Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Madhu]

It's likely that many of you have already seen the following piece:

Always bureaucratically adept, even if operationally incompetent in far too many cases, the CIA already has the Washington end of the action. But if weapons are to be supplied, it is essential to call on the only Americans who can tell the difference between Sunni bad guys who only want to oppress other Syrians and the really bad guys who happen to be waging their global jihad in Syria. What's needed are true experts, people who really speak the region's Arabic: the regular U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers who successfully sponsored and then effectively controlled the Sunni tribal insurgents in Iraq whose "awakening" defeated the jihadists who were attacking U.S. troops.

This sort of splits the difference between the Coindinista/Cointra argument but only at its very edges. Certain skills are useful in retention, it seems, but a civil war with the US supporting one side is something altogether different than a colonial pacification.

This is above my head, so interested in thoughts on the piece.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...syria?page=0,1

[ganulv]

I’m not quite sure I buy that the CIA is operationally inept. I’m not saying that they aren’t, but given the nature of their operations, how would we know?

And given Mr. Luttwak’s consulting work with the military I’m not quite sure that his piece doesn’t amount to concern trolling.

[Madhu]

But everything seems like some kind of trolling when it comes to foreign policy commentary these days, given the contracts and contacts and backgrounds of so many people involved writing pieces. Everyone has a consultancy.

As for the CIA, I have no idea either but there is always a certain vibe from some writers that are former CIA that irritates - a certain vainglory. True for the military as well.

[ganulv]

But everything seems like some kind of trolling when it comes to foreign policy commentary these days, given the contracts and contacts and backgrounds of so many people involved writing pieces. Everyone has a consultancy.

I also think there is something inherent in the publishing biz, especially the publishing online biz. I have been trying to break into freelance writing over the past few months and the experience has lead me to see some of what is going on behind the curtain as pieces make their way out for public consumption. A lot of the material that ends up online is space-filler. And if it gets more views via pushing buttons, all the better (for the publisher, editor, and author, at least; not necessarily for the public).

As for the CIA, I have no idea either but there is always a certain vibe from some writers that are former CIA that irritates - a certain vainglory. True for the military as well.

I always wonder how representative those guys are. One of the things I know a lot about is anthropology. Most of the rock star anthropologists within academia and the few that from time to time get public notice are typically, at least in my opinion, good but not great. Chance and a talent for marketing themselves put them in the limelight.

[carl]

Mr. Luttwak stated:

What's needed are true experts, people who really speak the region's Arabic: the regular U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers who successfully sponsored and then effectively controlled the Sunni tribal insurgents in Iraq whose "awakening" defeated the jihadists who were attacking U.S. troops.

If he actually believes that, I think he is very mistaken as to what happened in Iraq when the Sunni tribes changed their minds. First off, those officers (like Cavguy) were experts in what was going on in their part of Iraq because they had been hanging around on the ground, in their part of Iraq, for a long time. And they were only so expert.

Second off, I am not sure the tribes were sponsored or "effectively controlled" by anybody but themselves. They came to their own conclusions and we had people on the ground at the time who had the knowledge and capability to take advantage of that. Patriquin, McFarland and the guys describe in 'The Snake Eaters' aren't hanging out in schwarma shops on the outskirts of Alepo right now.

Third off, the tribes in Iraq were, from what I've read, fairly cohesive social entities. When the sheiks changed their minds, it meant something. I don't know what the state of the tribes are in Syria. Does Mr. Luttwak?

This statement by Mr. Luttwak seems facile. He also said this:

Do not invite an equal and opposite response by another great power.

The great power he is referring to is Russia. The Soviet Union was a great power. Russia is a demographic disaster ruled by a kleptocracy with an economy that is dependent, still, upon selling extracted resources. They are afflicted with a simmering insurgency (cies) in their south that they haven't been able to make go away in decades. Their military is not so hot. They may have been able to beat up on Georgia but that does not a 'great power' make them. In my view this statement by Mr. Luttwak ascribes power to a state that mostly is nervy.

They will get away with that for only so long (hopefully).

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7emAiiXpA8Y

[J Wolfsberger]

I suspect Mr. Luttwak fancies himself a 21st century Herman Kahn.

