For those that want a one-stop page on the Iraq Study Group's Report.
SWJ ISG Page
For those that want a one-stop page on the Iraq Study Group's Report.
Still no good options
It was foolish of me to hope for more from the study group, but I did. I don't disagree with regional engagement, you have to do it. If Iran is really the problem (I have seen conflicted reports on this), then I think we need to negotiate with them openly. We need to put them in a position where they support the international communities efforts (open statements saying they will), or they openly defy and they state they will continue to destabilize Iraq. If they state publically they desire to help stabilize Iraq, but we have evidence proving otherwise we need to show it. If they defiantly admit they want to continue destabilizing it, then we declare war on them. We need to take the initiative and put them in checkmate, and have the high moral ground. I think we have more maneuver room than we give ourselves credit for. Saudi and several other countries in the region are concerned about Iran, as are several European countries, not to mention Israel. Just because we made serious mistakes with Iraq doesn't mean we should prohibit ourselves from the necessary actions to win this war. Pull out or fight, but I don't think we'll ever solve the Iraqi problem by staying within the boundaries of Iraq. It is regional problem that hopefully we can solve diplomatically, if not then point our guns across the border. I don't recommend attempting another regime change, but executing very punishing military raids that cause significant pain to the regime and demonstrate our will. If that sets the conditions for Iranians to implement their own regime change so much the better.
Last edited by Bill Moore; 12-08-2006 at 02:14 AM.
Half full Half empty
I am ambivalent toward the ISG report in that the report itself is what it is: a collection of individual talking points some of which have key implications on Iraq, some of which are more Washington DC-centric. In this regard, I see the glass as half empty. I wish they (the ISG) had filled it up.
On the other hand, I see the glass as half full because at least the ISG has brought key issues to light, issues that have not seen the light of day in several years. Moreover, the process of the ISG is in my view what is important, not its substance (or lack there of).
On another thread here the other day council member Around Midnight framed a discussion around the issue of National Will as An Instrument of National Power . I see the ISG as a critical step in doing that; the choice is really whether to take the step forward or take a step backward.
Best
Tom
I agree, Tom. The ISG really reads as more of a talking paper, but it does bring out some issues that should be discussed. And by discussed I mean in a real, meaningful way that won't lend itself to quaint sound bites but rather a deeper discussion of what we hope to accomplish and a realistic appraisal of what lies in our way. The sort of talk where everything is on the table, including a more balanced view of the Middle East. I honestly don't have much hope that this will happen, but it would be nice.
The report could not possibly live up to all the expectations, having become all things to all people before it was released. While it may not be perfect it does a couple of things well. First, it starts with fact that what we have being do is not working, nobodies like me have been saying it for years but I am no Jim Baker. While the recommendations of the report may work they may not, many may not even be attempted but the bottom line is we need to do something different, if we keep doing the same thing we will get the same results. Second the reports recommendations attempt to take a comprehensive approach to Iraq instead of looking for solutions piecemeal and only addressing the issues we want to deal with. I doubt any attempt will be made to implement solutions in such an overarching way but hopefully I am just being cynical.
National Will
Great thoughts on the report's potential to unify our national will, and whether or not as a nation we will take a step forward or a step back. So far I'm still standing firm on the position that if regional diplomacy fails to bring about an acceptable path forward, then we must be prepared to conduct military operations in the region (not just Iraq) to influence the development of helpful diplomacy in the region (carrot and stick). Operations much like our bombing raid in Libya in response to their support to terrorism. I think that is an appropriate and just use of the military, but one that takes considerable political will (which is currently waning for obvious reasons). If we're going to be a player in the Middle East, then we need to be a player and play from a position of strength. We have been selling wolf tickets for too long. What's at risk if we don't this? We take several steps back and let Iraq devolve into a regional conflict that threatens access to the supply of crude oil in the region, which will drive the industrial world into a recession or worse. I would hope that Iran, Saudi, Syria, and others would opt to prevent this and ally with us (regardless of how repugnant it may be for all concerned) to get Iraq on the right path, to not do so is a lose-lose proposition for everyone except Al Qaeda.
ICG, 19 Dec 06: After Baker-Hamilton: What to Do in Iraq
...The exceptional convergence of interconnected Middle East crises, coupled with growing sectarian polarisation, is threatening to unleash a virtually unprecedented regional conflagration. While many international and regional actors privately acknowledge this possibility, their quasi- exclusive focus on the strategic competition between the U.S. and its Arab allies on the one hand and Iran, Syria and their allies on the other, is preventing them from taking collective action to stop the slide. Thus, the U.S. administration appears determined not to alter its approach toward Iran or Syria, convinced that any softening would only further embolden them. Likewise, Syrian officials, though privately conceding the grave risks posed by all-out civil war in Iraq and, possibly, Lebanon to the regime’s own stability, appear more interested in fending off U.S. threats than in preventing that outcome.
All in all, every actor remains engaged in policies that, whether in Iraq, Palestine, or Lebanon, threaten to ignite the final fuse. For now, Iraq – seen as the epicentre of, and the most significant prize in the struggle between two visions for the Middle East – stands at the centre of this regional tug-of-war. Its drama is fuelling regional tensions just as regional tensions in turn increasingly will fuel its civil war. Without a radical change in how the U.S. and regional actors deal with Iraq and with each other, the risks of a catastrophic result will rise exponentially.
Implementation of the various measures mapped out in this report is one last opportunity. It is at best a feeble hope, dependent on a fundamental shift among Iraqi political leaders who have been preoccupied with short term gain; on a radical rupture with past policies by a U.S. administration that has proved resistant to pragmatic change; on a significant alteration in relations between the U.S. and key regional countries that have been marked by deep mistrust and strategic competition; and on involvement by international actors that have warily watched from the sidelines. But it is the only hope to spare Iraq from an all-out disintegration, with catastrophic and devastating repercussions for all.
I agree with your thoughts sir. I am interested to hear what you think of the ISG recommendation to push the Israelis to return the Golan Heights to Syria.Originally Posted by Tom Odom
In addition, while the report makes repeated references to the issue of Kirkuk, why do you think that it would not specifically "spell-out" what the issue(s) is/are? Is there a fear of letting the US public know that the Kurds, who are portrayed as some of the "good-guys," will potentially break the country apart over this issue?
Golan
The Golan is a major redline with the Israelis--one more serious than the West Bank. The Israelis were willing---at least by my read of the Liberty Incident in 1967--to risk a major break with the US by taking the Golan after a UN ceasefire was in place (and again reading the Liberty Incident) and attacking a US intelligence ship to cover the move. They have in the past indicated a willingness to negotiate Golan in return for US forces deploying along the area--where UNTSO is now; another version of Camp David that would place US soldiers on the line as a trip wire. Remember also that the real risk in the 73 War was not in Sinai; the Syrians nearly broke the IDF on the Golan--see Heights of Courage for the story on that one.I agree with your thoughts sir. I am interested to hear what you think of the ISG recommendation to push the Israelis to return the Golan Heights to Syria.
As for Syria, getting the Golan back has been an objective since 67. I suspect the US aim would be to get Syria to back off on Lebanon and reduce increased ties with Iran as well of course furthering reducing support to groups in Iraq.
I believe you hit it on the head. Kurdish aspirations are at logger heads with much of what we have laid out for Iraq and have been the stumbling block between the Turks and our plans.In addition, while the report makes repeated references to the issue of Kirkuk, why do you think that it would not specifically "spell-out" what the issue(s) is/are? Is there a fear of letting the US public know that the Kurds, who are portrayed as some of the "good-guys," will potentially break the country apart over this issue?
Best
Tom
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