Iraq Study Group Report

[Uboat509]

I haven't finished reading the report yet but I can tell you that the snapshot of Iraq is pretty accurate. I haven't gotten to the recommendations yet but I can tell you that the biggest problem with it is that it will largely be viewed through political filters. I am not sure how much actual influence this report will really have. I suspect that something close to a majority have already made up their minds.

SFC W

[Jones_RE]

I think there's still plenty of national will left. I think most people have a sense that the war is going very badly, that's it's a very strange and different kind of war, and that none of the plans the leadership put out there make a lot of sense.

So far, no one here or anywhere else has come up with a genuine operational plan that will work and work permanently. What's needed to revive the national will, and improve sentiment for the war, is some kind of genuine victory on the ground. Until somebody starts making some lasting progress in the actual theater of operations, people are going to view the whole war effort pretty negatively.

So, I don't think this is a case of "the American people are weak willed and want to pull out of the war even though we haven't been beaten on the ground." Rather, it's a case of "the American people are smart enough to realize that we have been beaten on the ground, we just haven't been routed and driven off the battlefield because this isn't that kind of war."

[Jedburgh]

Cordesman on the ISG Report, 6 Dec 06:

The Baker-Hamilton Study Group Report: The Elephant Gives Birth to a Mouse

...The report also does not provide a credible security policy option. Undefined U.S. troop cuts are desirable by 2008, or possibly earlier or later. The U.S. is to rush in more qualified trainers and embeds that it doesn't have, and assign more existing combat forces unqualified for the mission. The plan for dealing with the militias is to form a new U.S. bureaucracy without addressing the need for immediate, day-to-day security in a nation without effective courts and police in most threatened areas.

There is no meaningful plan for creating a mix of effective Iraqi military forces, police forces, governance, and criminal justice system at any point in the near future, much less by 2008. A truly effective effort may be possible with political conciliation and the proper resources and planning. But, (a) the full report does not provide a credible explanation of how this can happen, and (b) the development of effective Iraqi forces is definitely not possible without conciliation.

The main report ignores the problems in today's training and force development programs to the point where many of its recommendations are little more than exhortative nonsense. It also is pointless to make a long series of detailed sub-recommendations for change in the Iraqi security forces in the main report without detailed justification and without a meaningful detailed assessment of the capabilities of the existing force and training effort....