Volunteers!!

[Bob's World]

They were first to mobilize.

They captured the critical Pacific island of Guam with it's protected deep water port.

They accepted the surrender of the Spanish Garrison in Manila.

They were on average: "25 years old, 5 feet 8 inches tall, and weighed 148 pounds. Most were single; fewer than ten percent had graduated from college. Their professions were quite varied; many were farmers, but more were clerks, students, or laborers. Fewer than half were members of a church."

They earned three Medals of Honor.

They were highly regarded by the Regular Army Generals appointed over them:

General General Wheaton at Malabon March 25th was asked "Where are your regulars"? Pointing to the Oregons then advancing on the first entrenchment he replied, "There are my regulars"!!

Again at Malinta March fith the General said "Orderly overtake those Oregon greyhounds on the road to Polo and order them to Malinta. Go mounted or you will never catch them"!

http://www.ohs.org/education/oregonh...ED1FECDEC4E121

http://books.google.com/books?id=yUw...nteers&f=false

There is a legend that lives among our military forces today that only regular army forces can fight wars. This is completely contrary to the history of our nation. Offered here is but one small example of how the American militia has stepped up in time of need to serve the nation, providing the time and space to allow the regular force to prepare for war.

[Varity]

There is a legend that lives among our military forces today that only regular army forces can fight wars. This is completely contrary to the history of our nation. Offered here is but one small example of how the American militia has stepped up in time of need to serve the nation, providing the time and space to allow the regular force to prepare for war.

One question. What militias do we have today other than of course, groups like the Michigan Militia?

I think it would be hard to go back to the old "well-regulated militia" paradigm, because our culture and even the meaning of the word militia has changed so much. Who would even join a militia when they could join the regular army?

[Bob's World]

One question. What militias do we have today other than of course, groups like the Michigan Militia?

I think it would be hard to go back to the old "well-regulated militia" paradigm, because our culture and even the meaning of the word militia has changed so much. Who would even join a militia when they could join the regular army?

These men were mostly members of the Oregon National Guard, and volunteered for wartime service when the call went out.

Similarly, on 15 September 1940 the 162nd Infantry of 41st Division mobilized and boarded the train up to Fort Lewis Washington. They were aboard the fleet that sailed from New York, splitting underway, with half heading to North Africa and the other half going through the Panama Canal and to Australia. The 41st is credited with killing more Japanese soldiers than any other division serving in the Pacific, and was one of the first American Divisions to deploy for WWII and one of the last to return. They had served in France in WWI as well, but did not fight under their division patch guide-on and patch in that campaign.

"Militia" is a term that has fallen to hard times of late. Our fear of militias in Afghanistan led us to avoid the obvious security solution of building locally recruited and employed security forces answering to District and Provincial governors. Instead we have been on a 11 year effort of attempting to create an Afghan National Army, a force that answers to the central government for the sole purpose of preserving the central government.


So long as we protect the 2nd Amendment we will have a "militia" in the US. Not "well regulated" to be sure, but one very deadly force that keeps our current government in check, and that deters any foreign force from even dreaming of invading us.

[Varity]

"Militia" is a term that has fallen to hard times of late. Our fear of militias in Afghanistan led us to avoid the obvious security solution of building locally recruited and employed security forces answering to District and Provincial governors. Instead we have been on a 11 year effort of attempting to create an Afghan National Army, a force that answers to the central government for the sole purpose of preserving the central government.

I would argue that the fear of militias in the US originated from the radicalization of American militias that ended in the Oklahoma City Bombings (though domestic terrorism is not over yet...).

So long as we protect the 2nd Amendment we will have a "militia" in the US. Not "well regulated" to be sure, but one very deadly force that keeps our current government in check, and that deters any foreign force from even dreaming of invading us.

But we don't have militias today, meaning right now in 2012, as far as I know (again, not counting right wing extremist paramilitary "militias"), do we? The second amendment says a militia is good, but does not say we must have one. It simply says we have the right to keep and bear arms, whether we're in a militia or not.

[wm]

Yes, Varity, there is a militia.

a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.
(b) The classes of the militia are—
(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and
(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.

At least one state that I know of, New Mexico, also refers to its militia in its state constitution:

Sectuion 1. The Militia of this State shall consist of all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, except such as are exempt by laws of the United States or of this State.
The organized Militia shall be called the "National Guard of New Mexico," of which the Governor shall be the Commander in Chief.
Section 2. The Legislature shall provide for the organization, discipline and equipment of the Militia, which shall conform as nearly as practicable to the organization, discipline and equipment of the Regular Army of the United States, and shall provide for the maintenance thereof.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob

Offered here is but one small example of how the American militia has stepped up in time of need to serve the nation, providing the time and space to allow the regular force to prepare for war.

