Carter on Israeli "Apartheid"

[aktarian]

I wonder how long will it take for people to call him anti-semite.

[120mm]

I just don't see how the Arabs will allow a solution to happen. It is in their best interests to keep the Palestinians in their camps. Without the Palestinians, they would have nothing to distract the "Arab street" with.

BTW - Isn't a bunch of supposedly "Palestinian land" in Arab nations? Would an agreement with Israel include that land? Or is it just the "Yids" land we are interested in, here?

Being seen as wanting to addressing the problem would have important IO ramifications, that could be exploited, but I have to believe that giving an inch to the Palestinians would result in them taking the proverbial mile, resulting in Israeli over-reaction, etc..

In the end, I think that if they could kill all the Jews, they'd complain that the Jewish bodies were contaminating the ground.

[Tom Odom]

I just don't see how the Arabs will allow a solution to happen. It is in their best interests to keep the Palestinians in their camps. Without the Palestinians, they would have nothing to distract the "Arab street" with.

On the contrary, the Arab states surrounding Israel the issues of Palestinian camps, rights, and poiltical/military activism are NOT factors that promote stability or in your terms divert the attention of the "Arab street." Begin with Lebanon as a case study and work south.

Secondly I would love to have you define "Arab street"; is that a linguistic definition or a quasi-ethnic definition? The "street" in Damascus is not the same as the "street" in Amman or anywhere else. There are common threads however and the issue of the Palestinians is one of them.

On the issue of Palestinian land in Arab states, depending on the state picked and how you define Palestine, you could make that case--the most common areas would be Jordan (especially the West Bank) and to a lesser degree Gaza. And that goes back to your theory about the Arab states wanting to keep the Palestinian issue bubbling. In the case of Jordan, look at September 1970.

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

I suspect one could argue that there ARE Arab interests who do like to see the Palestinian issue keep smoldering along, so long as it isn't in their backyards (Jordan being a good example). One could also argue that their fellow Arab governments have not done enough for the Palestinians on the whole (aside from funding suicide bombers' families and having discount sales on weapons), but I must admit that my knowledge in this area is somewhat restricted to the earlier days of Palestinian terrorism and doesn't have tons of depth when it comes to more current affairs.

And Tom, I agree about the "Arab street" thing. I get so tired of the MSM carrying on like there is some sort of mass "Arab street" out there that has the same opinions and needs to be catered to.

[Tom Odom]

Steve,

If you use Jordan as a test of Arab interests in sustaining the Palestinian issue, then the defintion of interests becomes critical.

In 1970, King Hussein after seeing the PLO morph into a state within a state, drove the Palestinian organizations from Jordan--that would be the origin of the phrase "Black September" and later the association of the name with Munich massacre stemmed from that. Hussein took action after the Palestinians blew up several hijacked airliners on the tarmac in Amman. And ultimately, the move of the Palestinians into Lebanon would unhinge that country's confessional political system. It was however in the immediate interest of Hussein to take the step and it was one with large risks for his kingdom.

In a larger sense and one argued from the Israeli side, that a Palestinian state already exists: Trans-Jordan and now modern day Jordan. It was that pressure point that (I believe) drove Hussein to push the Palestinians out (the organized groups, not all Palestinians). So in the larger sense, sustaining a hope for a Palestinian state is both boon and danger to Jordan. As a boon, it serves as a valve to bleed off tensions toward the kingdom. As a danger, there is the risk that a Palestinian state could undermine the Hashemite kingdom, another creation of the post-WWI era.

Jordan's actions in the 67 war ultimately are best explained in that light. As the Hashemite kingdom and protector of Jerusalem, Jordan was caught between the bombast of Nasser and the strong likelihhod that Amman had the most to lose in a war with Israel measured against the legitimacy off the throne inside Jordan. Simply stated it was a lose, lose scenario; ultimately Nasser lost Sinai and most of the Egyptian military machine. Sinai itself was largely symbolic to Cairo and the Egyptian military that emerged from the 67 war was far better thanks to the Soviets and Anwar Sadat--plus much smug complacency on the part of the Israelis. Jorsdan lost its hold on Jerusalem and the West Bank. The first was a symbolic loss, one critical to the kingdom and the larger Muslim world. The loss of the West Bank was more practical in its effects: larger Palestinian refugee issue inside Jordan's borders, an absolute radicalization of the Palestinian movement (the Arab governments had failed; the PLO turned to terror), and very serious issues regarding control of water in the Jordan river valley.

The point of all of this is that the conflicting pressures on Jordan place the Palestinian issue in the kingdom's front yard if not its living room.

