Victory in Iraq

**slapout9** · 12-17-2006

Bill, go to small wars journal library, go to security and stability section, download multi service ttp's for peace ops (manual has no number just title)
go to section 3 for ops design for good overview.

Go to the army digital library and you can down load the fm3-19.30 on physical security, also mission training plans are there. I can not access these but you can.

PS if you don't mind sending me an address (you can PM me) I have more stuff I can send you but they are physical documents, so they would have to go snail mail.

**Bill Moore** · 12-18-2006

Slapout you're the heat, this is an excellent reference for starting a program, and I now recall reviewing these TTPs a few years back when I working on another contingency. I'll download the Physical Security Manual next.

Jones RE, I don't want to guess what your position is, can you please expand on your thoughts? I think I agree up to a point, but I believe the reality is the local population must be protected. In some cases, that may require rather large, yet semi-surgical, sweep operations to clear the area of insurgents. After that we have to stay and secure the people, or we will lose them again. This is for areas where insurgents coerce support.

It is a different challenge when the insurgents are willingly supported by the local population, as appears to be the case in some of the Shi'a neighborhoods. In that case we need to isolate those areas, and aggressively as possible control everything entering and exiting (manpower intensive, and it won't be perfect), to include fuel, electric power, information, food, water, etc. If we can do it, we're then in a position to try using carrots and sticks to persuade the population. If this fails (war is hell), then "perhaps" we can attempt a mass relocation program of the non-reformists? I realize that none of these options are easy, and some, perhaps all, may not even be possible, I simply throw them out as food for thought.

However, confronting their strength with ours (if we're willing to do the tough work, and make some tough decisions) just may be effective, as we are stronger, so we shouldn't hesitate to use our strength (our asymmetric advantage) if it is an effective option.

What other options/strategies would you recommend?

Do you disagree that protecting the local population is essential to winning this conflict? If so, why?

Thanks, Bill

**Culpeper** · 12-18-2006

Colin Powell came out today and said it was a bad idea. I wish this guy would make up his mind on troop levels on any given decade.

Powell on troop increases

U.S. forces 'losing' in Iraq, Powell says
By Brian Knowlton
Published: 2006-12-17 14:55:48

WASHINGTON: The former secretary of state Colin Powell said Sunday that badly overstretched U.S. forces in Iraq were losing the war there and that a temporary U.S. troop surge probably would not help.

In one of his few commentaries on the war since leaving office, Powell quickly added that the situation could be reversed. He recommended an intense coalition effort to train and support Iraqi security forces and strengthen the government in Baghdad. Powell was deeply skeptical about increasing troop levels, an idea that appears to be gaining ground as President George W. Bush weighs U.S. strategy options.

"There really are no additional troops" to send, Powell said, adding that he agreed with those who say that the U.S. Army is "about broken."

I've always been a proponent of this guy but I'm getting a little tired of his consistent naysaying. I'm going to start referring to him as General Burnside.

**J.C.** · 12-18-2006

I think this is a pretty good plan. However, I would like to see the guiding document instead of a power point where the points come out like a MDMP brief. But, on the whole it’s not bad. We have done a sorry job at protecting the population and reconstructing the country.

Further, going in to these areas with a Mech force will not cause significant problems. It is most likely the insurgents and militia fighters would pull out leaving some rear guard to fight us. The only real problem I see in this plan is even with massive reconstruction aid flowing in to immediately rebuild these areas, is the reorganized offensive these groups are bound to mount to drive up casualties and push us out of these areas.

Protect the population yes, reconstruction yes, but can we maintain that stance when insurgent and militia forces turn up the heat in their backyards. If we can do that and implement the points of this plan then it may work. However, if we get in there and fail to proceed in implementing any kind of reform and fail to gain the trust of the people then it could get real nasty, real fast.

But, on the odd chance we can get in there and secure the area, develop relationships with the populace, and have an IA force that is respected and trusted, we may be able to do some good work. Moreover, I think a CAP style program is better than what is proposed in over circles where we insert advisers. I don’t particularly care for that approach and believe it would mean pulling to many SF and Ranger types from executing operations against foreign fighters.

