Setting up effective, local security forces

[TheCurmudgeon]

Difference in national traditions and self-perceptions. *

An interesting observation. I think there is a contradiction in the way American's view themselves in relation to non-western foreign militaries. We do not want to see ourselves as imperialists conquering and subjugating the locals. Therefore we do not like the idea of mixed, Sepoy style forces.

Yet we are a hierarchical culture. We believe that people make their own success and if you are in the gutter you are there based on your own failures. Therefore we still view people in parts of the world as somehow "lesser". You see it in the way we mock their systems as inferior to ours.

It sets up a condition where we do not want to build combined unite with them because that would be colonialist yet we refuse to accept that they can do the job as well as us so we continue to treat them as if they are our subjects.

It is our problem and I don't think we are likely to fix it any time soon.

[Fuchs]

There might also a lack of long-term strategy play into this.

I have two pet theories about how to handle small wars as the one in AFG:

(1) As described, build foreigners into the force till it turned foreign completely, shedding the too technicized TO&E components in the process.

(2) Send your troops, but set a withdrawal table from day one and tell the locals about it. Also tell them that for every WIA you take two replacements will arrive and for every KIA you take ten replacements will arrive - so violence against your personnel will have a perverted effect and be discouraged strongly. This approach is supposed to buy a calm period, for whatever purpose that's required.


Both could be combined, but (2) would lose effectiveness in such a combination.


Meanwhile, the standard Western approach under U.S. leadership is to send relatively few occupation troops, rotate them and reinforce them if politicians get too much under pressure by poor news about the occupation.
In parallel, indigenous puppet regime forces are being built from scratch, perform rather poorly and are unreliable for many reasons.

[Ken White]

I have two pet theories about how to handle small wars as the one in AFG:...

But what are we going to do about the politicians???

Meanwhile, the standard Western approach under U.S. leadership is to send relatively few occupation troops, rotate them and reinforce them if politicians get too much under pressure by poor news about the occupation.

In the US case, that's a forced error due to our personnel system and Congressional pressure -- unfortunately, US domestic political concerns outweigh both military and foreign policy issues. That does not mean the rest of a coalition has to do the same thing; that they opt to do so is a lick on them -- or also a function of their domestic political pressures...

In parallel, indigenous puppet regime forces are being built from scratch, perform rather poorly and are unreliable for many reasons.

True. Never a good idea but it seems hard to break the mold.

[JMA]

There might also a lack of long-term strategy play into this.

I have two pet theories about how to handle small wars as the one in AFG:

(1) As described, build foreigners into the force till it turned foreign completely, shedding the too technicized TO&E components in the process.

(2) Send your troops, but set a withdrawal table from day one and tell the locals about it. Also tell them that for every WIA you take two replacements will arrive and for every KIA you take ten replacements will arrive - so violence against your personnel will have a perverted effect and be discouraged strongly. This approach is supposed to buy a calm period, for whatever purpose that's required.


Both could be combined, but (2) would lose effectiveness in such a combination.


Meanwhile, the standard Western approach under U.S. leadership is to send relatively few occupation troops, rotate them and reinforce them if politicians get too much under pressure by poor news about the occupation.
In parallel, indigenous puppet regime forces are being built from scratch, perform rather poorly and are unreliable for many reasons.

The German example in East Africa (starting 1881) is a good one as was the British example across their colonies.

The critical success factor is based on all the officers and as many as possible of the NCOs being imported. Over time - many years - an NCO corps among the indigenous will being to form and the respective units will begin to form their own cultures.

The Rhodesian African Rifles example bears study as the officers were local and permanent as opposed to merely being on temporary secondment.

The principal US problem is the short attention span.

US training example in the DRC

Not sure the US model in the DRC is the correct method.

[Ken White]

The principal US problem is the short attention span.

Induced by size and traditions but most attributable to our political system and thus is unlikely to change. Many of the "cockups" you more or less correctly note are directly attributable to that feature. It should be considered by all 'strategists' and planners, particularly those in the US but it too seldom is. To ask that fact and feature be considered by observers is probably a step too far...

