Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Bill Moore]

Bill Moore:

None of our various methods of small war fighting encompass unlimited, indiscriminate application of violence. They basically have nothing to do with the way the Syrian gov has gone about its business now or in the past. There is a reason "our COIN theory" doesn't cover this kind of thing.

You are misreading my point. No one is advocating mimicking Syrian strategy, but pointing out our doctrinal focus on winning over the population in a civil war as a way to reduce violence, especially through a nation building approach does not address the underlying hatred driving the conflict. If governments can address underlying issues before passio n and hatred override reason that approach may work . Once the red line is crossed it won't.

[carl]

Bill Moore:

I can't think of a conflict that gets to a point where people kill each other that doesn't involve strong hatred, so I don't see where that has anything much to do with it.

As far as the dreaded nation building goes, that is only part of a good small war fight. The way we do things of course often has next to nothing to do with good practices. Ultimately you have to win over the population, or at least get them stand aside from the fight to the extent they don't support passively or actively the opposition. If you don't do that the only alternative is to get beat or do it the Syrian gov way.

[Madhu]

Bill Moore:

I can't think of a conflict that gets to a point where people kill each other that doesn't involve strong hatred, so I don't see where that has anything much to do with it.

As far as the dreaded nation building goes, that is only part of a good small war fight. The way we do things of course often has next to nothing to do with good practices. Ultimately you have to win over the population, or at least get them stand aside from the fight to the extent they don't support passively or actively the opposition. If you don't do that the only alternative is to get beat or do it the Syrian gov way.

Where do you get this information that a good small wars fight involves certain good practices? What are you basing your information on? Galula's book is hugely flawed, carl, there are huge problems with it and the situation he described didn't exist in Iraq or in Afghanistan.

It doesn't mean that tactically we can't learn things from it but it has to be put in context and matched up with other things.

Seriously, hard evidence? Sorry to be such a jerk but I can't understand this largely male fantasy. It's like male chick lit.

[Madhu]

The Centurions review:

M. Larteguy's argument, revolutionary though it is meant to sound, is a familiar one. If anything, that is its strength: The Centurions is a call for a radical defense of the old values. The Communists have remembered what we have forgotten; if we rededicate ourselves to the ideals of strength, independence, self-reliance, we can destroy them and thereby save ourselves. Indeed, we will have saved ourselves by the rededication itself.

Larteguy is probably right on military grounds. The day of Napoleonic Grande Armee has passed; the French experiences discussed in The Centurions prove it, and the United States is learning the same thing today in Viet-Nam.

But his contention that a revolutionized Army is the key to a new Revolutionary France is wide of the mark. Sartre's contrary theory of involution--that the desperation and violence of the Army is corrupting whatever survives of a healthy France--is, I think, more accurate. Perhaps Larteguy is just when he blames domestic decadence for the impotence of the Army in the colonies; but he does not convince me that it can and must therefore save France.

In fairness, I should say that I doubt anybody could sell me on such a theory. But if anyone could, it certainly wouldn't be Larteguy. The problem, as I suggested above, is that The Centurions is a very bad novel. Larteguy has allowed his venomous feelings towards France and his intoxication with the military to overwhelm his book.

http://www.thecrimson.com/article/19...-army-needs-a/

No, this is not a thread jack, promise

Aw, maybe it is. I seem to have this stuff on the brain. That review is weird, though. Seriously, male military fantasy. Don't get mad, okay? You all know I'm on your side.

PS: To pull this all together, it seems to me that a bunch of people romanticized guerrilla warfare and colonialism and certain novels and memoirs and somehow, doctrine incredibly followed this romantic, unsupported view of how to fight based on a bunch of idealized notions that weren't really what happened. That Americans with their own history could do that! I guess if the people are brown, the Constitution and our foundational values go out the window.

Now you can all yell at me and tell me what I've got wrong!

[carl]

The Centurions review:



http://www.thecrimson.com/article/19...-army-needs-a/

No, this is not a thread jack, promise

Aw, maybe it is. I seem to have this stuff on the brain. That review is weird, though. Seriously, male military fantasy. Don't get mad, okay? You all know I'm on your side.

PS: To pull this all together, it seems to me that a bunch of people romanticized guerrilla warfare and colonialism and certain novels and memoirs and somehow, doctrine incredibly followed this romantic, unsupported view of how to fight based on a bunch of idealized notions that weren't really what happened. That Americans with their own history could do that! I guess if the people are brown, the Constitution and our foundational values go out the window.

