Within the framework of the Air Force, I think their reliance on the technology totem (to the point of cutting people to retain programs...so long as they're "high tech") really cripples them when it comes to Small Wars practice. The AF has always been tied at a very basic level to technology (the airplane, the doctrine of strategic bombing that became their bedrock idea for many years), and this reliance is especially hard to break in their case. It is furthered by the cult of the bomber and high-speed fighter to (in some cases) the exclusion of all else.

The application of bombers and fighters to small wars is limited, although precision close air support is always welcome. What is really needed is a robust capability for airlift, both of personnel and supplies. With its totem bombers and fighters, the AF is weak in transport and has been for the majority of its existence. This limits their ability to participate in the full spectrum of small wars operations. Instead of working to correct this, the AF simply denies the viability of small wars or insists that a fleet of B-2s is more useful for stopping insurgents in the Horn of Africa than C-17s would be for providing logistical lift into those areas.

By supporting its totems through denial, the AF also shortchanges the ability of its people to make a difference in Small Wars. It also hurts their ability to provide good advisors, since true believers in the twin totems would not necessarily be prepared to view each small war as unique and provide the necessary unique advice. Instead they might try to "mirror image" the AF.

And that's my rather half-baked thought for Tuesday....