Volunteers!!

[Bob's World]

What has not changed is the danger of a standing warfighting army in times of peace in terms of the dangers of overly empowering the executive to begin wars as described by James Madison.

As to arguments about what type of force is most competent in the shortest period of time, those are interesting but moot to this discussion. The US has never needed a rapidly deployable warfighting army. Ever. Not in WWI. Not in WWII. Not in Korea. Not in Vietnam. And most certainly not in the subsequent era of conflicts that we have dived into head first.

Likewise, we do not need a large warfighting army on the books to defend our shores from invasion. Consider the example of our invasion of France. It took us two years to stage the men and supplies and capabilty to simply push across the English Channel. When China or Russia begin a two year program of staging on Vancouver Island or Nova Scotia, give me a call. Until then these are false arguements about false threats.

We are trapped in an inertia of thinking rooted in the anomoly of 60+ years of having to have a warfighting army on the books to implement containment in Western Europe, and then a long string of post Cold War conflicts that various Presidents have been able to engage upon simply because such an army was available.

We engage the future best when we apply our historical lessons properly. Madison was right, and if he could see what has happened over the past 40 years he would be shocked that we allowed this to happen. The original George W (Washington) would be equally alarmed and dismayed.

[Steve Blair]

I don't recall ever contending that we need a force of the size we have today. And I think it's better if we stop trying to read the minds of historical figures and simply look at the situation. Arguably we have never scaled well (during the period of Western expansion the Army was consistently too small for the task it was expected to accomplish....which we then compensated for by maintaining a force post-WW2 that is likely too large for most of what it should be doing). Likewise the shortcomings of Volunteer forces became apparent during that same period (as did some of their positives, but I want to avoid that rabbit hole).

Relying on historical lessons would lead to a diminished Army, a reasonably-sized Navy (with concurrent strength in the Marine Corps), and an Air Force likely sized somewhat below the Marine Corps. Sea lane and trade protection has always been a historical interest of the US, and one that led to more overseas commitments than any other source prior to World War I. Those landing elements were normally Marines and sailors (although over time it evolved to mostly Marines based on training and a developed mission by the Corps). The Air Force would follow a similar pattern under this construct, relying less on silver bullet technology (which eats up huge amounts of funding for debatable results...a practice that has spread to the other services after they saw how effective the AF's approach was to winning funding), and the Army would shrink drastically.

You would still see overseas conflict and entanglement (Wilson, anyone? He did that with a small Army), but it would be at reduced levels (one hesitates to use the phrase acceptable levels, but it might be appropriate). And the temptation would always be there to use airpower (as it's viewed as somehow cleaner than other forms of violence...unless you're the one being bombed). These days, I do think you need some sort of standing force beyond what folks in Madison's time might have considered appropriate, but the world has also changed dramatically since then. Perhaps a rationalized form of the British model as it currently exists might be more appropriate.

[Varity]

Yes, Varity, there is a militia.

At least one state that I know of, New Mexico, also refers to its militia in its state constitution:

Oops, I was thinking of organized state militias, but I guess my Californianess is showing. Turns out we (California) do have one though. I looked into it.

So...according to the constitution, much of the population is in the milita without knowing it.

[Varity]

I wonder, on a rough basis... what percentage of the population owned arms and was skilled in their use in, say, 1776, 1876, 1976... and today?

Here's the 1976-today:



Wow, and that's in the 70's. I never really associated the 70's with high gun ownership... I would imagine the downward trend is unbroken, starting from 1776.

[Dayuhan]

Interesting... it would be even more interesting to know what percentage of those gun owners shoot or hunt regularly.

All of this of course is closely tied to the transition from a predominantly rural population to a predominantly urban population. Country kids have options that city and suburban kids don't when it comes to learning to shoot, not to mention learning the basics of woodcraft.

[Bob's World]

Interesting... it would be even more interesting to know what percentage of those gun owners shoot or hunt regularly.

All of this of course is closely tied to the transition from a predominantly rural population to a predominantly urban population. Country kids have options that city and suburban kids don't when it comes to learning to shoot, not to mention learning the basics of woodcraft.

Equally interesting to know what percentage of the regular army who shoot or hunt regularly....probably about the same.

I wouldn't put too much stake on shooting or woodcraft. If the US were invaded city folk would fight in the city and country folk would fight in the country. Foreign invaders would die in both places, as would Americans, but ultimately the invaders would lose. Invading someone Else's country is always hard, but some countries are harder than others based on the nature of their terrain and the people who live there. Afghanistan is a country like that. So is America. So are many other countries.

