Volunteers!!

[Ken White]

23 April 1898 President McKinley called for 125,000 volunteers.

11 May 1898 the Second Oregon Volunteers were on the train from Camp Withycombe outside Portland, Oregon ( a great little military museum there, btw for those who enjoy that kind of thing) to their port of debarkation in San Francisco. As I recall they took up the motto "First to Assemble" as they were the first such volunteer regiment to form and ship out.

25 May they sailed from San Francisco...

That was then, this is now.

You know perfectly well that today we cannot even activate and ship a trained -- even one that's been to Iraq -- ArNG unit in that time for a host of valid reasons. Not least laws passed by the Congress that dictate training times and AC 'Certification' of combat readiness prior to deployment. Carl is correct in ascribing some of those problems to the military personnel bureaucracy (which needs to be totally rebuilt in any case) but it's more complex than that. Not least the concern over poorly to marginally trained and equipped units taking mass casualties, particularly if most such units come from the same small towns. That concern is not or would not be limited to Politicians though that factor prompted those laws I mentioned.

I can sweep the streets and give you a slew of 1900 -- or even 1950 -- level Infantryman in two to four weeks, resource dependent. I could train them shipboard on the 30 day voyage to the Phillipines as I'm sure occured. I cannot do that for today's Infantry. And that's walking Infantry, add in vehicles or aircraft and we're in a different world.

JMA is correct, it would take six months, minimum, IF we had the Cadre. We do not, so that would take a year. It would also take that long or longer to equip them...

We can activate the Guard or Reserve and deploy them in 90 to 180 days. That's about as good as it's gonna get in this era...

It's okay to be proud of ones heritage and experience, it's okay to dream, even to share those dreams with the world but it's not okay to promulgate dangerous illusions.

[Dayuhan]

Things would have to change of course as regards to officer selection. That is critical.

But you are wrong about vols having to supply their own equipment. Except for some of the fancy units early in the Civil War and Confederate cavalrymen supplying their own mounts, they were supplied mostly by the state and ultimately the federal gov.

Ok, grant that one... but are we talking about recruiting discrete volunteer units, as in the days RCJ is discussing, or simply recruiting volunteers into he existing institution?

I recall (from memory) a story of Frederick Funston, who had been appointed Colonel of a Kansas regiment being deployed to the Philippines, being asked what he knew of military tactics. The reply was something along the lines of "I have a book and expect to have mastered the subject by the time I reach San Francisco".

[carl]

So what am I saying... if you have the command and leadership cadre in place you can possibly ship a newly trained battalion off to war in six months.

If you don't have the trained cadre then quite frankly I can't see how it could be done.

Exactly. I knew you were the guy to ask. It couldn't be done unless the leaders were available and the standing forces, be they regular, NG or Reserve would most likely have to provide those. That might require structuring the force with that in mind, or not. That is effectively what we did in WWII and the Civil War etc. Joshua Chamberlain got his training from self study and Ames, a West Point guy. No matter if you built up your force with volunteer regiments or enlarged regular units, the problem of supplying them with leaders would be the same.

The benefits to this kind of thing are both societal and military. Societal in that regular people who want to do the job would be going, not regular soldiers. Military in that the units and at least the lower ranks would be there for a particular job and thereby by the unit would be there for a particular job. That might (or not, you guys know better than me) cut down on the career centric coin phenomanom (sic) that so cripples us today. An additional benefit would be sidestepping the military personnel system, which I read over and over is poison to a small war effort.

Imagine the benefits of a unit that was created to serve in Afghanistan for 3 years straight after being trained up. Then when that time was done, it would be disbanded and if another was needed another could be formed. The guys would be told the terms of service so no complaint coming in fulfilling it. A unit staying in place for 3 years would be great.

I know this may be impossible but we did it in the past and it worked. Human nature doesn't change so I don't see and fundamental reason, human nature type fundamental, it couldn't work again.

