Victory in Iraq

[Culpeper]

Colin Powell came out today and said it was a bad idea. I wish this guy would make up his mind on troop levels on any given decade.

Powell on troop increases

U.S. forces 'losing' in Iraq, Powell says
By Brian Knowlton
Published: 2006-12-17 14:55:48

WASHINGTON: The former secretary of state Colin Powell said Sunday that badly overstretched U.S. forces in Iraq were losing the war there and that a temporary U.S. troop surge probably would not help.

In one of his few commentaries on the war since leaving office, Powell quickly added that the situation could be reversed. He recommended an intense coalition effort to train and support Iraqi security forces and strengthen the government in Baghdad. Powell was deeply skeptical about increasing troop levels, an idea that appears to be gaining ground as President George W. Bush weighs U.S. strategy options.

"There really are no additional troops" to send, Powell said, adding that he agreed with those who say that the U.S. Army is "about broken."

I've always been a proponent of this guy but I'm getting a little tired of his consistent naysaying. I'm going to start referring to him as General Burnside.

[J.C.]

I think this is a pretty good plan. However, I would like to see the guiding document instead of a power point where the points come out like a MDMP brief. But, on the whole it’s not bad. We have done a sorry job at protecting the population and reconstructing the country.

Further, going in to these areas with a Mech force will not cause significant problems. It is most likely the insurgents and militia fighters would pull out leaving some rear guard to fight us. The only real problem I see in this plan is even with massive reconstruction aid flowing in to immediately rebuild these areas, is the reorganized offensive these groups are bound to mount to drive up casualties and push us out of these areas.

Protect the population yes, reconstruction yes, but can we maintain that stance when insurgent and militia forces turn up the heat in their backyards. If we can do that and implement the points of this plan then it may work. However, if we get in there and fail to proceed in implementing any kind of reform and fail to gain the trust of the people then it could get real nasty, real fast.

But, on the odd chance we can get in there and secure the area, develop relationships with the populace, and have an IA force that is respected and trusted, we may be able to do some good work. Moreover, I think a CAP style program is better than what is proposed in over circles where we insert advisers. I don’t particularly care for that approach and believe it would mean pulling to many SF and Ranger types from executing operations against foreign fighters.

Also what do you all think of trying to bring down Kurds to be the bulk of the Iraqi Army forces in this area? They would be neutral, it would tie them into the politics of the country, and might came some of the tensions we have seen caused by Shia dominated forces used throughout Baghdad. It may also help to put Shia and Sunni officers over them to help ease tensions and improve their situational awareness on the ground. Anyway, tell me what you think.

[Jedburgh]

* We must change our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it must become the first priority.
Securing the population should have been the first priority once we destroyed the regime. However, given that we completely dismantled all existing security force elements in Iraq, training Iraqis to secure and police themselves is inextricably linked with the goal of securing the population. One cannot be ignored in favor of the other - but we have yet to develop an effective combined focus of execution.

* We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and especially into Baghdad to support this operation. A surge of seven Army brigades and Marine regiments to support clear-and-hold operations starting in the Spring of 2007 is necessary, possible, and will be sufficient.
* These forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear critical Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods, primarily on the west side of the city.
* After the neighborhoods have been cleared, U.S. soldiers and marines, again partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security.
* As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to reestablish normal life and, working through Iraqi officials, will strengthen Iraqi local government.
Baghdad is a critical center of gravity. If we - meaning the coalition and the nascent Iraqi government - cannot secure the capital, we cannot succeed in the larger conflict. Unfortunately, resolving the Baghdad issue will require a far more complex fusion of kinetic and non-kinetic factors than the easy rhetoric of "sending in more troops" and paste in some reconstruction aid as they do their thing.

* The ground forces must accept longer tours for several years. National Guard units will have to accept increased deployments during this period.
* Equipment shortages must be overcome by transferring equipment from non-deploying active duty, National Guard, and reserve units to those about to deploy. Military industry must be mobilized to provide replacement equipment sets urgently.
Has this guy been paying attention to the state of the force? These would have been great had they been the standard in '03 - along with all the other common sense factors that were ignored through a unique fusion of utter stupidity and criminal negligence. However, in my personal opinion, at this stage of the game executing those recommendations effectively is not doable (except for the part about mobilizing industry for more rapid replacement of equipment).

