Setting up effective, local security forces

[davidbfpo]

On another thread I posted a week ago 'An option overlooked' after Fuchs rightly posted his succinct observation, with my emphasis:

The Americans never really mastered this indirect rule and the setup of effective indigenous sepoy-like forces either.

This is an issue which has always interested me and IMO deserves its own thread. As always this opening post will drop down when other, earlier posts are copied here.

I am very aware that for the USA there has been a long history of involvement in setting up such local forces; post-1945 it became an SOF responsibility and in various modes is undertaken today.

The big difference in this thread is 'sepoy-like', so I mean locally recruited with expatriate officers and NCOs. Not advisory teams, embedded and more recent descriptive terms.

[Fuchs]

The Montagnards were fighting for their 'tribe', not for the Americans. I believe this doesn't count in this context.

The Filipinos come more close, but at least the WW2-period Filipino troops were motivated by a promise of independence and thus again fighting for their people, not really for the Americans AFAIK.
__________________________________________________ _________

What's remarkable in the case of U.S. troops is that they don't form U.S.Army units with 80-90% foreigners from the region. It's really not that hard, as evidenced by the ease of how European powers did this during Imperialism times. See the German Askaris; German officers surely had no experience in creating such a force, yet built a formidable one in East Africa with IIRC initially Sudanese warriors.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Askari#German_colonies

Just imagine; rotation would be limited to about 20% of the total force, deployed U.S. personnel could be cut by two thirds and the actual force available in-theatre would still be larger and have enough boots on the ground to dominate most of the places that are now effectively without Western control.
Well-performing and reliable soldiers could be identified and promoted, with gradual replacement of U.S. troops over the span of maybe six years.


I suspect the U.S. has a misleading perception of the quality of its own troops. Most of their qualities are of little consequence in small wars and other characteristics are outright problematic. This also applies to Western mercenaries.
A critical little bit more optimism about the utility of foreign culture troops (done right, not the ridiculous ANA approach) could serve very well.



hmm, why do I pay attention to it? It's small wars stuff.
The only consequence for great war stuff here is the use of foreign culture troops as manpower akin to the French practice of employing black troops in Europe. The success of this was mixed at best.
We don't need foreign manpower for Europe's security (contrary to hysterical demography doom-sayers) and the Roman experience with culturally foreign auxiliaries in the long term is not a promising example.

[ganulv]

The Montagnards were fighting for their 'tribe', not for the Americans. I believe this doesn't count in this context.

The Filipinos come more close, but at least the WW2-period Filipino troops were motivated by a promise of independence and thus again fighting for their people, not really for the Americans AFAIK.

It’s hardly news that individuals working within a colonial structure are often primarily motivated by local concerns. I would assume that is the norm, actually.

There are a couple of anthropologists—Gerald Hickey and Oscar Salemink—whose work directly addresses the ties between Montagnard ethnic identity, the colonial endeavor, and Vietnamese nationalism.

I suspect the U.S. has a misleading perception of the quality of its own troops.

There is a tendency amongst Americans to talk themselves up, but I assure you that it is neither a universal amongst us nor exclusive to us.

[Ken White]

The Montagnards were fighting for their 'tribe', not for the Americans. I believe this doesn't count in this context.

That's incorrect, most of the Montagnards were in the go along and get along mode until recruited by and paid by the US. You can and will of course believe what you wish.

What's remarkable in the case of U.S. troops is that they don't form U.S.Army units with 80-90% foreigners from the region...

Difference in national traditions and self-perceptions. *

I suspect the U.S. has a misleading perception of the quality of its own troops. Most of their qualities are of little consequence in small wars and other characteristics are outright problematic. This also applies to Western mercenaries.
A critical little bit more optimism about the utility of foreign culture troops (done right, not the ridiculous ANA approach) could serve very well.

In reverse order for the last assertion, see * above.

On the first three statements, totally true but Ganulv answers it far better than I :

"There is a tendency amongst Americans to talk themselves up, but I assure you that it is neither a universal amongst us nor exclusive to us."

[Fuchs]

That's incorrect, most of the Montagnards were in the go along and get along mode until recruited by and paid by the US.

I don't consider this in conflict with what I wrote.
Propaganda and other means shape perceptions, and Montagnards knew that defeat would cause repercussions for their people once they had joined the 'anti-communist' cause.

Most conscripts of European armies were in a "go along and get along mode" shortly before being sent to war. So what?

[Ken White]

I don't consider this in conflict with what I wrote.

You rarely do see such conflicts. On the rare occasions you do, you attempt to drive your bulldozer over them...

Propaganda and other means shape perceptions, and Montagnards knew that defeat would cause repercussions for their people once they had joined the 'anti-communist' cause.

Most conscripts of European armies were in a "go along and get along mode" shortly before being sent to war. So what?

And the bearing of all this on your statement that the Montagnards were fighting for their tribes is precisely what? It would in fact seem to me that your statement they "...knew that defeat would cause repercussions for their people ..." which is true indicates a situation that would in fact deter them from fighting 'for the tribe' lacking some other incentive. As an Economist, you know money talks...