Also for something like Afghanistan, you wouldn't have to recreate a brigade combat team. Since it would be a temporary volunteer unit, you could tailor it to the need.

As far as the Grey's Scouts were concerned as a mounted infantry unit they drew their cadre from volunteers from across the army. I would think that in the US such a unit could be put together in a jiffy with the fully infantry trained manpower requiring only the 'mounted' aspect of training to be added... and the horses of course.

Given your experience, do you think a unit like that would be useful in Afghanistan?

[carl]

but are we talking about recruiting discrete volunteer units, as in the days RCJ is discussing, or simply recruiting volunteers into he existing institution?

I am talking about discrete volunteer units. And I realize that it probably could not be done nowadays.

But the critical thing is something Bob Jones, mentioned along the lines of an impassioned call for volunteers by the President. If he were to do that, joined by all the people he could get to join him in that call, maybe you could do almost the same thing without discrete vol units.

I still like the idea of volunteer units being created for a specific job though. It has some psychological advantages I think. Vols go into to do a job, not to be professional soldiers. That is important I think.

[carl]

Ken:

All your points can't be argued with, at least not by me. But, just for a small war like Afghanistan, could you get away with a lesser level of training for a unit that was just going to go there for that conflict? I don't mean short small unit combat training, to the contrary on things like that. I mean things like chem warfare training, battalion or multi battalion level operations, things like that that may not have that much use against the Taliban.

I hope you get what I mean. These are just musings by a civilian so any specifics I come up with don't mean much. What I mean I guess is would a volunteer unit meant specifically for Afghanistan have to match the full range and level of training of a regular unit?

[Dayuhan]

"Militia" is a term that has fallen to hard times of late. Our fear of militias in Afghanistan led us to avoid the obvious security solution of building locally recruited and employed security forces answering to District and Provincial governors. Instead we have been on a 11 year effort of attempting to create an Afghan National Army, a force that answers to the central government for the sole purpose of preserving the central government.

I don't know how well these things have worked in Afghanistan, but I have direct experience with them in the Philippines. That direct experience includes a thorough stomping at their hands (and feet, and rifle butts and barrels), so I am perhaps biased. Be that as it may, my observation is that in this environment those "militias" have in practice been little more than legally sanctioned goon squads for corrupt local and regional elites. They quickly pick up skills in extortion, oppression, abuse, and killing or intimidating people their boss doesn't like. They are rarely very effective at fighting the rebels. They are very effective recruiting agents for the rebels, as their victims frequently turn to the rebels to get revenge or fight back. The arms and ammunition issued to them are routinely snatched by the rebels.

In short in this environment efforts to form such civil defense "militias" have been counterproductive. That's particularly true in Mindanao. It's a bit different in the tribal areas where I live now: "militias" are less likely to abuse their own people, but there is a tendency for their arms to be used in inter-tribal conflicts. In fact most localities here in the Cordillera have simply refused to accept the formation of these units; they create more problems than they solve and the populace is already well armed and capable of looking after itself.

Again, I'm not saying any of that applies to Afghanistan, just that the whole idea of trying to use local "militias" against insurgents can have real problems associated with it.

[Ken White]

What I mean I guess is would a volunteer unit meant specifically for Afghanistan have to match the full range and level of training of a regular unit?

The Regular force there now is not doing all that well. I think that answers your question. If they need more and better training, then throwing together a crew of volunteers with less training -- that's a given; there will be no volunteers for the duration, never have been and training takes time out of their term so it has to be minimized.

Part of the Regular force problem is tours -- we haven't been in Afghanistan 11 years, we've been there eleven one year tours -- but part of it is turnover and level of training. The bottom line is what you suggest we do can be done but it almost certainly would be even less effective and would likely have a higher casualty ratio.

History is good, it is important but it also can breed dangerous illusions because too much of it is slanted to make ideological, political or military points. I mention that only to suggest that any sociological benefits from such Volunteer units may or may not appear. The US of today is quite different than the US in which I was a schoolkid and even more different than it was in the early 20th Century.

