Victory in Iraq

[Fabius Maximus]

They are obvious by their absence.

The first year -- perhaps 11/03 - 11/04 -- we (both inside and outside) were guessing about even the basic elements and characteristics of the Iraq War. After three years, the general outlines of the war have become clear.

Esp. illuminating have been our big "wins" in Fallujah and Tal Afar, allowing comparison of Iraq vs. the long history of similar wars, from the Boer to Malaysia.

[Bill Moore]

Fabius, Rome is not falling yet, but the hordes at the walls. I think your comments on our intelligence assets are probably misplaced. I think we have plently of intelligence assets, and I think they do a fairly good job of tracking and rolling up high value targets; however, that doesn't mean much in the end. It isn't necessarily our intelligence that is flawed, but the strategy that it supports.

If our our intelligence community has a weak point, it is that it has failed to correctly identify the nature of the war that we're in. In their defense, there is obviously political pressure to do so. Our intelligence community definitely has its warts, and I think a key problem is they are clinging to legacy analytical models, which simply don't work, such as using named areas of interest (NAIs), which is useful construct in maneuver warfare, but of limited value in this type of warfare (yet there are still some viable uses). They are very poor at mapping human terrain, but with the support of the anthropologists coming on board, they should improve there immensely. But, contrary to your claim, I think we have the intelligence to roll up a number of bad actors.

What we do NOT have is appropriate rules of engagement (ROE). If you read Ralph Peters' latest article, I think you may agree with me that we're fighting a war with politically correct war ROE. We need more authorities and freedom of action at the tactical level to take the fight to the enemy, and if we don't get them any strategy we have is doomed.

It is late in the game, but I'm not convinced that it is too late if .....we implement a radical change in our strategy (definitely not articulated in the ISG) and in our ROE. This could still result in an acceptable endstate (not necessarily a stable democracy in Iraq). If we're not willing to change our strategy and ROE, then I concur that we're wasting our time, money, and most importantly our Soldiers' lives. We can't claim that this fight is critical to our national interests and then attempt to fight it with one arm tied behind our back.

[Fabius Maximus]

These are all hard issues, far beyond the scope of anything suitable for a blog. Also, they are important issues wrapped in fog -- so that many views are reasonable and can be well supported.

I disagree with you on most of these points (but could easily be wrong). As I have written, we're in great danger -- but mostly from our own arrogance, hubris, and suicidal economic policies. For more on that see …

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_enemies.htm

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_fore...2006_part2.htm

Re: intel & ROE’s

I suspect -- based mostly on history and news accounts, not a reliable base -- that our intel assets in Iraq are grossly inadequate to our need. In Malaysia the Brits had a century to develop familiarity with the people, and build intel sources. We've had at most 3 years, assuming we started fast (which I doubt).

The ROE debate has been hashed over in Iraq and almost every previous colonial war. The loser -- the colonial power -- ratchets up the ROE's. It never works. It's a sign of failed strategic and tactical thinking, in my opinion.

The French fought the Hundred Years War using outdated doctrines. Three great defeats on battlefield, almost carbon copies of each other, monuments to human stubbornness and inability to change.

Let's not try to beat their record. 4GW is here, and the old methods no longer work. Radical change is necessary. Are we up to the challenge?

[Fabius Maximus]

These overlap with those discussed in Kagan's proposal.

part 1 (only the first page is relevant here, as an overview))
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_iraq...006_part_I.htm

Part 2 -- options for Iraq
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_iraq...06_part_II.htm

Part 3 -- more options
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_iraq...6_part_III.htm

Part 4 -- my proposal, coming soon.

[Culpeper]

They are obvious by their absence.

The first year -- perhaps 11/03 - 11/04 -- we (both inside and outside) were guessing about even the basic elements and characteristics of the Iraq War. After three years, the general outlines of the war have become clear.

Esp. illuminating have been our big "wins" in Fallujah and Tal Afar, allowing comparison of Iraq vs. the long history of similar wars, from the Boer to Malaysia.

