Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[ganulv]

A recent interview with University of Oklahoma professor Joshua Landis re: his comparison of the contemporary Levant to interwar Europe: http://youtu.be/_-roW5Y7vbw If you take nothing else away from the video, you'll at least learn that Jerry Seinfeld has a family tie to Aleppo.

Landis's take is that the Syrian conflict is not one in which political boundaries will be redrawn, but rather one in which demographics will be violently resorted (i.e., ethnic cleansing).

[CrowBat]

Kobane, Kobane, Kobane.... (and 'bad ally' Turkey, of course)...

Everybody is talking about Kobane as if it's the only place in Syria where there is combat. Actually, it seems the YPG and FSyA in Kobane have stopped the Daesh onslaught on this town. That is: the Daesh is now in control of two thirds of Kobane, but unable to advance any further.

On the contrary, the Kurds and FSyA are meanwhile launching counterattacks and recapturing some points. That is at least according to the SOHR, the YPG killed 13 Daesh yesterday while retaking two checkpoints in Kobane, and overall, the Daesh should have lost 42 idiots during the fighting there.

Ironic about the situation is that there are thousands of Kurds fighting for the Daesh too (i.e. there might be more of them fighting for the Daesh but for the YPG). Here a - warning: GRAFFIC - video of YPG and Deash-Kurds massacring each other:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FJDjtKUQHRo

More importantly...

Syrian regime continues its offensive north of Aleppo, attempting to clear insurgents from the area around the Infantry School, north of this city, and complete the encirclement of insurgents by reaching Nubol and az-Zahra - two regime-controlled Shi'a enclaves NW of Aleppo, presently supplied only through a - what else - Kurdish-held parts of NW Aleppo Province.

This offensive began the last week, and is almost completely run by the IRGC and Hezbollah: the NDF is only providing tank- and artillery support. After exploiting withdrawal of the JAN from some of local positions, this operation had quite some success early on. Meanwhile it was stalled after reaching Hindarat: the IF counterattacked there and temporarily captured the place, but then lost it and is now holding out on the outskirts, as can be seen on this video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E7cBXy0TarE

Another example of IRGC-combatants captured by insurgents at Hindarat appeared meanwhile in form of this video: this bloke says he served a sentence for drug-smuggling in an Iranian jail, until the IRGC offered him to go fighting in Syria for a pay of US$600 a month (almost as good as that of IRIAF pilots!):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHzKvwXLY7E

Elsewhere in Syria: the regime - that is: several IRGC-run brigades - have managed to overpower the last defenders of Jobar. This place was under a siege and continuous intensive attacks by elements of the Republican Guards (meanwhile largely suplanted by the IRGC) for more than two years. With this, the insurgent-held parts of Eastern Ghouta are now completely encircled and under a siege too.

Except for plenty of Iraqi Shi'a, the IRGC has lost one of its officers there: Maj Jabar Drissavi was KIA a few days ago. He was the second-highest IRGC officer KIA in Syria so far (after Maj Gen Abdollah Eskandari).

Further to this, at least according to the article here, the Hezbollah should have suffered a loss of no less but 840 KIA and 2,400 WIA in the war so far - and this not only during the fighting against Syrian insurgents and the JAN in Syria and Lebanon, but in Iraq too.

[CrowBat]

Some interesting developments there in Syria of the last 24-48 hours...

It's ironic to say that recent US attacks on makeshift refineries run by different Arab tribes in Daesh-controlled parts of Syria seem to have quite a fascinating effect - but upon the fuel reserves of the Syrian regime, not those of the Daesh.

Namely, they do see to have near-interrupted the flow of oil to regime (via the pipeline from Dayr az-Zawr to Homs). That means: the near-permanent fuel crisis of the regime (obvious in quite a few cases since mid-2012) has been significantly increased - indeed to a level where this is felt in the public there is now a major fuel shortage in Syri: Cold Winter Coming: Syria’s Fuel Crisis

As next... while everybody is blaming and damning Turkey for not providing any kind of help for the YPG (and FSyA) fighting the Daesh in Kobane, slowly, very slowly, indications are trickling in about Turkey actually very much doing what it can. It's not only that Turks report their local hospitals have treated at least 605 (another source said 620) YPG combatants WIA since the start of Daesh's attack on Kobane (including a number of PKK-terrorists sought for by the Turkish authorities, between them two 'commanders'). Or that the Turks don't mind a new YPG HQ that is on border crossing to Turkey. Lately, they have left in a US liaison team to meet Kurds and thus there is now a direct link between the CENTCOM and the YPG, resulting in YPG providing HUMINT and the CENTCOM not only significantly increasing the number of strikes, but these becoming effective too.

According to CENTCOM releases for 12 October, 13 October, 14 October, and 15 October, US, RSAF and UAEAF planes flew 51 air strikes against targets in Syria, primarily against the Daesh in Kobane area.

Correspondingly, today we're going to read plenty of news like this one: Islamic State militants are retreating in parts of the strategic Syrian town of Kobane, a Kurdish official has said.

Indeed, this combination of air strikes and cautious advance by the YPG and FSyA seem to have pushed the Daesh into the eastern outskirts of Kobane, perhaps even forced them out of the southern part of the town. This morning there are rumours (this report by WP is one example) that the Kurds and FSyA are actually in control of 80% of the place and have even recovered Mt Mishtenur, on the eastern side of the town.