Also, I've talked to several who were USV in various units. Typical is the Father of a good friend who served in the 2d Georgia in Mexico looking For P. Villa. He later went to France with the 2d Georgia -- by then the 121st Inf, GA ArNG. When activated to go to Texas and then Mexico, they were initially USV, then they were mustered into Federal service and training began. His contention was that training was a lifesaver both in Mexico and later.

[carl]

Ken:

I don't know if any sociological benefits from such units would appear. It is only my opinion that they would. That is based on my reading that in the past that form of service was on the whole beneficial and human nature hasn't changed so I think it could be beneficial again. That personal opinion holds despite the culture being very different as you note.

You are right of course about the importance of training. It would not work if the training was inferior. But I am thinking that if a unit was only going to be used for one purpose, small war in Afghanistan, training could be specifically tailored for that and that alone. All other things would be disregarded so training might actually be better for the things that only applied to the specific purpose for which the unit was raised.

The other thing that I think would be critical for this type of unit would be that it would go to one place and stay there for three years. Even if it started off with slightly inferior training by the time it had been there for a year or two it would be extremely good at what it was doing in that particular place. It might be completely lost if called upon to repel a North Korean combined arms attack but that would not be why it was created. And these would not be "for the duration" units. Specific term lengths would apply, say 6 months training then 3 years deployed in the same place with say 30 days leave once a year.

Like I said, I know the personnel bureaucracy will never let this come to be. But some way some how has got to be found to break that bureaucracy.

[Bob's World]

James Madison, Federalist Paper 46:

Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it. Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment, by a blind and tame submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it.

[Dayuhan]

I wonder, on a rough basis... what percentage of the population owned arms and was skilled in their use in, say, 1776, 1876, 1976... and today?

[Bob's World]

I have never argued that any RC army could be as fast and effective as a regular army to rapidly deploy and engage effectively. But that is not the point, and such a capacity has never, ever, been needed by our country. But the very effectiveness of such an active force is its greatest weakness as well. It is always an attractive option, and no President has shown the ability to ignore such an attractive option. This is a fact recognized by our founding fathers, that Kings always find good reasons for war that others don't see. That is why that power was placed firmly within the Congress. Not just to declare, but also to agree to resource and form such an Army in the first place. A cooling off period was built into the system and we have the geostrategic luxury to have such a period. Having a standing army in peace disrupts that system, and the facts speak for themselves. They founding fathers were spot on. Presidents find excuses for war and have worked to cut the congress out of the equation. It has not served us well and it has not made us safer.

For expeditionary interventions we have the USMC and a small number of Army units. That is more than sufficient to that mission. If a true war must be fought we have the time to build and train an army and to dust off our national militia as well.

When one commits the Army it commits the nation. It creates a de facto "war" and wars must be won. How many times must we fall into that trap before we learn that lesson??

[Bob's World]

"Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few. In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is extended; its influence in dealing out offices, honors, and emoluments is multiplied; and all the means of seducing the minds, are added to those of subduing the force, of the people. The same malignant aspect in republicanism may be traced in the inequality of fortunes, and the opportunities of fraud, growing out of a state of war, and in the degeneracy of manners and of morals engendered by both. No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare."

"Political Observations" (1795-04-20); also in Letters and Other Writings of James Madison (1865), Vol. IV, p. 491

"The constitution supposes, what the History of all Governments demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, & most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the Legislature. But the Doctrines lately advanced strike at the root of all these provisions, and will deposit the peace of the Country in that Department which the Constitution distrusts as most ready without cause to renounce it. For if the opinion of the President not the facts & proofs themselves are to sway the judgment of Congress, in declaring war, and if the President in the recess of Congress create a foreign mission, appoint the minister, & negociate a War Treaty, without the possibility of a check even from the Senate, untill the measures present alternatives overruling the freedom of its judgment; if again a Treaty when made obliges the Legislature to declare war contrary to its judgment, and in pursuance of the same doctrine, a law declaring war, imposes a like moral obligation, to grant the requisite supplies until it be formally repealed with the consent of the President & Senate, it is evident that the people are cheated out of the best ingredients in their Government, the safeguards of peace which is the greatest of their blessings."