Sounds "PowerPoint Deep". From my perspective there wasn't much considered as far as a post war Iraq. The plan was to develop one after we got there. Rumsfeld wanted a cheap war and even convinced Tommy Franks to buy into it. In hindsight, the original plans, viewed as overkill by the Defense Dept. would have been sufficient to guard sensitive sites, provide security for supply routes, and maintain security for a few months until the State Department could come in on the rebuilding. There was no fall back plan for Phase IV. Phase IV was that the Iraqis would be the cheapest method fulfilling these types of rolls. The United Nations, rightly so, was and is left out of the game after the regime collapsed. I see no comparison to the Boer or Malaysia conflicts. Iraq stands alone. If the USG simply stuck to the simple formula of $8 for rebuilding for every $2 on military activity we wouldn't be in this total waste of time and energy. In typical bureaucratic fashion the formula, 8+2=10, was changed using "miraculous governmental algebra" to 10=2/x. The variable x being Phase IV. Though I don't damn the current increase in troops plan, I do think it is just putting a finger in a hole in the dike if there is no fall back plan with this one as well. The original goal was to avoid a ten year Clinton style nation building scheme. Looks like once we got there it is what we are stuck with. Looks like Rumsfeld took a gamble and lost. So, now we will just use "patches" to fix problems. All problems. What else can we do? At sometime soon after Saddam was captured, Rumsfeld came to this same conclusion and started pubicly stating that it typically takes about 9 years to restore order. If he was referring to the Boer War and the conflict in Malaysia then I stand corrected.

[Bill Moore]

Fabius I just read your part III, and while I concur with many of your points, I don’t necessarily concur with your conclusions. They are a bit premature for me at this point, but you could very well prove to be right. We are in agreement that our military doesn’t understand 4GW (and 5GW is emerging), and failed to adapt to it, though it has been prevalent since the end of WWII. GEN Shinseki’s philosophy probably accurately reflected the conventional army’s leadership’s, which was we could afford not win in a counterinsurgency, but we could not afford to lose a conventional fight. In many ways I think he is right, as I can’t recall any of our non-wins in the COIN realm doing irreparable damage to our national interests. There were set backs and pride issues, but still no other country was able to impose their will on ours through military force, or the threat of military force, because we had the best conventional force in the world. That is one reason I think he cautioned (along with GEN Powell) not to get involved in insurgencies unless absolutely necessary. He stated that the realm of counter terrorism belonged primarily to law enforcement, intelligence and special operations. The more I reflect on what he said the two times I heard him talk, the more I think he was one of our greatest leaders. Obviously his wisdom didn’t mesh well with the SECDEF.

A couple years back I read that that our current CoS of the Army, GEN Schoomaker commented that we somehow have became the British Redcoats. I can only assume he was making reference to our current crop of officers who blindly embrace doctrine, have alienated the local population with our conventional tactics, and have almost formed our Army into a caste system where we have developed an unfounded arrogance in our officer corps. A corps that simply out of touch with reality.

Our officers (young and old alike) seem incapable of disregarding the doctrines of the past, and cling to them like a low income worker would cling to a winning lottery ticket, with same results in the long run, a apparent quick victory, and then end up broke again.

I recall a young Army CPT, working in W. Point (the Kool-Aid factory), so this should be no surprise, writing that the terrorists didn’t know their own doctrine as well as we knew it. Please park the arrogance on the shelf and take another look.

We're slow to adapt, and dangerously so. We are now embracing an updated counterinsurgency manual that unfortunately is a few years too late for Iraq, because the conflict has morphed into a civil war like conflict similar to Bosnia and Kosovo. Once we figure that out and adapt, we'll be in another environment.

All that said, if we could get the right military leaders into Iraq, get Karl Rove out of the strategy business, and impose martial law (the current government probably needs to go), and change the ROE I think there still may be time to make something out of it, other than a complete loss.

[Fabius Maximus]

Culpeper -- you are right, these comments are at BEST powerpoint deep. That's why I point to articles which discuss these issues in greater depth (although still just sketches, inadequate to their importance).

Bill --

You are of course right that Iraq is not over, hence my conclusions are just guesses ("forecasts" in the trade, sounds better). Thought-starters, nothing more.

You raise some great issues, ones that I am working on (3 or so articles out).

Here is something I think you will find of interest:

The US Army Learns from its Mistakes in Iraq
Der Spiegel
December 18, 2006

URL:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/...455165,00.html

Worth reading, esp the interview (link at the end of the article).

Wonderful example of taking the wrong lessons from a failed war, running with exactly the strengths that failed us.