Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Bill Moore]

Also of interest today in the news is that moderate sunnis in Aleppo said that ISIL made some mistakes, but that they were still brothers. I'm sticking with my belief we shouldn't be involved. We will get played like a violin by the Arabs, while we'll be convinced we're in charge. Seems we may be intentionally helping them eliminate the Kurdish in that area. If true are we supporting ethnic cleansing.?

Provocative comment, but as a nation we need to do a better job of balancing realism and adhering to our values. Values we seem to be drifting away from.

[CrowBat]

AFAIK, in most of the EU, and in many of federal states in the US, 'holding the ladder' for a thief trying to enter a home through the window, is equal crime to actually climbing that ladder and emptying the house. In some it's punishable to even turn the other way without alerting security services. Or isn't it?

So, if one declares a war on the Daesh, and then looks the other way and bombs the JAN or some empty houses while the Daesh is slaughtering Kurds in Kobane and forcing 160,000 others to flee to become homeless refugees in Turkey.... what shall one think about this?

Should somebody happen not to care about Kurds: well, imagine the outcry if the Daesh would force 160,000 Israelis to flee their homes....?

Now, I have no doubt that some might say, 'hey, that's a part of the strategy, called 'let them rot' and designed to let the extremists ruin their reputation between the locals on their own which in turn should prompt the locals to act on their own. Theoretically, this sounds great, especially when supported by articles like the following one: The U.S. Can’t Destroy ISIS, Only ISIS Can Destroy ISIS.

However, sad fact is that this article contains a number of illusions, i.e. theories that - to put it mildly - are simply not supported by facts one gets when taking a closer look at the situation there (in Algeria). Specifically:

...During the early 1990s the Algerian government fought one of the nastiest civil wars in recent history against a broad-based Islamist insurgency. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) conducted a brutal insurgent campaign employing vicious terrorist tactics on par with today’s modern menace the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (known by the acronyms ISIS, ISIL or IS for Islamic State – you pick the one you like). GIA attacks were often indiscriminate and violent; involving large civilian massacres – quite ISIS like. While I always reserve extreme caution in endorsing any counterinsurgency or counterterrorism tactic utilized by the Algerian government, there may be one instructive lesson from Algeria’s strategy that we in the West and particularly the U.S. might examine for designing a plan to counter ISIS.

The Algerian government, having already tried extreme brutality and overwhelming force, recognized the need to employ smarter tactics. Rather than tracking every GIA member to ground and in so doing causing harm to locals and further bolstering GIA’s popular support, the Algerians selectively employed what Luis Martinez, author of The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998, describes as the “Let Them Rot” strategy. The Algerian government, Martinez explains,“sought to avoid human losses for non-strategic zones, but also to lessen the demoralizing effects of the ‘dirty job’ on the troops.” (See pg. 150.) Algerian security services isolated districts with Islamist sympathies leaving the GIA emirs to govern via Islamist law and principles. Contained by the Algerian security services, GIA emirs employed their extreme practices and quickly alienated the local populace as the district, walled off from the rest of society, crumbled economically. Over time, the districts and the GIA emirs that ruled them, slowly "rotted" creating conditions favorable for the development of local militias to combat the GIA. Local businessmen and disillusioned Islamists were re-engaged over time by the Algerian government who offered employment through security positions and opportunities through economic development plans. In the end, the Algerian government didn’t destroy the GIA in these selected districts, they instead let the GIA defeat itself.
...

Call it 'hair splitting' if you like, but:

1.) Use of 'extreme brutality and overwhelming force': this was something that in nearly 95% of cases happened spontaneously, i.e. not on order from above, and not as a part of strategy, but because units involved were seeking revenge for massacres committed by Islamists.

Even so, and although much-reported, such cases remained few in total numbers: under immense pressure from various European powers the authorities were doing whatever is possible to show that they are respecting human rights. Or how else would author like to explain a high number of Islamists that were arrested - and then released too, after a few months (all provided the author happens to know about this fact) - or the fact that Islamists found themselves 'embedded' with the population and convinced the security forces are afraid of them, in quite a few places and for quite a long time?

2.) Algerian authorities, 'sought to avoid human losses in non-strategic zones, but also to lessen the demoralizing effects of the 'dirty job' on the troops.'

It's now anything between 10 and 33 years since this war, and Algerian military and security services are in the process of retiring dozens of thousands of troops that were involved. And thousands of these are suffering immense psychological problems: this is not so because they were involved in 'dirty jobs', i.e. massacres, but because they have seen with their own eyes what the terrorists were doing to the population while in their teenage.

Perhaps author would like to check his data on this issue before jumping to conclusions?