* The president must request a dramatic increase in reconstruction aid for Iraq. Responsibility and accountability for reconstruction must be assigned to established agencies. The president must insist upon the completion of reconstruction projects. The president should also request a dramatic increase in CERP funds.
This goes back to the very first bullet. We've already poured uncounted billions into Iraq reconstruction aid. But our abject failure to secure the population has rendered much of it moot (the few exceptions proving the general statement). Of course, we must continue to repair and improve and repair again basic infrastructure - the people must have clean water, sewage, electricity, etc. But, repeating myself, that is all part of securing the population. First things first.

* The president must request a substantial increase in ground forces end strength. This increase is vital to sustaining the morale of the combat forces by ensuring that relief is on the way. The president must issue a personal call for young Americans to volunteer to fight in the decisive conflict of this age.
I believe this will get done - at least the first half of the statement. However, its effects will not be felt operationally in time to significantly affect the outcome in Iraq.

* Failure in Iraq today will require far greater sacrifices tomorrow in far more desperate circumstances.
This statement reflects my feelings as well. The old OFDA/DART joke about being between Iraq and hard place has a real bitter taste to it.

[Fabius Maximus]

If we're wishing for the impossible, wish for a time machine -- go back and fix the mistakes of the past four years.

Without a time machine, little on this thread seems relevant or possible.

Some wars are decided on the field of battle, others at home due to exhaustion, bankruptcy, or loss of support for the war. We look to be headed for the last of these.

If the war had strong support in the US, why would this deployment of troops to Baghdad produce results different than those of the past 3 years? We still lack local intel sources and reliable translators -- both of which were so important for the Brits in Malaysia.

How do we "clear" Baghdad without good intel?

Tactically, we fighting an enemy that has developed the use of stand-off weapons to an extent not seen since the Mongols. Without good intel, our troops ride just thru the streets -- more targets.

Last, if we could "clear" Baghadad what would we clear it for? Are their Iraq troops willing to fight and die for their nation, as Union soldiers did during the Civil War?

This is different role for an Army than fighting to defend their homes from a foreign invader. It requires a spirit and loyalty that appears quite rare in Iraq, and that we know of no way to provide.

[slapout9]

Fabius, how do you know how many Intell assets we have over there?

[Fabius Maximus]

They are obvious by their absence.

The first year -- perhaps 11/03 - 11/04 -- we (both inside and outside) were guessing about even the basic elements and characteristics of the Iraq War. After three years, the general outlines of the war have become clear.

Esp. illuminating have been our big "wins" in Fallujah and Tal Afar, allowing comparison of Iraq vs. the long history of similar wars, from the Boer to Malaysia.

[Bill Moore]

Fabius, Rome is not falling yet, but the hordes at the walls. I think your comments on our intelligence assets are probably misplaced. I think we have plently of intelligence assets, and I think they do a fairly good job of tracking and rolling up high value targets; however, that doesn't mean much in the end. It isn't necessarily our intelligence that is flawed, but the strategy that it supports.

If our our intelligence community has a weak point, it is that it has failed to correctly identify the nature of the war that we're in. In their defense, there is obviously political pressure to do so. Our intelligence community definitely has its warts, and I think a key problem is they are clinging to legacy analytical models, which simply don't work, such as using named areas of interest (NAIs), which is useful construct in maneuver warfare, but of limited value in this type of warfare (yet there are still some viable uses). They are very poor at mapping human terrain, but with the support of the anthropologists coming on board, they should improve there immensely. But, contrary to your claim, I think we have the intelligence to roll up a number of bad actors.

What we do NOT have is appropriate rules of engagement (ROE). If you read Ralph Peters' latest article, I think you may agree with me that we're fighting a war with politically correct war ROE. We need more authorities and freedom of action at the tactical level to take the fight to the enemy, and if we don't get them any strategy we have is doomed.

It is late in the game, but I'm not convinced that it is too late if .....we implement a radical change in our strategy (definitely not articulated in the ISG) and in our ROE. This could still result in an acceptable endstate (not necessarily a stable democracy in Iraq). If we're not willing to change our strategy and ROE, then I concur that we're wasting our time, money, and most importantly our Soldiers' lives. We can't claim that this fight is critical to our national interests and then attempt to fight it with one arm tied behind our back.

[Culpeper]

They are obvious by their absence.

The first year -- perhaps 11/03 - 11/04 -- we (both inside and outside) were guessing about even the basic elements and characteristics of the Iraq War. After three years, the general outlines of the war have become clear.

