Military Totemism and its Impact on Small Wars

[Tom Odom]

Concise not half-baked, Steve

I have a friend now a senior officer in the Air Force SOF and he would echo what you said. As a user on the ground, airlift not bombs was what I needed most and in the case of Goma got--but it was a tremendous effort and one that stressed airlift assets both military and contract.

In the realm of CAS, the saga of the A-10 speaks volumes in that it is still here. As a 1stLT in the Officer Advanced Course in 1980 I visited Davis Monthan with my class and we talked to the 'Hog squadron there. Plans to phase out the A-10 were already on the table. 26 years later the A-10 is getting a new comms suite.

But we are not alone in this arena. French airlift in the Congo/Zaire could not meet the demands of lifting a 2500 man force and sustaining it; the answer was contract former Soviet airlift, complete with poor maintenance and near suicidal semi-drunk crews. The sight of an AN124 nearly groundlooping at Goma after losing 2 engines was only surpassed by watching the inebriated crew stagger into the airport bar while French ground crew helped the crew chief replace/repair blown tires from the heavy landing. And in running this composite airlift, the French drained much of Africa's airports of fuel because they lacked a refueling capacity to sustain it.

Best
Tom

[selil]

"Totemism" interesting... New one on me...

For PhD in Technology there are only a few places on the planet that aren't in the business school or located in computers or something....

Purdue has a new PhD Technology program if that is what you're interested in.

[120mm]

Right now I am intensely studying Russian tank developments post-Desert Storm.

They have found ways to make armor more and more impenetrable, but still, their tanks are not designed to fight on the modern battlefield. They still lack the ability to depress the main gun, which confines their fighting to exposed positions. The tank is just too compact to allow for the amount of electronic gear required to compete. The autoloader is still inferior to a human loader, but they are convinced they can make it work.

And countries like India are buying their stuff hand over fist.

Israel's armor forces reached "totem" status quite awhile ago, and it appears that they may be rethinking that, post Lebanon 2006.

I first had the kernel of an idea when studying Romania's military last year. They have a very pragmatic military technical development history, mainly because they are poor and cannot afford much more than pragmatism. They have done a very good job of using other nations' cast offs and improving them in order to get a battlefield-worthy weapon system.

Oddly enough, almost universally, the Romanians I meet are incredibly negative on their military's ability to cope with military threats. They see their MBT, the TR85M1 as crap, and desire to have newer, shinier toys, like the Leo II and M1A2. Despite no real demonstrated need for either one in any imaginable defense scenario.

[120mm]

I woke up last night, thinking about this topic. As far as Small Wars are concerned, the "rebel" leaders, since the mid-60s or so, have taken to using the Avtomat Kalashnikov as a "totem". And since the 80s, the Krinkov variation has supplanted the venerable "AK" as the "totem of choice".

The symbolism is quite important. Especially with the Krinkov, as they represented a "captured" weapon, used only by the "elite" soldiers. It lent the person posing with it a derivative manhood. The AK also symbolizes the Mao-style of warfare to a certain degree.

The video that went around with al Zarqawi struggling to make the M249 SAW work was actually very good IO. His inability to figure out how to make a relatively simple captured weapon work did much to peel away his persona, and since that time, the image that Zarqawi was actually just a wannabe who was never very important in the movement has gained serious traction.

Various form of SOF/SF "kit" have also gained totem status. Children and even adults around the world have taken to purchasing chest rigs, "para" helmets and knee pads, along with legally owned firearms as well as airsoft guns in order to run around in the woods and in abandoned houses, pretending to be various incarnations of the SOF/SF culture in their spare time.

Incidences of posing as genuine "operators" has reached epidemic proportions, even among bona fide members of the US military.

Among the actual "operators", the term "gear queer" is gaining common usage. SOF/SF soldiers are adopting and discarding various arrangements of gear based on looks and fashion/groupthink as much as on utility and practicality.

The ubiquitous M16/CAR15/M4 has morphed beyond recognition, with various mounting systems being filled with a myriad of sights, grips, lights, lasers and stock options. To be sure, a lot of these options increase capability, but many of the capabilities do not match practical reality and all that stuff adds weight and makes the weapon rather cumbersome.

Some tactical methods are highly totemic. The "Airborne" mania sucks up a lot of resources with very little to show in results. My colleagues and I snicker about the 173d Airborne Brigade's "Combat Jump Behind Friendly Lines" in 2003 quite often.

One could go on and on.

Thoughts?

