From this armchair as well. My fear is that there's a whole lot of folk plundering their way through military history, with some trend spotting in mind.Originally Posted by davidbfpo
Might be good if folk actually read Calwell and Gwynn, instead of just quoting them.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I would contend that there are trends, but that they lie in how organizations react to certain types of perceived threats. For example, the US Army's continual shedding of its counterinsurgency experience is one of those historical trends, and one that should be learned from. History is also a better source for understanding what DIDN'T work in a particular situation than it is for predicting future events.
The danger I usually see is one of polar constructs. We either ignore history entirely (or cherry-pick the appealing bits) or turn to it expecting a crystal ball into the future. Neither approach is especially helpful.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
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