Esp. illuminating have been our big "wins" in Fallujah and Tal Afar, allowing comparison of Iraq vs. the long history of similar wars, from the Boer to Malaysia.

Sounds "PowerPoint Deep". From my perspective there wasn't much considered as far as a post war Iraq. The plan was to develop one after we got there. Rumsfeld wanted a cheap war and even convinced Tommy Franks to buy into it. In hindsight, the original plans, viewed as overkill by the Defense Dept. would have been sufficient to guard sensitive sites, provide security for supply routes, and maintain security for a few months until the State Department could come in on the rebuilding. There was no fall back plan for Phase IV. Phase IV was that the Iraqis would be the cheapest method fulfilling these types of rolls. The United Nations, rightly so, was and is left out of the game after the regime collapsed. I see no comparison to the Boer or Malaysia conflicts. Iraq stands alone. If the USG simply stuck to the simple formula of $8 for rebuilding for every $2 on military activity we wouldn't be in this total waste of time and energy. In typical bureaucratic fashion the formula, 8+2=10, was changed using "miraculous governmental algebra" to 10=2/x. The variable x being Phase IV. Though I don't damn the current increase in troops plan, I do think it is just putting a finger in a hole in the dike if there is no fall back plan with this one as well. The original goal was to avoid a ten year Clinton style nation building scheme. Looks like once we got there it is what we are stuck with. Looks like Rumsfeld took a gamble and lost. So, now we will just use "patches" to fix problems. All problems. What else can we do? At sometime soon after Saddam was captured, Rumsfeld came to this same conclusion and started pubicly stating that it typically takes about 9 years to restore order. If he was referring to the Boer War and the conflict in Malaysia then I stand corrected.

[SWJED]

... blog concerning this thread and US strategy in Iraq - US Strategy in Iraq for 2007?

[SWJED]

Here is The Belmont Club post US Strategy in Iraq for 2007? Welcome to all the visitors from the Belmont Club and Pajamas Media - feel free to jump in here or on other Council threads...

A informed reader believes the eventual shape of the President's future plan in Iraq is taking shape. Pointing to informed speculation at Small Wars Journal, he thinks it is likely that there will be a "shift in mission" in Iraq, emphasizing a security solution over a political one: changing "our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it must become the first priority," as the AEI study he quotes puts it. A lot of readers may say, 'finally the US is going to kick ass', but the informed reader notes the plan will also require a greater effort on the American part, in particular an extension of tours of duty. He also has reservations about whether the non-military capabilities of the United States are up to the task of the followup to combat. In earlier correspondence the reader noted the Belmont Club talking about mobilizing the nation to fight the information and political warfare -- the levee en masse -- or, as the reader put it, to redress the fact that "the rest of the elements of national power are not present on the battlefield in ways that they should be". The military may be able to clear, but what does the rest of the US government to for an encore? The quotable parts of his email are given below and I hope it will spark discussion among other readers.

I noted this post at The Small Wars Journal with interest a couple of weeks ago. Since then, every couple of days there has been a news story leading me to believe that the plan developed by General Keane and Fred Kagan at AEI is the one that the President is going to adopt and announce in January.

Some of these signs: statements by Bush at a press conference before Christmas; a dramatic increase in op-eds by Kagan in nearly every major newspaper, including some British ones; stories in outlets such as the NYT alluding to possible force increases; Gates' well-publicized trip to Iraq, with the ostensible conclusion that larger forces are needed; and now, Joe Lieberman's op-ed in the Washington Post (which is linked on Instapundit), calling for a larger force.

I encourage you all to follow the links to the AEI plan and read it -- it's a ppt presentation and in classic Pentagon course-of-action style -- indicating that it has been wargamed by military officers, not just academics or civilians such as the ISG.

