Victory in Iraq

**Bill Moore** · 12-17-2006

PRC measures are intended to separate the population from the insurgents, or the insurgents from the population (there is a difference in my opinion), or both, and the "the" key to PRC is providing effective security to the populace. If you can't protect them, you can't effectively influence them. Speaking as if I was an Iraqi citizen (out of complete ignorance) my loyalty doesn't go to the U.S. military tribe because they build a well or a school in my village, but to the tribe that will kill my family if I don't comply with their wishes. Now if the U.S. military could protect my family 24/7, and still build those wells and schools, it would a completely different story.

I am not sure how to categorize PRC, but at this moment I'm going to call it a line of operation (LOO). A LOO that must be the main effort in Iraq and Afghanistan, as it should have been in any COIN, Stability and Support Operations, Peace Enforcement (Haiti, Liberia, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc.), or the majority of other irregular warfare or 4GW environments we find ourselves in, and yet there is a serious dearth of information in our military manuals (please prove me wrong) on how to implement PRC. All I have found to date are short annexes or a couple of paragraphs in various military publications, which is definitely not enough to develop an effective training program. I fully realize that PRC is situation specific and there cannot be a cookie cutter approach, but we can do better than this. Perhaps this is what we have failed miserably at it, especially protecting the local population? Worse, if we’re not successful at PRC, all the others fail, because it their success depends on successful PRC. If there is a center of gravity in this war, then this may be it (those who have read my previous posts will notice a change of attitude here), and it transcends tactical through strategic.

We obviously need more troops to do this, but it isn't just man power, we need troops well trained in PRC. The worst thing we could do is put a bunch of poorly trained and ill disciplined U.S. troops amongst the Iraqi population where every misstep will be exploited successfully by our foes. Well trained in what? Obviously cultural awareness is critical along with some language skills, and then a heavy dose of PRC skills. Again how do we train for it? How important is this mission? In my opinion if we get it right we have a good chance at victory, if we don't we can't win.

CPT Holzbach I admire your muddy boots, common sense perspective, and would appreciate it if you (and others) would please read my request for information on population and resource control (PRC) measures under request for information category (note, my actual post is now the 5th one down) and comment on it as you see fit.

P.S. Slapout, thanks for the tip, I'll get a copy of the physcial security manual this week.

Bill

**Jones_RE** · 12-17-2006

This plan is attacking strength with strength. We hit the militias and the insurgents right smack in the middle of the biggest city in the country. This is the rough equivalent of charging dug in machine guns with unsupported infantry - like they did at the Somme. We take the worst possible troops for the job (American heavy brigades), and send them unsupported into the enemy's best environment against their best fighters. The operational environment in Baghdad is hugely favorable to insurgents, al Qaeda and Shi'ite militias or they wouldn't be there.

A better approach would be to support our attack properly with money and language support - and to make that attack in a place where the enemy is weak.

**slapout9** · 12-17-2006

Bill, go to small wars journal library, go to security and stability section, download multi service ttp's for peace ops (manual has no number just title)
go to section 3 for ops design for good overview.

Go to the army digital library and you can down load the fm3-19.30 on physical security, also mission training plans are there. I can not access these but you can.

PS if you don't mind sending me an address (you can PM me) I have more stuff I can send you but they are physical documents, so they would have to go snail mail.

**Bill Moore** · 12-18-2006

Slapout you're the heat, this is an excellent reference for starting a program, and I now recall reviewing these TTPs a few years back when I working on another contingency. I'll download the Physical Security Manual next.

Jones RE, I don't want to guess what your position is, can you please expand on your thoughts? I think I agree up to a point, but I believe the reality is the local population must be protected. In some cases, that may require rather large, yet semi-surgical, sweep operations to clear the area of insurgents. After that we have to stay and secure the people, or we will lose them again. This is for areas where insurgents coerce support.

It is a different challenge when the insurgents are willingly supported by the local population, as appears to be the case in some of the Shi'a neighborhoods. In that case we need to isolate those areas, and aggressively as possible control everything entering and exiting (manpower intensive, and it won't be perfect), to include fuel, electric power, information, food, water, etc. If we can do it, we're then in a position to try using carrots and sticks to persuade the population. If this fails (war is hell), then "perhaps" we can attempt a mass relocation program of the non-reformists? I realize that none of these options are easy, and some, perhaps all, may not even be possible, I simply throw them out as food for thought.

However, confronting their strength with ours (if we're willing to do the tough work, and make some tough decisions) just may be effective, as we are stronger, so we shouldn't hesitate to use our strength (our asymmetric advantage) if it is an effective option.

What other options/strategies would you recommend?

Do you disagree that protecting the local population is essential to winning this conflict? If so, why?

Thanks, Bill

**Culpeper** · 12-18-2006

Colin Powell came out today and said it was a bad idea. I wish this guy would make up his mind on troop levels on any given decade.

Powell on troop increases

U.S. forces 'losing' in Iraq, Powell says
By Brian Knowlton
Published: 2006-12-17 14:55:48

WASHINGTON: The former secretary of state Colin Powell said Sunday that badly overstretched U.S. forces in Iraq were losing the war there and that a temporary U.S. troop surge probably would not help.

In one of his few commentaries on the war since leaving office, Powell quickly added that the situation could be reversed. He recommended an intense coalition effort to train and support Iraqi security forces and strengthen the government in Baghdad. Powell was deeply skeptical about increasing troop levels, an idea that appears to be gaining ground as President George W. Bush weighs U.S. strategy options.

"There really are no additional troops" to send, Powell said, adding that he agreed with those who say that the U.S. Army is "about broken."