[Steve Blair]

The Italian Red Brigades back in the 1970s and 1980s took on the P-38 (if memory serves) as their totem of sorts, and the IRA was well-known for preferring Armalites (AR-15s and M-16s) during the same time frame.

When totems become most dangerous is when they take on a life of their own (like the AF's addition to high tech or the navy's battleship fixation in the 1920s, although to the navy's credit they shook their totem fetish in - for an institution - pretty quick order) and start interfering with clear thinking and operational practices. Your comments on the "airborne" mantra are a good example of this, 120mm. The 173rd was used in the same way in the early stages of Vietnam, pulling off a "combat drop" of questionable value during the early stages of Operation Junction City in 1966. There was also a push in the same time frame to have an entire brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) airborne-qualified. This died under the pressures of combat and keeping the 82nd jump-ready.

Totems can be useful things (and I would call the USMC "globe and anchor" a totem in this sense), but one needs to be careful just the same.

As an aside, it's been my opinion that one of the reasons (aside from its roots) that the AF has become such a technology totem service is the way it constantly casts aside unit lineages. While preserving unit heritage is an obsession with the Marine Corps (and to a lesser degree the Army - I say this because of the wanton reflagging that goes on from time to time), the AF spins up and decommissions squadrons and entire Air Forces with amazing regularity. Many of the units that gained fame during World War 2 or Vietnam can no longer be found, or if they are it's through some convoluted "heritage" system that really provides no real connection to the historical unit.

[marct]

Hi Steve,

As an aside, it's been my opinion that one of the reasons (aside from its roots) that the AF has become such a technology totem service is the way it constantly casts aside unit lineages. While preserving unit heritage is an obsession with the Marine Corps (and to a lesser degree the Army - I say this because of the wanton reflagging that goes on from time to time), the AF spins up and decommissions squadrons and entire Air Forces with amazing regularity. Many of the units that gained fame during World War 2 or Vietnam can no longer be found, or if they are it's through some convoluted "heritage" system that really provides no real connection to the historical unit.

To my mind, I honestly don't think that's an aside . Totemism appears to have originally been tied directly into kin group lineages as a system of both genetic control and a way of parcelling out the rights to access resources (which were controlled by kin groups, aka lineages).

So, let's look at the Regimental system or "unit heritage" if you will. What does it actually do? Well, for one thing, it places people into an historical timeline that stretches back to well before they were born and will exist after they die. In very important ways, it also allows members of that unit to "commune with" the spirits of the dead and the yet to be born. Okay, that probably sounds nuts, but think about how the traditions of a military unit with a continuous heritage take on certain idiosyncratic reactions. Think about how many people become attached to those traditions and feel an "empathy" (the techincal term is communitas) with those who have gone before them and with past unit actions. It's really a process of intense emotional attachment to the stories and values of that unit.

As an aside, the stories of the unit, it's heroes and villains, are passed down to new members entering the unit. Those stories are the collective "wisdom" or "knowledge" that have been collected and stored by that unit (technically, it's the "tribal gnosis" refering to "experiential knowledge). Sometimes, these stories are marked with specific sigils - medals, sashes, etc., etc. Sometimes they are marked by particular unit-specific events.

Commenting on the AF's lack of unit lineage: I'm more than a touch worried about that, since it doesn't give them any historical depth or sense of continuity. It's very "Protestant", in the extreme, early Calvinist sense - there is nothing between you and "God" (technology). This is unlike regimental traditions, where the regiment is more "Catholic" - it stands between you and "God".

I'm starting to use theological analogies because one of the most important observations, and it was pretty confusing early on to Anthropologists, was the idea that totemsm was a "religion". In actuality, it both is and isn't. depending on how you define religion. Personally, I use a definition developed by Clifford Geertz (The Interpretation of Culture, 1973, Basic Books, New York). For Geertz, religion is

(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.

One of the reasons I like this definition is that it is actually very practical, at least to someone who analyzes "religions". Which brings me to a comment you made earlier, Steve.

Totems can be useful things (and I would call the USMC "globe and anchor" a totem in this sense), but one needs to be careful just the same.

Yupper . Technically, the Globe and Anchor is a sigil - it stands for the totem, which is the "spirit" of the USMC. Actually, the German term volksgeist would probably be better than "spirit". Anyway, think of it as a sigil that has the power to evoke a sense of, hmmm, "Godhood" maybe? The sense that there is a sacred "being" that is the focal point of all those, living and dead, who have served in the Corps. Sorry, guys, this is hard to explain without being able to use vocal tonality <wry grin>. Maybe I'll just leave it by saying that this "spirit" is the living, emotional link to that which is greater than any individual.

