Posted by David
.Into the Syrian civil war came the AQ-linked groups, which had virtually no independent presence in Syria beforehand. Funded by the "usual suspects" and neighbours having their own interests
Once more information is made available by analysts instead of the media spin masters I believe the above statement will be proven to be false. al-Qaeda wasn't the cause of the rebellion, but as a networked organization they had nodes in Syria that were established during the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and those logistics networks which can support movement both ways still exist.
This enabled AQ linked groups to respond quickly to the opportunity the rebellion created. It is unfortunate that AQ is present in both Iraq and Syria, because it does distort the West's perception that every Sunni fighter is affiliated with AQ. They're not, but AQ is active, and they have the most the effective groups, and those groups pose a threat to us. To pretend otherwise is as foolish is pretending AQ is the only faction opposing the governments in Iraq and Syria.
There also seems to be some truth that groups that are successful create their own gravitational pull and members from less effective groups join the winning team.
More important than AQ centeral is the concept of al-Qaedaism which is various groups and individuals embracing the idea of violent jihad to establish a caliphate, so the idea behinds UBL's AQ will always remain relevant despite our attempts to wish it away. I'll shock some readers, but it relevant much like Jesus remains relevant to the over 200 plus sects of Christianity. A lot of nuances between the sects, but they all believe in Jesus being the son of God.
In Syria, and Iraq, we have both the idea and a network that was able to exploit the situations there to become a central actor in the rebellions. It really doesn't matter if they're directed by AQ leadership in Pakistan does it? Networked groups don't have to have central leadership. Networks have a lot of characteristics we still haven't come to grips with yet, but one of them is the ability to surge, or swarm, to exploit opportunity, which is what happened in Syria, and now Iraq. We have asymmetrical views of the conflict, as state actors we attempt to view the revolts in Syria and Iraq as two separate fights, the non-state actors don't recognize the borders, so they view it differently and until we understand that I doubt our ability to come up with an effective strategy to more effectively manage this threat. It is easy to see this when we hear our political leaders talking about the governments in Syria and Iraq as the primary determinants in our response, when in reality the government in Iraq is becoming less relevant. This is where a case for adapting and exploring the human domain concept can be made to develop alternative options to supporting or opposing a particular government, but I digress.
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j...70138588,d.cGU
Not familiar with the next journal, but the information seems to jive with what I know and suspect.In his July 18, 2013, testimony to the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade, Thomas Joscelyn
defined al-Qaeda as:
a global international terrorist network, with a general
command in Afghanistan and Pakistan and affiliates
in several countries. Together, they form a robust
network that, despite setbacks, contests for territory
abroad and still poses a threat to U.S. interests both
overseas and at home.6
http://www.vox.com/2014/6/13/5803712...aq-crisis-isis
11 facts that explain the escalating crisis in Iraq
3. ISIS thrives on tension between Iraq's two largest religious groups
Perhaps the single most important factor in ISIS' recent resurgence is the conflict between Iraqi Shias and Iraqi Sunnis. ISIS fighters themselves are Sunnis, and the tension between the two groups is a powerful recruiting tool for ISIS.When ISIS reestablished itself, it put Sunni sectarianism at the heart of its identity and propaganda. The government persecution, according to the Washington Institute for Near East Studies' Michael Knights, "played right into their hands." Maliki "made all the ISIS propaganda real, accurate." That made it much, much easier for ISIS to replenish its fighting stock.
That wasn't the only way the Iraqi government helped ISIS grow, according to Knights. The US and Iraqi governments released a huge number of al-Qaeda prisoners from jail, which he thinks called "an unprecedented infusion of skilled, networked terrorist manpower - an infusion at a scale the world has never seen."At the end of the day Bob is right, poor governance (greatly understated in this case) created the opportunity, but I think once the fighting escalates to the point it is now that good governance won't stop it. It has its own momentum, and the issues become broader, the people become militarized, compromise is a dream at this point, so if there is a desire to end the fighting a side must be defeated militarily. Then good governance may be able to consolidate the peace gained.7. The Syria conflict has made ISIS much stronger
When fighting Syrian troops, ISIS can safely retreat to Iraq; when fighting Iraqis it can go to Syria. Statistical evidence says these safe "rear areas" help insurgents win: "one of the best predictors of insurgent success that we have to date is the presence of a rear area," Jason Lyall, a political scientist at Yale University who studies insurgencies, said.
Originally Posted by CrowBat
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