Letter to Thomas Jefferson (1798-04-02); published in The Writings of James Madison
(1906) Edited by Gaillard Hunt, Vol. 6, pp. 312-14

[Dayuhan]

For expeditionary interventions we have the USMC

Indeed we do... does anyone else remember Tom Lehrer? Remember, it was 1965...

Send the Marines

When someone makes a move
Of which we don't approve
Who is it that always intervenes
U.N. and O.A.S.
They have their place, I guess
But first... send the Marines

We'll send them all we've got
John Wayne and Randolph Scott
Remember those exciting fighting scenes
To the shores of Tripoli
But not to Mississippoli
What do we do, we send the Marines

For might makes right
And 'til they've seen the light
They've got to be protected
All their rights respected
Till somebody we like can be elected

Members of the corps
All hate the thought of war
They'd rather kill them off by peaceful means
Stop calling it aggression
We hate that expression
We only want the world to know
That we support the status quo
They love us everywhere we go
So when in doubt, send the Marines

[Ken White]

You are right of course about the importance of training. It would not work if the training was inferior. But I am thinking that if a unit was only going to be used for one purpose, small war in Afghanistan, training could be specifically tailored for that and that alone.

Doesn't work that way. Training for combat has to be full spectrum and we currently train folks only for the 'job at hand' and grade held instead of the old fashioned way for world wide service and a grade or two ahead of that currently held. See the result? What do you suppose would occur with even less training?

As wars go, Afghanistan is quite benign -- but that can change in any number of unforeseen ways -- like the sudden entry of the Army of Pakistan because they're upset with the Pakistani Taliban flowing over the Afghan Border. Even a large shipment of mortars and Ammo to the Talib would be a game changer. We could cope with it, could even if there were Volunteers but what if the first few uses of those mortars caught Volunteer units in a big way (the Talib are smart enough to target the elements with political penalties rampant. See the Canadian experience...)?

You may be willing to take a chance on the Volunteer program. I suspect few politicians would agree.

The other thing that I think would be critical for this type of unit would be that it would go to one place and stay there for three years. Even if it started off with slightly inferior training by the time it had been there for a year or two it would be extremely good at what it was doing in that particular place. It might be completely lost if called upon to repel a North Korean combined arms attack but that would not be why it was created. And these would not be "for the duration" units. Specific term lengths would apply, say 6 months training then 3 years deployed in the same place with say 30 days leave once a year.

I'm unsure you'd get many volunteers to go to Afghanistan (for just one example) for three years.

It may also be unwise to predicate your efforts on being in one place for three years. For just one example, a slew of people left the Dominican Republic (conflict) and Germany (no conflict) in 1965-66 and went straight to Viet Nam with no replacements in the former nations.

You may start off with the premise that as they gain experience they'll get better but if they take a big hit from a North Korean attack (or anyone else's, large or small...) someone will pay. Particularly if it's soon after they get in theater, where ever it is...

Like I said, I know the personnel bureaucracy will never let this come to be. But some way some how has got to be found to break that bureaucracy.

I don't think the personnel bureaucracy would be your biggest problem -- I suspect that would be politicians. Second, I suspect, would be the volunteers themselves...

[JMA]

Exactly. I knew you were the guy to ask. It couldn't be done unless the leaders were available and the standing forces, be they regular, NG or Reserve would most likely have to provide those. That might require structuring the force with that in mind, or not. That is effectively what we did in WWII and the Civil War etc. Joshua Chamberlain got his training from self study and Ames, a West Point guy. No matter if you built up your force with volunteer regiments or enlarged regular units, the problem of supplying them with leaders would be the same.