Note also that the Montagnards were neither European or conscripted -- the tribal leaders did not force their young men to fight for the Americans, they simply allowed them to do so. The men had a choice and they exercised it so that comparison is sorta specious, that's what.

Not that contradictory statements have ever deterred you, Lieber Fuchs...

[Fuchs]

which is true indicates a situation that would in fact deter them from fighting 'for the tribe' lacking some other incentive.

People can be amazingly short-sighted.

Besides, the North Vietnamese were more nationalists than communists, and nationalists are no good news for minorities.

[Ken White]

People can be amazingly short-sighted.

This is even more so:

Besides, the North Vietnamese were more nationalists than communists, and nationalists are no good news for minorities.

Boy, is it ever...

[TheCurmudgeon]

Difference in national traditions and self-perceptions. *

An interesting observation. I think there is a contradiction in the way American's view themselves in relation to non-western foreign militaries. We do not want to see ourselves as imperialists conquering and subjugating the locals. Therefore we do not like the idea of mixed, Sepoy style forces.

Yet we are a hierarchical culture. We believe that people make their own success and if you are in the gutter you are there based on your own failures. Therefore we still view people in parts of the world as somehow "lesser". You see it in the way we mock their systems as inferior to ours.

It sets up a condition where we do not want to build combined unite with them because that would be colonialist yet we refuse to accept that they can do the job as well as us so we continue to treat them as if they are our subjects.

It is our problem and I don't think we are likely to fix it any time soon.

[Fuchs]

There might also a lack of long-term strategy play into this.

I have two pet theories about how to handle small wars as the one in AFG:

(1) As described, build foreigners into the force till it turned foreign completely, shedding the too technicized TO&E components in the process.

(2) Send your troops, but set a withdrawal table from day one and tell the locals about it. Also tell them that for every WIA you take two replacements will arrive and for every KIA you take ten replacements will arrive - so violence against your personnel will have a perverted effect and be discouraged strongly. This approach is supposed to buy a calm period, for whatever purpose that's required.


Both could be combined, but (2) would lose effectiveness in such a combination.


Meanwhile, the standard Western approach under U.S. leadership is to send relatively few occupation troops, rotate them and reinforce them if politicians get too much under pressure by poor news about the occupation.
In parallel, indigenous puppet regime forces are being built from scratch, perform rather poorly and are unreliable for many reasons.

[Ken White]

I have two pet theories about how to handle small wars as the one in AFG:...

But what are we going to do about the politicians???

Meanwhile, the standard Western approach under U.S. leadership is to send relatively few occupation troops, rotate them and reinforce them if politicians get too much under pressure by poor news about the occupation.

In the US case, that's a forced error due to our personnel system and Congressional pressure -- unfortunately, US domestic political concerns outweigh both military and foreign policy issues. That does not mean the rest of a coalition has to do the same thing; that they opt to do so is a lick on them -- or also a function of their domestic political pressures...

In parallel, indigenous puppet regime forces are being built from scratch, perform rather poorly and are unreliable for many reasons.

True. Never a good idea but it seems hard to break the mold.

[JMA]

There might also a lack of long-term strategy play into this.

I have two pet theories about how to handle small wars as the one in AFG:

(1) As described, build foreigners into the force till it turned foreign completely, shedding the too technicized TO&E components in the process.

(2) Send your troops, but set a withdrawal table from day one and tell the locals about it. Also tell them that for every WIA you take two replacements will arrive and for every KIA you take ten replacements will arrive - so violence against your personnel will have a perverted effect and be discouraged strongly. This approach is supposed to buy a calm period, for whatever purpose that's required.


Both could be combined, but (2) would lose effectiveness in such a combination.


Meanwhile, the standard Western approach under U.S. leadership is to send relatively few occupation troops, rotate them and reinforce them if politicians get too much under pressure by poor news about the occupation.
In parallel, indigenous puppet regime forces are being built from scratch, perform rather poorly and are unreliable for many reasons.

The German example in East Africa (starting 1881) is a good one as was the British example across their colonies.

The critical success factor is based on all the officers and as many as possible of the NCOs being imported. Over time - many years - an NCO corps among the indigenous will being to form and the respective units will begin to form their own cultures.

The Rhodesian African Rifles example bears study as the officers were local and permanent as opposed to merely being on temporary secondment.

The principal US problem is the short attention span.

US training example in the DRC

Not sure the US model in the DRC is the correct method.

[Ken White]

The principal US problem is the short attention span.

Induced by size and traditions but most attributable to our political system and thus is unlikely to change. Many of the "cockups" you more or less correctly note are directly attributable to that feature. It should be considered by all 'strategists' and planners, particularly those in the US but it too seldom is. To ask that fact and feature be considered by observers is probably a step too far...

The foreign policy implications of Chine, Russia, Syria and Libya (as well as US aid in the search for Kony and the LRA...) that you surface are all examples of the fact that US domestic politics take primacy for a number of reasons, some bad, some good. Short termism r us...

Not sure the US model in the DRC is the correct method.

It is not however it is short term (that "attention span...") adequate. The British and most of the Commonwealth as well as the Germans always strove for 'good'[ or excellence For the US, adequate has always been sufficient. So far...