Volunteers!!

[carl]

They'll tell you you have to figure the worst thing you could run into, plan, equip and, very critically, train for that and realize that something will still happen you didn't figure on you will have to deal with...

Undertrain and underassume and you'll pay, as we have seen recently; overtrain and cautiously assume and you'll prevail -- as has also been proven but not recently.

Murphy and all that.

Yes, Ken...sigh. I guess I'll defer to your precise phraseology because when I originally said "You figure what you are most likely to run into, plan for that and realize that something will happen you didn't figure on you will have to deal with it." it is obvious that the word "likely" as I used it couldn't possibly encompass the worst you will most likely run into, and that "likely" isn't applicable because it won't happen that if you figure the simple worst thing you could run into you will try to account for everything and apply too little everywhere, over burden yourself so you can't move or paralyze yourself with indecision and not do anything at all...or all three and some more I didn't think of. I'll defer also because the word "could" as you use it couldn't also be written as "are likely to" or "are most likely to" because you never have to assume some limit on the threat in order to get anything done or avoid hugely overburdening yourself.

And I'll defer too because I never in all my posts on this thread mentioned properly training or equipping.

We're saying the same thing.

[Ken White]

Yes, Ken...sigh. I guess I'll defer to your precise phraseology because when I originally said "You figure what you are most likely to run into, plan for that and realize that something will happen you didn't figure on you will have to deal with it." it is obvious that the word "likely" as I used it couldn't possibly encompass the worst...

Words are important. "Likely" implies to be expected. You do offer the possibility of 'worse' with the follow on "deal with it" but the meaning of your sentence was clear -- prepare for what you expect (want?) to happen and be aware that it may change for the worse.

What I wrote was prepare for the worst and then everything else becomes simple or easy.

Those are emphatically NOT the same so we are far from saying the same thing.

...if you figure the simple worst thing you could run into you will try to account for everything and apply too little everywhere, over burden yourself so you can't move or paralyze yourself with indecision and not do anything at all...or all three and some more I didn't think of.

That could happen but certainly need not and should not. In fact, any halfway decent military planner should easily avoid all those traps. Those things are all indicators of inadequate training.

I'll defer also because the word "could" as you use it couldn't also be written as "are likely to" or "are most likely to" ...

Not so. 'are likely' or 'most likely' are less permissive than 'could' -- could opens up more possibilities and is simply worst casing the the possibilities whereas your likely is best casing. That may seem like semantics but it is not, it is indicative of a mindset and mindsets trigger actions in a certain way. I find it hard to believe if in a pre-flight briefing a pilot was told to prepare for the most likely events on a flight and that, alternatively, he or she was told to prepare for the worst possible alternatives enroute, at destination and on return they would go through exactly the same planning steps and arrive at the same alternatives

Your comments reinforce my point, that most people would agree -- simply because you reinforce your point that one does not need to plan for the worst case. We can differ on that.

It is important to note that I mentioned that Congress (among others) would agree with you. Their agreement in effect assures that no US military planner will be able to go absolute worse case because, in the eyes of the Congroids, it costs too much (not just in dollar terms but also in training time and training casualties and in domestic political / foreign relations messages sent among other things.

You obviously read a great deal and much of that is history, so you should be awar that Congress kept a lot of strings on FDR and the Service really until 1943-44 when we finally got serious and prepared -- and trained -- for the worst.

...because you never have to assume some limit on the threat in order to get anything done or avoid hugely overburdening yourself.

Again, that should not be an issue. The earth is full of the bones of dead military leaders who 'assumed' some limits on threats. You have mentioned misreading the Mitsubishi Zero among others. Underestimation of an enemy is folly and the US is particularly prone to do that. That's a habit that does not need to be encouraged.

And I'll defer too because I never in all my posts on this thread mentioned properly training or equipping.

You have mentioned both -- we just differ significantly on what's entailed in doing that. You can opt for minimum to hopefully get the job done or you can overdo it to make the job easy and assured. I specifically mentioned them in this context to highlight the necessity of correct training for the full spectrum of combat, not just 'adequate' training for the mission in question. As I mentioned, we're doing 'adequate' bit now. How's that working out for us...

