Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Dayuhan]

It seems inevitable that intractable problems will generate utterly unrealistic "solutions" from onlookers, but this conflict seems to be doing more than its share. This has to be right up there near the top:

If the United States and its allies want to combat the Islamic State jihadists (IS, formerly known as Isis) successfully, they should arrange a ceasefire between the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the non-IS Syrian opposition.

If we're going to presume omnipotence, why not just "arrange for" the ISIS guys to shoot themselves and/or each other, and have done with it?

Obviously Assad has no interest in a truce with "the non-ISIS opposition". His interest lies in annihilating the non-ISIS opposition, so he can pitch himself as the only alternative to ISIS. Why would Assad go ahead with a truce and focus on ISIS when he knows perfectly well that as soon as ISIS is out of the picture he'll be the next target? Makes no sense. Assad seems perfectly happy to have ISIS in the picture, as well he might be: as long as they're around, he's no longer the least attractive alternative.

The proposal is every bit as unrealistic on the other side. "The non-ISIS opposition” is anything but cohesive and unitary: you're talking about hundreds of divergent and deeply conflicted factions, from relative moderates to full blown Islamist loonies like al-Nusra, which is among the most obvious demonstrations that "non-ISIS" does not necessarily mean "moderate". Even the thought of trying to get all or even most of them to agree to or observe a truce is far beyond the bounds of absurdity.

So we propose to “arrange a truce” between those who haven’t the capacity to agree on a truce (or anything else) and those who have no reason whatsoever to want a truce, and we expect this to happen… why? Because we decided that it should be? Again, if we were omnipotent we’d have easier ways of solving the problem.

Another prevailing utterly unrealistic proposal goes back to the old “find the good guys and make them win” mantra, also known as “arm and fund the moderates, and guide them through war and politics”. The obvious questions about whether a proxy war is really an advisable strategy, whether a suitable proxy exists, and (most of all) what we propose to do when our proxy doesn’t win are generally not answered, or even acknowledged: it’s just assumed that there have to be good guys, that they will surely win if we support them, that they will of course willingly submit to our “guidance”, and that of course they would never ever dream of applying our money and resources to any purpose not approved by us.

Given the number of times we’ve been burned in that particular fire you’d think we’d know better than to stick our faces back into it… but I guess we’re slow learners.

And then of course there’s the old reliable proposal that America should “demand” that the GCC regimes stop being oppressive and do as we say, as if they give a rat’s ass about our demands, and as if they need to.

All of these “proposals” have one thing in common: they assume capacities that do not in fact exist. That makes them quite useless for any practical purpose, though they do provide us with a way to make an unrealistic suggestion and then accuse others of incompetence for not following it. Why anyone would want to do that is something I’ve not quite figured out. Different strokes, I guess…

[CrowBat]

Sigh, more of usual speculation and guessing...

In all of your regurgitation, there is only thing that's making me curious, Dayuhan: you're all the time emphasising how disunited the insurgents are.

Provided you are able to at least once answer a question: who has ever told you that 'Assadists' are 'unified'?

Assad is meanwhile an Iranian puppet, upheld for the purpose of representing Iranian interests in Damascus and holding together a bunch consisting of different militias.

On the battlefield - and that's all that matters in Syria presently - his regime is supposedly represented through the 'Syrian Arab Army'. Where is this Syrian Arab Army, please? Can you mention me but a single brigade, not to talk about any division of the former Syrian Arab Army that is still existing?

Yes, there is a Ministry of Defence and the usual chain of command, but officers of these have representative roles only: their main duty is to listen to IRGC-QF officers and follow their orders. Technically, the 'Syrian military' (including intelligence services) is under the control of IRGC-QF officers: much of it is actually run by various families that are siding with Assad in interest of their own survival. Result is a mafia-like organization, not a 'military': even somebody with Soleimani's authority has experienced all sorts of problems in attempting to exercise battlefield control of all the diverse forces. His staff has launched seven different offensives through 2013 and in early 2014, and couldn't complete even one of these because of 'disruption' by various of cliques - which often withdrew their forces from the battlefield in disagreement with him. And since Soleimani was sent back to Iraq, the cooperation between different cliques only worsened - which is why we haven't seen any of glorious large-scale offensives being undertaken since months.