This staffing challenge is not unlike what the US has faced and will face in times of general mobilisation. Where do the officers and NCOs come from?

I suggest one sets some ground rules in this regard that must be complied with.

* It remains undisputed that the NCO structure is the backbone of the infantry battalion.

* You cant instantly produce NCOs (especially not through the same training process as that of the basic troopies - meaning the better and brighter are selected an given a little extra attention with some rank at the end).

* As with officers, NCOs must be trained and exercised at two command levels above their current rank level. Meaning that a section comd/squad leader must be trained tactically at squad, platoon and company levels (platoon sergeant is not a command level).

* If during peacetime the training tempo is maintained along these lines a sudden influx of recruits at the time of mobilisation can be reasonably successfully absorbed. Unfortunately this does not happen as in peacetime all armies can't resist sliding into a routine where their are no military priorities - given that there will be budgetary restrictions.

The benefits to this kind of thing are both societal and military. Societal in that regular people who want to do the job would be going, not regular soldiers. Military in that the units and at least the lower ranks would be there for a particular job and thereby by the unit would be there for a particular job. That might (or not, you guys know better than me) cut down on the career centric coin phenomanom (sic) that so cripples us today. An additional benefit would be sidestepping the military personnel system, which I read over and over is poison to a small war effort.

May I suggest a small change of terminology here. I would suggest that such units be raised for a particular campaign or war (rather than a job).

Its only in times of almost total war that the mindset changes for the better - normally after taking a bloody nose : Kasserine Pass - but sadly it does not take long until things return to the old ways.

Imagine the benefits of a unit that was created to serve in Afghanistan for 3 years straight after being trained up. Then when that time was done, it would be disbanded and if another was needed another could be formed. The guys would be told the terms of service so no complaint coming in fulfilling it. A unit staying in place for 3 years would be great.

I suggest that you get the volunteers to sign up to serve in the unit for three years - this applies also to the leadership cadre. We are not talking about 100s of thousands of people here - you will find them out there. People like me People you sign up to go to war. Once I got into a mostly peacetime environment it was so stifling suffocating to the extent I had to leave. There will be thousands like that in the US you will get a good day's work out of.

Looking into the low incidence of PTSD in the RLI I believe we stumbled upon the secret by chance. Therefore in my experience where I spent a full three years doing a 6week:10days rotation of ops:R&R without any long term ill-effect (any aggressive behaviour I may exhibit from time to time was there from before my service started )

Now to page 251 of Stuart Cloete's book "A Victorian Son" talking about his time in hospital during the Great War, "The feeling that for the next few weeks I need no longer feel afraid or act with courage." That was it. Every two months you had a week when you returned to normality. You could drop your guard, you could wind down. I discussed this some time back somewhere here and suggested how such a rotation would work. That said little wonder - given what I saw in the movie Restrepo - that there is an increasing level of mental and PTSD incidence among those deployed to Afghanistan.

It will take a cost/benefit analysis before the power that be see the benefit of investing in R&R during tours/deployments/campaigns/wars in terms of reduced PTSD and associated costs.

I know this may be impossible but we did it in the past and it worked. Human nature doesn't change so I don't see and fundamental reason, human nature type fundamental, it couldn't work again.

It is absolutely workable ... but not perhaps under your current systems.

Also for something like Afghanistan, you wouldn't have to recreate a brigade combat team. Since it would be a temporary volunteer unit, you could tailor it to the need.

You need the leadership cadre who are in it for the duration. Command continuity and theatre experience are essential. That is your backbone and it extends down to corporal level (squad leader). Ttoopie replacements (as I remember discussing elsewhere here a few years ago) can be trickle fed into the units at a slow rate to never diminish the level of combat experience of units. This I submit needs to be managed and must be maintained down to section/squad level. Once the units have deployed promotions must in the main be from within.

Given your experience, do you think a unit like that would be useful in Afghanistan?

Quite frankly I can't say, but I sometimes wonder if it (and other methods and tactical options) has received any serious consideration.

