Setting up effective, local security forces

[Fuchs]

A government that allowed its own citizens to enlist in the armed forces of a foreign occupying power - even if it calls itself a foreign assisting power - for domestic service would lose even the most tattered facade of sovereignty or legitimacy. It would no longer be able to even pretend to be a government.

Well, hardly more so than a puppet government that allows an occupying force to act as police, to shoot at everyone who closes in with their checkpoints, to bomb obscure vehicles from the air, to hire local militias of young gunmen, to employ foreign mercenaries who behave utterly disrespectful and value the countries' civilian's lives very lowly and which grants legal immunity to said foreigners.

So where exactly is my pet approach worse in regard to puppet government legitimacy than the generally practised one?

[JMA]

Well, hardly more so than a puppet government that allows an occupying force to act as police, to shoot at everyone who closes in with their checkpoints, to bomb obscure vehicles from the air, to hire local militias of young gunmen, to employ foreign mercenaries who behave utterly disrespectful and value the countries' civilian's lives very lowly and which grants legal immunity to said foreigners.

So where exactly is my pet approach worse in regard to puppet government legitimacy than the generally practised one?

With all respect you are allowing yourself to be needlessly distracted.

There are many permutations on how this sepoy/askari system could be put in place and developed. It needs an open mind ... in fact a military mind that has studied the employment of such forces under different (governmental) circumstances and varying cultural milieux.

[Dayuhan]

So where exactly is my pet approach worse in regard to puppet government legitimacy than the generally practised one?

It loses the distinction between us and them.

You can speculate over your pet approach if you like, but realistically it isn't going to happen, and I don't see how you can draw a meaningful comparison between the establishment of "sepoy-like forces" in imperial settings (which Americans did as well as anyone else) and what you're proposing.

Your initial contention:

The Americans never really mastered this indirect rule and the setup of effective indigenous sepoy-like forces either

still seems somewhat dubious to me, both for the misplaced comparison referred to above and in the implicit assumption that "indirect rule" is the desired end state.

[Fuchs]

still seems somewhat dubious to me, both for the misplaced comparison referred to above and in the implicit assumption that "indirect rule" is the desired end state.

Seriously, I would never advocate foreign rule, and thus never advocate indirect rule.

The context of the quote was me explaining why the U.S. isn't enough of an empire to reap the benefits of imperial arrogance.

[Dayuhan]

The context of the quote was me explaining why the U.S. isn't enough of an empire to reap the benefits of imperial arrogance.

Or the penalties of that arrogance.

Either way, I don't see how that particular set of imperial methods is really applicable to today's non-imperial small wars.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan

I personally suspect that AQ and similar groups maintain a quite substantial urban apparatus... of course they would be trying very hard not to draw attention to themselves, and you'd expect them to have little or no contact with local militant groups other than with a few trusted individuals.

Re-read my comments, I said as much and agree, but these are not strong holds where they live in the open and control the area. The urban area is generally hostile territory to overt (even clandestine) terrorists.

I suspect part of the reason their activity is limited in the larger urban areas is due to security concerns.

That comment was not intended to mean AQ is not active in the urban area, heck the urban areas are their targets. I suspect there are tens of AQ cells in London, New York, Paris, and elsewhere throughout the world, and they are very dangerous. However, this doesn't require the deployment of general purpose forces (like it did in Iraq, Algeria, etc.).

Which is why I wrote:

and if the scale of the AQ presence and activity in an urban areas is (dropped my thought, so completing it here in bold) relatively small and clandestine, then the appropriate response is generally small scale security assistance composed mainly of personnel from intelligence, special operations, and contractors with speciality skills. This is often enough to enable the affected state to defeat/suppress this threat.

In sum I agree with you. What I am not getting is why it would be that much tougher for us to assist a partner with an Urban insurgency versus rural insurgencies (though in reality most are blended)? Urban areas are a tough battlefield, but so are the mountains and jungles, so regardless you have to adapt.

If we occupy (not do FID) a country and try to control the populace ourselves then I agree that "may" (still situationally dependent, wasn't exceptionally tough in Germany or Japan) be brutal.

My fault for failing to better clarify my intent.

[Dayuhan]

In sum I agree with you. What I am not getting is why it would be that much tougher for us to assist a partner with an Urban insurgency versus rural insurgencies (though in reality most are blended)? Urban areas are a tough battlefield, but so are the mountains and jungles, so regardless you have to adapt.

I realize that we mostly agree; I was mostly trying to underscore the differences between dealing with an "AQ-type" group and with an insurgency... two quite different things. If the local security services have any level of competence, they shouldn't need much help beyond intel to roll up a network of terrorist cells. An actual insurgency would be a quite different proposition, and the need for outside help, the desirability to an outside power of moving against the insurgency and the type of help that might be useful would depend entirely on the specific characteristics of the insurgency and the situation.

Urban areas are of course highly visible to the media and offer abundant potential for collateral damage, factors that have to be considered.

[Bill Moore]

I'm guilty of conflating AQ terrorist cells and insurgencies, that wasn't my intent, but felt the need to address both. Of course it isn't unheard of for AQ to co-opt an insurgency (Iraq) and to a lesser extent Afghanistan. By the way we also dealt with an urban insurgency that utlized terrorist cells in Vietnam.

As challenging as this may be, I still don't think it compares to the true hybrid challenges our forces faced in Vietnam (fighting NV regulars, insurgents, suicide bombers "the sappers", electronic warfare, high end anti-aircraft weapons, major state actor support from Russia and China, etc.).

Our biggest challenge today isn't the enemy, it is ourselves. We went into this fight with unrealistic goals, adapted a doctrine that is deeply flawed, etc. This is a scenario where we actually could do more with less.

[Bob's World]

Our biggest challenge today isn't the enemy, it is ourselves. We went into this fight with unrealistic goals, adapted a doctrine that is deeply flawed, etc. This is a scenario where we actually could do more with less.

A statement that should draw loud "Amen, brother!" from the chorus AND the congregation.

Challenge is getting to some degree of agreement on what less looks like. We are much better at making things bigger in ways that don't make much sense or work that well, but when things go south when one does less people feel like you just aren't trying hard enough.