Now you can all yell at me and tell me what I've got wrong!

It's a novel and if I recall right, it reflects the ideas of a certain group of French officers who were really impressed by their captivity at the hands of the Commies. They actually believed that if they go the propaganda right everything would fall into place. It didn't but they had some influence for a while. The Constitution goes out the window in many wars including ours. It has to. Check out the fate of Vallandigham.

[carl]

Where do you get this information that a good small wars fight involves certain good practices? What are you basing your information on? Galula's book is hugely flawed, carl, there are huge problems with it and the situation he described didn't exist in Iraq or in Afghanistan.

It doesn't mean that tactically we can't learn things from it but it has to be put in context and matched up with other things.

Seriously, hard evidence? Sorry to be such a jerk but I can't understand this largely male fantasy. It's like male chick lit.

Which Galula book are you talking about? I only skimmed Counterinsurgency because I read Pacification in Algeria and it covered everything in greater and more readable detail. You should read that. It's great...and free at RAND. I don't think Galula's ideas are flawed hardly at all. Our interpretation by career oriented interpreters is very flawed however. But if you don't like him how about Lyautey? Most of the things Galula advocated had been done by Hubert. Or the US Army experience in the Philippines and Moroland? Or The Village? Or the Snake Eaters? Or the fight against the Huks? Or on and on.

Obviously the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan differs from Algeria or Peru. If somebody believes that what worked in one place can be precisely applied in the same manner someplace else there is something wrong with them, not with the overall idea. Just like you say it has to be adapted to the situation.

There isn't any hard evidence. It isn't science. It is things that generally work. You want hard evidence, stick with ballistics, except for terminal ballistics, which involves humans again so things get complicated.

You ain't a jerk.

[Madhu]

Carl:

You are misreading my point. No one is advocating mimicking Syrian strategy, but pointing out our doctrinal focus on winning over the population in a civil war as a way to reduce violence, especially through a nation building approach does not address the underlying hatred driving the conflict. If governments can address underlying issues before passio n and hatred override reason that approach may work . Once the red line is crossed it won't.

No, I believe Bill's point is that a complex sectarian and civil war with multiple ethnic militias and splintered anti-government factions is different than a classical Maoist insurgency/an insurgency in the mold of classical wars of liberation (post colonial).

To switch examples, would you have fought the American Civil War as a classical Maoist insurgency?

Population centric counterinsurgency with its emphasis on providing government services by a third party on behalf of a quasi Sovereign entity in order to win over locals, as in the case of Afghanistan--sometimes we respect sovereignty, sometimes we don't--is something almost sui generis and it hasn't worked very well because it doesn't do the trick for a variety of reasons. Safe havens because of our heavy logistical needs, the Af Pak strategy paying or training two armies, the Taliban taxing our nation building work, our money serving as a corrupting source that prevents good goverment.

Why do you think this can be fixed? Developmental aid as nation building has been tried in many places around the world and it has often been a big fat failure. And that is in peace time.

What evidence supports the thesis that money for development projects changes the essential governing situation?

I keep quoting the following book but there are so many passages pertinent to the conversation on multiple threads:

That spring, traveling around Iraq, reading the various commander's memos and intelligence reports, Casey had an epiphany: the was had degenerated into a battle for political and economic power among many ethnic and sectarian factions; in other words, the enemy was no longer an "insurgency". That being the case, he inferred that it no longer made sense to pursue a counterinsurgency strategy.

Kaplan, The Insurgents

Nation building as understood from population counterinsurgency is built on much bad science, poor quality studies, and outright mythology when examined clinically, IMO.

What is the evidence to support that it worked? The actual, hard evidence by past example?

For instance, Algeria: violence and coercion were used against the population but somehow pulling out the examples of providing services is supposed to work in a different country in a different century against different people. And Algeria didn't even work.

If factors X, Y and Z add up to a particular small wars pacification, then how can one justify taking only Y out and saying it will work every time?What if you needed all three to break the insurgency?
Each event is contingent.

On some of the famous papers from Military Review circa 2005, well, I understand the pressure the military was under and why practical papers were rushed out and it is noble when viewed in that context, noble and wonderful and admirable, and, unfortunately, flawed upon reflection. They are basically just a bunch of random opinion when examined critically. I am sorry to say that, but that is what I get from reading a few.

