Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[carl]

Since I'm not sure of the extent of support we're providing and to whom, I can't make an argument on whether we need to increase it our not, but I haven't see a good argument yet on why we should intervene, or should have, intervened, militarily in Syria. Everyone is making a lot of wild guesses made on sensational news reporting instead of facts, because the facts are not available the public.

Crowbat argued the case better than I can but I want to address this particular point.

To me your argument in the paragraph above boils down to "Trust us we know what we are doing and you don't need to know...and by the way if you did you would see how good we were but we won't let you know so trust us."

After L. Paul Bremer, Rumsfeld, the spectacle of us paying the Pak Army/ISI to kill us and all the other things that have happened over these many years, I don't trust those with the facts not available to the public not to be anything but hammer headed stupid.

[Bill Moore]

Crowbat argued the case better than I can but I want to address this particular point.

To me your argument in the paragraph above boils down to "Trust us we know what we are doing and you don't need to know...and by the way if you did you would see how good we were but we won't let you know so trust us."

After L. Paul Bremer, Rumsfeld, the spectacle of us paying the Pak Army/ISI to kill us and all the other things that have happened over these many years, I don't trust those with the facts not available to the public not to be anything but hammer headed stupid.

Carl,

A of lot truth in that argument and there is the rub. A lot of our covert and clandestine efforts are conducted by idiots who don't have a clue and their work is concealed from critics, so they have a degree of free play that won't be exposed until it is a tragic failure. On the other hand, covert and clandestine operations don't work if they're exposed, so obviously there is a tension here that can't be resolved unless we take covert and clan ops off the options list. I don't think we want to do that. There has been talk for years on pushing these paramilitary ops from the CIA to the military. I think there are pros and cons for doing that and I'm not prepared to present an informed opinion on keeping the same or switching DOD to the lead. Like you said, we have already seen what the likes of Rumfield and Wolfowitz did as DOD leaders, imagine giving them the lead for the nation's covert and clan capabilities for paramilitary operations. It really comes down to picking the right people to lead these I think more than picking the right organization.

We work best when we're not trusted and are forced to demonstrate we don't have our head up our butts. My point to Crowbat is I suspect, I certainly don't know in my current position, we're doing more than meets the public eye. A large of part I suspect is due to partners in the region not wanting their roles publicized. Is it enough? Is it the right thing? Are our objective right? I don't know.

[carl]

It really comes down to picking the right people to lead these I think more than picking the right organization.

I ask your personal opinion. Is the US military capable of selecting and putting the right people in charge, or is the personnel system so strong that that is impossible?

Same question for the spook community, are they capable of that? Can either group overcome their bureaucracies in order to accomplish the mission?

[Bill Moore]

I ask your personal opinion. Is the US military capable of selecting and putting the right people in charge, or is the personnel system so strong that that is impossible?

Same question for the spook community, are they capable of that? Can either group overcome their bureaucracies in order to accomplish the mission?

I can' answer for the spook community. For the military if it was considered important they would carefully select commanders, at least initially much like they do for certain elite SOF units. If it wasn't considered important, then you get what you get from the bureaucracy.

[ganulv]

A of lot truth in that argument and there is the rub. A lot of our covert and clandestine efforts are conducted by idiots who don't have a clue and their work is concealed from critics, so they have a degree of free play that won't be exposed until it is a tragic failure. On the other hand, covert and clandestine operations don't work if they're exposed, so obviously there is a tension here that can't be resolved unless we take covert and clan ops off the options list. I don't think we want to do that. There has been talk for years on pushing these paramilitary ops from the CIA to the military. I think there are pros and cons for doing that and I'm not prepared to present an informed opinion on keeping the same or switching DOD to the lead. Like you said, we have already seen what the likes of Rumfield and Wolfowitz did as DOD leaders, imagine giving them the lead for the nation's covert and clan capabilities for paramilitary operations. It really comes down to picking the right people to lead these I think more than picking the right organization.

The military is already involved in Title 50 operations, though, isn’t it?

[davidbfpo]

A long, multi-sourced and linked article - the full title being 'Provocation and the Islamic State: Why Assad Strengthened the Jihadists' and from an author who is an observer or student of the Syrian Civil War: http://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2...the-jihadists/

His argument is that Assad has consistently followed a strategy of provocation, which is cited as:

simply means taking control of your enemies in secret and encouraging them to do things that discredit them and help you

[Bill Moore]

A long, multi-sourced and linked article - the full title being 'Provocation and the Islamic State: Why Assad Strengthened the Jihadists' and from an author who is an observer or student of the Syrian Civil War: http://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2...the-jihadists/

His argument is that Assad has consistently followed a strategy of provocation, which is cited as:

I suspect some of these claims are true, but it is also true that the first casualty of war is the truth. We're to the point now, especially in the social media era, where everyone simply quotes their so called experts creating a cesspool of opinion and propaganda attempting to shape the views of various audiences. We won't have access to what our intelligence community knows, but we're to the point that we have to rely on the professionals (not the retired loud mouths from the military and CIA who are making money has talking heads), because the truth has been too distorted in the public realm.