He's wrong.

The article did make some good points, but failed dismally by not even raising the central question: Why should we do anything?

We don't have any friends in this fight. I don't think there's any of them I'd WANT as a friend. At best, there are some innocent civilians caught in the crossfire. Fine, let's establish protected safe havens. But as for the rest, as far as I'm concerned they can slaughter each other to their bloodthirsty, savage little hearts' content and Shaitan can sort 'em out.

[wm]

I suspect Mr. Luttwak fancies himself a 21st century Herman Kahn.

I think the comparison to Herman Kahn may be a little overdrawn. As I am sure you are aware, Luttwak has written 2 books in which he tries to spell out the "Grand Strategy" of the later Roman and Byzantine Empires. Arguably, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the USA stands as a modern analog to the Roman and Byzantine empires of the 1st to the 6th centuries AD. One might consider Luttwak's recent effort as a stab at educating the latest American leadership on lessons to be learned from the failed strategies of those two former world powers. Whether Luttwak has correctly identified the strategies of the Romans and Byzantines and whether the lessons learned are really applicable to America and the world of the 21st century are probably much more fruitful ways to criticize him.

But, as pointed out, a cost benefit analysis ought to be the first order of business, with the bottom line being an answer to the question, "Does the US achieve a net gain by intervening?" I suspect a disinterested, rational calculation (one that avoids placing too much value on the need to demonstrate leadership's testosterone level) will identify a significant net loss to America.

[Dayuhan]

I am not sure the tribes were sponsored or "effectively controlled" by anybody but themselves.

Very true, and Luttwak's demand that the US "lay some ground rules for the endgame" seems to me an exercise in fantasy. Various rebel groups will make whatever promises they think will get them equipped by the US. If they win, they will do what they want to do, not what they agreed to do. The idea that helping someone allows us to control that someone is utterly specious.

The Soviet Union was a great power. Russia is a demographic disaster ruled by a kleptocracy with an economy that is dependent, still, upon selling extracted resources. They are afflicted with a simmering insurgency (cies) in their south that they haven't been able to make go away in decades. Their military is not so hot. They may have been able to beat up on Georgia but that does not a 'great power' make them. In my view this statement by Mr. Luttwak ascribes power to a state that mostly is nervy.

True to some extent, but great or not, the Russians have sufficient leverage (nuclear and hydrocarbon) to be able to do as they please in the region without fear of direct repercussions. They don't have to be particularly great to provide the "equal and opposite reaction" that is feared. They can provide arms and assistance, and they can get away with it. Iran and Hezbollah aren't great powers either, but they can and will intervene, and the US capacity to control them is limited by domestic political imperatives. Deploying US forces against either is not something Americans are going to want to do, for excellent reasons.

The whole mess illustrates why drawing red lines is such a bad idea. When those lines get crossed, you have to act, or seem impotent. That puts you in a position where your action is purely a response, and you're acting without clear, practical and achievable goals and in circumstances where no compelling US interest is at stake.

J. Wolfsberger's central question remains rather conspicuously unanswered. Why intervene at all? What desirable and achievable end state are we pursuing here?

[carl]

Very true, and Luttwak's demand that the US "lay some ground rules for the endgame" seems to me an exercise in fantasy. Various rebel groups will make whatever promises they think will get them equipped by the US. If they win, they will do what they want to do, not what they agreed to do. The idea that helping someone allows us to control that someone is utterly specious.

The way we do it, yes. And that is probably true in some cases no matter what. But I still think that if we played the game hard enough, we could exercise much much more control than we think possible.

But that is really here nor there because we are so inept that we will be in effect slinging in weapons blindly. That isn't such a good thing.

True to some extent, but great or not, the Russians have sufficient leverage (nuclear and hydrocarbon) to be able to do as they please in the region without fear of direct repercussions. They don't have to be particularly great to provide the "equal and opposite reaction" that is feared. They can provide arms and assistance, and they can get away with it. Iran and Hezbollah aren't great powers either, but they can and will intervene, and the US capacity to control them is limited by domestic political imperatives. Deploying US forces against either is not something Americans are going to want to do, for excellent reasons.