[carl]

If the US Congress is unwilling to leave all volunteer regular Army soldiers in theater for over a year, people who signed up to go anywhere and do anything and based on the precedents of Korea and Viet Nam with draftees involved, is it really possible they'd acceded to a three year tour for volunteers? If the volunteers are sent for three years tours, would the tours for regular Army people also have to be three years? If not why not? Would Congress concur? Would the Mothers and Fathers of the younger volunteers concur?

What if Congress did concur then changed its mind? And if it didn't, what if it was thinking about it? What if the Mothers and Fathers of the younger volunteers were divorced? Who would we listen to? What if forms have to be reprinted? What type face would be used? What if it had to be different from the regular Army forms so we could tell them apart? What if the Red Bull ran out? Would we have to withdraw? What if we had to have Red Bull runout adjustments to pay? What if...

Added: This also merits a response:The difference is that the regular units have signed up for full spectrum warfare and heavy casualties can be a norm; that is an accepted fact. 'Volunteers' would be signed up for less that full spectrum warfare and implicit in that is no heavy casualties -- you don't say that but I assure you it would be so assumed -- and as for being able to "handle Pak(sic) conventional units," the answer is dependent on many factors but based on what you've written thus far, the answer to that question is a qualified yes -- mostly because your volunteers have been trained only to do tasks in the FID mode in Afghanistan, not to engage in conventional force on force war with a peer equipped unit

I assure ypu that it wouldn't be implicit that there wouldn't be heavy casualties. It would be explicitly stated that the volunteers were signing up for war and war and battles are unpredictable and often massively and fatally dangerous. People aren't stupid, especially when you are honest with them. Those who would volunteer, and I agree with JMA that there would be enough, would know perfectly well what might potentially happen.

The volunteer unit I propose would not be able to face a Pak Army armored unit in conventional force on force war. Not surprising since that would not be the purpose for which it was raised, trained and equipped. Viewing that as a fatal flaw is like saying a Boston Whaler isn't a very good snowplow. If there was a danger that that type of a threat existed (it doesn't) you obviously would not employ a unit like this. The enemy to be faced and all that.

But then, as I said, I doubt the regular units could take on the Pak Army in conventional force of force war. They don't have hardly any of their heavy weapons and equipment. No matter that they have been trained to drive around in M-1s and prevail. There aren't any M-1s to drive around in. (Maybe the Marines have a handful) And the reason for that is there is next to no chance that the Pak Army is going to do that. They also probably are very light on anti-aircraft defenses because there is next to no chance the PAF or the IAF is going to strafe them.

[Ken White]

What if Congress did concur then changed its mind? And if it didn't, what if it was thinking about it? What if the Mothers and Fathers of the younger volunteers were divorced? Who would we listen to? What if forms have to be reprinted? What type face would be used? What if it had to be different from the regular Army forms so we could tell them apart? What if the Red Bull ran out? Would we have to withdraw? What if we had to have Red Bull runout adjustments to pay? What if...

What if indeed. What if the political realities were objectively and realistically considered...

Those who would volunteer, and I agree with JMA that there would be enough, would know perfectly well what might potentially happen.

I agree you could get 'enough volunteers' for some wars. I disagree that Afghanistan is one such war.

Viewing that as a fatal flaw is like saying a Boston Whaler isn't a very good snowplow.

Both statements are true, yours is just more obvious...

If there was a danger that that type of a threat existed (it doesn't) you obviously would not employ a unit like this. The enemy to be faced and all that.

And you propose to guarantee this with no changes in their tour just how?

And the reason for that is there is next to no chance that the Pak Army is going to do that...

That is true but you did say "next to no chance" instead absolutely no chance -- so you're learning.

Still, lacking the Pakistani Army, simply introducing Mortars -- or a bunch of these (LINK) would be a temporary if minor game changer -- but minor game changes in the wrong place at the right time can do untold political if not military damage. Introduction of both at the same time along with a tactical revision by the bad guys could be a major minor game changer...

You can hang on to your dream. My disagreement with it doesn't affect it. We disagree on most things, this is just one more.

[Bob's World]

There "not being enough volunteers" is a pretty good metric that the President is misreading the situation.

The Congress not agreeing to raise an Army and resource the same to wage such a war is another great metric for the President.