The air force is receiving orders from the Ba'ath Party HQ, not from the MOD or down the usual chain of command: the Ba'ath Party is primarily consisting of Sunnis and maintaining its own militia which, at least according to Iranians, has proven more combat effective than any other elements of regime's military. Should it then be surprising the SyAAF proved most-effective in providing CAS when doing so in support of BPM units - which include several former Special Forces regiments? None of BPM-members I managed to contact so far would say he's fighting 'for Assad': 'for Syria', 'defence of my family' etc., but not for Assad. And, they dislike Iranian presence and influence too. So, they're one 'clique' there.

Air Defence Force was disbanded already before the war, and integrated into the SyAAF: majority of its former units were disbanded and their personnel integrated into the NDF.

Theoretically, the core of what is left of the Army would be the Republican Guards Division. This is meanwhile down to only two 'special' brigades, plus air defence assets (most of those operating 'high-tech' systems, like SA-17s and SA-21s) and few artillery regiments equipped with MLRS' and SSMs. One of 'special' brigades has a sole duty of keeping Alawites under control: during the fall of Tabqa, the regime flew out all of its favourites, but left behind hundreds of soldiers to get slaughtered by the Daesh. This caused renewed unrest and some public protest even within supposed 'core support base', which were squashed only through mass-arresting of anybody who expressed critique. And that's the next point of conflict here: loyal Alawites vs. disloyal Alawites (and where one should keep in mind that Alawites are traditionally disunited, and held 'together' only by sheer violence and brutality of the Assadist regime).

Out of RGD's former three mechanized brigades only one remains existent: the 104th (that is: its remnants after three years of war) was sent to save Dayr az-Zawr. The equipment of the other two is now manned by Hezbollah and Iraqis, under command of IRGC-QF officers, of course.

The 4th AD was broken down into detachments that were put in command of countless detachments from various Army units already back in 2011 (in order to prevent defection). All of these were - together with all that's left of the Army - reorganized by the IRGC-QF into the NDF. The NDF is operated in form of about 100+ battalions, sometimes bunched together into makeshift brigades and even divisions for specific tasks, but majority of these are 'territorial' by nature: capable only of limited defensive operations within the area where their members are living. There are ex-intelligence, ex-Army, ex-Shabiha, ex-air defence, and then 'other' battalions, each of them run by their own clique and with its own level/degree of loyalty to the regime. Nobody knows to what side would which of them turn should Assad fall.

Except for the BPM, the other two most effective 'military forces loyal to the regime' are the militia of the Syrian Nationalist Party's (SSNP, which has Nazi-like ideology) and the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA was established already back in the late 1960s, and is meanwhile largely recruited from the West Bank). In essence, the regime's military can barely survive without them (and the BPM): they're involved in every single 'successful' offensive operation of the regime since this spring. The SSNP and the PLA are fighting 'on regime's side', but not for Assad either.

Now try to arrange a 'truce' between these forces and the insurgents: even when Iranians were arranging truces with specific of insurgent held pockets around Damascus and Homs earlier this year, they first had to remove specific regime units from the given area in order to negotiate. Whenever they didn't there were renewed atrocities, looting, raping and all of that sort. Just like on the insurgent side, there are 'commanders' that are disobeying any corresponding orders - if for no other reasons then because they know they have too much blood on their hands and are afraid of retaliation (whether by their own or the 'other' side). And that's 'just for the start'...

And for those shedding crocodile tears over non-cooperation with the Assadist regime... Bashar and Iranians can only thank to Obama, but not complain about him. It's not only that this intervention comes much too late, that Obama has left them three years to save the regime from the collapse, and grow the Daesh for their own purposes. The Daesh's advance on Mosul came just about when the IRGC was about to go bankrupt because of US sanctions - by pure accident, I guess? Thanks to Daesh's advance, they're now free to finance themselves through Iraqi purchases of Iranian arms and ammo, Russian arms and ammo and wholesale raise of Shi'a militias in Iraq.