Yes but what power they have I think is really a function of what we allow them to exercise, at least in Russia's case. That doesn't make it any less real on the ground in Syria, but it is what we allow.

There are a lot of things we could do that don't involve troops on the ground. One thing that comes to mind is approving multiple LNG export terminals here in the US. That would be very bad for Russia because a few years after that, no more blackmailing the Europeans.

Our Navy could be a bit of a lever too. There is lots of precedent for shoving people around, to be blunt about it, at sea without getting close to shooting.

The whole mess illustrates why drawing red lines is such a bad idea. When those lines get crossed, you have to act, or seem impotent. That puts you in a position where your action is purely a response, and you're acting without clear, practical and achievable goals and in circumstances where no compelling US interest is at stake.

Yep, to an extent. I fear ultimately our interests will be very much at stake, but I can't think of any good way, that the US leadership would actually do, to affect things.

J. Wolfsberger's central question remains rather conspicuously unanswered. Why intervene at all? What desirable and achievable end state are we pursuing here?

In an ideal world, turn Syria into Malaysia, but that ain't gonna happen. Or at least keep the thing from spreading too far, prevent an AQ emirate in east Syria and west Iraq and install a regime (not PC for sure) that wouldn't slaughter too many people and cause a lot of trouble. But we ain't capable of achieving that given our leadership. So it is a moot point.

[Dayuhan]

The way we do it, yes. And that is probably true in some cases no matter what. But I still think that if we played the game hard enough, we could exercise much much more control than we think possible.

There are real world limits to how "hard" we are able to play, especially if playing hard means significant commitment of military or other resources. I'd submit that "playing hard" is only sensible if you have a clear, practical, and achievable goal, and I'm not at all sure we have that. I'm sure that with sufficient application of resources we could force certain events (like the fall of Assad) to happen. The extent to which we could exercise meaningful "control" of that process or its aftermath without undertaking an unacceptable commitment (occupation) remains very doubtful.

Yes but what power they have I think is really a function of what we allow them to exercise, at least in Russia's case. That doesn't make it any less real on the ground in Syria, but it is what we allow.

Have we the capacity, realistically, to disallow any Russian action? We're not going to get into a shooting incident with the Russians over Syria, and they know it, which makes bluff a pretty pointless game. It's silly to issue ultimatums or draw lines in the sand if you don't have the means and will to take real meaningful steps to back them up and enough interest at stake to justify the costs and risks of backing them up.

There are a lot of things we could do that don't involve troops on the ground. One thing that comes to mind is approving multiple LNG export terminals here in the US. That would be very bad for Russia because a few years after that, no more blackmailing the Europeans.

I don't see the US exporting enough gas to Europe to significantly reduce dependence on Russia, and the Russians know that the current US gas glut will not last, given the overall US energy equation. I doubt they'd be deterred at all.

Our Navy could be a bit of a lever too. There is lots of precedent for shoving people around, to be blunt about it, at sea without getting close to shooting.

Only works if they believe you'd be willing to escalate. We aren't willing. They know it.

Yep, to an extent. I fear ultimately our interests will be very much at stake, but I can't think of any good way, that the US leadership would actually do, to affect things.

Interests will be affected no matter what the outcome, but I don't see how intervention will make that picture any better. It could make the picture a whole lot worse. Again, the first thing you need to justify intervention is a clear, practical, and achievable goal. Have we got one?

In an ideal world, turn Syria into Malaysia, but that ain't gonna happen. Or at least keep the thing from spreading too far, prevent an AQ emirate in east Syria and west Iraq and install a regime (not PC for sure) that wouldn't slaughter too many people and cause a lot of trouble. But we ain't capable of achieving that given our leadership. So it is a moot point.

I'm not sure those are achievable with any leadership. It's easy to complain about lack of political will, but lack of the will needed to stick your tender bits into a meatgrinder seems to me eminently logical. Even the most peripheral mention of "installing" regimes should throw up a whole forest of red flags. Us getting involved is as likely to cause spillover and escalation as it is to prevent it. It's not a question of leadership. We have neither the desire nor the capacity to govern Syria, directly or by proxy, nor is it in our interests to try to govern Syria.