When examined at a distance and clinically, they are bunch of war stories about what some guys thought. Fine, that is one important data point but it has to be backed up with other data or you are basically just repeating a bunch of myths. Maybe they are correct, maybe they are not, but the evidence is not, "hey, this is what I think and my opinion is the same as a fact or evidence."

[Bill Moore]

Madhu, you captured my point accurately. Carl I think you're perpetuating our COIN doctrine myth, and blaming the failure of it to work so far because we simply don't do it well. I admit the doctrine seems logical, but having participating in more than two of these conflicts as an advsior in multiple countries in Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East I know the logic of doctrinal assumptions tend to fall apart when it hits the reality of a complex convergence of psychological, social, and political influences. There are a few insurgencies around the world where the doctrine would work, but in most cases the conflict is much more complex than simply insurgents battling a so called illegimate government or in our case (when we do COIN) an occupying power.

Back to Syria, there have been some articles suggesting we should intervene in Syria and the authors imply we can use all the lessons learnt from our conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to stabilize Syria. This implies our COIN doctrine actually worked in those cases, and therefore it would work in Syria. It implies that the population in Syria can be won? What segment is that? The Alawites? The Kurds? The AQ affiliates? I'm sure if we rebuild their schools and create petty jobs with our CERP money that they all forgive each other, Al-Qaeda will retreat, Iran and Hizbollah will withdraw, and we will have denied a future safe haven for terrorists at moderate cost. However, just in case this doesn't work out, what can we do?

At best we can achieve limited military objectives of seizing and securing certain facilities to limit the distribution of weapons to the growing extremist network. We can assist the resistance movements by attacking the Syrian regime, but to what end? I hope we think this one through very carefully. We can shape this conflict, but we can't control it. We can achieve limited objectives if deemed necessary, we can't impose a legitimate government that all the people will embrace.

[carl]

Madhu, you captured my point accurately. Carl I think you're perpetuating our COIN doctrine myth, and blaming the failure of it to work so far because we simply don't do it well. I admit the doctrine seems logical, but having participating in more than two of these conflicts as an advsior in multiple countries in Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East I know the logic of doctrinal assumptions tend to fall apart when it hits the reality of a complex convergence of psychological, social, and political influences. There are a few insurgencies around the world where the doctrine would work, but in most cases the conflict is much more complex than simply insurgents battling a so called illegimate government or in our case (when we do COIN) an occupying power.

Well we'll have to disagree. We don't do it well, witness the command structure in Afghanistan. I actually don't know, but have we ever got around to doing a comprehensive census over there? I know we have done nothing about the external support and sanctuary provided by Pakistan.

But come to think of it, what type of small wars fighting are you talking about, the type we did in the Philippines or the 'throw money and aerial bombs at them till they like us' type of career centric small war we do in Afghanistan?

Back to Syria, there have been some articles suggesting we should intervene in Syria and the authors imply we can use all the lessons learnt from our conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to stabilize Syria. This implies our COIN doctrine actually worked in those cases, and therefore it would work in Syria. It implies that the population in Syria can be won? What segment is that? The Alawites? The Kurds? The AQ affiliates? I'm sure if we rebuild their schools and create petty jobs with our CERP money that they all forgive each other, Al-Qaeda will retreat, Iran and Hizbollah will withdraw, and we will have denied a future safe haven for terrorists at moderate cost. However, just in case this doesn't work out, what can we do?

I think your problem is more with stupid authors and the 'throw money and aerial bombs at them till they like us' school of thought than anything else.

At best we can achieve limited military objectives of seizing and securing certain facilities to limit the distribution of weapons to the growing extremist network. We can assist the resistance movements by attacking the Syrian regime, but to what end? I hope we think this one through very carefully. We can shape this conflict, but we can't control it. We can achieve limited objectives if deemed necessary, we can't impose a legitimate government that all the people will embrace.

I don't think there is anything we can do. We can't shape it at all. I can't for the life of me figure out how. I seriously doubt we have any good idea at all where the various weapons we fear are and if we did we won't risk the very real possibility of serious casualties to secure them. Everybody in that country is 10 times better at intrigue than almost any of us will ever be.