Also what do you all think of trying to bring down Kurds to be the bulk of the Iraqi Army forces in this area? They would be neutral, it would tie them into the politics of the country, and might came some of the tensions we have seen caused by Shia dominated forces used throughout Baghdad. It may also help to put Shia and Sunni officers over them to help ease tensions and improve their situational awareness on the ground. Anyway, tell me what you think.

**Jedburgh** · 12-18-2006

* We must change our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it must become the first priority.
Securing the population should have been the first priority once we destroyed the regime. However, given that we completely dismantled all existing security force elements in Iraq, training Iraqis to secure and police themselves is inextricably linked with the goal of securing the population. One cannot be ignored in favor of the other - but we have yet to develop an effective combined focus of execution.

* We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and especially into Baghdad to support this operation. A surge of seven Army brigades and Marine regiments to support clear-and-hold operations starting in the Spring of 2007 is necessary, possible, and will be sufficient.
* These forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear critical Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods, primarily on the west side of the city.
* After the neighborhoods have been cleared, U.S. soldiers and marines, again partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security.
* As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to reestablish normal life and, working through Iraqi officials, will strengthen Iraqi local government.
Baghdad is a critical center of gravity. If we - meaning the coalition and the nascent Iraqi government - cannot secure the capital, we cannot succeed in the larger conflict. Unfortunately, resolving the Baghdad issue will require a far more complex fusion of kinetic and non-kinetic factors than the easy rhetoric of "sending in more troops" and paste in some reconstruction aid as they do their thing.

* The ground forces must accept longer tours for several years. National Guard units will have to accept increased deployments during this period.
* Equipment shortages must be overcome by transferring equipment from non-deploying active duty, National Guard, and reserve units to those about to deploy. Military industry must be mobilized to provide replacement equipment sets urgently.
Has this guy been paying attention to the state of the force? These would have been great had they been the standard in '03 - along with all the other common sense factors that were ignored through a unique fusion of utter stupidity and criminal negligence. However, in my personal opinion, at this stage of the game executing those recommendations effectively is not doable (except for the part about mobilizing industry for more rapid replacement of equipment).

* The president must request a dramatic increase in reconstruction aid for Iraq. Responsibility and accountability for reconstruction must be assigned to established agencies. The president must insist upon the completion of reconstruction projects. The president should also request a dramatic increase in CERP funds.
This goes back to the very first bullet. We've already poured uncounted billions into Iraq reconstruction aid. But our abject failure to secure the population has rendered much of it moot (the few exceptions proving the general statement). Of course, we must continue to repair and improve and repair again basic infrastructure - the people must have clean water, sewage, electricity, etc. But, repeating myself, that is all part of securing the population. First things first.

* The president must request a substantial increase in ground forces end strength. This increase is vital to sustaining the morale of the combat forces by ensuring that relief is on the way. The president must issue a personal call for young Americans to volunteer to fight in the decisive conflict of this age.
I believe this will get done - at least the first half of the statement. However, its effects will not be felt operationally in time to significantly affect the outcome in Iraq.

* Failure in Iraq today will require far greater sacrifices tomorrow in far more desperate circumstances.
This statement reflects my feelings as well. The old OFDA/DART joke about being between Iraq and hard place has a real bitter taste to it.

**Fabius Maximus** · 12-18-2006

If we're wishing for the impossible, wish for a time machine -- go back and fix the mistakes of the past four years.

Without a time machine, little on this thread seems relevant or possible.

Some wars are decided on the field of battle, others at home due to exhaustion, bankruptcy, or loss of support for the war. We look to be headed for the last of these.

If the war had strong support in the US, why would this deployment of troops to Baghdad produce results different than those of the past 3 years? We still lack local intel sources and reliable translators -- both of which were so important for the Brits in Malaysia.

How do we "clear" Baghdad without good intel?

Tactically, we fighting an enemy that has developed the use of stand-off weapons to an extent not seen since the Mongols. Without good intel, our troops ride just thru the streets -- more targets.

Last, if we could "clear" Baghadad what would we clear it for? Are their Iraq troops willing to fight and die for their nation, as Union soldiers did during the Civil War?

This is different role for an Army than fighting to defend their homes from a foreign invader. It requires a spirit and loyalty that appears quite rare in Iraq, and that we know of no way to provide.

**slapout9** · 12-18-2006

Fabius, how do you know how many Intell assets we have over there?