But 'no', I guess you'll say: that's taking things into context. We're discussing Syria, so who cares about Iraq here.

OK, then let's go back to Syria: this intervention in Syria is coming just about when the Daesh was preparing a major assault on Dayr az-Zawr. Thanks to this intervention, the extremists are never going to launch that attack - and thus Bashar is never going to find himself facing such fierce critique from within 'own' ranks, like after the fall of Tabqa.

On the contrary: withdrawal of major FSyA, SF and SRF contingents for 're-training and re-equipment' in Jordan and KSA is opening major gaps in insurgent frontlines. US attacks on the JAN are likely to open additional gaps in these frontlines, which other insurgent groups can't close on their own: for this, they lack troops, armament and supplies - and they are already lacking troops, armament and supplies to fight both, the Daesh and the regime at the same time. And the US is doing nothing from curbing ever fiercer air strikes by the SyAAF against FSyA, SF, SRF and the IF.

What do you think: attacks on the JAN and the Ahrar are improving position of the FSyA and the IF? On the contrary: given how disillusioned by the USA (and the West) majority of insurgents became after three years of waiting for them, it's no surprise they're all very sceptic about results of this intervention. Indeed, should it turn out the US air power is continuously killing civilians while missing various of Ahrar's and JAN's HQ, it is going to be not the least surprising if insurgents turn against the USA too: such actions are therefore an ill-advised va banque game.

So, where is actually the problem? USA are already 'cooperating' with the regime in Damascus, though indirectly. Run the way it is, the US-led action in Syria is saving that regime. I have said it already, and I'll repeat it: sooner or later, Bashar is going to decorate Obama for his achievements in saving his regime. Khamenei, Vahid & Co are then going to stand in line right behind Bashar...

[Bill Moore]

I think further disunifying Assads security forces should be a primary effort by the resistance and their supporters, and this can be done if the resistance is willing to compromise. As for a temporary alliance with Assad Sec Kerry said Assad was not fighting ISIL, so much for that realist approach.

No doubt we can defeat Assad, but should we until there is some hope there won't be a worse blood bath when he falls and everyone is vying for power and seeking revenge? We will end up taking the blame and our foreign friends who insisted we help remove Assad will imply we the morning after problem also.

We can't defeat ISIL unless the masses in the region turn on them and we turn a blind eye why they slaughter them. We can certainly weaken them, but just as much effort should be directed at psychological operations to facilitate decisive operations.

[CrowBat]

Bill,
all this theory, guessing and speculation is not going to help anybody. One can't go demanding from some insurgents to do this or that like if they are a state: they are insurgents, not a state, otherwise they wouldn't be insurgents but the state. So, clean the table first (and the backyard too, then obviously the table is never going to get clean without the backyard getting cleaned), help the insurgents become a state and then demand things from them.

Though the idea with destabilizing the 'Assadist coalition' is a sound one (definitely a much better solution that launching a military intervention at least two years late and then in entirely wrong fashion... sigh... why is that Churchill's statement 'you can always count on Americans to do the right thing, after they've tried everything else' - not leaving my mind today...). In three years of war, absolutely nothing has been done in this regards: opponents of the regime within Assad's 'very own' ranks are simply left on their own device... On the contrary, internet is full of BSPR thrown up by Assad fans, and they threw up so much... 'dirt', that even serious politicians have lost direction....

************

Whatever, now comes a wonderful illustration for how misguided this operation is. The US is bombing the Daesh now the third night in succession. Apparently, USAF B-1s, F-22s, F-15Es and F-16Cs, and USN's BGM-109s have manwhile been joined by RSAF F-15S' and UAEAF's F-16s. Surprise, surprise, the GCC decided to move their small finger, after all...

Saudi prince flew jet in Syria ISIL attacks

...The son of Saudi Arabia’s crown prince was among the pilots who carried out attacks against ISIL militants in northern Syria this week.