The foreign policy implications of Chine, Russia, Syria and Libya (as well as US aid in the search for Kony and the LRA...) that you surface are all examples of the fact that US domestic politics take primacy for a number of reasons, some bad, some good. Short termism r us...

Not sure the US model in the DRC is the correct method.

It is not however it is short term (that "attention span...") adequate. The British and most of the Commonwealth as well as the Germans always strove for 'good'[ or excellence For the US, adequate has always been sufficient. So far...

[JMA]

Induced by size and traditions but most attributable to our political system and thus is unlikely to change. Many of the "cockups" you more or less correctly note are directly attributable to that feature. It should be considered by all 'strategists' and planners, particularly those in the US but it too seldom is. To ask that fact and feature be considered by observers is probably a step too far...

The foreign policy implications of Chine, Russia, Syria and Libya (as well as US aid in the search for Kony and the LRA...) that you surface are all examples of the fact that US domestic politics take primacy for a number of reasons, some bad, some good. Short termism r us... It is not however it is short term (that "attention span...") adequate. The British and most of the Commonwealth as well as the Germans always strove for 'good'[ or excellence For the US, adequate has always been sufficient. So far...

Ken, you know this limitation but how many of the currently serving US soldiers do? If they do - and accept it - then they can figure out a work around for the inherent weakness.

A good first step would be to refuse to train locals under the current system because:

* it is a given that at some point (determined by the vermin in DC) they will be abandoned to their fate, and/or

* there is no telling how long it will be before they change sides taking with them the supplied weapons and their new skills.

[Ken White]

Ken, you know this limitation but how many of the currently serving US soldiers do? If they do - and accept it - then they can figure out a work around for the inherent weakness.

My impression is that many know but feel powerless to effect change (the belief in civilian control is carried to a fault on some occasions), many know and take advantage of it for personal or parochial reasons (it can provide advantages to those willing to use the system for less than beneficial to the nation reasons) and too many sort of know but fail to consider it in planning.

Hope is not a plan...

A good first step would be to refuse to train locals under the current system because:

* it is a given that at some point (determined by the vermin in DC) they will be abandoned to their fate, and/or

* there is no telling how long it will be before they change sides taking with them the supplied weapons and their new skills.

Your two points are accurate however, the last is defeated by the short termism; "Let's fix the problem now and let others worry about that later..." The first suffers from the same syndrome plus the venality of most politicians.. Or is that verminicity?

Regrettably, refusal is unlikely due to the strong tradition of civilian control. The really smart Flag Officers will stall and prevent a lot of harm but are confronted with others, usually unduly ambitious, who want to pleas the Pols. Our foray into Kosovo and the saga of competing Generals on the employment of Apaches is an example. In that case the smart guy won -- doesn't always work out that way. Viet Nam is an example of that...

[Dayuhan]

The Filipinos come more close, but at least the WW2-period Filipino troops were motivated by a promise of independence and thus again fighting for their people, not really for the Americans AFAIK.

True of the WW2 period, but well before independence was promised the US was training Filipino units and deploying them for internal security functions, just as most imperial powers did.

What's remarkable in the case of U.S. troops is that they don't form U.S.Army units with 80-90% foreigners from the region. It's really not that hard, as evidenced by the ease of how European powers did this during Imperialism times. See the German Askaris; German officers surely had no experience in creating such a force, yet built a formidable one in East Africa with IIRC initially Sudanese warriors.

Just imagine; rotation would be limited to about 20% of the total force, deployed U.S. personnel could be cut by two thirds and the actual force available in-theatre would still be larger and have enough boots on the ground to dominate most of the places that are now effectively without Western control.

What you're missing here is that the whole idea of recruiting locals directly into the armed forces of a foreign power is only possible is the foreign power rules the area. You can't do it if there's an even nominally sovereign local government in the picture. The US could and did form such units in its colony in the Philippines. It couldn't and didn't and hasn't in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan because these are not direct imperial ventures where the US is setting up to rule, they are nominally sovereign states with their own governments and armed forces.

Either you're a colonial power, in which case you can and will take direct control of indigenous armed forces, or you're not, in which case you can't and won't. Can't have it both ways.