The strategic effects of that cannot be overstated.

As I've already stated, effective interrogation supporting counterterrorism is far more complex and difficult than everyday LE interrogation or military PW interrogation in a conventional conflict/war of maneuver. To repeat myself yet again, torture does absolutely nothing to facilitate the effective collection of intelligence information in support of that effort. In the long-term, it is counterproductive.

The use of torture is indicative of poor supervision and poor training of interrogators - both of which boil down to a leadership failure. Without going into specifics, I'll just say that it takes a while to train an effective interrogator. Graduation from one of the LE or military courses available, or attending the Reid or any other contract courses on the market, does not produce an effective interrogator right off the bat. There is no substitute for experience - getting live feedback in working with real sources tempered with professional mentoring. Manipulative human communications takes time to refine to the point where an individual can deal effectively with the hard cases. Some people, no matter how much training they receive, or how hard they try, will never become effective interrogators. Its not something that is in everyone's nature to apply effectively.

Torture, on the other hand, is easy. In this context, torture is an act of desperation and an admission of failure on the part of the interrogator. Besides being a crime, that is....

From Joint Forces Quarterly: Guantanamo Bay: Undermining the Global War on Terrorism
In addition to undermining the rule of law, the consequence of the policy at Guantanamo has been to fuel global anti-Americanism, which undermines U.S. influence and effectiveness, degrades the domestic support base, and denies the United States the moral high ground it needs to promote international human rights. It appears that these costs have far outweighed the operational benefits that the detainee operations have generated.
From Parameters: Six Floors of Detainee Operations in the Post 9/11 World
There is good reason for the international community to agree upon more understandable and more stringent measures against unlawful combatants and terrorists in order to deter hostile forces from adopting such tactics. But we must not legitimize inhumane measures and debase ourselves by adopting anything like the tactics of the common enemies of mankind.
From Military Review: Defining Success at Guantanamo Bay: By What Measure?
Success in the struggle against terrorism will be measured in generations. When future strategists look back on the early years of this decade, they will not judge Camp Delta on the relative value of intelligence reports but on humanitarian issues, how detainees were treated, the legitimacy of the trial process, whether laws reflected evolving definitions of “combatants”, and how detainees were ultimately dealt with when America dismantled terrorist groups. As we discover what the law will not allow, serious action to define what is permissible will follow. Justice—evidenced by whether criminal defendants were successfully defended or prosecuted, acquitted or convicted, fairly sentenced and safely incarcerated or repatriated—will be the enduring legacy of America’s actions at Guantanamo.