Photographs released by the official Saudi Press Agency yesterday showed eight Saudi air force pilots at an undisclosed location after returning from the mission.

The pilots included Prince Khaled bin Salman, son of Crown Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.

Dressed in flight suits, the beaming pilots posed for a group photo in front of a fighter jet parked in an airplane hanger. Two of the pilots were also seen sitting in a two-man fighter jet, and there were additional shots of the pilots examining helmets and other equipment in a dressing room.

The fighter jet was marked with the crossed swords ensign of the Royal Saudi Air Force.

“My sons, the pilots, fulfilled their obligation toward their religion, their homeland and their king,” SPA quoted Crown Prince Salman as saying.
...

UAE’s first female fighter pilot likely dropping bombs on ISIS militants in Syria

...Maj. Mariam Al Mansouri, 35, joined the United Arab Emirates' air force once the military branch accepted women. She graduated the academy in 2008 and now pilots an F-16 Block 60 fighter jet, likely among those taking part in the air strikes against Islamic State terrorists in Syria.

She’s raining bombs on terrorist thugs.

The first female pilot in the United Arab Emirates' air force is reportedly taking part in the coalition air strikes against ISIS militants hiding in Syria.
...

By all theoretical commonality of the deployed hardweare, it would be interesting to find out how did they sort out the control and the IFF: then this is anything but sorted out even between friendlies (i.e. USAF and the USN), and if somebody gets a nervous finger, or some SyAAF idiot runs in between all of them...

And now comes the bitter part: except for one of two B-1B-strikes during the first night (these have hit one of Daesh columns converging on the Kobane pocket), all that all these planes are hitting - are empty buildings. All the videos released by the CENTCOM so far are showing no outside movement, few vehicles around, and some show that no sentries were posted nearby. Reports indicate that majority of objectives were vacant:

Syria Rebels Say They Were Told of Airstrikes Against Islamic State

...Syrian opposition figures said the U.S. military informed them over the weekend that American airstrikes against Islamic State would begin this week, advising the Free Syrian Army to prepare its forces while a covert arming program run by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency provided fresh weapons.

The U.S. bombarded Islamic State-held towns and cities overnight Monday to provide support to the FSA and pave the way for the allied opposition to attempt to clear and hold territory held by the Islamist militants. So far, more than a dozen airstrikes have hit Islamic State military targets and administrative buildings in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces in the north as well as al Qaeda's official arm in the country, al Nusra Front in the northwestern city of Idlib, the opposition said.

A statement from the U.S. Central Command, which is spearheading the operation, confirmed the airstrikes in Raqqa and Aleppo and added that it also targeted Deir Ezzour province in eastern Syria, where Islamic State has been siphoning off oil and selling it on the black market to finance its operations. The statement made no mention of airstrikes targeting Nusra in Idlib,

But Islamic State had also been preparing for the airstrikes, moving its top leadership and most sophisticated weapons from Raqqa, residents said, after the U.S. announced earlier this month that it would target the extremist group in Syria.

Residents of Raqqa said they didn't know where the weapons and leadership were relocated to, but Monday's night's airstrikes hit at least four Islamic State military bases and an administrative building in the province. Raqqa is the only province that is fully controlled by Islamic State and serves as operational headquarters for the group.
...

So, more or less, this is all 'shock and awe' - all over again. Useless blasting of empty structures...

(to be continued...)

[CrowBat]

Throughout this time, the Daesh is attacking the Kobane pocket and has - according to Kurdish sources - reached a point only 5km outside this town, during the afternoon. And this after overrunning the local YPG HQ, as shown on this video (warning: GRAFFIC in some places!):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qRLPs1L22cE

Coalition raids prompt ISIS advance on Syria Kurdish town

...ISIS has reinforced fighters who are battling Kurdish forces for control of a Syrian town at the border with Turkey, a redeployment triggered by U.S.-led air strikes on the group elsewhere, a Kurdish military official said.

