Setting up effective, local security forces

[Bob's World]

Bill,

The Soviets promoted a worker's movement, focused in the Cities. Mao tried that and it fell flat, so they shifted to rural areas where their message of land reform resonated more effectively in their agrarian society. Bottom line is, as an insurgent leader go with what works, not with what the book says. Actually that is some damn good advice for our COIN gurus as well...

There can be many reasons why more activity happens outside a city rather than in, some as simple as the old rule of not defecating where one eats.

Most of the insurgency we see inside of Afghanistan is the resistance (small t taliban) against the US forces, and the populaces with the most reason for resisting the US/NATO forces are in the rural areas where we have been operating.

Similarly, the revolutionary aspect of the insurgency (coming out of Pakistan where the Big T Taliban take sanctuary) primarily targets the low hanging fruit of GIRoA governance, and it is much easier to take out a police outpost or disrupt traffic on some remote highway than it is to storm the Provincial HQ.

[ganulv]

There can be many reasons why more activity happens outside a city rather than in[.]

The days of an urban cadre in the Guatemalan civil war with which I am familiar were numbered indeed (and s/he knew it). On the other hand, I suspect that during the darkest days of the conflict guerrillas in the hills slept more soundly than did civilians in the cities and pueblos. Something like a third of the Guatemalan population was urban at that time, as compared to about two-thirds of the contemporary Iraqi population. And in Iraq, outside of the north there isn’t much in the way of highlands to abscond to. And of course the stability of governance in Iraq in 2007 didn’t approach that in Guatemala in 1983. So, as you say, lots of reasons.

[Mike in Hilo]

Regret (1) I stumbled onto this belatedly and (2) the sidetrack
Nevertheless, Fuchs, to clarify: Both sides made ample use of Montagnards. We even had a name for the ones on the other side: "VCM." Their collaboration and guidance (literally) were essential to allowing NVA units to pop up "out of nowhere," as it were--on the coastal plain in northen Binh Dinh....

A couple of the main ethnic groups from which US recruited, the Rhade and Jarai, were easy to attract because they feared and hated lowland Vietnamese---whether communist or GVN....and had formed FULRO, their own independence "Front." They saw an association with the US as a counterbalance to the hated ARVN. Their anti-Vietnamese sentiment did not play entirely into US hands, as they also sought strength from a noted, local, anti-Viet force--namely, the Khmer Rouge.....An interesting side note is the fact that Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot's personal guard unit was, from the '60's until his end, composed solely of Jarai.

Cheers,
Mike.

[ganulv]

A couple of the main ethnic groups from which US recruited, the Rhade and Jarai, were easy to attract because they feared and hated lowland Vietnamese---whether communist or GVN....

I know a fellow in my hometown who worked with Montagnards during the war and he told me one of his best guys had been with the ARVN until an in broad daylight incidence in which he turned his rifle on fellow ARVN—ethnic Kinh who wouldn’t leave off yelling various takes on “####ing Montagnard!” at him from across the street. Possibly a stolen and/or invented story, but indicative of a more general truth, I’m sure…

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Mike in Hilo

Both sides made ample use of Montagnards. We even had a name for the ones on the other side: "VCM."

Interesting comments on the Montagnards. I'm currently reading Black Ops by Tony Geraghty "The Rise of SF in the CIA, the SAS, and Mossad" (jury is still out on the book).

Mike if you have any insights on the following please share.

In the Vietnam chapter he explains the ARVN disarmed the Montagnards in the late 50s and were not too happy we armed them again. He described a couple of situations where the program was transfered over to ARVN and it rapidly broke down because the Vietnamese didn't trust them; a pattern that widely repeated itself. The Vietnamese tried to reclaim their weapons, refused to go on patrol with savages, etc. All this I was aware of, but one bit of history I wasn't (or I forgot about) is that in September 1964 there was a Montagnard armed uprising. At one site they disarmed and detained their SF advisors and declared a rebellion against Saigon. At another site they killed 15 Vietnamese team leaders, at another site 11 Vietnamese SF soldiers were killed.

These surrogate operations are generally dicey, but especially so when those we are arming and training are opposed to the government we're trying to keep in power. The expedient choice is not always the right choice.