I would ask the guys who have been there and those who are going there to actively give the use of mounted infantry some thought. You may be greatly surprised at what the troopies come up with.

[carl]

May I suggest a small change of terminology here. I would suggest that such units be raised for a particular campaign or war (rather than a job).

Absolutely.

I suggest that you get the volunteers to sign up to serve in the unit for three years - this applies also to the leadership cadre. We are not talking about 100s of thousands of people here - you will find them out there. People like me People you sign up to go to war. Once I got into a mostly peacetime environment it was so stifling suffocating to the extent I had to leave. There will be thousands like that in the US you will get a good day's work out of.

I think so too, even now and back in the early 2000s, very much more so. There are over 300 million people in this country and the right types would be found in sufficient numbers.

Looking into the low incidence of PTSD in the RLI I believe we stumbled upon the secret by chance. Therefore in my experience where I spent a full three years doing a 6week:10days rotation of ops:R&R without any long term ill-effect (any aggressive behaviour I may exhibit from time to time was there from before my service started )

Now to page 251 of Stuart Cloete's book "A Victorian Son" talking about his time in hospital during the Great War, "The feeling that for the next few weeks I need no longer feel afraid or act with courage." That was it. Every two months you had a week when you returned to normality. You could drop your guard, you could wind down. I discussed this some time back somewhere here and suggested how such a rotation would work. That said little wonder - given what I saw in the movie Restrepo - that there is an increasing level of mental and PTSD incidence among those deployed to Afghanistan.

How beautifully and cogently stated by Cloete. Sometimes I think, Ken alludes to this, that the Americans are stuck with an early 20th century industrial view of human beings. We view them as just parts in a machine. Other countries seem to understand better that people are people and have be treated as such.

Could you view the Taliban as doing the same thing you guys did but in an informal manner? They get tired or stressed, and they just don't do missions or they go to Pakistan for a while to chill out. Then when they feel better, back they go.

You need the leadership cadre who are in it for the duration. Command continuity and theatre experience are essential. That is your backbone and it extends down to corporal level (squad leader). Ttoopie replacements (as I remember discussing elsewhere here a few years ago) can be trickle fed into the units at a slow rate to never diminish the level of combat experience of units. This I submit needs to be managed and must be maintained down to section/squad level. Once the units have deployed promotions must in the main be from within.

Yes x 3. I remember your talking about how handling replacements. I cut that one out (so to speak) because it is an excellent example of recognizing that you are dealing with people, not parts.

Leadership cadre in for the duration and promotion from within would result, I think (in my civilian bookish way), in a unit like this getting better and better during the course of its 3 year deployment.

I think a volunteer unit like this could work but it would require at least 3 mainly cultural adjustments that the American military might not be able to make. The first is recognizing that small wars are really honest to goodness different and have to be handled differently. I know we've been at this for 11 years but I still don't think that has really been accepted. The second is that people are people, not parts and have to be handled as such. The third comes from the first sort of in that just because you make changes to handle something unique, doesn't mean you are locked into those changes forever. You can switch back again...and people being people, not parts, they will be able to handle the adjustment.

That is all part of being adaptable. We used to be able to adapt. Chesty Puller and his contemporaries could adapt. He started out leading local constabulary. Then Pacific island battles against the Japanese then winter rough country fighting with a great large combined arms unit. He was adaptable. i don't see guys now being any less so, if given the chance.

Quite frankly I can't say, but I sometimes wonder if it (and other methods and tactical options) has received any serious consideration.

I would ask the guys who have been there and those who are going there to actively give the use of mounted infantry some thought. You may be greatly surprised at what the troopies come up with.

The American troops would be, I would bet, be quite enthusiastic about something like this. American leaders no, because there would be no high tech involved and they would be afraid they would have to have mounted units forever.

[Steve Blair]

In every war, they have also introduced innovative thinking, new and better ways of doing things and changed a rather hide bound regular force for the better. The longer we have gone without such infusions, the more stultified the regular force has become. For an example, see the period 1953-2001.