So true if you go want to go back 60 plus years in our history. Fortunately we now have a standing professional Army ready to answer our nation's call to arms, while the NG generally remains in a state of partial readiness. Now the Active Component will hold the line while the NG works off the effect of too many twinkees and lattes, and industry produces enough military kit to equip them thus enabling them to deploy and be combat effective.

The million dollar question (perhaps the trillion dollar question) is how big does the AC need to be to hold the line?

I understand what you're saying and I know you are chumming the waters hoping I would take the bait, and of course having a pea sized brain, and a body designed for killing I couldn't resist the temptation.

I think that you're proposing is standing our current process on its head by increasing the readiness of the NG and decreasing the readiness of the Active Component by downsizing it, and then assuming we can expand the AC rapidly if required during a time of crisis. Did I get it right?

In hindsight, this may be feasible and even desirable, but I suspect that in this day and age this will only brief well, but in practice won't work due to changes in our culture, industrial base, complex skills required for a high tech military, etc. I always play counterpoint to your arguments (even when I agree with you on rare occassions ) because it is fun, but in all seriousness I think there are serious risks with this course of action.

By the way where do the reserves fit into all of this? Add a layer of fidelity to your proposal and in broad terms describe the roles of the NG, AR, and AC (Army and other services' reserves) and how this would actually work in say 2020, not 1942.

[Varity]

Yes, Varity, there is a militia.

At least one state that I know of, New Mexico, also refers to its militia in its state constitution:

Oops, I was thinking of organized state militias, but I guess my Californianess is showing. Turns out we (California) do have one though. I looked into it.

So...according to the constitution, much of the population is in the milita without knowing it.

[Bob's World]

"militia" is a term that has been hi-jacked by several groups of disgruntled wantabes who spend their weekends camping out with their buddies, dressing in camo and playing with rediculous weapons (If America was ever invaded by a professional army, I figure I could take my Ruger 10-22 I bought as a kid and have all the military weapons I needed in short order. Not because I'm John Rambo, but just because it isn't that hard to isolate some REMF and take his gear.)

As to the existence of formal militias that are not part of the federally supported National Guard, I know Oregon has one, and I suspect many other states do as well.

When the Constitution was written it had been the law of the land for nearly 200 years that every able-bodied male between the ages of 18 and 45 (or there abouts) was required to be a member of the militia and to bring his own firearm. While this is no longer the case, America is still a land with a large armed male populace that would respond as irregulars if we were ever invaded, and that steps forward to voluteer or fill draftee ranks in times of war. Do we need a more formal system? Probably not. But don't let those who have hi-jacked the term of late lead you to believe that that is what a militia truly is all about.

[Dayuhan]

"Militia" is a term that has fallen to hard times of late. Our fear of militias in Afghanistan led us to avoid the obvious security solution of building locally recruited and employed security forces answering to District and Provincial governors. Instead we have been on a 11 year effort of attempting to create an Afghan National Army, a force that answers to the central government for the sole purpose of preserving the central government.

I don't know how well these things have worked in Afghanistan, but I have direct experience with them in the Philippines. That direct experience includes a thorough stomping at their hands (and feet, and rifle butts and barrels), so I am perhaps biased. Be that as it may, my observation is that in this environment those "militias" have in practice been little more than legally sanctioned goon squads for corrupt local and regional elites. They quickly pick up skills in extortion, oppression, abuse, and killing or intimidating people their boss doesn't like. They are rarely very effective at fighting the rebels. They are very effective recruiting agents for the rebels, as their victims frequently turn to the rebels to get revenge or fight back. The arms and ammunition issued to them are routinely snatched by the rebels.

In short in this environment efforts to form such civil defense "militias" have been counterproductive. That's particularly true in Mindanao. It's a bit different in the tribal areas where I live now: "militias" are less likely to abuse their own people, but there is a tendency for their arms to be used in inter-tribal conflicts. In fact most localities here in the Cordillera have simply refused to accept the formation of these units; they create more problems than they solve and the populace is already well armed and capable of looking after itself.

Again, I'm not saying any of that applies to Afghanistan, just that the whole idea of trying to use local "militias" against insurgents can have real problems associated with it.

[Ken White]

In every war, they have also introduced innovative thinking, new and better ways of doing things and changed a rather hide bound regular force for the better. The longer we have gone without such infusions, the more stultified the regular force has become. For an example, see the period 1953-2001.

[JMA]

In every war, they have also introduced innovative thinking, new and better ways of doing things and changed a rather hide bound regular force for the better. The longer we have gone without such infusions, the more stultified the regular force has become. For an example, see the period 1953-2001.

