That's also the common refrain from the autocrats in power.Originally Posted by Dayuhan
This was true to an extent in Syria but is not as accurate in Saudi Arabia. It's probably more accurate in Wahhabist strongholds like the Nejd but regions like the Hijaz are probably more concerned with the confiscation of their wealth by the royal government. The peoples of the Hijaz have a history of autonomy and there is been long-standing tension betweem their leading families and the al-Saud family. There's also the question of the assumption that every element desires to "hold the country together" or that it's beneficial or necessary for democratic reformation. Saudi Arabia was formed by conquest less than one hundred years; it's borders are literally drawn in sand. It's formation as a state is dependent not on political institutions but the House of Saud. The same arguments made in favor of Iraq's partition (which I disagree with actually) could be made about Saudi Arabia. I don't necessarily think partitioning Saudi Arabia is ideal but it's territorial integrity is less important than its political reformation so perhaps it's something that should be considered.
Which Saudis are you referring to specifically?
I agree. The Iraq was a disaster on many levels for the U.S. - not least of which is the credibility of the U.S. as a champion of democratic government and human rights.
What's your view?
The U.S. cannot and should not attempt to do it directly. It can however prompt reforms through diplomatic and social pressure either at the government or grass-roots level. It is "our business" because (1) the U.S. has a moral obligation as the patron of the international system and the self-proclaimed defender of democratic governance and human rights; (2) pluralist governance will go a long ways in marginalizing extremism and terrorism, and the U.S. has a primary security interest in this regard; and (3) the U.S. has the political and economic means to compel change in other states.
Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has transitioned from a challenger of the Old World status quo (imperialism, colonialism, autocracy, etc) to a defender of the current status quo, which is a half-completed project of an international order founded on the recognition of universal human rights. Unfortunately, from the point of view of hegemonic stability theory, this makes the U.S. reactionary and conservative since it aims to preserve its gains rather than risk making new ones (i.e. "unintended consequences"), which in the long term actually undermines its capabilities and credibility as other challengers emerge who are willing to take risks for their own gains (China, Russia, Islamists, et al). It is in the long-term interests of the U.S. to actively promote and agitate for pluralist governance around the world.
We don't know best how other countries 'should' be governed, but we do know that pluralist governance is the most stable and effective government in the long term. Pluralism does not define how a state should be ordered (i.e. is it a republic or a democracy? what kind of institutions will it have?) since there are a wide range of options and cultural characteristics that make governance different in every part of the world. However, we do know that government is made more effective the larger the number of stakeholders involved in its political processes and institutions, however organized. And we also know that pluralist states are not as aggressive towards one another as well as more effective in reducing radicalism.
You make the inference that I am arguing the U.S. should put the Iraq War on repeat in a global campaign for democracy. That is not true. War is essentially a destructive and anti-humanist endeavor, even if necessary. We should be building political institutions, not tearing them down. You also make the inference that there is a inverse relationship between pluralist governance and stability. This is not true at all. There is certainly instability during transition between one form of government and another, but any kind of government with strong institutions is inherently stable. And that's where the U.S. should start: strengthening political institutions. War is not effective in that regard.
This is why I also floated the idea of a transitional 'strong-man' government. A number of states have more or less peacefully transitioned from an autocratic government to a pluralist one: Spain, South Korea, Taiwan, etc. Yes - there are risks, such as a right-wing counter-revolution (i.e. fascist Italy, Japan, Nazi Germany) or foreign invasion prematurely ending the experiment of democratization. But in the majority of cases, a braod-based civic movement is capable of pushing through democratization. A reform-minded autocratic government is really a 'useful idiot' who can maintain sufficient stability and legitimacy to reform institutions until they are removed from power (preferably through an electoral process). So, that's the other action the U.S. can take: promoting the development of civic society.
Pluralist sentiment exists in Saudi Arabia. There are reform-minded members of the royal family, though not many and none in key positions of power (yet). The challenges to democratization in Saudi Arabia is not some mythological Arab aversion to pluralism, but the autocratic nature of the state, as well as a political economy financed exclusively by oil wealth to expand royal patronage to the National Guard (security) and the clerical establishment (legitimacy). Democratizing the country's oil wealth would democratize the country - and that, in turn, would go a long way towards reducing the threat of terrorism. And of course, a caveat must be mentioned that reducing the long-term threat of insecurity does not affect the current threat (i.e. AQAP, etc) and security forces must remain available to combat them. The U.S. can't reform Saudi Arabia's political economy from the outside, but we can help shape the conditions to make this possible through a variety of political, social, and economic levers.
). 
Bookmarks