Yes and no, Ken. As far as I'm concerned, the Volunteer myth ranks right up there with "we have to have a draft." Some of the volunteers did bring in new ideas, but if you go back to the Civil War I'd also make a strong case for some of that innovating thinking actually came from Regular officers of junior rank who were quickly promoted to provide leadership for those new Volunteer units. A good chunk of the "volunteer" officers in the Civil War were West Point-trained (or had prior service experience) who gained their rank through State appointments.

Volunteer units also didn't start doing well until they were brought in on extended service terms (two years at least). Lots of issues, and I suspect that the "volunteer" question leads down the same rabbit hole as the draftee force.

[carl]

Doesn't work that way. Training for combat has to be full spectrum and we currently train folks only for the 'job at hand' and grade held instead of the old fashioned way for world wide service and a grade or two ahead of that currently held. See the result? What do you suppose would occur with even less training?

I don't see why there would be less training. There would be more training, but specialized and adapted to the conditions to be faced. That is the idea of specialized troops isn't it? Abrams borne infantry doesn't train like foot borne infantry which doesn't train like artillerymen. This type of unit would be specialized. That has been done forever, hoplites and peltasts, legionaries and velites etc.

As wars go, Afghanistan is quite benign -- but that can change in any number of unforeseen ways -- like the sudden entry of the Army of Pakistan because they're upset with the Pakistani Taliban flowing over the Afghan Border. Even a large shipment of mortars and Ammo to the Talib would be a game changer. We could cope with it, could even if there were Volunteers but what if the first few uses of those mortars caught Volunteer units in a big way (the Talib are smart enough to target the elements with political penalties rampant. See the Canadian experience...)?

I don't see the sudden entry of the Pak Army having much to do with this. Units such as these would not be the only ones in Afghanistan. They would supplement not supplant regular units. That is the way it has always been with volunteer troops. You would naturally have some regular units there anyway. Besides would the regular units there now be able to handle Pak Army conventional units? Many are deployed in small outposts and if I've read correctly many have left a lot of their heavy equipment at home. I don't see too much difference.

Units such as I propose would be equipped and trained for small war. Mortars have been used by insurgents and part of small war for a long time. They would also have recourse to fire support from regular units. Remember they would only supplement not supplant regular troops. And I believe Taliban and Co. already use recoilless rifles. Those have a pretty big bang.

You may be willing to take a chance on the Volunteer program. I suspect few politicians would agree.I'm unsure you'd get many volunteers to go to Afghanistan (for just one example) for three years.

No, you would get the volunteers. Of that I am certain. You can disagree, but they would be there. Remember like JMA says, you don't need hundreds of thousands.

Political reluctance would be big and probably the real killer of the idea. But political outlooks change and can be changed. B.O. Davis probably saw the day when a Colin Powell would be the big boss but few of his contemporaries saw it.

It may also be unwise to predicate your efforts on being in one place for three years. For just one example, a slew of people left the Dominican Republic (conflict) and Germany (no conflict) in 1965-66 and went straight to Viet Nam with no replacements in the former nations.

No, the idea depends on being in one place for three years. That is the whole idea of having a special volunteer unit raised for a specific campaign. This wouldn't be a regular unit. If things really got bad of course it would be different but then everything would be different.

You may start off with the premise that as they gain experience they'll get better but if they take a big hit from a North Korean attack (or anyone else's, large or small...) someone will pay. Particularly if it's soon after they get in theater, where ever it is...I don't think the personnel bureaucracy would be your biggest problem -- I suspect that would be politicians. Second, I suspect, would be the volunteers themselves...

They wouldn't take a big hit from a North Korean attack because they wouldn't be in North Korea. They would be raised for service in the Afghan campaign and would serve there. I used the example of a North Korean combined arms attack as an example of something they would not face in Afghanistan and so would not be trained and equipped for that.