The strategy of provocation sounds logical in hindsight, and may in fact have been Assad's strategy, but it is also a strategy that the state would have had little control over once implemented. Other reasons could explain what is happening, such as the government may be forced to buy oil from ISIS based on economic realities. As for protecting ISIS to prevent the other groups from gaining strength, maybe, but it could also be that ISIS is located in the areas that Assad's forces are not capable of defending (to far away from Damascus). Seems like government has never had good control of eastern Syria.

The counterfactual argument that "if" support was provided to the moderates earlier the extremists wouldn't be as strong is simply pure speculation. First off quite a bit of support was provided to the moderates from a lot of different countries, but we like to ignore that. The moderates simply don't appear to be that strong, which goes back to the former article you posted that they're not that united.

We want to believe so badly that this rebellion is all about moderates seeking to overthrow an illegitimate government that we tend to grasp at straws when they are presented if we think they support our world view. No doubt there are many moderates in Syria who have a vision for the country that is more aligned with what the U.S. considers universal values, but is also true many do not. While most potential outcomes are possible in a conflict, it is hard to envision how various groups of moderates who are not united could effectively control the stronger extremist groups if the moderates actually ousted Assad. First they would have to consolidate power among themselves, and this period of chaos would create a window of opportunity for ISIS and al-Nusra and others who seem to be better organized. We all know this isn't a simple conflict between extremists and moderates and Assad. There are many actors within and external to the country that are interacting in ways that results in an unpredictable situation. In the end, those of us on the outside, and even most in the inside, are stuck viewing this conflict through opinion of others, not expert opinion, just opinion. Those that argue that someday the stock market will crash are probably right, but if they can't tell you when it isn't overly helpful. Those that tell us this conflict is all about poor governance may be right, but again it is trite and not helpful. Those that argue it would be better if the moderates win seem to be right also, but they don't provide realistic strategies on they could.

All the background noise is important, but ultimately we have to determine what, if anything, actually threatens our interests and deal with it. Ideally in a way that doesn't strengthen Iran, Assad, AQ, or other groups that our contrary to our interests. However, we don't live in an ideal world, and waiting to develop the perfect strategy could put us in a position in disadvantage. We may have to choose from the least bad of several bad options.

[CrowBat]

....perhaps David posted that precisely because there're so mufh insisting on 'the first casualty of war is the truth'...while the idea of sticking heads into sand and searching for excuses is usually proving the worst one...?

Furthermore:

- It doesn't matter - not the least - what the US IC knows. What matters is what the WH decides (and what Israel tells the WH and State Department they should think) and that are Problems No.1 thru 99 in the case of US policy for Syria.

- And from the standpoint of the WH (and everybody gathering around it or searching for excuses 'to do nothing there'), every excuse is good just NOT to cooperate with what is left of the insurgency: either (or earlier) it is (or was) 'better' because insurgents are not united and nobody knows what would happen if they win; then it was 'better' because everybody was explaining that the insurgency = Islamist extremists, and 'Assadists = fighting against Islamist extremists', although neither of this was (or is) truth; and lately it's 'better'.... well, because anything is better but to cooperate with or support anti-Assadist insurgents...

...and all of this, of course, because it's so 'impossible to predict' what would've happened in Syria if one would have provided support to insurgency.

(Where's that bamboozled smiley....?)

Makes me wonder: if that's so impossible to predict, but it's so easy to predict what is going to happen if Assadists are left in power... then how to hell comes that nobody predicted the emergence of the ISIS, first and foremost?

- Yeah, it's so pity the insurgency was so very much weakened by a simultaneous attacks from Iran- and Russia-supported regime and the ISIS from the other side. But, what can one do now? 'Nothing'. Back then when the insurgency was near-destroyed through cooperation of the regime and the ISIS, one didn't find that at least worth reporting, not to talk 'understanding'. So, why doing anything else now, when 'moderates simply don't appear to be that strong' any more...?

