Setting up effective, local security forces

[Ken White]

Ken, you know this limitation but how many of the currently serving US soldiers do? If they do - and accept it - then they can figure out a work around for the inherent weakness.

My impression is that many know but feel powerless to effect change (the belief in civilian control is carried to a fault on some occasions), many know and take advantage of it for personal or parochial reasons (it can provide advantages to those willing to use the system for less than beneficial to the nation reasons) and too many sort of know but fail to consider it in planning.

Hope is not a plan...

A good first step would be to refuse to train locals under the current system because:

* it is a given that at some point (determined by the vermin in DC) they will be abandoned to their fate, and/or

* there is no telling how long it will be before they change sides taking with them the supplied weapons and their new skills.

Your two points are accurate however, the last is defeated by the short termism; "Let's fix the problem now and let others worry about that later..." The first suffers from the same syndrome plus the venality of most politicians.. Or is that verminicity?

Regrettably, refusal is unlikely due to the strong tradition of civilian control. The really smart Flag Officers will stall and prevent a lot of harm but are confronted with others, usually unduly ambitious, who want to pleas the Pols. Our foray into Kosovo and the saga of competing Generals on the employment of Apaches is an example. In that case the smart guy won -- doesn't always work out that way. Viet Nam is an example of that...

[Dayuhan]

The Filipinos come more close, but at least the WW2-period Filipino troops were motivated by a promise of independence and thus again fighting for their people, not really for the Americans AFAIK.

True of the WW2 period, but well before independence was promised the US was training Filipino units and deploying them for internal security functions, just as most imperial powers did.

What's remarkable in the case of U.S. troops is that they don't form U.S.Army units with 80-90% foreigners from the region. It's really not that hard, as evidenced by the ease of how European powers did this during Imperialism times. See the German Askaris; German officers surely had no experience in creating such a force, yet built a formidable one in East Africa with IIRC initially Sudanese warriors.

Just imagine; rotation would be limited to about 20% of the total force, deployed U.S. personnel could be cut by two thirds and the actual force available in-theatre would still be larger and have enough boots on the ground to dominate most of the places that are now effectively without Western control.

What you're missing here is that the whole idea of recruiting locals directly into the armed forces of a foreign power is only possible is the foreign power rules the area. You can't do it if there's an even nominally sovereign local government in the picture. The US could and did form such units in its colony in the Philippines. It couldn't and didn't and hasn't in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan because these are not direct imperial ventures where the US is setting up to rule, they are nominally sovereign states with their own governments and armed forces.

Either you're a colonial power, in which case you can and will take direct control of indigenous armed forces, or you're not, in which case you can't and won't. Can't have it both ways.

[Bill Moore]

What you're missing here is that the whole idea of recruiting locals directly into the armed forces of a foreign power is only possible is the foreign power rules the area. You can't do it if there's an even nominally sovereign local government in the picture. The US could and did form such units in its colony in the Philippines. It couldn't and didn't and hasn't in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan because these are not direct imperial ventures where the US is setting up to rule, they are nominally sovereign states with their own governments and armed forces.

Either you're a colonial power, in which case you can and will take direct control of indigenous armed forces, or you're not, in which case you can't and won't. Can't have it both ways.

Exactly, that is why trying to compare the U.S. foreign capacity building to European foreign conscripts lead by Europeans is futile exercise. If we integrated foreign troops into our logistic, C2, medical, fires and intelligence systems and led them with U.S. officers and senior NCOs we could rapidly employ relatively effective forces that were largely composed of foreign troops. However, in a FID scenario that just isn't possible.

Other comments were not accurate either. Our political patience is rarely the problem. It doesn't take 10 plus years to develop a relatively effective fighting force. It may or may not take 10 plus years to stomp out an insurgency, but that is a different issue.

Where I think we go wrong (and this is just a start):

- We try to develop forces that mirror the U.S. force structure and tell them to employ our doctrine. It is generally too sosphisticated for most in developing nations to replicate, culturally inappropriate, and fiscally unsustainable.