I have always thought this about this conflict, but I think I was wrong to think that 1 or 2 years ago. Not now though. If we had had the nerve to pick a side and fully back it or kill Bashir ourselves back then, maybe. At least we would have had a chance of keeping the Jihadists from hijacking the rebellion. Not now though. Even if our political leaders had the nerve, I haven't a clue what we should do except hope for the best.

The big problem is things might get to the point where we will be forced to do something if the scenario Tequila's articles mentions comes about.

[Bill Moore]

Carl,

Actually I don't disagree with your assertion that we don't do COIN, or more accurately small wars, well at the tactical level. My point is even if we did do it well in accordance with our COIN doctrine it wouldn't make a difference in the outcome if the strategy is flawed.

I agree with your statements about the tactical essentials of denying safe haven, frequent patrolling, protecting the population, etc. Failure to be more aggressive in the initial years and excessive use of fire power was due to a risk adverse mentality that infected the force. None the less, the major cause of failure were our nave policy goals. Even with tactical excellence we wouldn't have achieved those ends, but we would have taken few casualties by being more aggressive towards the fighters and less aggressive towards the population (excessive aerial bombings, etc.).

People will always question whether Syria would have turned out differently if we intervened in the early years. No one will know, but I suspect that is wishful thinking on our part. The same groups fighting now were always there. Al-Qaeda had a presence in Syria ever since they established a presence in Iraq to counter our occupation. The Iranians and Russians were supporting Bashir before we would have intervened and they would most likely increased their support if we supported the adversaries.

[Madhu]

The voices in my head, apparently.

There is more than one conversation going on:

1. If we had intervened in Syria earlier could we have prevented a jihadist infiltration? I doubt it but here we can agree to disagree.

2. The process of writing FM 3-24 and the political battles behind the scenes in the military is very interesting to me and has been documented now in books, some papers, certainly here at SWJ. The reflection and documentation will be argued forever, I suppose, given the nature of the subject.

Yes, small was have certain practices that are generally accepted but if you look at the behind the scenes arguments different scholars and practitioners of small wars wanted to focus on different aspects and objected to the focus of Army counterinsurgency doctrine as it was being written (for instance Bing West).

Reportedly, during the conference for that doctrinal manual he mentioned that what he was talking about in the Village was intrinsically different than population centric counterinsurgency, that his patrolling was at night killing insurgents. It wasn't focusing on building wells and schools as a first step to draw out insurgents. Those books that you talk about that detail small wars good practices? The practices were different, in, well, practice.

That's the argument, that Army doctrine has made it a one size fits all situation. The counterargument is that people don't really follow doctrine but if that is the case, then the whole thing is messed up either way.

It is the focus and emphasis of one tactical example over the other that is the argument, they are not all equally emphasized in the different COIN strategies. This is what I believe Colonel Gentile means when he says the enemy is absent in the current doctrine. You are saying the same thing too, actually.

3. By evidence I mean historical evidence, intelligence, sociological evidence, psychological evidence, terrain as evidence, etc.

For instance, on the art, there is good art and bad art. Good art realizes that a heavy logistical train through insurgent territory might be a bad idea; bad art thinks it can rescue this problem with better well and school building and patrolling. Good art vs. bad art.

I need to do a better job referring to the different things I've read to make my points. Upon reflection, I can see how confusing my comments are because I'm thinking of specific papers and books and how can you know if I don't tell you? I will try and do better.

The better part of valor is for me to track down those papers and perhaps discuss them on a thread here but I am shy to do this because I understand the tremendous pressure under which the papers are written. I also have no military experience. I do believe that they need to be discussed and "close read" carefully. The military folks can correct me if I'm wrong on certain things.

I mentioned the novel because it was a formative experience for Petraeus and lead to an interest in small wars and an interest in Galula, apparently. I think there is a paper in Salon about this and the reissue of the novel.

Douglas Porch is the scholar that has written on the French in Algeria and in his opinion Galula's impressions didn't match up with what actually happened when examining other sources.

Remember, there are lots and lots of sources and some evidence was probably never collected right? This is the situation in India where my poorer illiterate ancestors never left any record of their experience under the Raj.

By the way, the colonial government in India did do some good things (well, they were the government, they were supposed to do that) but the fantasy versions that are very popular in books and the historical reality based on historical evidence are different. I know that reality changes with interpretation but that evidence paints a very different picture than romanticized novels.