Having a warfighting army on the books ready to fight takes those metrics out of play. This is what President's Madison and Jefferson both wrote numerous cautions about.

We need to stop seeing the post-WWII era as the norm that we measure everything else against in terms of our national security. It was a fluke and anomaly in many ways, and the containment strategy was a choice - not the only option for dealing with security challenges in that era.

Today many pundits (Form the SECDEF to Think tanks to Services to GCCs to random people with access to some media) proclaim powerful and existential threats to America. But these are either grossly exaggerated (China currently, AQ-X ever, Iran ever), or are not military missions at all (cyber attacks on US infrastructure). Similarly we propose solutions that don't work to problems that don't exist (Massive conventional Army SFA conducted by rotating BCTS that have been trained first by SF and have a HTT attached to them; or A2AD to counter China's ability to project their defensive systems a few hundred miles from their coastline).

When does this stop? When does common sense once again prevail? It is time to have a new national dialog on our true national security concerns. Someone needs to put the services back into their respective lanes. Someone needs to take this dangerous toy away from the President. Someone needs to infuse a greater sense of responsibility and backbone into the Congress. That somebody is the American people.

Equally problematic are the social programs; our approach to education; our approach to immigration and integration of new citizens; and our puritanical approach to vice-related crimes that feeds such massive illicit economies and fills countless prisons with our young men. (but this site is about the military, small wars, etc, so we'll leave others to chew on these).

When was the last MANDATORY "small war" for the US? What if we had limited Afghanistan to a punitive raid and avoided Iraq altogether? Would we be less safe than we are today?? We are drawn along by an inertia of thought and action that we seem unable (or unwilling) to break free of.

[Steve Blair]

Let the mandated defense cuts go through and you may see some change.

Seriously, though, the volunteer thing is not the way to go. You simply open the floodgates again to political patronage in commissions, units, basing requirements, and so on. Some volunteer units performed well...others did not. It's same rabbit hole as the draft. Let it go.

If you want to shake the large standing army model, you have to go back to the days before World War II. Go back to a regimental system. Get rid of divisions, brigades, the whole lot. Then cap those regiments based on a funding model. That's how it was done in the "old days." Back before the deification of the military in the US, a standing army was viewed as a drain on the taxpayers. That viewpoint didn't necessarily apply to the navy, but it certainly did to the army. And I think your "dangerous toy" comment misses a number of points. In a society that values STEM degrees more than they do a balanced liberal arts education, it's not surprising that they latch onto those toys. And given a generational "bubble" that has turned "support the troops" into a successful effort to put the military on a pedestal it's even harder to reassess. So long as people buy the rhetoric that "the draft is the historical norm for the American military" and similar red herrings you won't see change.

A small, reasonably-trained (at least after 1880 or so) Regular Army has been our norm prior to 1940 or so. That Army was always volunteer-based, and often had a fair percentage of foreign-born members working their way toward citizenship. That was also the norm. Any time we wanted to get expansionist we called in Volunteers.

Uninformed leadership will never have informed discussions. That's the way of things. It's not a problem that will be solved overnight, or possibly in our lifetimes. Not something I like to think about, but so long as policymakers can buy loads of goods disguised as F-22s it's what we're stuck with.

[Bob's World]

Steve. Agreed.

[wm]

Uninformed leadership will never have informed discussions. That's the way of things. It's not a problem that will be solved overnight, or possibly in our lifetimes. Not something I like to think about, but so long as policymakers can buy loads of goods disguised as F-22s it's what we're stuck with.

How are the current hi-tech weapon buys for the services really all that different from the surge in coast defense fort building following the War of 1812 and then the Endicott Board and the Taft Board reports? Or the Nike boom of the 50's? Did we ever have to repel a foreign naval invasion after Washington DC was burned? How many enemy bombers did those Nikes shoot down?
I submit that a retrenchment from foreign adventuring, passed off as whatever will best sell in the press releases to the electorate, will not see a significant change in defense spending. What will change is simply what the Congress will authorize/direct the services to buy.

[JMA]

I think so too, even now and back in the early 2000s, very much more so. There are over 300 million people in this country and the right types would be found in sufficient numbers.

There can be no question that there is a large enough pool from which to draw volunteers to deal with some local problem somewhere (for that read a small war or insurgency).

