Military Totemism and its Impact on Small Wars

[120mm]

Marcus, I have an interest in the History of Military Technology as a form of "totemism". I strongly suspect that mil tech development is driven as strongly by cultural reasons as practical reasons, but am having trouble finding traction in actually approaching this from a research standpoint. Are there some "good" overview texts out there that would get me started?

Also, are there some schools with noteworthy PhD producing programs in this subject area? I am well-connected with Iowa State University's History of Technology and Science department, but for reasons of my own, I want to go elsewhere for my "sheepskin" if I can....

[marct]

Hi 120mm,

Marcus, I have an interest in the History of Military Technology as a form of "totemism". I strongly suspect that mil tech development is driven as strongly by cultural reasons as practical reasons, but am having trouble finding traction in actually approaching this from a research standpoint. Are there some "good" overview texts out there that would get me started?

Good overview texts? That's tricky. Probably the best one is by Claude Levi-Strauss, Totemism (I have the translation by Rodney Needham, 1963 Beacon Press). I think you could get some traction on it by making a somewhat broader argument along the following lines:

1. military organizations are collections of "lineages" (para kinship networks)
2. lineages draw their validity from "eponymous ancestors"; this includes foundation myths, tribal "gnosis" (i.e. tribe specific knowledge), and culural patternings for using technology.
3. lineages have mythic "arrangements" with their founders, stories and, also, have sterotype myths of "proper conduct", both fictive and real (i.e. the "should" and the "would").
4. in order to sell to a lineage, a product or story must fit that lineages myths, including all of its patternings.

There's probably a couple of lines of logic I've left out, but I think that would ground your argument, especially since military organizations tend to be fairly "conservative".

Also, are there some schools with noteworthy PhD producing programs in this subject area? I am well-connected with Iowa State University's History of Technology and Science department, but for reasons of my own, I want to go elsewhere for my "sheepskin" if I can....

The best person I could recommend is a friend of mine, Philip Thurtle, at the University of Washington (http://faculty.washington.edu/thurtle/). Phil taught at Carleton for a couple of years and is both brilliant and, at the same time, a really nice guy open to new ideas. He teaches in the Comparative History of Ideas program (http://depts.washington.edu/chid/).

He would certainly be a good person to contact for information on a Ph.D. program (tell him I sent you ).

Marc

[Steve Blair]

If you want to see a good example of the technology totem idea, I'd recommend looking at the Air Force in particular. Their entire history has been centered around a number of technology totems.

[jcustis]

My senior thesis as an undergrad covered this exact subject, in the Air Force context, and how the development of the B-2 was an example. I didn't make a connection to totemism though.

I'll be interested in how this comes out for you 120mm.

[Steve Blair]

I copied these from the RFI forum because I think this is a topic that's well worth discussing in the history and education forum. My main personal interest here is the Air Force because of its obvious ties to technology as a totem and its consequent impact on its ability to function in a small wars environment, but there are other examples as well.

Marc's post sets some of the theoretical background for us, but I'd propose some additional ideas for discussion:

1) How do the totems of each specific service help or hinder their Small Wars practice?

2) How can we identify these totems?

3) When a totem has a negative influence here, what are some ways to work around that influence?

These are just some starting points for discussion. I find this area quite interesting.

[Steve Blair]

Within the framework of the Air Force, I think their reliance on the technology totem (to the point of cutting people to retain programs...so long as they're "high tech") really cripples them when it comes to Small Wars practice. The AF has always been tied at a very basic level to technology (the airplane, the doctrine of strategic bombing that became their bedrock idea for many years), and this reliance is especially hard to break in their case. It is furthered by the cult of the bomber and high-speed fighter to (in some cases) the exclusion of all else.

The application of bombers and fighters to small wars is limited, although precision close air support is always welcome. What is really needed is a robust capability for airlift, both of personnel and supplies. With its totem bombers and fighters, the AF is weak in transport and has been for the majority of its existence. This limits their ability to participate in the full spectrum of small wars operations. Instead of working to correct this, the AF simply denies the viability of small wars or insists that a fleet of B-2s is more useful for stopping insurgents in the Horn of Africa than C-17s would be for providing logistical lift into those areas.

By supporting its totems through denial, the AF also shortchanges the ability of its people to make a difference in Small Wars. It also hurts their ability to provide good advisors, since true believers in the twin totems would not necessarily be prepared to view each small war as unique and provide the necessary unique advice. Instead they might try to "mirror image" the AF.

And that's my rather half-baked thought for Tuesday....

[Tom Odom]

Concise not half-baked, Steve

I have a friend now a senior officer in the Air Force SOF and he would echo what you said. As a user on the ground, airlift not bombs was what I needed most and in the case of Goma got--but it was a tremendous effort and one that stressed airlift assets both military and contract.

In the realm of CAS, the saga of the A-10 speaks volumes in that it is still here. As a 1stLT in the Officer Advanced Course in 1980 I visited Davis Monthan with my class and we talked to the 'Hog squadron there. Plans to phase out the A-10 were already on the table. 26 years later the A-10 is getting a new comms suite.

But we are not alone in this arena. French airlift in the Congo/Zaire could not meet the demands of lifting a 2500 man force and sustaining it; the answer was contract former Soviet airlift, complete with poor maintenance and near suicidal semi-drunk crews. The sight of an AN124 nearly groundlooping at Goma after losing 2 engines was only surpassed by watching the inebriated crew stagger into the airport bar while French ground crew helped the crew chief replace/repair blown tires from the heavy landing. And in running this composite airlift, the French drained much of Africa's airports of fuel because they lacked a refueling capacity to sustain it.