BTW, if anyone wants historical examples, think of the Eagles of the Roman Legions or the Patron Saints of the medieval Guilds.

Marc

[jcustis]

So, let's look at the Regimental system or "unit heritage" if you will. What does it actually do? Well, for one thing, it places people into an historical timeline that stretches back to well before they were born and will exist after they die. In very important ways, it also allows members of that unit to "commune with" the spirits of the dead and the yet to be born. Okay, that probably sounds nuts, but think about how the traditions of a military unit with a continuous heritage take on certain idiosyncratic reactions. Think about how many people become attached to those traditions and feel an "empathy" (the techincal term is communitas) with those who have gone before them and with past unit actions. It's really a process of intense emotional attachment to the stories and values of that unit.

Spot on here...I've long hoped for a Regimental system in the Marine Corps, to some degree.

[Tom Odom]

In the current mantra/dogma concerning transformational theory, strategic speed is a central totem; the theory that lighter, "higher capacity" forces must be able to get anywhere in a nano-second.

I say this is a "totem" because it is hardly transformational; the idea of strategic mobility has been central to military strategy for centuries. What has changed are our reference points on what constitutes speed.

But in the current mantra, transformational "speed" is very much a bandaid for intellectual sluggishness. The idea that we have to get anywhere fast to confront various crises begs the question about anticipating such crises in the first place. Moreover the assumption that speed is the answer assumes that the same sluggish decisionmaking apparatus will make the correct decision on using such highly deployable forces in the first place. Desert Shield to me remains an excellent example of where adequate strategic mobility delivered the proper forces into theater at a rate consonant with decisionmaking capacities. And for those who still point to the "long build up" for Desert Storm, I merely point to the fact that those same forces were largely home inside 18 months.

There are other historical examples: the debate between the US and the Brits over invading France rapidly versus pursing Churchill's pet theory about a "soft under belly" of fortified Europe is one. Another would be the force mixtures and decisionmaking that sent ultra-light forces into Somalia and then refused to reinforce them when a need for heavier forces was apparent.

And yes the theory and practice of airborne warfare remains a central front in the struggle to define strategic, operational, and tactical speed. It applies not only to those who use parachutes; it applies equally to vertical envelopment with rotary, fixed, or soon to be in use tilt wing aircraft.

The central reality in the debate over speed is often overlooked: getting there quickly or even just getting there are less important than deciding what you are going to do there in the first place.

Best

Tom

[slapout9]

120MM and Steve Blair,talk about a mantra have you ever heard Ridgeway-Taylor-Gavin being referred to as the "The Airborne Mafia." However I would disagree about the Air Cav. I think the Airborne portion died mostly because they were in Nam and it was hard to maintain an Airborne Brigade and fight the war at the same time.

Tom Odom,very much agree on your concept of what the Airborne should be and was meant to be. "Move like lighting, strike like Thunder"

[zenpundit]

"Among the actual "operators", the term "gear queer" is gaining common usage. SOF/SF soldiers are adopting and discarding various arrangements of gear based on looks and fashion/groupthink as much as on utility and practicality."

I have to ask. Has this trend reached the point where there are catalogs/advertising dedicated to -err -"fashion" for military professionals?

[Steve Blair]

Actually if you look at Stanton's work on the 1st Cav, the need to keep the 82nd on full jump status, along with elements of the 101st and the 173rd had more to do with the 1st Air Cav losing its airborne brigade than anything else. There just weren't enough paratroopers in the pipeline. The 173rd's casualties alone drained troopers that would have gone to the 1st Cav's brigade. They had enough trouble getting enough jump-qualified people just to deploy to Vietnam.

And Tom, I agree about the whole theory of vertical envelopment. It has a certain mantra all its own. Gavin in particular argued that it was just a continuation of the old cavalry doctrine, which in the European military tradition (at least for light cavalry) focused on speed.