- Has the gov had good control of eastern Syria? Well, think whatever you like, but the fact is that the original cadre of idiots that established the ISIL in Syria has entered Syria and passed government-controlled territory with help of a bribe of local regime's functionaries. Barely three months later, they were already in control of specific oilfields and 'exporting' oil to the regime in Damascus (via the pipeline in Homs).

So, if the gov was 'not in control', then how comes these idiots had to pay a bribe for a safe passage through gov-controlled territory?

We want to believe so badly that this rebellion is all about moderates seeking to overthrow an illegitimate government that we tend to grasp at straws when they are presented if we think they support our world view. No doubt there are many moderates in Syria who have a vision for the country that is more aligned with what the U.S. considers universal values, but is also true many do not.

This is so right, you wouldn't believe. After nearly four years of insistent ignorance - or at least downplaying - of moderates in Syria, there are hardly any moderates left. And even the few that are left are certainly not going to start cheering any kind of US/Western help any more. That train is away, long, long ago - just like the Iraqi 'pro-US-train' was away in 1991, and in 2003 there was hardly anybody left greeting the US invasion.

But, why learn from such historical lessons? It's so much more easier to explain that there are too few moderates left and nobody can be sure about what would they do if...well, if... erm... if what happens?

... Those that tell us this conflict is all about poor governance may be right, but again it is trite and not helpful. Those that argue it would be better if the moderates win seem to be right also, but they don't provide realistic strategies on they could.

....yeah, and that's a reason more to keep on protracting this war through letting others to provide only enough help for the insurgency to survive, but not to win...

...However, we don't live in an ideal world, and waiting to develop the perfect strategy could put us in a position in disadvantage. We may have to choose from the least bad of several bad options.

Yeah, that's why it's better to go on with Assadists, because the longer the war lasts the more extremist is everybody getting - and because the USA are 'not meddling' since that is not in 'higher US interests'...?

Sigh...

Bill, frankly, while the sarcast in me has big fun reading and commenting it, this logic is this short >><< of confusing even me.

[carl]

We won't have access to what our intelligence community knows, but we're to the point that we have to rely on the professionals (not the retired loud mouths from the military and CIA who are making money has talking heads), because the truth has been too distorted in the public realm.

Given the history of the last 25 or so years relying upon "the professionals" for almost anything is a sure fire recipe for disaster.

[CrowBat]

...and here's what's the probable reason for this 'new' problem, i.e. 'shall we or shall we not cooperate with Assad' and this intensive search for all possible excuses not to support Syrian insurgency....

Just few days ago, Col Pesach Malovany (IDF, ret.), has published his newest book, titled (as far as the Google Translate says) 'North Shall Evil. Malovany, who served as expert for Arab militaries with the IDF, became famous for his book 'The Wars of Modern Babylon' (like his new title, this is available in Hebrew only), which is a massive volume about the history of Iraqi armed forces. Correspondingly, his new book is covering the history of Syrian armed forces.

...and, between others, on the back-cover of that book, one can read the following:

Upon Israel, the Syrian army filled two dominant while conflicting roles; up until the Yom - Kippur War, the Syrian Army was a key participant and supporter of the hostilities toward Israel, while after the Yom - Kippur War, the Syrian Army was responsible of making the Israeli-Syrian border and Golan Hights one of the most peaceful areas in Israel and the Middle-East.

And that's the essence of the newest 'thinking' we can hear from the DC in regards of Syria: 'if we support Assad, then his army is going to take care for Syria to remain peaceful.'

...as peaceful as graveyard.

[Bill Moore]

Given the history of the last 25 or so years relying upon "the professionals" for almost anything is a sure fire recipe for disaster.

Can't argue the facts you presented, but what is the alternative? To have passionate bloggers with personal agendas influence the voters and then have the voters influence the politicians to take action which may be rash and unwise, or rely on all-source intelligence analysts to provide the closest proximity to truth we can obtain, and then see what we should do based on "our national interests," if we need to do anything?

Everyone with a Smartphone can now be a propagandist and push a narrative out, and even support it with tidbits of truth to support it. The truth in the Middle East is exceedingly complex and shifting, so to assume simple answers like provide support to rebel group X will work is overly deterministic. It may or may not achieve whatever our objective(s) are, and there are certainly risks of it going bad based on our history of grossly mismanaging most UW efforts we have been involved in at the strategic level.

http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/au...s-and-billions

The video at this link is sadly hilarious, it was Jon Stewart supporting Obama during his election run in 2007, obviously Obama didn't do any better. It is roughly 4 minutes long after the 30 second commercial, and it is focuses on foreign policy in the Middle East. Sort of sums up why I'm hesitant for any grand schemes the home team may be dreaming up.