These infusions seem to have a merely temporary positive effect before in the immediate post-war period the same bunch of garra-troopers (or their clones) emerge and bring the army back to some real soldiering.

From Lord Moran's "The Anatomy of Courage" written six-months after the Armistice:

The clear, war-given insight into the essence of a man has already grown dim. With the coming of peace we have gone back to those comfortable doctrines that some had thought war had killed. Cleverness has come into its own again. The men who won the war never left England; that was where really clever people were most useful. I sometimes wonder what some of those good souls who came through make of it all. They remember that in the life of the trenches a few simple demands were made of all men; if they were not met the defaulter became an outlaw. Do they ask of themselves when they meet the successful of the present how such men would have fared in that other time where success in life had seemed a mirage? Are they silently in their hearts making those measurements of men which they learnt when there was work afoot that was a man’s work? They know a man, for reasons which they are too inarticulate to explain, and they are baffled because others deny what seems to them so simple and so sure.

Of course this quote is more than the military reverting to type immediately after a war. In the current circumstances where relatively small percentages of the forces are deployed a long way from home it is a relatively simple matter for the garra-troopers to ring fence and protect their territory from war learned changes and progress. I wonder how many times modern returning veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan have been admonished (or worse) to remember that they are not in Iraq/Afghanistan anymore and they need to get back to 'real' soldiering?

Further, I share his concern for the qualities of the "successful of the present". With the return to the pre-war selection processes nothing changes at officer or enlisted levels. There is no hope.

[Steve Blair]

In every war, they have also introduced innovative thinking, new and better ways of doing things and changed a rather hide bound regular force for the better. The longer we have gone without such infusions, the more stultified the regular force has become. For an example, see the period 1953-2001.

Yes and no, Ken. As far as I'm concerned, the Volunteer myth ranks right up there with "we have to have a draft." Some of the volunteers did bring in new ideas, but if you go back to the Civil War I'd also make a strong case for some of that innovating thinking actually came from Regular officers of junior rank who were quickly promoted to provide leadership for those new Volunteer units. A good chunk of the "volunteer" officers in the Civil War were West Point-trained (or had prior service experience) who gained their rank through State appointments.

Volunteer units also didn't start doing well until they were brought in on extended service terms (two years at least). Lots of issues, and I suspect that the "volunteer" question leads down the same rabbit hole as the draftee force.

[Ken White]

Yes and no, Ken.... some of that innovating thinking actually came from Regular officers of junior rank who were quickly promoted to provide leadership for those new Volunteer units...Volunteer units also didn't start doing well until they were brought in on extended service terms (two years at least). Lots of issues, and I suspect that the "volunteer" question leads down the same rabbit hole as the draftee force.

All quite true. The same phenomenon occurred in later wars; Spanish American, WW I, WW II. The infusion of volunteers / guard or Reserve led in all those case to improvements in the way the Army did things in many areas and generally for long term improvement but that was as much a function of the huge change in structure as of 'volunteer' input.

Most of the military / tactical improvements were indeed introduced by the Regular Officers who were rapidly promoted due to a war (and those guys were in Regular as well as Guard / Reserve units) however most but not all of the nut and bolt, supply and service, housekeeping and administration, industrial and technical changes (most but not all were improvements) came from the RC folks. One of the 'strengths' they do bring is generally more current technical capability derived from civilian jobs. Another is that being less militarily knowledgeable (or conditioned...) in most senses, they are, as one bright young Regular Army BG once told me "...not aware of what they can't do..."

In all cases, it did take well over a year before most (again, not all) RC units began to function well tactically. That varies by type unit -- most RC Field Artillery and Combat Support units do well rather quickly; CSS is a mixed bag and the maneuver units take longer due to a relative lack of practice.

Totally agree that the "volunteer question" does lead down that rabbit hole. The world and too many thing in it have changed too much for either to be viable under other than unusual circumstances...

[Ken White]

AddendumWe can disagree on most all that. I will offer just one statement of yours for you to ponder:

No, the idea depends on being in one place for three years. That is the whole idea of having a special volunteer unit raised for a specific campaign. This wouldn't be a regular unit. If things really got bad of course it would be different but then everything would be different.

to expand on that comment in reverse order:

One of the problems with ground combat is that things tend to get really bad unpredictably. It may be only local but it can have significant impact.

If the US Congress is unwilling to leave all volunteer regular Army soldiers in theater for over a year, people who signed up to go anywhere and do anything and based on the precedents of Korea and Viet Nam with draftees involved, is it really possible they'd acceded to a three year tour for volunteers? If the volunteers are sent for three years tours, would the tours for regular Army people also have to be three years? If not why not? Would Congress concur? Would the Mothers and Fathers of the younger volunteers concur?