[taillat]

As a french teacher in History and both officer in Troupes de Marine's Operational Reserve and student in political science, I would like to stress your attention about a book by Paul Edwards. It's title, Closed world. Computers and the politics of discourse in Cold War America, emphasizes a constructivist approach of technological discourse in military matters. Indeed, Edwards says that Computer (and cyborg alike) is a metaphor of a closed world (i.e. an horizontal world of individuals) built for a total control of men's society. In his point of view, technological discourse doesnt describe reality, rather it create it.In this case, social scientists and techno scientists, working for DoD through think tanks, created a military and social paradigm around computers and communication (the famous C4ISR in our times), ultimately leading to "national security state" as US national identity. Altough i think this position to be very excessive, I'm currently using it at a startpoint to work on a pre-thesis on urban warfare and its evolution through times. I don't believe the evolutionnist-technological discourse to be true, i.e. that warfare changes by a combination of technological innovations and economic structural changes (like for preindustrial wars, industrial wars of attrition, third generation wars and so on). My primary argument is that modifications occure by cultural means, whether from a normative discourse or an interactive one. For example, french victory in Valmy remains incomprehensible if one doesn't look at the cultural gap between Prussia and Revolutionnary France (a "professionnal army" relying on drill-training and tactical mastery vs "national army" whose strenght was ideological). This is what i labelled "the ontological asymetric law". In the last ten years, western armies were confronted with newly urban warfare against asymetric foe. The differential not only rely upon military capabilities, but upon cultural conceptions. In this perspective, studying what you named "totem" (in structuralist way) is as crucial to understand actual developments (and to predict future ones) than it is to understand war as a whole human activity, profoundly rooted in human nature. Technology in military thinking appears to me as a "totem" whose function is to cancel uncertainty and indecision as well as to conceal violence, death given and death received. In a further way, it allows to improve "cohesion" ("integration" in a durkheimian point of view) and creates collective and individual identities. At last, technology seems to me as a powerful tool to shape military society.
I hope i was clear (my english is "french-infected"). As an officer and a scholar, i pay a great attention to what is lived in frontline by your soldiers in Iraq. I feel concerned about this war (not condemning it) because it can teach us numerous things about warfare and warfighting in self-called "post-modern" and "post-heroic" societies.
Sous-lieutenant (r) St&#233;phane TAILLAT
Agr&#233;g&#233; de l'Universit&#233;
master sciences politiques s&#233;curit&#233; et relations internationales
IEP de Toulouse

[Tom Odom]

Merci bien, Stephane

Your English is better than my French to put it mildly. I taught military history at Ft Leavenworth for 3 years and served as a thesis advisor for some 5 or 6 officers in that time. Part of the process was the oral examinations at the end of the term for our thesis students. We used the same questions each year because we were seeking to confirm our students were approaching history in an analytical sense, not in an emprical, data memorization exercise.

A key question was always: explain the historical relationship between doctrine and technology, the classic which came first the chicken or the egg question. We would require students to support their analysis with historical examples; this did much to eliminate simple answers. But that said, it was interesting to me because my thesis students were often foreign, usually African or Arab and both groups tended to look at doctrine as being purely driven by technology. They did not see the linkage between doctrinal imperatives and their influence on technological developments. Simply stated they believed that greater complexity translated into greater capability.

I saw this same trend play out across the Middle East and much of Africa. Countries like Sudan had enormous graveyards on Soviet equipment and we were adding our own section to it (lesser numbers but better equipment ).

The single exception to it was in Rwanda where the new army first identified what it needed to do as a military force, organized itself to fight accordingly, and then sought the technology to achieve its desired end state.

My favorite example of this was during a survey of Rwandan military facilties we had already identified a need for patrol boats for Lake Kivu. And we went to look at the unit that had that responsibility along the Lake; the brigade commander became a good friend. But as we arrived, I noticed that he had several soldiers swimming in circles in what was quite cold water at the time. I asked him about it and he grinned as he said, "Colonel Tom, I wanted you to know I expect my soldiers to be able to swim before I give them a boat."

Best

Tom

[carl]

As an example of military technical development being driven as strongly by cultural as by practical reasons I submit as a prime example the SINGLE SEAT F-22.

A large portion of the Air Force believes that a real fighter is flown by a single fighter pilot. If it is operated by a crew of two it can't be a real fighter. The F-22 was designed to be an air to air fighter so it would only have one seat and that was that.

So we have the most expensive, most complicated fighter in history; with the most extensive set of systems, sensors and weapons ever installed on a fighter and with previously unimagined aerodynamic perfomance being operated by one pilot. That pilot has fly the airplane, keep track of all the data, operate the systems and watch the world around him all at once and all by himself. When the day comes when the enemy makes it through to visual contact with the F-22 the pilot won't even have someone there to look out the back for him.

The airplane would be vastly more effective and have more potential for growth if it was a two seater. But, then it wouldn't really be a fighter.

[marct]

Good example, Carl!

[Steve Blair]

Carl, the AF has a history of this sort of behavior going back many years. The F-22 is just the latest example of this sort of totemic behavior on the part of the AF. It's a good example, as is the quest for the next strategic bomber (B-3, anyone?).