- Department of State has responsibility for security assistance and frankly they don't know what they're doing. They have a long track record of throwing millions of dollars at these challenges with little understanding of what is actually required. The worst part is they do not develop a logistics system for the supported nation that is sustainable (if they develop one at all). If Americans had a better appreciation of how much Dept of State spent on these efforts and what little they have to show for it, I suspect more authorities would shift back to the military. State should own policy and have a veto vote, but once a decision is made to execute they need to enable and stop impeding.

- If it is a security assistance Mobile Training Team U.S. forces do not have the authority to combat advise, only to train and equip. Without mentoring them in combat it is very difficult for those trained to transition from the classroom and range to the battlefield. Mentors in the field instill confidence and can make on the spot corrections and identify shortfalls in training that need to be addressed. As that military matures over time these lessons are incorporated in their doctrine (not U.S. doctrine with their country's name stamped over it) and taught in their schools.

- Not surprisingly, when forces that are actually trained to build partner security forces like U.S. Special Forces have the resources and authorities to do so like they did in Iraq and Afghanistan they developed some very capable partner Special Forces units. Much better than the sepoys and numerous other forces developed by the Europeans during the colonial years. The point is the U.S. can do this if we have the right people in charge it enabled with the right authorities and resources. We have a proven track record. We have a dysfunctional bureaucracy and disparate authorities that make effective execution difficult at best, impossible at worst.

[Dayuhan]

Where I think we go wrong (and this is just a start):

I would add that we're inclined to assume that the nominal partner government and its security forces share our goals and objectives and our ideas on how those goals and objectives are best achieved, an assumption that is not always valid... to put it mildly.

[JMA]

Our political patience is rarely the problem.

I suggest it is, especially when it changes mid stream (as it is apt to happens with politicians) and the military have to rapidly rejig the process. That's when the compromises on quality start.

It doesn't take 10 plus years to develop a relatively effective fighting force. It may or may not take 10 plus years to stomp out an insurgency, but that is a different issue.

That depends on the quality of your enemy in that instance. If you are drawing your manpower from the same pool as the enemy then it all will come down to their training and leadership. This is what your command cadre will have to deal with when they take the unit operational.

Where I think we go wrong (and this is just a start):

- We try to develop forces that mirror the U.S. force structure and tell them to employ our doctrine. It is generally too sosphisticated for most in developing nations to replicate, culturally inappropriate, and fiscally unsustainable.

That's a problem with who gets to be put in charge of this training and these units. If they come from a rigidly structured environment they will probably not have the faintest idea how to go about it and will resort to what they know.

To be honest the US doctrine is too sophisticated for the US military to adopt across the whole military itself.

- Department of State has responsibility for security assistance and frankly they don't know what they're doing. They have a long track record of throwing millions of dollars at these challenges with little understanding of what is actually required. The worst part is they do not develop a logistics system for the supported nation that is sustainable (if they develop one at all). If Americans had a better appreciation of how much Dept of State spent on these efforts and what little they have to show for it, I suspect more authorities would shift back to the military. State should own policy and have a veto vote, but once a decision is made to execute they need to enable and stop impeding.

You know, I know that State is dysfunctional and for the most part incompetent. Is that going to change anytime soon?

- If it is a security assistance Mobile Training Team U.S. forces do not have the authority to combat advise, only to train and equip. Without mentoring them in combat it is very difficult for those trained to transition from the classroom and range to the battlefield. Mentors in the field instill confidence and can make on the spot corrections and identify shortfalls in training that need to be addressed. As that military matures over time these lessons are incorporated in their doctrine (not U.S. doctrine with their country's name stamped over it) and taught in their schools.

Who would these mentors be? I suggest that if they were have to be drawn from your most combat experienced soldiers with the proviso that they have the aptitude and emotional disposition to do this sort of work.

- Not surprisingly, when forces that are actually trained to build partner security forces like U.S. Special Forces have the resources and authorities to do so like they did in Iraq and Afghanistan they developed some very capable partner Special Forces units. Much better than the sepoys and numerous other forces developed by the Europeans during the colonial years. The point is the U.S. can do this if we have the right people in charge it enabled with the right authorities and resources. We have a proven track record. We have a dysfunctional bureaucracy and disparate authorities that make effective execution difficult at best, impossible at worst.