Best
Tom

[selil]

"Totemism" interesting... New one on me...

For PhD in Technology there are only a few places on the planet that aren't in the business school or located in computers or something....

Purdue has a new PhD Technology program if that is what you're interested in.

[marct]

One of the things that always interested me about the British Regimental system, which Canada uses, is the existence of "Honourary" Colonels. With this in mind, CBC posted an interesting story:

That's Col. Rick to you: Mercer gets a military gig
Last Updated: Wednesday, January 24, 2007 | 5:25 PM ET
CBC News

In a post sometimes reserved for business executives or minor royalty, Rick Mercer may be the first professional comedian to serve as honorary colonel of a Canadian air force unit.

Mercer, who is younger than some of the aircraft in 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron, says he is "probably an unconventional choice" for the unpaid ceremonial gig. "But I'm happy that it's the guys with the Sea Kings because I always root for the underdog," he told CBC News Online on Wednesday as word of his appointment spread. "And I've always felt perfectly safe riding in Sea Kings."

More...

Marc

[Steve Blair]

The US Army had this as well, although I suspect it was strongest with the cavalry regiments. Now...who knows what happened to it.

[marct]

Hi Steve,

The US Army had this as well, although I suspect it was strongest with the cavalry regiments. Now...who knows what happened to it.

Didn't the US version come from the militias via the state legislatures? If that's the case, then I expect it disappeared with them. I'm pretty sure that our version came out of the Napoleonic Wars' reorganization of regiments and the association with a military rank and social status; things like buying a commission in an inactive regiment or BTN. I know that my Great Grandfather had to do this to maintain his social standing.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Not originally. The honorary colonel system came into use as a way to preserve unit heritage, and was really in vogue after World War I, if memory serves. It continued on with fits and starts through the last re-org, and I don't know where it stands now. Under the old system the honorary colonel had to have served as an active officer with the regiment in question.

What you're thinking of, Marc, was the system used to create officers for militia and volunteer units during the Civil War (it was used in other conflicts, but obviously saw its greatest use during the Civil War). Typically if a person put up the money to raise and equip a unit, he was given command of that unit and the rank to go with it. So if a guy funded the "Livingston Light Rifle Company," he'd get the rank of captain or major from the state legislature to go with his unit. Many of those units also elected officers and NCOs, with often comical results. It was a purchase system, in a way, but also a way to show political patronage and clout.

After a year or so of war, most units abandoned the election process, but you would still see regimental commanders appointed by politicians. If they were idiots, they were fired or (if the clout was too strong) shifted to an assignment where they would cause little damage.

[marct]

Hi Steve,

Not originally. The honorary colonel system came into use as a way to preserve unit heritage, and was really in vogue after World War I, if memory serves. It continued on with fits and starts through the last re-org, and I don't know where it stands now. Under the old system the honorary colonel had to have served as an active officer with the regiment in question.

Hunh, I never knew that. It's totally different from our system, then.

What you're thinking of, Marc, was the system used to create officers for militia and volunteer units during the Civil War (it was used in other conflicts, but obviously saw its greatest use during the Civil War). Typically if a person put up the money to raise and equip a unit, he was given command of that unit and the rank to go with it. So if a guy funded the "Livingston Light Rifle Company," he'd get the rank of captain or major from the state legislature to go with his unit. Many of those units also elected officers and NCOs, with often comical results. It was a purchase system, in a way, but also a way to show political patronage and clout.

Actually, I was thinking of the war of 1812 rather than your civil war, and the later militia land grabs in the west - the Indian Wars, etc. I think it was a little looser, i.e. you didn't have to actually pay for the unit itself to get the rank. Didn't Jackson say something about that regarding the Georgia militias?

After a year or so of war, most units abandoned the election process, but you would still see regimental commanders appointed by politicians. If they were idiots, they were fired or (if the clout was too strong) shifted to an assignment where they would cause little damage.

Yeah, I can see that. That type of system wouldn't have worked well in your civil war.

Marc

[marct]

The PPCLI announced a new Honourary Colonel last week, and the CBC story has some interesting observations about the role.

Former GG assumes honorary role for regiment
Last Updated: Saturday, March 17, 2007 | 6:19 PM ET
CBC News

Canada's former governor general has been given an honorary regimental position usually reserved for members of the Royal Family.

Adrienne Clarkson, who was the Queen's representative in Canada, became the first Canadian to be appointed colonel-in-chief of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, in a ceremony on Saturday in Edmonton.

She succeeds Lady Patricia Brabourne, Countess Mountbatten of Burma, who has been colonel-in-chief for 32 years.

"It gives me a sense of great comfort and joy that we now have such a perfectly splendid successor, and I retire in the knowledge that the Patricias will be as well looked after as I was able to do," Lady Patricia said.

The position was first held by Lady Patricia Ramsay, a granddaughter of Queen Victoria, from whom the regiment gets its name.

According to the regiment, Clarkson was chosen because she meets all of the criteria for the position, including having visited Canadian troops overseas while governor general, and has a personal connection to the regiment because her husband, John Ralston Saul, is the son of a regiment officer.

More...

Marc