3.) Perhaps the most important part: 'Algerian security services isolated districts with Islamist sympathies leaving the GIA emirs to govern via Islamist law and principles'.

Frankly, in nearly 15 years of research about this conflict, I have never heard about such strategy/tactics. If anything of this kind has happened, then not as a part of strategy. Surely, Algerians would isolate specific districts and sometimes do so for several months. However, this happened because they lacked troop strength to go in, mop up and secure the area.

Before anybody comes to the idea to complain that I'm making this up because it simply cannot be that the Algerians were lacking numbers: one of issues with the Algerian military is that - for obvious reasons (corruption, favourising etc.) - troops are not permitted to serve in their region of origin unless they have eight years of service in their books; i.e. all the active troops (including officers, of course) have to serve 'far away from home' for eight years, before they are permitted to re-deploy close to their area of origin. Except one does not know about this fact, it should be obvious that this practice/regulation has caused quite a number of problems with deploying specific units around the country during that war.

Because of this problem, the authorities began organizing a sort of armed militia that was responsible for protection of their homes/villages/towns, that knew the local people and terrain etc.

Thus, quite on the contrary: it can be said that the Algerian military did precisely the same mistake like the French in Algeria before, i.e. was deploying inexperienced conscript troops on a terrain unknown to them for most of the war.

Therefore, any impression about 'isolated districts and letting the GIS to rot' is based on theories of somebody who has studied this conflict from very, very far away - to put it mildly.

Now, before somebody comes to the idea to ask me, 'then how to hell did the Algerians then win, actually?' Well, they began deploying professional troops (primarily special forces) in ops supported by helicopters and advanced ELINT/SIGINT assets for actions against specific, carefully selected terrorist leaders. With these out, and with the population well informed about what the terrorists were doing to it, the rest was 'easy' (well: kind of), or at least a 'matter of time'.

Furthermore, the 'letting the Daesh rot' idea is simply bad, and this for several reasons. Firstly, Daesh is already in deep problems with large parts of local population. It's not only that various Sunni tribes in Iraq are turning against it, but there was already an armed uprising against it in Dayr az-Zawr (and this only few months after it occupied this area), as can be read here, here, here (just for example).

Reaction of the Daesh is always the same: mass slaughter.

Thus, I would say that there is simply no time to 'let them rot': if one gives these idiots enough time, there will be nobody - especially no 'local population' - left to save.

[CrowBat]

And now comes the next trouble (in addition to US ignorance of situation in Kobane).

Following withdrawal of the JAN and Ahrar from positions in northern Aleppo - in the wake of US attacks on their local bases - the IRGC-QF and NDF have launched an offensive around the northern rim of this city in western direction and attacked the Hindarat Village, which is on the only road connecting Turkey with the liberated (insurgent-held-) areas of Aleppo. They have not yet captured Hindarat, but are already inside of it.

Worse yet: additional regime forces should be on the way around Hindarat to Nubol and az-Zahra (Shia' villages near Menngh AB, 35km NW from Aleppo), i.e. are already assaulting Sayfat and Mt Antar, near Haritan and Anadan.

Means: while we're about to see many more of 'TOW-videos' from Harakat Hazm, like the one below in the coming days, should the regime punch through to Nubol and az-zahra, the insurgents inside Aleppo will be besieged.

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=981_1412281376

[CrowBat]

As could've been expected...

Following an assault of NDF armour, supported by the Brigade of al-Quds al-Filistini (IRGC-QF), the Ba'ath Party Militia and one of Hezbollah Battalions, the regime brought parts of Hindrat under its control, and established a major checkpoint on its northern entrance, and the hills overlooking the area.

With this, it is overviewing the Kastillo road and al-Jundul roundabout: although these are still held by the FSyA and IF, all insurgent forces inside Aleppo are now de-facto under a siege.

And: ISIS Fighters Enter Kobani

ISIS fighters entered the Syrian town of Kobani near the Turkish border, a CNN editor said Friday.

CNN editor Ram Ramgopal tweeted that Alan Minbic, a Kurdish fighter, told the network that jihadists had entered the southwestern edges of the besieged town, known as Ain al-Arab in Arabic.

Heavy clashes erupted earlier Friday between Kurdish militiamen and ISIS jihadists who have besieged a key Syrian town near the Turkish border, an AFP correspondent reported.

ISIS militants in Syria have advanced on Kobani, known as Ain al-Arab in Arabic, despite U.S. airstrikes in support of Kurdish fighters.

Heavy mortar fire around the town was heard across the border and plumes of white smoke were rising up, the correspondent reported from the Turkish side of the border.

"We are desperately watching what the murderer ISIS is doing," said 48-year-old Turkish Kurd Cafer Seven, who came to Mursitpinar border crossing 10 days ago from the Turkish city of Van.