See also my response to Steve Blair just above.

Added: This also merits a response:

Besides would the regular units there now be able to handle Pak Army conventional units? Many are deployed in small outposts and if I've read correctly many have left a lot of their heavy equipment at home. I don't see too much difference.

The difference is that the regular units have signed up for full spectrum warfare and heavy casualties can be a norm; that is an accepted fact. 'Volunteers' would be signed up for less that full spectrum warfare and implicit in that is no heavy casualties -- you don't say that but I assure you it would be so assumed -- and as for being able to "handle Pak(sic) conventional units," the answer is dependent on many factors but based on what you've written thus far, the answer to that question is a qualified yes -- mostly because your volunteers have been trained only to do tasks in the FID mode in Afghanistan, not to engage in conventional force on force war with a peer equipped unit

[Bob's World]

What has not changed is the danger of a standing warfighting army in times of peace in terms of the dangers of overly empowering the executive to begin wars as described by James Madison.

As to arguments about what type of force is most competent in the shortest period of time, those are interesting but moot to this discussion. The US has never needed a rapidly deployable warfighting army. Ever. Not in WWI. Not in WWII. Not in Korea. Not in Vietnam. And most certainly not in the subsequent era of conflicts that we have dived into head first.

Likewise, we do not need a large warfighting army on the books to defend our shores from invasion. Consider the example of our invasion of France. It took us two years to stage the men and supplies and capabilty to simply push across the English Channel. When China or Russia begin a two year program of staging on Vancouver Island or Nova Scotia, give me a call. Until then these are false arguements about false threats.

We are trapped in an inertia of thinking rooted in the anomoly of 60+ years of having to have a warfighting army on the books to implement containment in Western Europe, and then a long string of post Cold War conflicts that various Presidents have been able to engage upon simply because such an army was available.

We engage the future best when we apply our historical lessons properly. Madison was right, and if he could see what has happened over the past 40 years he would be shocked that we allowed this to happen. The original George W (Washington) would be equally alarmed and dismayed.

[carl]

If the US Congress is unwilling to leave all volunteer regular Army soldiers in theater for over a year, people who signed up to go anywhere and do anything and based on the precedents of Korea and Viet Nam with draftees involved, is it really possible they'd acceded to a three year tour for volunteers? If the volunteers are sent for three years tours, would the tours for regular Army people also have to be three years? If not why not? Would Congress concur? Would the Mothers and Fathers of the younger volunteers concur?

What if Congress did concur then changed its mind? And if it didn't, what if it was thinking about it? What if the Mothers and Fathers of the younger volunteers were divorced? Who would we listen to? What if forms have to be reprinted? What type face would be used? What if it had to be different from the regular Army forms so we could tell them apart? What if the Red Bull ran out? Would we have to withdraw? What if we had to have Red Bull runout adjustments to pay? What if...

Added: This also merits a response:The difference is that the regular units have signed up for full spectrum warfare and heavy casualties can be a norm; that is an accepted fact. 'Volunteers' would be signed up for less that full spectrum warfare and implicit in that is no heavy casualties -- you don't say that but I assure you it would be so assumed -- and as for being able to "handle Pak(sic) conventional units," the answer is dependent on many factors but based on what you've written thus far, the answer to that question is a qualified yes -- mostly because your volunteers have been trained only to do tasks in the FID mode in Afghanistan, not to engage in conventional force on force war with a peer equipped unit

I assure ypu that it wouldn't be implicit that there wouldn't be heavy casualties. It would be explicitly stated that the volunteers were signing up for war and war and battles are unpredictable and often massively and fatally dangerous. People aren't stupid, especially when you are honest with them. Those who would volunteer, and I agree with JMA that there would be enough, would know perfectly well what might potentially happen.

The volunteer unit I propose would not be able to face a Pak Army armored unit in conventional force on force war. Not surprising since that would not be the purpose for which it was raised, trained and equipped. Viewing that as a fatal flaw is like saying a Boston Whaler isn't a very good snowplow. If there was a danger that that type of a threat existed (it doesn't) you obviously would not employ a unit like this. The enemy to be faced and all that.

But then, as I said, I doubt the regular units could take on the Pak Army in conventional force of force war. They don't have hardly any of their heavy weapons and equipment. No matter that they have been trained to drive around in M-1s and prevail. There aren't any M-1s to drive around in. (Maybe the Marines have a handful) And the reason for that is there is next to no chance that the Pak Army is going to do that. They also probably are very light on anti-aircraft defenses because there is next to no chance the PAF or the IAF is going to strafe them.