[Steve Blair]

Tom,

My fault for bad wording. You said regarding Jordan more or less what I meant (in terms of them kicking the Palestinians out and starting lots of stuff as a result).

[120mm]

On the contrary, the Arab states surrounding Israel the issues of Palestinian camps, rights, and poiltical/military activism are NOT factors that promote stability or in your terms divert the attention of the "Arab street." Begin with Lebanon as a case study and work south.

So, would you say the idea that Arab national leaders do not use the "plight of the Palestinians" as a unification tool for their populations? And as a distractor from their own corruption and abuses? I would think that Arab states are not upset with <some> instability in the ME, as long as it's bad for the Israelis

Secondly I would love to have you define "Arab street"; is that a linguistic definition or a quasi-ethnic definition? The "street" in Damascus is not the same as the "street" in Amman or anywhere else. There are common threads however and the issue of the Palestinians is one of them.

Perhaps a better phrase would be public opinion?

On the issue of Palestinian land in Arab states, depending on the state picked and how you define Palestine, you could make that case--the most common areas would be Jordan (especially the West Bank) and to a lesser degree Gaza. And that goes back to your theory about the Arab states wanting to keep the Palestinian issue bubbling. In the case of Jordan, look at September 1970.

Best

Tom

For some reason I can't post unless I type something down here.

[Tom Odom]

Reference Arab nation's use of the Palestinian issue as a distractor/unifier:

This was the trend in the 1950s through 1967 in the height of the Pan Arab movement and the creation and sustainment of secular parties in the Arab world--the Baath Party in Syria and Iraq and at one stage the long distance unification of Egypt with Syria (a short term Vegas marriage) if there ever was one. 1967 was a watershed event in the Middle East because itr exposed the Arab regimes in Syria and Egypt as paper tigers and set lose radical Palestinian militancy and terrorism.

1975 was the next watershed year with the eruption of the Lebanese civil war; it was the most serious sectarian and civil struggle the region had seen. The spark that ignited this war was the Palestinian issue; as I said earlier Sep 1970 in Jordan was a precursor event. And although the palestinian issue was in 1975 largely non-sectarian within Arab circles, it set off what became a sectarian conflict and a larger infiltration/conquest/alignment of radical forces in the Middle East. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and occupation set the stage for the development of Hizballah--a religious based Shia militia--in competition with Amal--a political based Shia militia (yes that is a contradiction) more aligned with Syria and the Syrian Baath party. Amal ultimately lost and we have the current tinder box in Lebanon as a result.

After the sectarian violence on Lebanon, the spread of radical Islam into the Palestinian struggle with Hamas as a Sunni clone of Shia Hizballah drew strength from the lack of results of the 1st Intifahda. The 2nd Intifadah was and is much more radicallly Islamic and the surrounding Arab states and their leaders all know it. What could be used in your terms as a distractor in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and the early 1980s got very dangerous in the 1990s and leaders in those states see it as such.

On the other hand reverse your analysis. It has long been the policy of Israel to export unrest among its enemies. Israeli missions with the Kurds in the 1960s, Israeli support to southern Sudanese rebels in the 1960s, and their once close relations with Idi Amin in Uganda all supported that goal. The creation and sustainment of the South Lebanese Army during the occupation of Lebanon was perhaps the most blatant expression of this policy.

As for corruption of Arab regimes etc etc., that is quite true in that all have shall we say "integrity issues". Name me a region that is corruption free.

On Arab street versus population--what I was getting at is the issue of who is an Arab and who is not. Modern defintions limit Arab to Arabic-speakers rather than try and identify "ethnic Arabs". On commonalities between such populations' opinions regional differences certainly play a role; proximity to an issue like the Palestinian issue tends to increase intensity of those opinions. And in lesser educated or uneducated people those opinions become tied to what their respective governments say. Unless of course and that is the shift I tried to lay out above the issue is reframed in a purely religious sense; then those same lesser or uneducated populations inflamed through religious zealots make such issues as the Palestiinians very dangerous for Arab leaders to manipulate.


Best

Tom

[120mm]

That makes incredible sense. If the Palestinian issue can be used to threaten Israel, why isn't it in Israel's best interest to resolve it.

Thanks for the enlightenment.

[Tom Odom]

The short answer is that it is and it has been in Israel's interest to resolve or at least lessen the issue.

The longer answer is complex involving political. military, economic, and ultimately psychological issues that press key nerves. Internal Israeli politics are whirlwind and cuthroat; Israeli culture has morphed over the years. And it is not a monolith; there are significant voices for change inside the country and outside in the greater Jewish community.

But basic social and physical laws apply here and we the US are a factor; by that I mean when our position in the equation is carved in stone, that same stone works against any movement on this issue.

Good discussion

Best
Tom