For instance, people call the Indian Mutiny the First Indian War of Independence. They never thought they were pacified, carl. Some never thought they were pacified. How's that for a trip?

Studying the diaries of, say, a British officer is great but to have a full picture you need to examine the stories of more than one person and try and match up the stories to evidence from the ground.

No, it's not science as hard science is understood but Military Science exists or we wouldn't be having this conversation.

This is what I meant by evidence. Artists, really good artists, research plenty.

Aargh, you people always draw me in when I tell myself, "that's it, I'm not commenting here anymore!"

I guess it's a compliment to all of you!

[Madhu]

I've worked or trained in a lot of different hospital environments but until now primarily with an academic and clinical tertiary care institutional focus. Now I see the effects of Iraq and Afghanistan with regularity. It may be that I am too emotional on the subject.

On Syria, I rambled on here:

http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2013/04/kow...#comment-22456

The entire situation is messed up and has been from the beginning, the Syrian diaspora I know don't want outside involvement (many terrified of the opposition with or without jihadist infiltration) and some of the people writing pro intervention papers are journalists that wrote for Iraq intervention and were part of a particular type of British or American think tank world. The connections are curious and the track record of their prediction pretty dismal.

[carl]

Carl,

Actually I don't disagree with your assertion that we don't do COIN, or more accurately small wars, well at the tactical level. My point is even if we did do it well in accordance with our COIN doctrine it wouldn't make a difference in the outcome if the strategy is flawed.

My turn to agree with you. The strategy was completely fouled up in Afghanistan at least. Part of strategy is figuring out who the prime enemy is, in my view the Pak Army/ISI. If you can't figure that out nothing at all is going to help. After you figure that part right, the next part of strategy is figuring what your biggest weakness is vis a vis the prime enemy and then do something about it. That would be the Karachi supply line and we could have just abandoned it and lightened up, which would have helped in a hundred different ways. But we didn't recognize those big picture realities and it was a forlorn hope.

One of the big strategic realities we face is our senior leadership, political AND military, to put it bluntly, have no backbone at all. It seems that bluff is their primary weapon and if that doesn't work there is nothing else. The problem with that is once the enemy figures that out, it puts you in a position that there is no way out of.

That is part of our problem in Syria (just part), at least as far as the Russkis and the Iranians go. Russia has nothing except nerve, which they got a lot of. If we were to really put the screws on them they would have to back off but they know we won't do anything but bleat so on they go. You don't impress Russians with earnest talk. They're Russians. For God's sake you don't let them snub your Sec of State by making him wait in the ante room for 3 hours. They'll walk all over you if you do that.

The same with the Iranians. Those guys are tough guys. Words mean nothing to them. If one of their cargo flights went mysteriously missing over the Iraqi desert, that would mean something.

The problem our leadership classes present us is insurmountable. The opportunities they give our enemies are vast.

[carl]

Madhu:

I don't know where the 'give them money and they will love us enough risk getting their throats cut' idea came from. I always been amazed too when I've read about some armoured truck column going to a village once a week and asking what they need and where is the enemy and how is security and then they wonder why they aren't making any progress with that village. That has never worked. Heck I don't think anybody ever was stupid enough to think it would before the inside the beltway types twisted small war fighting into something Oprah would approve of. It always was about controlling the place first. I think West, Lt. Johnston, Galula and Lyautey would all agree with that. Most of our guys know that and can do it if we let them.

I just finished Galula by Cohen and it was a very good book. He said that Galula didn't really know much about Lyautey and all those guys because of when they came into the army, just at the start of WWII. There wasn't time to teach them. Mr. Galula came up with his ideas mostly from watching the war in China. Cohen said that was a shame because many of his ideas were similar to those of the French who pacified North Africa way back when. Ours isn't the only army that forgets its past I guess.

By Indian Army, I meant the army of the country of India, not the army of the Raj. The Indian Army of today has a huge amount of small war fighting experience.

[carl]

Carl:No, I believe Bill's point is that a complex sectarian and civil war with multiple ethnic militias and splintered anti-government factions is different than a classical Maoist insurgency/an insurgency in the mold of classical wars of liberation (post colonial).

To switch examples, would you have fought the American Civil War as a classical Maoist insurgency?