The same guys in the same place with the same leadership cadre promoting from within, as outlined by JMA above, the unit would get very much better.

If it came to pass that a critical emergency required them to move to Korea, they would have to be given new equipment and training. But the unit would be far ahead of any other newly raised unit because it would be cohesive with men, NCOs and officers known to each other who have worked together.

To the contrary, I think the volunteers would be the strength of the outfit, for this reason "In every war, they have also introduced innovative thinking, new and better ways of doing things and changed a rather hide bound regular force for the better. The longer we have gone without such infusions, the more stultified the regular force has become. For an example, see the period 1953-2001."

(Amendment Alert! Amendment Alert! I only just now read Steve Blair's comment on Ken's remark quoted above. Accurate comment but I think the effect is the same regardless of the exact mechanism.)

[Ken White]

Yes and no, Ken.... some of that innovating thinking actually came from Regular officers of junior rank who were quickly promoted to provide leadership for those new Volunteer units...Volunteer units also didn't start doing well until they were brought in on extended service terms (two years at least). Lots of issues, and I suspect that the "volunteer" question leads down the same rabbit hole as the draftee force.

All quite true. The same phenomenon occurred in later wars; Spanish American, WW I, WW II. The infusion of volunteers / guard or Reserve led in all those case to improvements in the way the Army did things in many areas and generally for long term improvement but that was as much a function of the huge change in structure as of 'volunteer' input.

Most of the military / tactical improvements were indeed introduced by the Regular Officers who were rapidly promoted due to a war (and those guys were in Regular as well as Guard / Reserve units) however most but not all of the nut and bolt, supply and service, housekeeping and administration, industrial and technical changes (most but not all were improvements) came from the RC folks. One of the 'strengths' they do bring is generally more current technical capability derived from civilian jobs. Another is that being less militarily knowledgeable (or conditioned...) in most senses, they are, as one bright young Regular Army BG once told me "...not aware of what they can't do..."

In all cases, it did take well over a year before most (again, not all) RC units began to function well tactically. That varies by type unit -- most RC Field Artillery and Combat Support units do well rather quickly; CSS is a mixed bag and the maneuver units take longer due to a relative lack of practice.

Totally agree that the "volunteer question" does lead down that rabbit hole. The world and too many thing in it have changed too much for either to be viable under other than unusual circumstances...

[Ken White]

AddendumWe can disagree on most all that. I will offer just one statement of yours for you to ponder:

No, the idea depends on being in one place for three years. That is the whole idea of having a special volunteer unit raised for a specific campaign. This wouldn't be a regular unit. If things really got bad of course it would be different but then everything would be different.

to expand on that comment in reverse order:

One of the problems with ground combat is that things tend to get really bad unpredictably. It may be only local but it can have significant impact.

If the US Congress is unwilling to leave all volunteer regular Army soldiers in theater for over a year, people who signed up to go anywhere and do anything and based on the precedents of Korea and Viet Nam with draftees involved, is it really possible they'd acceded to a three year tour for volunteers? If the volunteers are sent for three years tours, would the tours for regular Army people also have to be three years? If not why not? Would Congress concur? Would the Mothers and Fathers of the younger volunteers concur?

See also my response to Steve Blair just above.

Added: This also merits a response:

Besides would the regular units there now be able to handle Pak Army conventional units? Many are deployed in small outposts and if I've read correctly many have left a lot of their heavy equipment at home. I don't see too much difference.

The difference is that the regular units have signed up for full spectrum warfare and heavy casualties can be a norm; that is an accepted fact. 'Volunteers' would be signed up for less that full spectrum warfare and implicit in that is no heavy casualties -- you don't say that but I assure you it would be so assumed -- and as for being able to "handle Pak(sic) conventional units," the answer is dependent on many factors but based on what you've written thus far, the answer to that question is a qualified yes -- mostly because your volunteers have been trained only to do tasks in the FID mode in Afghanistan, not to engage in conventional force on force war with a peer equipped unit