I've always been a proponent of this guy but I'm getting a little tired of his consistent naysaying. I'm going to start referring to him as General Burnside.

**J.C.** · 12-18-2006

I think this is a pretty good plan. However, I would like to see the guiding document instead of a power point where the points come out like a MDMP brief. But, on the whole it’s not bad. We have done a sorry job at protecting the population and reconstructing the country.

Further, going in to these areas with a Mech force will not cause significant problems. It is most likely the insurgents and militia fighters would pull out leaving some rear guard to fight us. The only real problem I see in this plan is even with massive reconstruction aid flowing in to immediately rebuild these areas, is the reorganized offensive these groups are bound to mount to drive up casualties and push us out of these areas.

Protect the population yes, reconstruction yes, but can we maintain that stance when insurgent and militia forces turn up the heat in their backyards. If we can do that and implement the points of this plan then it may work. However, if we get in there and fail to proceed in implementing any kind of reform and fail to gain the trust of the people then it could get real nasty, real fast.

But, on the odd chance we can get in there and secure the area, develop relationships with the populace, and have an IA force that is respected and trusted, we may be able to do some good work. Moreover, I think a CAP style program is better than what is proposed in over circles where we insert advisers. I don’t particularly care for that approach and believe it would mean pulling to many SF and Ranger types from executing operations against foreign fighters.

Also what do you all think of trying to bring down Kurds to be the bulk of the Iraqi Army forces in this area? They would be neutral, it would tie them into the politics of the country, and might came some of the tensions we have seen caused by Shia dominated forces used throughout Baghdad. It may also help to put Shia and Sunni officers over them to help ease tensions and improve their situational awareness on the ground. Anyway, tell me what you think.

**Jedburgh** · 12-18-2006

* We must change our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it must become the first priority.
Securing the population should have been the first priority once we destroyed the regime. However, given that we completely dismantled all existing security force elements in Iraq, training Iraqis to secure and police themselves is inextricably linked with the goal of securing the population. One cannot be ignored in favor of the other - but we have yet to develop an effective combined focus of execution.

* We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and especially into Baghdad to support this operation. A surge of seven Army brigades and Marine regiments to support clear-and-hold operations starting in the Spring of 2007 is necessary, possible, and will be sufficient.
* These forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear critical Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods, primarily on the west side of the city.
* After the neighborhoods have been cleared, U.S. soldiers and marines, again partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security.
* As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to reestablish normal life and, working through Iraqi officials, will strengthen Iraqi local government.
Baghdad is a critical center of gravity. If we - meaning the coalition and the nascent Iraqi government - cannot secure the capital, we cannot succeed in the larger conflict. Unfortunately, resolving the Baghdad issue will require a far more complex fusion of kinetic and non-kinetic factors than the easy rhetoric of "sending in more troops" and paste in some reconstruction aid as they do their thing.

* The ground forces must accept longer tours for several years. National Guard units will have to accept increased deployments during this period.
* Equipment shortages must be overcome by transferring equipment from non-deploying active duty, National Guard, and reserve units to those about to deploy. Military industry must be mobilized to provide replacement equipment sets urgently.
Has this guy been paying attention to the state of the force? These would have been great had they been the standard in '03 - along with all the other common sense factors that were ignored through a unique fusion of utter stupidity and criminal negligence. However, in my personal opinion, at this stage of the game executing those recommendations effectively is not doable (except for the part about mobilizing industry for more rapid replacement of equipment).

* The president must request a dramatic increase in reconstruction aid for Iraq. Responsibility and accountability for reconstruction must be assigned to established agencies. The president must insist upon the completion of reconstruction projects. The president should also request a dramatic increase in CERP funds.
This goes back to the very first bullet. We've already poured uncounted billions into Iraq reconstruction aid. But our abject failure to secure the population has rendered much of it moot (the few exceptions proving the general statement). Of course, we must continue to repair and improve and repair again basic infrastructure - the people must have clean water, sewage, electricity, etc. But, repeating myself, that is all part of securing the population. First things first.

* The president must request a substantial increase in ground forces end strength. This increase is vital to sustaining the morale of the combat forces by ensuring that relief is on the way. The president must issue a personal call for young Americans to volunteer to fight in the decisive conflict of this age.
I believe this will get done - at least the first half of the statement. However, its effects will not be felt operationally in time to significantly affect the outcome in Iraq.

* Failure in Iraq today will require far greater sacrifices tomorrow in far more desperate circumstances.
This statement reflects my feelings as well. The old OFDA/DART joke about being between Iraq and hard place has a real bitter taste to it.

**Fabius Maximus** · 12-18-2006

If we're wishing for the impossible, wish for a time machine -- go back and fix the mistakes of the past four years.

Without a time machine, little on this thread seems relevant or possible.

Some wars are decided on the field of battle, others at home due to exhaustion, bankruptcy, or loss of support for the war. We look to be headed for the last of these.

If the war had strong support in the US, why would this deployment of troops to Baghdad produce results different than those of the past 3 years? We still lack local intel sources and reliable translators -- both of which were so important for the Brits in Malaysia.

How do we "clear" Baghdad without good intel?

Tactically, we fighting an enemy that has developed the use of stand-off weapons to an extent not seen since the Mongols. Without good intel, our troops ride just thru the streets -- more targets.

Last, if we could "clear" Baghadad what would we clear it for? Are their Iraq troops willing to fight and die for their nation, as Union soldiers did during the Civil War?

This is different role for an Army than fighting to defend their homes from a foreign invader. It requires a spirit and loyalty that appears quite rare in Iraq, and that we know of no way to provide.