Ocalan Iso, deputy leader of the Kurdish forces defending the town of Kobani at the Turkish border, said more ISIS fighters and tanks had arrived since the U.S.-led coalition began air strikes on the group on Tuesday.

"The number of their fighters has increased, the number of their tanks has increased since the bombardment of Raqqa," Iso told Reuters by telephone. He repeated calls for the U.S.-led coalition to expand its air strikes to ISIS positions near Kobani, which is also known as Ayn al-Arab.

"Kobani is in danger," he said.
...

So, the Kurds are crying for help, but all they've got so far is from the nearby pocket held by the FSyA (yes, there are two FSyA-held pockets north of Raqqa, no matter how much is this ignored by almost everybody), and from those Kurds that brought their families to the safety in Turkey, and then returned to fight the Daesh. Contrary to the extremists, though, neither the FSyA nor the YPG forces there have tanks and artillery: only RPGs and machine-guns.

Meanwhile, Twitter reports from this evening are indicating new waves of air strikes - but not in support of YPG/FSyA forces at Kobane: instead, those that 'know better' are blasting empty 'HQs' and 'storage sites' around Abu Kamal, Mayadin, and Markdah near Dayr az-Zawr...

This is making damn lots of sense. Especialy because the Daesh has withdrawn so many of its forces from this area, that its lines there are held by Arab tribes that used to fight for the FSyA already since 2011 (they nearly liberated all of Dayr az-Zawr in summer 2012), until they found themselves sandwiched between the regime and the Daesh (by the ISIS advance into their backs), then had all of their leaders killed by extremist suicide bombers - and were left without a choice but to submit themselves to the extremist command...

Congratulations to whoever is writing that frikkin' targeting list: this is reminding me of similar air strikes on Bagram AB back in October 2001, when somebody was so eager to spend several dozens of GBUs (the cheapest went at something like US$500.000) to blast rusty hulks of long-since abandoned MiG-15UTIs, MiG-17s and Il-28s at the local junkyard... while a look into one of old issues of the World Air Power Journal could've provided clear and undisputable evidence that such target selection is simply stupid.

[Bill Moore]

Crowbat

all this theory, guessing and speculation is not going to help anybody. One can't go demanding from some insurgents to do this or that like if they are a state: they are insurgents, not a state, otherwise they wouldn't be insurgents but the state. So, clean the table first (and the backyard too, then obviously the table is never going to get clean without the backyard getting cleaned), help the insurgents become a state and then demand things from them.

This approach will lead to a huge humanitarian disaster, if insurgents are just insurgents, then they're just thugs, and I don't think they're just thugs. They have a political agenda, unfortunately too many competing ones to be successful. We can help them establish a shadow government now and begin training/educating those who will need to fill critical positions to avoid a vacuum. I understand your point about cleaning the backyard, but they can and should begin the critical preparation work for the next phase. If they don't those with the plan like MB will take over.

[CrowBat]

Crowbat

This approach will lead to a huge humanitarian disaster, if insurgents are just insurgents, then they're just thugs, and I don't think they're just thugs.

Bill,
If 10 million of Syrian refugees (inside and outside the country), 400,000 dead (arguably, 'only' 200,000 of these 'confirmed'), and deployment of chemical weapons is no 'huge humanitarian disaster' already, I don't know what else might ever become one.

The insurgents haven't had any other political agenda except removal of the regime. It was Turkey, followed by the USA and the West (France, UK, Germany, etc., etc.) that began requesting from them to declare political agendas - even imposing ultimatums on then to do so. Even as of mid-2012, when they were assaulting Aleppo for the first time, insurgents continued attempting to avoid any such declarations. And thus they received no aid when there was time to provide it - and thus prevent the spread of extremism.

Instead, they were left to their own device - and exposed to extremists that arrived with pockets full of cash.

Then, in autumn 2012, there was something like a 'last ditch attempt' - a series of efforts by different parties to 'sort insurgents out'. The only result of this was friction between insurgents along all imaginable lines, precisely because of insistence upon their declarations of political agendas.