That Afghanistan is a small war the US is going to "lose" does not prove that in the event of a "call to arms" (as the Brits would say) where would not be a few thousand volunteers who would step forward. (The Oregon militia spoken of here numbered around 1,300).

I would agree with Ken (for probably different reasons) that it won't happen, not because it is not workable but rather because the politicians and the general staff won't let it. Different thing altogether.

How beautifully and cogently stated by Cloete. Sometimes I think, Ken alludes to this, that the Americans are stuck with an early 20th century industrial view of human beings. We view them as just parts in a machine. Other countries seem to understand better that people are people and have be treated as such.

To understand the learning curve the Brits went through you should read "Six Weeks : The Short and Gallant Life of the British Officer in the First World War" by John Lewis-Stempel. And of course my favourite "The Anatomy of Courage" by Lord Moran. We did touch on the replacement system in Gen Gerhardt's 29th Infantry Division (post D-Day) and the roll of neuro-psychiatrist, Major David Weintrob (who much like Lord Moran for the Brits a war before) in improving such and other systems. See post here.

Could you view the Taliban as doing the same thing you guys did but in an informal manner? They get tired or stressed, and they just don't do missions or they go to Pakistan for a while to chill out. Then when they feel better, back they go.

I understand they have a much more informal approach to the war than the NATO forces do. They are in it for the long haul and pace themselves pretty well. It also appears that they are lured into major actions by the promise of 'bonuses' so the whole dynamic is different. Yes, it appears as if those from Pakistan go home for winter.

On the allied side the US acknowledged that 180 in combat was "burn-out point". See post on this. Hence my alarm on seeing the movie Restrepo where the company spent virtually the whole year in that hell hole with only one 2 week R&R in the middle (IIRC). Come....... on now!

I would be interested what the shrinks believe the best rotation is in today's circumstances. From my personal experience I liked the 6 week : 10 day rotation because is not long enough to start ticking days off the calender and the promise of some serious partying just next month is good for morale. The married from then will tell you that such (6 week) breaks don't lead to long sad farewells and while the wife will have to attend to leaking taps (faucets) he will not be away long enough to have to give her signing powers on the bank account ...

Under current arrangements you can't fly everyone home every 6 weeks but once the long term cost of increased mental issues and PTSD are factored in a nice little rotation will indeed be feasible.

If you recall I spoke of upping the number of platoons in a company to 4 or 5 to ensure the company is not continually depleted through R&R.

All this can be done, will work well ... but won't - unfortunately - be allowed to happen. Old habits die hard.

Yes x 3. I remember your talking about how handling replacements. I cut that one out (so to speak) because it is an excellent example of recognizing that you are dealing with people, not parts.

Indeed. How did it ever get to the point the people part was lost sight of?

Leadership cadre in for the duration and promotion from within would result, I think (in my civilian bookish way), in a unit like this getting better and better during the course of its 3 year deployment.

That must be the general principle, difficult to maintain and there must be darn good reasons to deviate.

I think a volunteer unit like this could work but it would require at least 3 mainly cultural adjustments that the American military might not be able to make. The first is recognizing that small wars are really honest to goodness different and have to be handled differently. I know we've been at this for 11 years but I still don't think that has really been accepted. The second is that people are people, not parts and have to be handled as such. The third comes from the first sort of in that just because you make changes to handle something unique, doesn't mean you are locked into those changes forever. You can switch back again...and people being people, not parts, they will be able to handle the adjustment.

All valid IMHO. The field commander have to adapt - mostly they have no choice - but it is those back home in a peacetime environment that have the problems.

That is all part of being adaptable. We used to be able to adapt. Chesty Puller and his contemporaries could adapt. He started out leading local constabulary. Then Pacific island battles against the Japanese then winter rough country fighting with a great large combined arms unit. He was adaptable. i don't see guys now being any less so, if given the chance.

Perhaps officer and NCO selection goes some way to screening out the most adaptable people able to use their initiative. Don't believe the Brits or anyone has has followed what became apparent was needed from officers in the post WW2 insurgencies and small wars. I quote the British manual 'Keeping the Peace' Part 2 - Tactics and Training - 1963 again:

332. Leadership and battle discipline.. Fighting an underground enemy probably requires a higher standard of junior leadership than any other type of warfare yet experienced. ... Command often has to be decentralized and the training of junior commanders must, therefore, be directed towards giving them the ability and confidence to make sound decisions and act on their own initiative.

See where I'm coming from?