Special forces don't only have to train special forces. A special forces training team can and should be able to train anything from a village militia to a HVT hit squad. I know they seem to only want to do the sexy stuff but that is where military discipline comes in.

The problem is that there is a squeeze from both ends... from the politicians on one side and from the grunt level on the other who have all the answers... and it seems those in the middle don't have the balls to push back.

See an example from the current Australian infantry problems.

[Bob's World]

The real question is, are we attempting to build a security force to protect a government that we think is best from its own populace; or, are we attempting to help a government that its own populace wants protect them from some rogue threat (internal or external). If internal, does that "rogue" threat have any legal, trusted and certain options for engaging its government, or are they forced to resort to illegal / violent arguments?

This is a fine line, and it is one where the perceptions applied matter. Our perceptions as the intervening power are the ones that matter least, and one can rest assured that the perceptions of the government in question will be heavily biased to the preservation of their own status quo.

I am happy to argue to any audience that in Afghanistan we attempt to do the former and that more than any other factor is why we are still there slogging away after all this time and why the security force can't seem to become a competent, self-sufficient organization. GIRoA is a Northern Alliance monopoly. We think that is the right answer, and GIRoA seeks to preserve the monopoly. The excluded segment of the populace have no trusted, legal and certain means avialable to them, so they act out illegally. We brand them all "Taliban" with little regard to which are revolutionary actors seeking to force GIRoA to break their monopoly, and which are resistance actors who are simply weary of our foreign occupation of their home and the violence we bring to them on behalf of GIRoA.

Such approaches were the model for both Colonialism and for Containment as well. In the modern era, however, the pursuit of such approaches is demanding ever increasing energy and producing ever decreasing effects. It is also a major driver of the motivations that lead young men frustrated with the governance of their own country to not only join nationalist insurgency movements, but to also volunteer to support trans-nationalist terrorist organizations such as AQ.

Sometimes there may still be times and places where creating and sustaining artificial systems of security designed to protect and preserve some government against the express insurgent will of its own populace. I suspect those cases are rare.

Increasingly we are better served by employing our influence to bring those governments and populace to the table to work out new guards for their future security, and be willing to work with whatever and whomever emerges from such a process.

We need to evolve.

[davidbfpo]

I wonder whether the impact of increasing urbanisation across the world will have an impact here. To date much of the counter-AQ and counter-AQ partners has been in relatively isolated / remote / extreme climates / rural locations.

The scale of FID could well increase. Imagine if Nigeria or Egypt was the setting.

The French experience in Algeria for example, where the French at one point had security forces of 500k IIRC and this included a not insignificant local element. At that time Algeria was split evenly between rural and urban IIRC; today it is very urbanised.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Davidbfpo

I wonder whether the impact of increasing urbanisation across the world will have an impact here. To date much of the counter-AQ and counter-AQ partners has been in relatively isolated / remote / extreme climates / rural locations.

The scale of FID could well increase. Imagine if Nigeria or Egypt was the setting.

The French experience in Algeria for example, where the French at one point had security forces of 500k IIRC and this included a not insignificant local element. At that time Algeria was split evenly between rural and urban IIRC; today it is very urbanised.

I think increasing urbanization already has had an impact on military operations, and I'm not sure why you appear to be dismissing the rather large urban CT operations in Baghdad, Tikrit, Falujah, Mogadishu, Kandahar, etc.

On the other hand I think your point is still interesting, it does seem AQ affiliates/partners generally establish strong holds in rural areas (where in theory they should be easier to target). I suspect part of the reason their activity is limited in the larger urban areas is due to security concerns. A lot of citizens watching and reporting, so unless they could establish control in an urban area this will likely remain the norm (of course there will also be exceptions that we may to respond to). I don't think too many people in the world, even the Muslim world view AQ as liberators, so I suspect AQ will generally be at greater risk in larger urban areas and forced to work in a traditional underground cellular in these areas for security.

FID encompasses a broad range of activities and actors, and if the scale of the AQ presence and activity in an urban areas is, the appropriate response is generally small scale security assistance composed mainly of personnel from intelligence, special operations, and contractors with speciality skills. This is often enough to enable the affected state to defeat/suppress this threat.