**SWJED** · 01-01-2007

... blog concerning this thread and US strategy in Iraq - US Strategy in Iraq for 2007?

**SWJED** · 01-03-2007

Here is The Belmont Club post US Strategy in Iraq for 2007? Welcome to all the visitors from the Belmont Club and Pajamas Media - feel free to jump in here or on other Council threads...

A informed reader believes the eventual shape of the President's future plan in Iraq is taking shape. Pointing to informed speculation at Small Wars Journal, he thinks it is likely that there will be a "shift in mission" in Iraq, emphasizing a security solution over a political one: changing "our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it must become the first priority," as the AEI study he quotes puts it. A lot of readers may say, 'finally the US is going to kick ass', but the informed reader notes the plan will also require a greater effort on the American part, in particular an extension of tours of duty. He also has reservations about whether the non-military capabilities of the United States are up to the task of the followup to combat. In earlier correspondence the reader noted the Belmont Club talking about mobilizing the nation to fight the information and political warfare -- the levee en masse -- or, as the reader put it, to redress the fact that "the rest of the elements of national power are not present on the battlefield in ways that they should be". The military may be able to clear, but what does the rest of the US government to for an encore? The quotable parts of his email are given below and I hope it will spark discussion among other readers.

I noted this post at The Small Wars Journal with interest a couple of weeks ago. Since then, every couple of days there has been a news story leading me to believe that the plan developed by General Keane and Fred Kagan at AEI is the one that the President is going to adopt and announce in January.

Some of these signs: statements by Bush at a press conference before Christmas; a dramatic increase in op-eds by Kagan in nearly every major newspaper, including some British ones; stories in outlets such as the NYT alluding to possible force increases; Gates' well-publicized trip to Iraq, with the ostensible conclusion that larger forces are needed; and now, Joe Lieberman's op-ed in the Washington Post (which is linked on Instapundit), calling for a larger force.

I encourage you all to follow the links to the AEI plan and read it -- it's a ppt presentation and in classic Pentagon course-of-action style -- indicating that it has been wargamed by military officers, not just academics or civilians such as the ISG.

I don't have time to blog about this, but these are my thoughts:

a) the plan calls for a surge in forces, but what is less publicized is the manner in which this surge will be sustained: by increasing the rotation time of Marine units from 7 to 12 months and Army units from 12-15 months. I wonder if this detail is the reason why the President is waiting until after Christmas to announce. Anyway, this jives with what I am hearing from several sources on the need for longer rotations for Marine units, due to the nature of counterinsurgencies and the length of time required to build trusted local networks.

b) the plan calls for what is a shift in mission: from a priority of training Iraqi forces to a priority of providing a secure environment for the people. This might get lost in the coverage, which will dwell upon the increase in forces -- along with cries of "escalation" a la Vietnam. But it is a very important shift. The coming year might see some new battles possibly on the scale of that of Fallujah in 2004, but this time in both Baghdad and Ramadi. This is a guess though and is not crystal clear in the plan -- the battles could also be smaller in scale, given the strengths of Iraqi forces in some areas.

c) finally, I feel the plan is not detailed enough when destructing reconstruction: the "build" part of "clear, hold, and build." There needs to be a dramatic decentralization of funding, a renewed commitment to the CERP program; full staffing of provincial reconstruction teams; and the USAID and State Dept need to become expeditionary and fully staffed virtually overnight -- there's no reason why USAID personnel shouldn't be asked to work at the company level. My thoughts here are not enough. I'm not a reconstruction expert. But several Marine officer friends have noted this problem. Robert Kaplan did so as well in an Atlantic piece not long ago. Basically, the rest of the elements of national power are not present on the battlefield in the ways that they should be.

I could be way off the mark: Bush might propose something completely different. But I'm calling this one: he's going with the AEI plan, perhaps with some modifications.

Having a good plan is one thing, but the enemy also gets to vote in its execution. He will kick back. As in the past, the enemy can be expected to emphasize political and propaganda countermeasures against any new US initiative. If the US shifts the mission to emphasize security, expect a plethera of articles to emerge decrying extended tours of duty, revealing more atrocity stories, etc. In general, expect a full-court press in both the political and media areas to blunt any new strategy. Washington DC will be part of Iraq battlefield...

H/T to Wretchard at The Belmont Club - check out the post - 57 comments so far...