I don't have time to blog about this, but these are my thoughts:

a) the plan calls for a surge in forces, but what is less publicized is the manner in which this surge will be sustained: by increasing the rotation time of Marine units from 7 to 12 months and Army units from 12-15 months. I wonder if this detail is the reason why the President is waiting until after Christmas to announce. Anyway, this jives with what I am hearing from several sources on the need for longer rotations for Marine units, due to the nature of counterinsurgencies and the length of time required to build trusted local networks.

b) the plan calls for what is a shift in mission: from a priority of training Iraqi forces to a priority of providing a secure environment for the people. This might get lost in the coverage, which will dwell upon the increase in forces -- along with cries of "escalation" a la Vietnam. But it is a very important shift. The coming year might see some new battles possibly on the scale of that of Fallujah in 2004, but this time in both Baghdad and Ramadi. This is a guess though and is not crystal clear in the plan -- the battles could also be smaller in scale, given the strengths of Iraqi forces in some areas.

c) finally, I feel the plan is not detailed enough when destructing reconstruction: the "build" part of "clear, hold, and build." There needs to be a dramatic decentralization of funding, a renewed commitment to the CERP program; full staffing of provincial reconstruction teams; and the USAID and State Dept need to become expeditionary and fully staffed virtually overnight -- there's no reason why USAID personnel shouldn't be asked to work at the company level. My thoughts here are not enough. I'm not a reconstruction expert. But several Marine officer friends have noted this problem. Robert Kaplan did so as well in an Atlantic piece not long ago. Basically, the rest of the elements of national power are not present on the battlefield in the ways that they should be.

I could be way off the mark: Bush might propose something completely different. But I'm calling this one: he's going with the AEI plan, perhaps with some modifications.

Having a good plan is one thing, but the enemy also gets to vote in its execution. He will kick back. As in the past, the enemy can be expected to emphasize political and propaganda countermeasures against any new US initiative. If the US shifts the mission to emphasize security, expect a plethera of articles to emerge decrying extended tours of duty, revealing more atrocity stories, etc. In general, expect a full-court press in both the political and media areas to blunt any new strategy. Washington DC will be part of Iraq battlefield...

H/T to Wretchard at The Belmont Club - check out the post - 57 comments so far...

[Tamquam]

Relevant ideas and sources here: http://www.newyorker.com/fact/conten...61218fa_fact2?

[slapout9]

Dave, a few days ago(week or so) you recommended the westhawk blog and to read all it. Did you read his Plan to win? What do you think of it?

[RTK]

Dave, a few days ago(week or so) you recommended the westhawk blog and to read all it. Did you read his Plan to win? What do you think of it?

Here's the plan

I disagree with 85% of it. It's the "turtle" approach in some parts, edging to the brink of extremely stupid in others. Here's some lowlights that I could pick out.

1. Advisors turn into combat liaisons for logistics, intel and fire support. Yeah, like I'd want that job.

2. Advisors don't interfere with planning operations. Kinda steals away the purpose of even being there.

3. Al Anbar and Baghdad get offered up for a massive show of force on the Iranian border - with no task or purpose.

4. The police and IA training point threw me for a loop. Most of the academies I saw last year *were* being run by Iraqis to Iraqi standards. I understand we run some academies, but most of the big ones are run by the government already.

5. By abandoning counterinsurgency, it's like the kid who puts his fingers in his ears, yells really loud, and tells you his not listening to you. It's too late for that. Counterinsurgency operations are the primary task and purpose in theater. Defeat of insurgents is the decisive point. This proposal makes no mention of the new decisive point, key tasks, or endstate.

6. The argument that moving tons of combat power to the Iranian border would "intimidate the Iranians" is utter nonsense. It would likely piss them off and perhaps escalate things to a position we need them not escalate to.

7. US forces quit patrolling in the cities and towns. Again, what's the task and purpose, then, of the forces remaining? QRF to the logistic liaison?

As for Keane's proposal: I know quite a few people who worked on that. It Tal Afarizes Baghdad. It works. I've seen it happen. And judging from the names I saw on the last page and those I know well, the OPLAN has probably already been written to include the BUILD part that another blog felt was lacking entirely. After working with some of them, I know that's a good plan and could easily see it work.

My major question to it, however, is why not have a test run of it in Ramadi, which is a haven of its own but far easier to isolate, not to mention smaller?

[slapout9]

RTK, thanks for responding. I didn't know if anybody would. I was for the Keane plan the first time I saw it. Couple of comments from an LE standpoint.

1-I don't think Iraqi Police have standards.

2-In the end if we are going to stay we have to go to B'Dad and clean it out and restore some basic security and sanity to the place. There is no other way to do it. You have to deal with those assholes and I mean lead pipe,blow torch and ranger hatchet personal combat I gonna seriously kick you ass once and for all. No more shooting or bombing or head chopping. We have to get respect! then you can do that huggy wuggy nicey stuff, but until we show who is in charge nothing is going to change.

Later