The American troops would be, I would bet, be quite enthusiastic about something like this. American leaders no, because there would be no high tech involved and they would be afraid they would have to have mounted units forever.

There has never been any doubt about the quality of the American soldier... but there are serious questions to be asked about their leaders and the politicians.

[Steve Blair]

How are the current hi-tech weapon buys for the services really all that different from the surge in coast defense fort building following the War of 1812 and then the Endicott Board and the Taft Board reports? Or the Nike boom of the 50's? Did we ever have to repel a foreign naval invasion after Washington DC was burned? How many enemy bombers did those Nikes shoot down?
I submit that a retrenchment from foreign adventuring, passed off as whatever will best sell in the press releases to the electorate, will not see a significant change in defense spending. What will change is simply what the Congress will authorize/direct the services to buy.

I'd say part of it is a difference in scale. Your Nike example is probably the best one of that bunch when it comes to the change in funding models.

[slapout9]

Or the Nike boom of the 50's? Did we ever have to repel a foreign naval invasion after Washington DC was burned? How many enemy bombers did those Nikes shoot down?

Having lived through the Cuban Missile crisis in Florida I can tell you they(Nike Missiles) were critical. And so were Pershing Missiles(and the Strategic Interstate Highway System) but you are not likely to see that talked about much because it proves Gavin's point that in modern War there is no more Army men or Air men or Sea men......they are just Missile men!! As we move into the future I fear we are going to learn that lesson again the hard way.

[carl]

How are the current hi-tech weapon buys for the services really all that different from the surge in coast defense fort building following the War of 1812...

I don't think building coastal defense forts after the British burned Washington D.C. was an unreasonable action. Some coastal forts served the Confederates fairly well.

Just because you don't use a weapon or capability doesn't mean it isn't useful. Very few cops ever fire their weapons for real but they are quite useful to carry around.

[carl]

And you propose to guarantee this with no changes in their tour just how?

I'll amend that statement to read "(it basically doesn't)". That should cover it. Tomorrow the sun might not rise in the east after all.

Still, lacking the Pakistani Army, simply introducing Mortars -- or a bunch of these (LINK) would be a temporary if minor game changer -- but minor game changes in the wrong place at the right time can do untold political if not military damage. Introduction of both at the same time along with a tactical revision by the bad guys could be a major minor game changer...

That is the nature of men fighting men, things change. You figure what you are most likely to run into, plan for that and realize that something will happen you didn't figure on you will have to deal with it.

You can hang on to your dream. My disagreement with it doesn't affect it. We disagree on most things, this is just one more.

Not so much my dream, my dream is a Skyote (LINK). No, it is more along the lines of an idea that I think might be useful and is interesting to discuss.

Some things we disagree on, but the really important basic ones, I think we see eye to eye.

[carl]

Indeed. How did it ever get to the point the people part was lost sight of?

The answer to that question would win a prize for American history and cultural development. Maybe it started with mass production, scientific management and has been buttressed lately by the fascination with all things electronic. I wish it would change.

[Ken White]

That is the nature of men fighting men, things change. You figure what you are most likely to run into, plan for that and realize that something will happen you didn't figure on you will have to deal with it.

While the vast majority of people will agree with that statement -- especially including Congress critters, many civilian 'strategists,' pundits and budgeteers -- no one with any serious involvement or experience in combat will agree.

They'll tell you you have to figure the worst thing you could run into, plan, equip and, very critically, train for that and realize that something will still happen you didn't figure on you will have to deal with...

Undertrain and underassume and you'll pay, as we have seen recently; overtrain and cautiously assume and you'll prevail -- as has also been proven but not recently.

Murphy and all that.

[Steve Blair]

While the vast majority of people will agree with that statement -- especially including Congress critters, many civilian 'strategists,' pundits and budgeteers -- no one with any serious involvement or experience in combat will agree.

They'll tell you you have to figure the worst thing you could run into, plan, equip and, very critically, train for that and realize that something will still happen you didn't figure on you will have to deal with...

Undertrain and underassume and you'll pay, as we have seen recently; overtrain and cautiously assume and you'll prevail -- as has also been proven but not recently.

Murphy and all that.

Yes and no. You also have to recognize that some of our worst training/preparation models have originated with the military. It's easy to claim that "those pesky civilian 'experts' cause all our problems," but that would be incorrect. The American military has in many cases proven to be its own worst enemy when it comes to training, preparing, and learning from its own experiences.