Every war is different from every other in some ways and the same as every other in other ways. Your description above isn't that different from China in the 20s and 30s. It wasn't always the the KMT vs. the ChiComs. In the beginning there was seemingly all against all plus the Japanese and it took decades to sort itself out. The same could be said sort of for Mexico from 1910 to the mid 20s. Societies that have come apart will take some time to put themselves back together. Different kinds of things will be needed in different places at different times.

The trick is to know what to do when. Bill said originally "our COIN theory" doesn't cover this. It also doesn't cover amphibious operations or operations to counter operational maneuver groups. If somebody tries to apply small war fighting to those kinds of fights, it is their fault, not the fault of the small war fighting practices that seem to work over the years. Somebody will eventually prevail in Syria and they will probably have to fight everything from small tank battles to pacification. And they will have to use the gamut of things from tank heavy formations swinging around a flank to get an HQ to small groups of soldiers garrisoning towns and villages. We did the same thing by the way in the American Civil War. In addition to the big fight there were lots and lots of small war operations that were conducted throughout the war and for years afterward.

Population centric counterinsurgency with its emphasis on providing government services by a third party on behalf of a quasi Sovereign entity in order to win over locals, as in the case of Afghanistan--sometimes we respect sovereignty, sometimes we don't--is something almost sui generis and it hasn't worked very well because it doesn't do the trick for a variety of reasons. Safe havens because of our heavy logistical needs, the Af Pak strategy paying or training two armies, the Taliban taxing our nation building work, our money serving as a corrupting source that prevents good goverment.

Why do you think this can be fixed? Developmental aid as nation building has been tried in many places around the world and it has often been a big fat failure. And that is in peace time.

What you are describing is the screwed up American way of doing things in the age of pro-force, power point, 1 year armies replaced by another 1 year army every year, completely impossible chains of command whose primary purpose is to soothe professional egos rather than win, state dept people who won't go into harms way, national leadership elites short on determination and on and on and on. Arguing that as an indictment is like arguing the failure of Arab air forces to get much of anything done in their history means airpower isn't very useful.

What evidence supports the thesis that money for development projects changes the essential governing situation?

None. It can't work if nothing else accompanies it. But it appeals to the American elite governing class because they have easily quantifiable metrics to point at when they prepare their resumes for their next step up. We don't do small war fighting so much as we more often do 'Career Centric Coin'. (There is a brilliant article about career centric coin somewhere back in SWJ about two years ago.)

Nation building as understood from population counterinsurgency is built on much bad science, poor quality studies, and outright mythology when examined clinically, IMO.

War fighting isn't a science, it is an art. People are too variable for it to be a science. But there are certain things that generally work, generally. Say this for example '"Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain't lookin'." I think people who are good at it have a feel for it that can't be taught. An inborn talent, like great artistic ability.

What is the evidence to support that it worked? The actual, hard evidence by past example?

What worked? Career centric coin? Never. Successful small wars using say lots of patrols, quadrillage, local self defense groups, units staying in place (especially officers) a long time, minimizing sanctuaries, controlling the population etc? The Philippines, twice. Iraq, once. Check out the history of the Indian Army, multiple times. The Marines in Haiti. The fight against Sendoro Luminoso. The French conquest of North Africa and others.

If factors X, Y and Z add up to a particular small wars pacification, then how can one justify taking only Y out and saying it will work every time?What if you needed all three to break the insurgency?
Each event is contingent.

Yes each event is different. And you do need to do all the things. Dependence upon one at the exclusion of the others is foolish. Who are you arguing with?

On some of the famous papers from Military Review circa 2005, well, I understand the pressure the military was under and why practical papers were rushed out and it is noble when viewed in that context, noble and wonderful and admirable, and, unfortunately, flawed upon reflection. They are basically just a bunch of random opinion when examined critically. I am sorry to say that, but that is what I get from reading a few.

When examined at a distance and clinically, they are bunch of war stories about what some guys thought. Fine, that is one important data point but it has to be backed up with other data or you are basically just repeating a bunch of myths. Maybe they are correct, maybe they are not, but the evidence is not, "hey, this is what I think and my opinion is the same as a fact or evidence."

That is one thing about war, this forever a civilian thinks, when a guy who is good at it says this is what I think and here is my opinion; it is evidence and it should be considered. Warring does not exactly lend itself to the scientific method.