"We are in deep sorrow. Our brethren are under difficult conditions. This is brutality!" he said as he gazed at the heavy smoke rising over Kobane.

Kurds have expressed anger and disappointment over Ankara's policy against ISIS, accusing the government of turning a blind eye to the group and refusing to allow Turkish Kurds to cross the border and fight in Syria.

"There is a massacre being committed before the eyes of the world. The world remains silent when Kurds are being massacred," said Burhan Atmaca, 54, who also came to Mursitpinar to show solidarity with Kurdish fighters in Kobane.
...

Congratulations Obama: call Assad and demand your medals there...

[Tukhachevskii]

... the political realist in me heartily agrees; I couldn't have said it better.

Embracing Assad Is a Better Strategy for the U.S. Than Supporting the Least Bad Jihadis

Assad is not going to be overthrown in the foreseeable future. He is hardly an ideal ruler, but he is rational, has run a longtime functioning state and is supported by many in Syria who rightly fear what new leader or domestic anarchy might come after his fall. He has not represented a genuinely key threat to the U.S. in the Middle East -- despite neocon rhetoric. The time has now come to bite the bullet, admit failure, and to permit -- if not assist -- Assad in quickly winding down the civil war in Syria and expelling the jihadis. We cannot both hate Assad and hate those jihadis (like ISIS) who also hate Assad. We fight, crudely put, with al-Qaeda in Syria and against al-Qaeda in Iraq. But restoration of order in Syria is essential to the restoration of order in the Iraqi, Lebanese, Israeli and Jordanian borderlands. Permitting Assad to remain in power will also restore a Syria that historically never has acted as a truly "sectarian" or religious state in its behavior in the Middle East -- until attacked by Saudi Arabia for its supposed Shi'ism.

[CrowBat]

A glorious idea, no doubt.

Now, would you, or the author of that article, explain how is anybody supposed to 'make peace' with Assad - if he's neither in control of even 50% of all the gangs supposed to be fighting on his behalf, nor in control of what's going on outside Damascus?

Alone the title of that feature is a shame and points at the author simply being clueless: what kind of 'least bad Jihadis' are the SF, SRF, Harakat Hazm, 13th Division-, 93rd Brigade-, 97th Brigade-, 19th Artillery Brigade FSyA etc.?

And then think about following examples:

1.) This 'regime' offensive that has cut off insurgents in Aleppo is run by the al-Quds al-Filastini Brigade, a Battalion each of Ba'ath Party Militia and Hezbollah, and only supported by (IRGC-commanded) NDF tanks and artillery. None of these formations is 'fighting for Assad', and only the BPM is 'Syrian'.

2.) The very moment Assad attempts making anything more but 'temporary truce' with another of besieged-and-starved-to-death insurgent pockets (actually, most of such truces were negotiated by IRGC-QF officers, not by Assadists), he's likely to get assassinated by one of 'his own' gangs, simply because all them either have an ideology that's exclusive and totalitarian, or so much blood on their hands that they can't make peace without concern for their own security, or are little else but criminals.

And overall: who has said that a Syria without insurgents and without the Daesh/Jihadists etc. is going to be 'stabile again'? Anybody here ready to bet the Alawites are then not going to start fighting each other, or at least not going to start fighting the SSNP, the BPM, the PLA, perhaps even the IRGC and Hezbollah - in order to re-establish their claim at exclusive right to rule?

[Tukhachevskii]

A glorious idea, no doubt.

Now, would you, or the author of that article, explain how is anybody supposed to 'make peace' with Assad - if he's neither in control of even 50% of all the gangs supposed to be fighting on his behalf, nor in control of what's going on outside Damascus?

I believe the point of the article is that Assad should be supported in regaining control of Syrian territory. As for the various forces fighting with the SAA they are only doing that because the US/UK/France/Turkey have been supporting the other guys. You can't push someone into a corner and then expect them not to use any and all measures to protect themselves. As the de facto government of Syria working with Assad means we assist conditionally; he leashes his dogs (and sends them back to where they come from) and in return we help him regain control of his country by shaping his actions, and restraining him where possible, through conditionality (stop doing X and we'll give you Y). No one said it was easy. The point is you can't help restore the Iraqi state and leave out the Syrians when they are both fighting the same enemy (which also happens to be our enemy). As for the Iranians they are merely doing what they have to to keep those maniacs as far away from their borders as they can (they are fighting in Iraq too don't you know). The best way to get the Iranians out of Syria and Iraq is to ... take their place. IMO. How is another question. I don't think large scale "BOG" is the answer. SoF (which can also collect valuable intelligence on the ground), artillery and air power might well be though.