[Fuchs]

What you're missing here is that the whole idea of recruiting locals directly into the armed forces of a foreign power is only possible is the foreign power rules the area. You can't do it if there's an even nominally sovereign local government in the picture.

I disagree. Most governments easily tolerate when their citizens/subjects become mercenaries for another power. Austria is one of the very few exceptions AFAIK.

Furthermore, I mentioned the possibility to integrate the foreign troops, promote some, disband the too technicized parts of the TO&E and then allow the foreign culture troops to take over the entire force. In the end, the host nation would inherit a competent brigade.
The only reason to oppose this that I see is that the host nation's corrupt elite would expect difficulties regarding the extraction of money or power from this force. Aside from that the mixed force should be no less tolerable than a 100% alien force.

[Dayuhan]

I disagree. Most governments easily tolerate when their citizens/subjects become mercenaries for another power. Austria is one of the very few exceptions AFAIK.

As long as they go somewhere else to do their fighting.

Furthermore, I mentioned the possibility to integrate the foreign troops, promote some, disband the too technicized parts of the TO&E and then allow the foreign culture troops to take over the entire force. In the end, the host nation would inherit a competent brigade.

The only reason to oppose this that I see is that the host nation's corrupt elite would expect difficulties regarding the extraction of money or power from this force. Aside from that the mixed force should be no less tolerable than a 100% alien force.

A government that allowed its own citizens to enlist in the armed forces of a foreign occupying power - even if it calls itself a foreign assisting power - for domestic service would lose even the most tattered facade of sovereignty or legitimacy. It would no longer be able to even pretend to be a government.

The idea that the US could recruit, say, Afghan units into the US military to serve in Afghanistan is perhaps an interesting speculation, but hardly relevant to any real-world situation.

[Fuchs]

A government that allowed its own citizens to enlist in the armed forces of a foreign occupying power - even if it calls itself a foreign assisting power - for domestic service would lose even the most tattered facade of sovereignty or legitimacy. It would no longer be able to even pretend to be a government.

Well, hardly more so than a puppet government that allows an occupying force to act as police, to shoot at everyone who closes in with their checkpoints, to bomb obscure vehicles from the air, to hire local militias of young gunmen, to employ foreign mercenaries who behave utterly disrespectful and value the countries' civilian's lives very lowly and which grants legal immunity to said foreigners.

So where exactly is my pet approach worse in regard to puppet government legitimacy than the generally practised one?

[JMA]

Well, hardly more so than a puppet government that allows an occupying force to act as police, to shoot at everyone who closes in with their checkpoints, to bomb obscure vehicles from the air, to hire local militias of young gunmen, to employ foreign mercenaries who behave utterly disrespectful and value the countries' civilian's lives very lowly and which grants legal immunity to said foreigners.

So where exactly is my pet approach worse in regard to puppet government legitimacy than the generally practised one?

With all respect you are allowing yourself to be needlessly distracted.

There are many permutations on how this sepoy/askari system could be put in place and developed. It needs an open mind ... in fact a military mind that has studied the employment of such forces under different (governmental) circumstances and varying cultural milieux.

[Dayuhan]

So where exactly is my pet approach worse in regard to puppet government legitimacy than the generally practised one?

It loses the distinction between us and them.

You can speculate over your pet approach if you like, but realistically it isn't going to happen, and I don't see how you can draw a meaningful comparison between the establishment of "sepoy-like forces" in imperial settings (which Americans did as well as anyone else) and what you're proposing.

Your initial contention:

The Americans never really mastered this indirect rule and the setup of effective indigenous sepoy-like forces either

still seems somewhat dubious to me, both for the misplaced comparison referred to above and in the implicit assumption that "indirect rule" is the desired end state.

[Fuchs]

still seems somewhat dubious to me, both for the misplaced comparison referred to above and in the implicit assumption that "indirect rule" is the desired end state.

Seriously, I would never advocate foreign rule, and thus never advocate indirect rule.

The context of the quote was me explaining why the U.S. isn't enough of an empire to reap the benefits of imperial arrogance.