Syria is not functioning that way. Syrians do not think 'well in advance': grossly oversimplified, it can be said that 'they do and then think'. That might not sound 'logical' or even 'reasonable' to us, but that's the way they function.

Correspondingly, one can't demand (or, better said: one shouldn't have) from them to state political agendas before they remove the regime: that's begging for precisely the kind of trouble we've seen emerging there ever since.

Next point that should be kept in mind is this: Syria is never going to be something like 'unified political entity'. Syrians are traditionally diverse, not only in regards of their ethnic groups or religion, but especially in regards of their political interests. They are insistently (yet respectfully) 'pluralist' by their nature, history and tradition: 'insistently' because they insist on their own standpoints, 'respectfully' because - with few exceptions (see Jadid, Assad Sr. etc.) - they know to respect differing standpoints. This means: they'll always quarrel about politics. Always. Now, tomorrow, in 10 and in 100 years.

Therefore, there is absolutely no need to now go 'teaching' them about establishing shadow governments, filling critical positions etc. After three years of all sorts of failures in doing exactly this, I would say it is about the time to realize: this is NEVER going to work.

Again: they do not function that way.

This does not mean there would be some sort of 'political vacuum' and 'anarchy' if the insurgents would topple Assad 'tomorrow in the morning'. Syrians are very good at self-organizing themselves, even with bare minimum of resources (or none at all). Despite all they went through, they're reasonable too, and know to reconciliate. In that sense, some recommended 'viewing':

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=al2fXeAvg38

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwSnyQYy5SE (Probably the best part is one guy's definition of 'moderate Islam' in this report)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FavaA3w6eXw

[Dayuhan]

Sigh, more of usual speculation and guessing...

That's... entertaining, given your own habit of simply declaring that early American intervention was "the right thing", while presenting no supporting evidence or logic beyond variants on the "because I said so" theme.

Provided you are able to at least once answer a question: who has ever told you that 'Assadists' are 'unified'?

Nobody told me that, neither have I said that. You have a way of putting words into other people's mouths, and assuming opinions that aren't there.

Now try to arrange a 'truce' between these forces and the insurgents: even when Iranians were arranging truces with specific of insurgent held pockets around Damascus and Homs earlier this year, they first had to remove specific regime units from the given area in order to negotiate. Whenever they didn't there were renewed atrocities, looting, raping and all of that sort. Just like on the insurgent side, there are 'commanders' that are disobeying any corresponding orders - if for no other reasons then because they know they have too much blood on their hands and are afraid of retaliation (whether by their own or the 'other' side). And that's 'just for the start'...

Yes, that's why "arranging" a large scale truce to serve our strategic purpose seems so far outside the realm of credibility.

The Daesh's advance on Mosul came just about when the IRGC was about to go bankrupt because of US sanctions - by pure accident, I guess? Thanks to Daesh's advance, they're now free to finance themselves through Iraqi purchases of Iranian arms and ammo, Russian arms and ammo and wholesale raise of Shi'a militias in Iraq.

Certainly the rise of ISIS has been very convenient for Iran and for Assad, and certainly they've taken full advantage of the opportunity. That doesn't necessarily mean they created ISIS to serve their own purposes: it could just as easily mean that they simply took advantage of events as they emerged.

But 'no', I guess you'll say: that's taking things into context. We're discussing Syria, so who cares about Iraq here.

You'd guess wrong.

So, where is actually the problem?

IMO the problem is that there's no viable end state goal and thus no real strategy, just an attempt to show some visible action against ISIS without excessive commitment. I think the actions being taken are aimed more at the domestic audience than at achieving any particular impact on the ground.

I think further disunifying Assads security forces should be a primary effort by the resistance and their supporters, and this can be done if the resistance is willing to compromise.

Is there any evidence that the resistance is willing to compromise, and do we have any viable and realistic way to disunify Assad's forces?

No doubt we can defeat Assad, but should we until there is some hope there won't be a worse blood bath when he falls and everyone is vying for power and seeking revenge? We will end up taking the blame and our foreign friends who insisted we help remove Assad will imply we the morning after problem also.