We're saying the same thing.

Not at all. Not even close.

[carl]

Yes, Ken...as you say.

[Bob's World]

I think the key is to "over do it" in the right areas...and assume risk in the rest. We don't do a good job lately of that little drill

We are too much about being "equal" across the services, and a hard cold fact of life is that nothing is less fair than equal.

We need to find the right balance for the world we live in today, and the threats we need to be prepared to deter or deal with immediately tomorrow. That demands a very unequal distribution of funding across the services.

[JMA]

This discussion is getting a little confusing as it started off honouring the successes of 1,300 odd volunteers on what can only be termed a very limited overseas military intervention.

Not sure where it has ended up now.

My position has been that if a fully trained and experienced Leadership cadre is available - comprising 30 odd officers, 30 odd senior NCOs and 50 odd junior NCOs at squad level - then in six months at the earliest with 600 odd raw volunteers an infantry battalion can be sent off to war.

The challenge in a country with a large population - like the US - would not be attracting good/acceptable/adequate volunteers art troopie level but rather to identify and obtain the services of the "leadership cadre" to first take the raw volunteers through training and then to war.

The concern has been voiced that such a force may be up to the task as long as they do "not to engage in conventional force on force war with a peer equipped unit".

I would agree in principle on first thought but then I remember Fuchs asking sometime back when was the last time any army was truly well prepared for a war.

Then there is the quote I posted some time ago about the Brit experience during WW2:

A Grim Price in Blood
Possibly, like most of our infantry, they (the battle school directing staff) suffered from the consequences of the pre-war shortage of creatively intelligent regimental officers. Too few of them were professionally dedicated to the extent that they could visualise how battles would be fought and identify the problems that might arise when planning them. They seemed to lack the capacity to think relentlessly through these things until solutions were found. Much of their time had been spent policing the British Empire. Also, unlike the Germans, we British instinctively avoid displays of keenness. The enthusiast, particularly if he is innovative, is an embarrassment. Thus the battlefield became our teacher and, inevitably, it exacted a grim price in blood and time.
Sydney Jary, MC - 18 Platoon (1987).

Then I would ask when last the US put units into the field who were fully prepared for all types and phases of warfare?

[Ken White]

Then I would ask when last the US put units into the field who were fully prepared for all types and phases of warfare?

About 1965. The operative word being "units" and very few of them. Never the whole force. Not in over 200 years...

[JMA]

About 1965. The operative word being "units" and very few of them. Never the whole force. Not in over 200 years...

Then why the concern over deploying a "one trick pony" unit raised and trained for a specific type of warfare to a small war environment?

[Ken White]

Then why the concern over deploying a "one trick pony" unit raised and trained for a specific type of warfare to a small war environment?

Just pointing out it's not going to happen because it isn't feasible for a host of non-military reasons and is questionable militarily.

The fact that the US has only rarely been able to offer more than a few units that are truly ready to fight in any type of war is not self justifying nor is it an excuse for deploying less than the most capable units we can. It would be better if that were not the case, if the bulk of the Armed Forces were indeed ready. However, they never have been and never will be.

Democracies won't accept the costs in several parameters for that degree of competence and readiness -- and even if they were willing to do so, ability to predict what will unfold is denied us and it is not possible to prepare for everything. However, one can prepare for the worst to the extent possible and adapt quickly to lesser problems -- one cannot prepare for the minimum and easily, rapidly scale up.

We should do better in the combat readiness aspect but probably cannot do so to any significant degree. That's no reason to volunteer to do worse...

[JMA]

Just pointing out it's not going to happen because it isn't feasible for a host of non-military reasons and is questionable militarily.

That it is not going to happen because of the US system does not make it a bad idea.

Questionable militarily?

Volunteers are always better than conscripts in terms of attitude and commitment.

As far as serving soldiers at the outbreak of hostilities are concerned... what percentage signed up to wait for a war as opposed to the percentage who signed up because they needed a job?

Give me well led and commanded bright eyed and bushy tailed troopies anyday.

The challenge would be to get the right 100 odd man leadership cadre per battalion.