With this, chances of the Daesh capturing Kobane are de-facto nil.

[davidbfpo]

Crowbat a question about the Kurds. Two days ago you posted this:

Ironic about the situation is that there are thousands of Kurds fighting for the Daesh too (i.e. there might be more of them fighting for the Daesh but for the YPG)..

IIRC this theme has appeared elsewhere, which came as a surprise to me.

I appreciate the Kurds across the regional borders are not a unified mass and recall a small number have supported the violent jihad before, IIRC when in Iraq years ago.

Why would thousands today support the Daesh?

[CrowBat]

Frankly: I've got no clue, David.

What I can tell you is (short version): it's more than a year that I've heard first time about recruiting of hundreds of Kurds in Iran (and local authorities doing nothing against this, in some cases even being afraid of recruiters).

While trying to find more info about this topic, I somewhere stumbled over a report about Treasury imposing sanctions against specific figures in Tehran for 'supporting the ISIL'. Back then I was wondering about 'actual reasons' for such reports. But, in last few weeks multiple reports appeared about thousands of Kurds that have joined the Daesh. Many of these are supported by videos uploaded on YouTube by quasi-Turkish or quasi-Arabic members of the Daesh, with a distinct accent several people told me is 'Kurdish'.

In total, when I connect the dots and calculate all the numbers I've heard from sources anywhere between Diyarbakir in Turkey and Baku in Azerbaijan... I can't but conclude that about 10,000 of them have already joined.

(And that's my 'most conservative' estimate.)

[AdamG]

Make a fresh batch of popcorn, the hilarity level is about to go to 11. With the MiG-21's crash record, ISIS looks like they're building a Kamikaze Squadron.

Beirut (AFP) - Islamic State group jihadists are being trained by Saddam Hussein's former pilots to fly three fighter jets captured from the Syrian military, a monitoring group said Friday.

The planes, which are believed to be MiG-21 and MiG-23 jets, are capable of flying although it is unclear if they are equipped with missiles, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

The jets were seized from Syrian military airports now under IS control in the northern provinces of Aleppo and Raqa, according to the Britain-based group, which has a wide network of sources inside the war-torn country.

http://news.yahoo.com/jihadists-trai...115733078.html

[CrowBat]

Aside of the nonsense about 'MiG-23s', this is actually an issue that should be taken seriously, Adam.

The Daesh has captured at least 25 MiG-21s (of different variants) at Tabqa, plus 2 at Ksheesh ('Jirah').

Additionally, it has captured perhaps as many as 13 L-39s at Ksheesh.

Of course, most of planes in question are long since derelict and of no use: indeed, the two MiG-21FLs at Ksheesh were posted as gate-guards already about 10 years ago. But, several others were in 'near operational' condition when seen for the last time.

Except for planes, photos and videos released by various Jihadist idiots there have shown stocks of air-to-air missiles, UB-16-57 and similar pods for unguided rockets, and light bombs of Soviet design. There is little doubt that they've captured stocks of spares - plus an intact radar station nearby.

Summary of what they've got:
- planes
- spares
- weapons
- radars necessary to guide pilots of these aircraft.

Now, the usual Western prejudice would be that 'barbaric Jihadists' have no clue how to operate such complex pieces of machinery like 'MiGs'. Actually, not only that especially L-39s are easy to operate (just ask all the private pilots in the USA: they own more L-39s than all the air forces around the world), but MiG-21s are relatively easy to maintain and operate too (exception is landing at speeds higher than those of Space Shuttle).

More serious is fact that when one monitors various Jihadist internet appearances carefully enough, it's obvious they're looking for and recruiting people with technical and electro-technical skills, i.e. technical personnel with military background. Several cases are known of them forcing captured Syrian military personnel to work with them, or even hijacking Syrians, Turks, Kurds and others with required skills to work for them.

Furthermore, Daesh is claiming to be operating several helicopters supposedly captured in Iraq already since June. While this is not true, it points at the fact that they are eager to obtain a sort of 'air force' capability.

Combined with the fact that the Daesh includes a large number (over 1,000) of ex-Iraqi Army and Iraqi Air Force officers, with enough related experience, that it has captured enough military bases in Iraq and Syria to find the necessary documentation, means that the Daesh is 100% sure in possession of necessary technical documentation too.

Overall: they have the wish, and now they have equipment, and are likely to have the skill necessary to overhaul and maintain, and then to fly these MiGs. And they've been left two months to do something about them (time-frame between the capture of Tabqa and the start of US attacks on NE Syria).

And finally: the Daesh is lot less keen to run suicide ops than AQ, for example. That's one of factors making it much more attractive for all 'potential recruits' in comparison. So, I doubt we're going to see the emergence of some sort of a 'Kamikaze Air Force'.

On the contrary, while they are unlikely to grow an 'USAF-equivalent/counterpart' in a matter weeks, months or even years, gauging by the fact that the Taliban have managed to establish and run a small, yet operational and combat-effective air force under precisely the same circumstances back in the 1990s - and that while having a lot less money, and far lesser global reach than the Daesh - I would say that one should take Daesh's efforts in this regards damn seriously.