Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Dayuhan]

Sigh, more of usual speculation and guessing...

That's... entertaining, given your own habit of simply declaring that early American intervention was "the right thing", while presenting no supporting evidence or logic beyond variants on the "because I said so" theme.

Provided you are able to at least once answer a question: who has ever told you that 'Assadists' are 'unified'?

Nobody told me that, neither have I said that. You have a way of putting words into other people's mouths, and assuming opinions that aren't there.

Now try to arrange a 'truce' between these forces and the insurgents: even when Iranians were arranging truces with specific of insurgent held pockets around Damascus and Homs earlier this year, they first had to remove specific regime units from the given area in order to negotiate. Whenever they didn't there were renewed atrocities, looting, raping and all of that sort. Just like on the insurgent side, there are 'commanders' that are disobeying any corresponding orders - if for no other reasons then because they know they have too much blood on their hands and are afraid of retaliation (whether by their own or the 'other' side). And that's 'just for the start'...

Yes, that's why "arranging" a large scale truce to serve our strategic purpose seems so far outside the realm of credibility.

The Daesh's advance on Mosul came just about when the IRGC was about to go bankrupt because of US sanctions - by pure accident, I guess? Thanks to Daesh's advance, they're now free to finance themselves through Iraqi purchases of Iranian arms and ammo, Russian arms and ammo and wholesale raise of Shi'a militias in Iraq.

Certainly the rise of ISIS has been very convenient for Iran and for Assad, and certainly they've taken full advantage of the opportunity. That doesn't necessarily mean they created ISIS to serve their own purposes: it could just as easily mean that they simply took advantage of events as they emerged.

But 'no', I guess you'll say: that's taking things into context. We're discussing Syria, so who cares about Iraq here.

You'd guess wrong.

So, where is actually the problem?

IMO the problem is that there's no viable end state goal and thus no real strategy, just an attempt to show some visible action against ISIS without excessive commitment. I think the actions being taken are aimed more at the domestic audience than at achieving any particular impact on the ground.

I think further disunifying Assads security forces should be a primary effort by the resistance and their supporters, and this can be done if the resistance is willing to compromise.

Is there any evidence that the resistance is willing to compromise, and do we have any viable and realistic way to disunify Assad's forces?

No doubt we can defeat Assad, but should we until there is some hope there won't be a worse blood bath when he falls and everyone is vying for power and seeking revenge? We will end up taking the blame and our foreign friends who insisted we help remove Assad will imply we the morning after problem also.

That's been the problem from the start, no? If Assad falls, that leaves a vacuum with an infinitude of factions fighting to fill it. That's not a reason to actively support Assad, of course, but it is a reason not to wade neck-deep into the scheisse.

Throughout this time, the Daesh is attacking the Kobane pocket and has - according to Kurdish sources - reached a point only 5km outside this town, during the afternoon.

Is it realistically possible to provide effective CAS to ground forces in Kobane or elsewhere without properly trained and equipped forces on the ground communicating with the air forces?

Congratulations to whoever is writing that frikkin' targeting list: this is reminding me of similar air strikes on Bagram AB back in October 2001, when somebody was so eager to spend several dozens of GBUs (the cheapest went at something like US$500.000) to blast rusty hulks of long-since abandoned MiG-15UTIs, MiG-17s and Il-28s at the local junkyard... while a look into one of old issues of the World Air Power Journal could've provided clear and undisputable evidence that such target selection is simply stupid.

If you assume that the purpose of the exercise is to degrade and destroy ISIS, it makes no sense. If the purpose of the exercise is to put on a show of "doing something about ISIS" for domestic consumption, while allowing the Saudis to get some princes into combat with minimal risk and the Emiraltis to showcase women's participation and earn some warm-and-fuzzy points in the west... maybe in that context it makes a bit more sense.

If an action seems supremely irrational it's often because the purpose we assume is not the actual purpose of the action.