That's been the problem from the start, no? If Assad falls, that leaves a vacuum with an infinitude of factions fighting to fill it. That's not a reason to actively support Assad, of course, but it is a reason not to wade neck-deep into the scheisse.

Throughout this time, the Daesh is attacking the Kobane pocket and has - according to Kurdish sources - reached a point only 5km outside this town, during the afternoon.

Is it realistically possible to provide effective CAS to ground forces in Kobane or elsewhere without properly trained and equipped forces on the ground communicating with the air forces?

Congratulations to whoever is writing that frikkin' targeting list: this is reminding me of similar air strikes on Bagram AB back in October 2001, when somebody was so eager to spend several dozens of GBUs (the cheapest went at something like US$500.000) to blast rusty hulks of long-since abandoned MiG-15UTIs, MiG-17s and Il-28s at the local junkyard... while a look into one of old issues of the World Air Power Journal could've provided clear and undisputable evidence that such target selection is simply stupid.

If you assume that the purpose of the exercise is to degrade and destroy ISIS, it makes no sense. If the purpose of the exercise is to put on a show of "doing something about ISIS" for domestic consumption, while allowing the Saudis to get some princes into combat with minimal risk and the Emiraltis to showcase women's participation and earn some warm-and-fuzzy points in the west... maybe in that context it makes a bit more sense.

If an action seems supremely irrational it's often because the purpose we assume is not the actual purpose of the action.

[CrowBat]

That's... entertaining, given your own habit of simply declaring that early American intervention was "the right thing"...

Since you obviously have never carefully read even one posts of mine: mind pointing at the place where I have said anything of this kind?

Nobody told me that, neither have I said that. You have a way of putting words into other people's mouths, and assuming opinions that aren't there.

That's a very precise explanation for what you're doing with my posts, and that all the time, thanks.

Seems you don't like the same being done to you?

Yes, that's why "arranging" a large scale truce to serve our strategic purpose seems so far outside the realm of credibility.

Oh, really?

Certainly the rise of ISIS has been very convenient for Iran and for Assad, and certainly they've taken full advantage of the opportunity. That doesn't necessarily mean they created ISIS to serve their own purposes: it could just as easily mean that they simply took advantage of events as they emerged.

...which is a well-formulated excuse for 'at best the regime was negligent, and at worst they facilitated the rise of the Daesh'...

Is there any evidence that the resistance is willing to compromise...

Do I really need to find you all of their corresponding statements?

...and do we have any viable and realistic way to disunify Assad's forces?

Nope: the US is completely powerless in this regards - as it is in all other similar regards... Makes one wonder who to hell came to the idea to call the US a 'superpower'...

That's been the problem from the start, no? If Assad falls, that leaves a vacuum with an infinitude of factions fighting to fill it.

What kind of evidence can you provide in support of this speculation?

Is it realistically possible to provide effective CAS to ground forces in Kobane or elsewhere without properly trained and equipped forces on the ground communicating with the air forces?

Ever heard of something named 'INTERDICTION'?

Rumour has it that this should've been a part of some 'air-land-battle' concept of the US military...

Half the Daesh is presently converging on the Kobane, and nobody is attacking all of their columns moving in territory where there is nobody else but the Daesh to find.

Meanwhile, they're assaulting YPG/FSyA positions 1 kilometre outside the town...

If you assume that the purpose of the exercise is to degrade and destroy ISIS, it makes no sense. If the purpose of the exercise is to put on a show of "doing something about ISIS" for domestic consumption...

If an action seems supremely irrational it's often because the purpose we assume is not the actual purpose of the action.

Who said the action is 'supremely irrational' (except you)?

If one doesn't destroy these refineries, one is not going to get contract to rebuild them. That's 'perfectly rational'.

The problem is that if the declared purpose of this operation is 'destroying the ISIS', then why destroying the Syrian infra-structure? If some princes there want 'show', they can keep on flying air shows - or crashing F-15s against sand dunes while flying supersonic at minimal altitudes for fun...